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Preface
This book – that’s a long story. It began during the 1993/94 winter term, when I held
an introductory seminar at the University of Zurich onMetaphysics Λ. I had already
been wondering for some time about howAristotle’s ousia had come to be translated
with the Latin substantia, what influences were at work and which of the passages
in the Corpus Aristotelicum had provided the grounds for this interpretation. The
first time I had the opportunity to present an outline of my ideas was in Methexis
IX, in 1996. In 1997/8, I received a research grant from the Swiss National Science
Foundation which allowed me to reduce my working hours as a grammar school
teacher and to dedicate more time to my project. It was during this time that the
foundation for this book was laid. After my application for another research grant
was rejected, in 2004 I retired from my work as a teacher in order to finish this
book.
***************
Following this brief information on the genesis of this book, the lector benevole
might rightly now expect and deserve a preliminary outline of its aims and conclu-
sions, especially given the length and complexity of the material presented here.
The following introduction will provide such an outline.
This book aims to present a completely new approach to Aristotle’s Metaphysics
Λ. For the past two thousand years, this book has been considered the foundation
of Aristotle’s theology, which is centered on an ‘Unmoved Mover’ – an expres-
sion never used by Aristotle – whose activity is said to be ‘Thinking of Thinking.’
Anyone who has ever actually read the original will be aware thatMet. Λ has noth-
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ing to do with theology and the word ‘god’ appears far less often than the transla-
tions would have us believe. Further, whenever it does appear (the first time being
1072b24), it is introduced as a benchmark for knowledge and for a form of life, to
be compared with human knowledge and life.
Met. Λ does not aim to be a theology, but instead constitutes a speculative outline
of ousia, being. This outline may be summarised with a formula which has, at its
heart, the notion of noesis – whose meaning, however, is very different from what
the tradition has lead us to think. That is, the meaning of noesis is far broader than
‘thinking’ alone, and primarily means ‘to perceive’ and ‘to be aware of.’ As Kant
noted, “I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself,” but I
can only be aware of what is; awareness is never the prerogative of a god, but an
opportunity for all of us. In the statement
…καὶ ἔστιν νόησις νοήσεως νόησις,
…and awareness3 is awareness2 of awareness1
awareness1 means the structure of a world in which each individual instance of
being aware (awareness3) realizes (awareness2) a certain node in a net; the result
of this process is that both the perceiving and die perceived are. To be in this way
means to enter in a noetic framework (noesis1 as awareness1), and this provides the
speculative answer to the question of what founds becoming.
As it stands, my interpretation of Aristotle’s speculative approachmight seem ridicu-
lous or improbable. Thus, to make it plausible will require going over a lot of back-
ground information. The reason for this need is partly grounded in the way Met.
Λ has been received over the centuries. This book will address this reception, as
well as its problems, in order to demonstrate that this alternative interpretation has
been developed with full awareness of this tradition. The other reason for the scope
of these preliminaries is due to the fact that I am determined to follow strictly a
methodological principle that is generally accepted, but hardly ever applied in this
particular case: an answer only becomes meaningful in the context of the question
from which it arises. Within this context, the first sentence of Met. Λ picks up the
essential questions that arose from the positions of the Presocratics, from Plato’s
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Timaeus and Sophist and the problems of the Old Academy, and focuses them on
one point, on the question about being, the Frage nach dem Sein;Met. Λ essentially
constitutes a speculative sketch of ousia, being. For these reasons, the background
information reviewed in this book is rather extensive.
Giving up the assumptions of the standard interpretation we gain in return an under-
standing that is not only historically more correct than the standard interpretation,
which is guided by medieval principles, but also an insight that we can immediately
make fruitful for ourselves: Being, Sein, means noesis, without subject and without
substance, even without the Immovable Mover.
***************
The Introduction is followed by the Translation of Met. Λ – this is Part I, and serves
as the basis of this entire book. Part II begins by exposing the presuppositions of
the traditional interpretation and contrasting them with our new premises. In the
third chapter, I will give reasons for my choice of some sentences which I will use
as key propositions in the commentary. Part III contains my Commentary on Met
Λ. Part IV is a short section consisting of a brief interpretation of Plotinus’ Ennead
III 8, [30] On Nature, Contemplation, and the One, where the concept of theoria
corresponds in its function to Aristotle’s concept of noesis. At the end of this book
you will find Indices of Cited Literature, References, Names, and Subjects.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The Roots of the Standard Interpretation of Met. Λ
Usually, philosophical texts are only of interest to philosophers, and it is rare for
philosophers to have an impact on public life. Some exceptions to this rule include
some of the Presocratics, the reception of Confucius in the East, and the reception of
Hegel in theWest. Met. Λ is yet another one of the few philosophical texts that have
had an incredible impact across several cultures and eras. Its effects, in breadth and
depth, are absolutely astonishing, especially when one takes into account its brevity,
i. e. the fact that it spans no more than approximatively 7 pages in I. Bekker’s, and
17 pages in W.D. Ross’s edition.
So, what is the reason for its significance?
Its impact cannot be explained on the basis of its content alone, because this is of
a speculative nature; instead, it is grounded in the context of the times in which
it was read, especially in its reception by the Church Fathers of late antiquity and
during the theological disputes of the Medieval period (concerning issues as the
nature of Jesus, or the problems with the Trinity). Some ideas developed in Met.
Λ subsequently became integral to the Christian concept of God. This integration
into the theological system of the Christian tradition gave rise to a very special
interpretation of this text, which has survived across many centuries and up to this
day. As part of the foundation of a theological system, Met. Λ has influenced
religious practice and pastoral activities, and consequently has affected the daily
lives of millions of people who have no awareness of this book. In turn, the text’s
close association with Christianity has affected how it was interpreted, with the
result that even philosophers who do not have any interest in theology are believing
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1. Introduction
that Met. Λ is Aristotle’s theology. Leading scholars of ancient philosophy and
Aristotle also confirm this interpretation of the text again and again.1 Thanks to
its integration into Christianity and the corresponding philosophical interpretation,
Met. Λ has served as a method and foundation for proving the existence of god from
the time of the Church Fathers up to today. Further, it has given rise to several other
consequences, as well as a host of questions which have provoked many original
philosophical and theological theses. The most important systematical claims will
be discussed in Part II, Chapter 2, in order to make explicit some of their inherent
problems (metaphysics of substance, theology, etc.).
Although Aristotle’s Metaphysics is still an object of dispute (sometimes even in a
violent form),2 none of the interpreters engaged in this dispute queries its traditional
interpretation. One of the key points of this traditional interpretation is the claim
that Aristotle’s Met. Λ expounds a theology that is founded on a metaphysics of
substance. While the impressive studies conducted by A. Zimmermann, 1998, show
that God played various roles in the metaphysical debate during the 13th and 14th
century, they also confirm that these debates never leaved the framework for the
basic interpretation of this work (155).3 E. J. García de la Garza, 2011, wrote a new
1 Take e. g. Stephen Menn, “Aristotle’s Theology,” in: Chr. Shields (ed.), Oxford Handbook Of
Aristotle, OUP 2012, 422–464; the New Essays, 2016, edited by Horn. – The Introduction and
Commentary in the present book is based on work produced by the following authors, although I
do not necessarily mention them at every possible point: F. Brentano, 1986; P. Natorp, 1888; W.
Jaeger, 1923; W.D. Ross, 1924; P. Merlan, 1953; V. Decarie, 1961; W. Wieland, 1970 and 1982;
W. Bröcker, 1957; P. Aubenque, 1966; I. Düring, 1966; H. J. Krämer, 1967; L. Routila, 1969; E.
Vollrath, 1969; L. Elders, 1972; W. Leszl, 1975; J. Owens, 1978; K. Brinkmann, 1979; M. Burnyeat,
1979; K.-H. Volkmann-Schluck, 1979; T. Kobusch, 1980; W.K. C. Guthrie, 1981; W. Viertel, 1982;
H. Flashar, 1983; M.-T. Liske, 1985; H. Schmitz, 1985; D.W. Graham, 1987; M. Frede, G. Patzig,
1988; M. Furth, 1988; T. Irwin, 1990; M.-L. Gill, 1989; E. C. Halper, 1989; J. H. Königshausen,
1989; B. Manuwald, 1989; C. Witt, 1989; F. A. Lewis, 1991; M. J. Loux, 1991; J. Barnes, 1992: A.
Preus, 1992; G. Fine, 1993; A. Graeser, 1993; G. Reale, 1993; D. Bostock, 1994; T. Scaltsas, 1994;
J. Barnes, 1995; O. Höffe, 1996; C. Rapp, 1996; the contributions in M. Frede, D. Charles, 2000;
D. Fonfara, 2003; M. Bordt, 2006; the contributions in C. Horn, 2016; S. Fazzo, 2012 and 2014. F.
Baghdassarian, 2019.
2 See e. g. how M.-T. Liske, 1988, has reviewed the book of W. Viertel, along with M. Viertel’s re-
sponse, 1989, and the review of both by K. Brinkmann, 1989. – Fundamental comments on criticism
of metaphysics give W. Stegmaier, 1977, E. Schott, 1994 (both with bibliography), K. Baynes et al.
(Hrsg.), 1987.
3 Cf. the Omnibus review by T. Dangel, 2014.
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dissertation on the reception of Met. Λ, and, according to him, it is almost self-
evident that this text is not about theology. However, like those before him, he also
seems to believe that the only alternative to a theological interpretation is that of
metaphysics of substance.
Most scholars agree that it is Aristotle’s intention to develop a system of meta-
physics including a God, the so-called ‘Unmoved Mover,’ which occupies the pri-
mary position in this system. What this interpretation still leaves open are only
residual questions and concerns e. g. regarding the completeness or conclusiveness
of this metaphysical system.
On the other side, modern scholarship is increasingly voicing hesitation and restrain.
That is, many new writings are prefaced with considerations of the ‘searching char-
acter’ of Aristotle’s philosophy and the difficulty of pinning him down, reflections
which are easy to support by the text. To some, these matters simply indicate some
flaws of his philosophy, while others go no further than paying lip service to them,
or attributing them to Aristotle’s development. Still, regardless of the attitude taken,
without failMet. Λ continues to be presented as a metaphysical system in the main
bodies of this scholarship. This system can be divided into what was later called
Metaphysica generalis and specialis, i. e. into ontology, cosmology, theology (with
the subsequent onto-theology), and psychology or noology.
According to the standard interpretation, the concept at the centre of metaphysica
generalis is ousia, a term, as is generally agreed, that is most appropriately and accu-
rately translated as ‘substance.’ Further, it is claimed that the concept of substance
was originally developed by Aristotle himself or, at least, is a legitimate interpreta-
tion of his theorizing. Even if somebody were of a mind to translate it differently,
ousia would still refer first to some individual object, a thing that is separate from
intellect and able to exist independently, that is, an entity, and, second, its essence.
Aristotle is said to have made the fundamental distinction between first and second
substances, and between substance and accidents, in order to create a system that
accurately reflects the world as experienced by ordinary human beings. Further,
this is exactly what is supposed to be so valuable and timeless about Aristotle’s
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philosophy, it is the very thing or concept that is still useful for us.4
Aristotle’s original question of ‘‘What is ousia?’’ is turned into ‘‘Which of the
things presented in Met. Z 3, namely to katholou, to ti en einai, to genos, to
hypokeimenon, is the essential being, the first thing, the primary substance?’’5 With
regard to metaphysica specialis, Chapters 6–7 of Met. Λ are thought to pertain to
theology, Chapters 7–8 to cosmology, Chapters 6–7 and 9 to (onto-)theology, and
Chapters 7 and 9 to noology.
Another problem is the accepted view that there is a distinct difference in how Aris-
totle uses the term ‘substance’ in the Categories, in Met. ΖΗΘ, and in Λ. The stan-
dard view holds that in the Categories, substance primarily refers to the concrete
particular (‘‘this horse’’), but in Met. ΖΗΘ substance refers to eidos. The reason
why this is problematic is that Aristotle has made it as clear as possible that ousia
cannot be a general form (that is why some speak of an ‘individual form’).6
If there are substances whose main characteristic is subsistence,7 then there must
be a first substance fulfilling this condition. In the standard interpretation, this is
the ‘First Mover’ (an expression that does not actually occur anywhere in the text),
which is considered to be identical with God, and this is why Met. Λ is thought
a book of theology – the view held by the majority of scholars in this field.8 The
4 T. Buchheim, H. Flashar, R. A.H. King (edd.),Kannman heute noch etwas anfangen mit Aristoteles?
2003.
5 Cf. M. Frede, G. Patzig, 1988; M. J. Loux, 1991, 2: “Which things are the primary ousiai? …the
primary ousiai are the ontologically basic entities. They are the things by reference to which we
explain why other things exist …”; cf. his exposition on the metaphysics of substance in id., 2002,
123–135; J. Barnes, 1995; C. Rapp, 1996.
6 The question of whether there are any individual forms or not is older than Frede-Patzig leads us to
believe; Plotinus, Enneades V 9 (5) 8,2, asked this question, and after him Duns Scotus, and then F.
Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, V, Sectio IV, 175b ergo forma est principium individuationis,
176a on Met. 7, 13 actus est, qui distinguit, ergo forma est, quae complet rationem individui. For
further predecessors see p. 80.
7 In its Medieval version.
8 J. Barnes, 1995, 101–108; most of the participants of the Symposium Aristotelicum, 2000, (contribu-
tions held on the occasion of the 14th Symposium Aristotelicum, August 1996 in Oxford, which had
as his theme Met. Λ) and most of the contributions in New Essays, 2016 (Proceedings of the 13th
Conference of the Karl and Gertrud-Abel Foundation, Bonn, November, 28th–December 1st, 2010);
F. Baghdassarian, 2019.
22
1.1. The Roots of the Standard Interpretation of Met. Λ
generally accepted view is that the goal ofMet. Λ is to prove that god is in some way
the cause of our world. Many identify Aristotle’s ‘Unmoved Mover’ with Plato’s
demiurge from the Timaeus. P. Merlan, 1953, even turned the question of how to
interpret the term ὂν ᾗ ὄν (being as being) into a theological question.
Too often, modern philosophers accept the standard interpretative accounts of philol-
ogy and history of philosophy, found in handbooks, companions, guides etc. and
have thereby good reasons to criticize Aristotle on this very point.9 An older exam-
ple of these instances is N. Hartmann, 1965, 31f., who accuses the old ontologies of
proceeding deductively. On the other hand, it is comforting to note that there also
some philosophers expressing caution over theMedieval-inspired conceptualization
of Aristotle, e. g. G.W. F. Hegel:10
…some ascribe to him views that completely contradict his philosophy …11
or as M. Heidegger expressed it:12
For the most part, the philosophy of today’s situation moves inauthentically
within the Greek conceptuality, and indeed within a conceptuality which has
been pervaded by a chain of diverse interpretations.13
or H. Putnam, 1994, 50, who speaks about what Burnyeat called ‘‘the Christian
view’’:
…if there is another interpretation that is both textually more sound and philo-
sophically more powerful (…), then where does the rival interpretation come
from, and why has it enjoyed such a long history? We find the history of this
misreading so interesting that we cannot resist a brief digression.
9 E. g. A. J. Ayer, 1936, (in German 1970), 50–54: metaphysical statements result from grammatical
illusion; W. Cramer, 1959; W. Quine, 1969 (in German 1975), 41: ‘‘There is no place for a first
philosophy,’’ 95: truth and ontology are part of a transcendental metaphysics; W. Quine here takes
his position against essentialism, which for him is an Aristotelian feature; cf. W. Stegmaier, 1977;
P. F. Strawson, 1992.
10 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Theorie Werkausgabe, 19, 133
11 …Man schreibt ihm Ansichten zu, die gerade das Entgegengesetzte seiner Philosophie sind…;
12 Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (1922), 1989, 249; cf. Being and Time, § 6.
13 Die Philosophie der heutigen Situation bewegt sich zum grossen Teil uneigentlich in der griechischen
Begrifflichkeit, und zwar in einer solche, die durch eine Kette von verschiedenartigen Interpretatio-
nen hindurchgegangen ist.
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Although they all admonish us not to be seduced by a traditional Aristotle, none of
them had the power to affect any significant change, which means that scholasticism
goes on unchecked.
1.2. The Current State of Research and its Strata
Apart from its immediate effect on everyday life, Met. Λ has had vast philosophi-
cal consequences, traces of which are still evident in the state of the research. The
term Forschungslage (the research-situation) refers to a set of common convictions
that are held to be necessary by a scientific community, that define the methods
for addressing problems, and that even establish which kinds of questions are ap-
propriate for investigation. The nature of research is to generate new insights ev-
ery day, which means that the Forschungslage is constantly changing. Those who
are directly involved often overlook this fact, despite they recognize that this kind
of change is indispensable for scientific progress. This means that the research-
situation is relative to some specific questions. Although the time we live in may
have certain drawbacks, we certainly have an advantage in being aware of many
earlier states of research. Further, we can also see that, even concerning funda-
mental philosophical questions, the research-situation has a tendency to change and
become outdated at a relatively rapid pace.
But the concept of the research-situation involves yet another idea, too. For, just
as in geological processes, changes of a certain state tend to create tangible sedi-
ments (strata), remainders of what has gone. These are fixed results, convictions,
beliefs; the older they are, the more solid they seem to be true. Met. Λ has had such
a long-lasting impact, and it was analyzed, debated, and commented on from a very
early stage. In addition the book had, as already mentioned, an application in the
religious domain. Thus, concerning Met. Λ with its long history and succession of
research-situations, we probably will found most solid convictions. Examples of
them are the belief that Met. Λ primarily deals with substances and, in particular,
with God as ‘Unmoved Mover’; that the planets are additional, albeit secondary,
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unmoved movers; that Aristotle’s teleology, even if it was not primarily invented
for this purpose, has an essential function in this theological context; and finally that
this entire theoretical construct culminates in the formula of noesis noeseos, even if
this expression has been given various interpretations. No handbook, no history of
philosophy, no paper relevant to current research can miss these themes. A substan-
tial amount of 20th century research has been dedicated to rearrange results within
the above mentioned convictions, may be with minor or greater shifts.
Any approach toMet. Λ today must be aware of the hermeneutical fact that there are
layers of interpretations that virtually obscure the text itself. This is not a provoca-
tive statement, but instead my object is to make explicit the sedimentations of the
various prior research-situations, and, in doing so, to point to the fact, that behind
the traces of these research-situations in the communis opinio aboutMet. Λ there is
a text that can only be understood in the context of its own background. The main
features of the Forschungslage will be presented in Part II, Chapter 2, but we will
not go into any great detail here, as this is neither possible nor useful. Getting a
basic outline will enable us to bracket them out of our own reading, with a kind of
epoche, as Husserl did in relation to the natural attitude.
My project will be conducted in the spirit of a kind of “informed naivety” or second-
order naivety. It must be done in full awareness of the difficulties associatedwith the
conventional presuppositions; we must make them explicit and replace them with
new premises. But we do not operate under the illusion that it is possible to read
Met. Λ without any presuppositions – quite to the contrary. Instead, I differentiate
between the hermeneutic situation of our Forschungslage and the actual text itself,
and I will make every effort tomakemy presuppositions explicit. When pointing out
the problems of the standard interpretation, by no means am I suggesting – which
would be absurd – that my alternative interpretationwill not have any problems. The
choice here is not between problems and no problems – problems will remain – but
is simply about finding the more meaningful and acceptable ones. Furthermore, I
should note that I am not questioning the concepts of substance, purpose, or theology
in themselves. The problems mentioned in Part I are not of the same kind as those
Kant spoke of in the Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, 1781. Rather, the issue
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here are the difficulties that arise if someone contends thatMet. Λ is a metaphysics
of substance, a theology, etc. Part II, 2, “Traditional Reception…” is mainly the
negative part of this work, while the positive is in the commentary where I will
articulate Aristotle’s speculative approach to the question about being.
All of these questions also involve questions concerning the character of the Aris-
totelian philosophy. Metaphysics in general may have the character of an investiga-
tion about what the natural beings or the beings in the whole are. A metaphysics of
substance has an answer to this, namely that being is substance. It is this thesis that
it has to defend. So we must ask, if our text is stating and defending claims of this
kind. The alternative would be of a more reflective and descriptive manner, without
asserting its results as a new truth. Our answer depends on how we think Aristotle
continues the Platonic way of organizing and asking questions, and what we think
about the fact that Aristotle’s research always begins with endoxa, the examination
of established opinions. Are these just a starting point in the path to some final truth
or do they constitute an area that we can never get beyond, but whose principles
can be made explicit? I call the Aristotelian form of thinking unbehauptend (non-
assertive), it would be a misunderstanding to identify this with aporetic thought,
because at its core, aporetic thought also makes assertions.14
1.3. My Intention
Thus there are sound reasons to review the traditional premises when reading and
approaching Met. Λ, and to look for new premises. The purpose of doing this is
not as much about examining the finer details of the standard interpretation, but to
re-examine its basic assumptions. The examination of these assumptions in Part II
shows that today it is even more urgent to question them, because they are currently
so unalterably established as to completely obscure the text’s original intention.
That is, given the importance of Met. Λ, we must find a new approach to examining
14 I think here of modern forms of aporetic thought (e. g. P. Aubenque) which contend that some prob-
lems are not solvable.
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its subject. To that end, I propose replacing the old premises with new ones that I
will develop in Part II, 3; on the one hand these allow us to readMet. Λ while taking
into account its intellectual background, on the other hand the new reading leads to
an understanding that has an impact on us at once. This motivation to re-read Met.
Λ with new premises is inspired not only by the loss of philosophical relevance of
Aristotle’s writings today, or by the modern methods to correct text and thought if it
does not fit the expectations, but even more by the result of philological and histor-
ical research. One of the major points that has arisen from this research is the issue
of the dating of Met. Λ and of Theophrastus’ Metaphysics. It has become evident
that these are contemporaneous, and that they are both narrowly concerned with the
problems of the Old Academy. In this context, Aristotle concentrates on the ques-
tion about ousia (being, Sein), which is also directly related to our understanding
of genesis (becoming). And, while Aristotle has the more speculative approach,
Theophrastus’ is rather a realistic reflection of the same.
The commentary in Part III follows the key propositions (KP; Leitsätze), which are
listed in the last chapter of Part II. These key propositions express the direction of
the thought at the heart of Met. Λ; thus Chapter 4 can be read as an outline of the
text with a view to articulating its speculative approach. The speculative nature of
Aristotle’s project will be discussed in detail in the commentary of Met. 6, 7 and 9
in Part III; here I provide a preview of the same.
From the start to the end the main question inMet. Λ is:
On which being (Sein) becoming does rest? 15
This question is asked in two contexts, one cosmological the other speculative. The
dual nature of this question arises from the fact that the thoughts expressed inMet. Λ
arose to a large extent in reference to Plato’s Timaeus. In the cosmological context,
we already have the sun as an unmoved moving being. But the sun does not fully
meet the criteria of an unmoved being, because it still has the potential for move-
ment, even if that is circular motion. The real beginning which we are searching for
15 Auf welchem Sein ruht das Werden?
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is totally unmoved and without any potentiality, i. e. pure actuality (Met. Λ 6.8).16
We must bear in mind that energeia, actuality, in this theoretical context, does not
mean existence, but the actualization of the required characteristics that constitute
the eidos of the respective being. A thing is actual or real when it has reached its
telos, its end, in a stable form.
InDe Anima, B 1, Aristotle tries to clarify what he means by “the soul is the ousia in
the sense of the eidos of an natural body, which is potentially living” (412a19–21)
with an example, saying that the soul is the ousia resp. entelecheia of the natural
body in a similar way as the sight is the actuality of the eye (412b18–20, the sight
is the ousia of the eye). This is applicable to the use of energeia in our case.
Based on the first speculative point of culmination, in Met. Λ 6.8
δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια,
therefore, there must be a principle such that its being (ousia, Sein) is actuality,
Aristotle arrives at the second point of culmination in Met. Λ 7.17–7.19, where he
uses the metaphorical term ‘way of life’ (διαγωγή) in order to make clear that he
is no longer talking about beings (beings, onta) but about being (ousia, Sein). At
this point, it is becoming evident that, in the context of this speculation, it is no
longer possible to maintain the otherwise valuable distinction between the being
aware (nous) and that which it is aware of (noeton) because the telos, the end, of
each being (on) is to get its characteristics and determinations in order to be actually
in noesis. By saying that to be means ‘to be in noesis,’ where the being aware and
that which it is aware of are indistinguishable, Aristotle does not suggest that this is
primarily or exclusively the noesis of a god, but he takes the term noesis in a more
general meaning.
Already at this early stage, anyway later in Met. Λ 9, it becomes evident that to be
in its first and fundamental sense means ‘to be in the noesis’ (awareness), and that it
is in the noesis that a being is properly actual. In our factual world, ‘to be aware of
16 ‘Pure’ is meant as in Kant’s Critique of pure reason, that is ‘not empirical, but the foundation of
experience,’ ‘noetic.’
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something’ means to notice a thing (normally we restrict this possibility to humans,
animals, to a lesser extent to plants). But here we are told that our possibility to
be aware of something is based on another awareness which is not that of an con-
sciousness of a subject, an awareness, which is not a possible counterpart of us, the
aware-beings. The ‘awareness without subject’ is comparable to a encompassing
system that unites both aware-beings and that of which they are aware. This under-
standing of the first and fundamental to be can be represented by a formula derived
from Met. Λ 6, 7 and 9: {οὐσία ← νόησις → ἐνέργεια}.
And, since Aristotle grounds his investigation of to be on the endoxa using the
method of unbehauptendes (non-assertive) thinking and as its argument range the
basic views expressed by endoxa, the complete formula for to be is:
{
ousia← noesis→ energeia
Doxa
}
that is
{
being← awareness→ actuality
Doxa
}
The above material, which I have presented as a preview and without further jus-
tification, will be explained in detail in the commentary to the Chapters 6, 7 and
9.
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1.4. Theory, Speculation
The terms ‘theory’ and ‘speculation’ appear very frequently in this book and play
a major role in my argument, because I aim to show that Met. Λ is neither a meta-
physics of substance nor a form of theology. Met. Λ does not make any attempt
to prove the existence of god, or to explain what god is or that god has these or
some other characteristics, but it primarily constitutes a speculative approach to ou-
sia (being, Sein). For this reason, I should provide some explications about the use
of these terms. First of all, I use them in their substantive and the adjectival form
as synonyms; ‘theory’ should evoke more the Greek term, which appears not very
often in the Greek text but at strategic points; ‘speculation’ should refer more to the
methodical aspect of the text.
The adjectives ‘theoretical’ and ‘speculative’ contrast with several terms, such as
‘mundane’ or ‘physical’ or ‘cosmological,’ but also ‘theological,’ ‘religious,’ ‘his-
torical,’ ‘realistic,’ and many others as well. All of these contrasts designate at-
titudes in our everyday life, when we pay attention to which is actually at hand,
while the term ‘theory’ seeks to identify the non-empirical origin and basis of our
everyday convictions.
In this book, the term ‘theory’ is never used in in the modern sense. Both terms des-
ignate a special and unique form of knowledge and method. In the Nicomachean
Ethics, theory is considered the highest possible realization of a human being. Exer-
cising theory is the best way for a particular human being to actualize its humanity.
Theory is neither empirical nor a priori, neither deductive nor inductive, as all of
these forms of knowledge deal with things in a definite and given world. What
theory does, instead, is to inquire into the world in terms of a framework, and this
inquiry must be of quite another form than any questions relating to things in that
world. Otherwise, it would become an external question, themethod that was rightly
criticized by R. Carnap.‚ Theory is first and foremost a method. It is the method for
searching for the principles that determine the nature of being in a respective world
(in the present case the Greek, pre-Christian world). And just as the question at
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hand is unique, the method used to address is also unique in that it has only this
application.
In Met. Λ, Aristotle proves not only that it is necessary but also possible to ask for
the frame of a world. The starting-points for this inquiry are the prevailing beliefs
about to be and the analysis of the actual use of to be (pollachos legetai to on). The
first and principal beliefs, the origin of our everyday beliefs and ways of speaking,
can only be found by means of theory, which has to be performed in topical attitude
(a method that anticipates some of the modern analytical insights).17
Met. Λ is a speculative sketch. It is speculative because the question of ousia (being,
Sein) is explored in a speculative manner, that is, not one that leads to new assertions
about the whole, which is what the later traditional metaphysics does, but as infor-
mation about the result of an inquiry and analysis about the endoxa. It is a sketch,
because it leads to the baselines only. Aristotle arrives at his result in two phases.
In the first one, the connection between ousia (being) and energeia (actuality) be-
comes evident; in the second, we see that ousia is founded on noesis (awareness).
This structure of ousia – noesis – energeia (being – awareness – actuality), which is
based on prevailing opinions, can be represented by the above formula. Normally
I write the formula in the graphically easier form {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια /
Doxa}.
1.5. Notes on the Use of this Book
1.5.1. List of terms
All Greek terms and phrases that are not in this list are translated at the place where
they occur. To some translations which are a little bit more unusual I have added
short explanations, in most cases more details and justifications can be found in my
Commentary on Met. Z, 2012, in the chapter on quotations (Anführungen). Most
words appear in transcription; in lengthy quotes I use the the Greek font.
17 For ‘topical attitude’ see E. Sonderegger, 2012, 3.1, “Topik.”
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The names of the categories and the types of causes are given in the more com-
plicated form which corresponds to their Greek expression (hence usually ‘with-
reference-to-something’ for πρὸς τι instead of ‘relation,’ or ‘the-for-the-sake-of-
which’ for τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα instead of ‘end’ etc.)
– αἴσθησις aisthesis sense-perception
– αἴτιον, αἰτία aition, aitia cause, causes
– ἀκρίβεια akribeia exactness; to be principal
– ἀλλοίωσις alloiosis (qualitative) alteration
– ἀνάγκη ananke necessity
– ἀπορία aporia aporia, impasse
– ἀρχή arche origin, principle, rule
– γένεσις genesis becoming, coming-to-be, genesis
– γένος genos kind, class, genus
– γίγνομαι gignomai I come into being
– δεύτεραι οὐσίαι deuterai ousiai secondary beings (i. e. genera and
species)
– δόξα doxa in colloquial speech: opinion, what
we commonly belief; as a term:
Doxa, as the meaning of ‘being’ in
a particular world, for which no fur-
ther explanation can be given
– δύναμις dynamis power, capability, potentiality
– εἶδος, εἴδη eidos, eide shape; the invisible, non-hyletic
form; the noetic determination
– εἰκὼς λόγος eikos logos ‘probable speech’ / ‘figurative
speech’ probably speaking: to
speak about probable or plausi-
ble things with only probable or
plausible credibility
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– ἐκ τούτων, τὸ ek touton, to the ‘from-these’; the ‘out-of-these’
(: out of hyle andmorphe); the con-
crete particular
– ἕν hen one; unity
– ἔνδοξον, ἔνδοξα endoxon, endoxa generally admitted opinion, opin-
ions
– ἐνεργεῖν energein in colloquial speech: to be in action,
to act, to execute; as a term also: to
be actual
– ἐνέργεια energeia in colloquial speech: activity; as
term: actuality (= having arrived its
eidos as result of a process)
– ἐντελέχεια entelecheia actuality (in its perfection)
– ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὸ ex amphoin, to the ‘from-both’; as to ek touton:
the concrete particular being (com-
posed of eidos and hyle)
– ἐξ οὗ, τὸ ex hou, to the ‘out-of-which’; as noun: hyle
– ἐπαγωγή epagoge guidance <by examples>; leading to
the understanding of something by
typical examples
– ἐπιστήμη episteme knowledge (not “science”)
– θεόλογοι theologoi theologians (e.g. Hesiodus)
– θεολογία,
θεολογικὴ
<ἐπιστήμη>
theologia, the-
ologike <epis-
teme>
knowledge about gods; the first
in ranking of the three theoretical
forms of knowledge, which is about
separate and unmoved being (Sein)
– θεωρία theoria theory; contemplation, the specula-
tive project (see Introduction)
– καθ’ αὑτό kath’ hauto with respect to itself, in itself; an
sich
– καθ’ αὑτό λεγόμενον, τὸ
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kath’ hauto legomenon, to
what is said with respect to itself
– κατ’ ἄλλο kat’ allo with respect to something else
– καθόλου katholou universal
– κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγόμενον, τὸ
kata symbebekos legomenon, to
what is said incidentally
– κίνησις kinesis movement, motion (not only change
of place, but also qualitative and
quantitative change, and, if in paral-
lel with metabole, also becoming)
– κινοῦν, τὸ kinoun, to which sets in motion
– λόγος logos speech, statement, thought, reason
– μέγιστα γένη megista gene the highest kinds (Plato, Sophist:
being, movement, rest, identity, dif-
ference; for details see E. Sondereg-
ger, 2012, 91–94.)
– μεταβολή metabole change
– μονή – πρόοδος – ἐπιστροφή
mone – prohodos – epistrophe
staying in itself – proceeding forth –
returning to itself (as the three mo-
ments of being in Neoplatonism)
– νόησις noesis awareness, being aware, perception
(Bemerken, Gewahren)
– νόησις3 νοήσεως1 νόησις2 ἐστιν
noesis noeseos noesis estin
awareness3 is awareness2 of
awareness1 (see commentary on
KP 23 and Index Rerum)
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1.5. Notes on the Use of this Book
– νοητόν noeton what is perceptible by the nous; that
which the nous is aware of; per-
ceived
– νοῦς, ὁ nous, ho what is aware of; the being aware
of; the intellect
– ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς
hothen he arche tes metaboles
the origin of change; where the im-
pulse to change comes from
– ὄν, τὸ on, to the being; the term, the word being
– ὂν ᾗ ὄν on he on being as being
– ὂν, τὸ, λέγεται πολλαχῶς
on, to, legetai pollachos
the word ‘being’ is used in many
ways
– ὄντως ὄν ontos on properly or really being (Plato)
– ὀρεκτός orektos what is desired, what is desirable,
what is longed for
– ὄρεξις orexis desire
– ὁρισμός horismos in speculative context: the effort to
articulate the ti en einai, which nec-
essarily must fail; definition as a
substitute18
– οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ hou heneka, to the for-the-sake-of-which; as noun:
to telos, end, goal
– οὐρανός ouranos the heavens, the sky
– οὐσία ousia being (Sein); a being (Seiendes), a
thing; proper being
– οὐσίαι ousiai beings, ways of being, classes or
kinds of being
18 See my commentary on Z 4–6, 2012, Chapter 6.
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– οὐσία αἰσθητή ousia aisthete perceptible being
– οὐσία ἀκίνητος ousia akinetos unmoved being
– οὐσίαι φυσικαί ousiai physikai natural beings
–
{οὐσία←νόησις→ἐνέργεια/Doxa}
{ousia←noesis→energeia/Doxa}
{being←awareness→actuality/Doxa}
– περὶ οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία
peri ousias he theoria
the theory (: the speculative project)
is about being
– ποιόν / ποῖον, τὸ poion, to, the of-some-kind / the of-what-
kind?
– πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον, τὸ
pollachos legomenon, to
what is said in multiple ways
– ποσόν / πόσον, τὸ poson the somehow-many; the how-
many?
– ποτέ / πότε pote at some time / the When
– πρὸς ἕν pros hen with respect to one (: the form of
unity of focal meaning compared
with e. g. the unity of a genus)
– πρὸς ἓν λέγεσθαι
pros hen legesthai
to be said with respect to one
– πρός τι, τὸ pros ti, to the with-reference-to-something
– πρώτη ὕλη prote hyle what underlies, as the first of all
perceptible things (in an absolute
sense); what underlies directly a
particular thing, that of which a
thing is made (in a relative sense)
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– πρώτη οὐσία prote ousia the first and one, with respect to
which to be, which is said in man-
ifold ways, has its unity
– πρώτη φιλοσοφία prote philosophia the philosophy that investigates
what is primary
– πρῶτον κινοῦν, τὸ, (or: κινῆσαν)
proton kinoun, to (or: kinesan)
the first moving (note: never in a
masculine form!)
– πρῶτος οὐρανός protos ouranos the first heaven; the sphere of the
fixed stars
– στάσις stasis rest
– στέρησις steresis privation, fault, lack; lacking some
determinations
– συνεχές syneches continuous, constant
– ταὐτόματον tautomaton chance, spontaneity
– τέλος telos end, goal; as noun for to hou
heneka
– τί ἦν εἶναι, τὸ ti en einai, to to be as it is used in the question
τουτί τί ἦν; (“What in the world is
that?”) The way prote ousia is, in
respect to which the manifold use of
to be has its unity; the ‘What-in-the-
World?-Being’
– τὶς ἄνθρωπος, ὁ tis anthropos, ho the some-how-human; the human,
insofar as she/he has accidental de-
terminations, but it is not deter-
mined which of them are realized in
the present case (cf. τόδε τὶ)
– τό... to … with terms: ‘‘the word …,’’ or:
‘‘the term…’’; otherwise the neuter
article
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– τόδε τι, τὸ tode ti, to some-this, the19
– τύχη tyche chance
– ὕλη hyle as a way of being: the appropriate-
ness for…(Heidegger); the stuff out
of which a thing is made (Liddell-
Scott)
– ὑποδοχή hypodoche receptacle of becoming, a character-
istic of chora
– ὑποκείμενον hypokeimenon that what underlies; the subject; the
about-what (das Worüber)
– ὑπόστασις hypostasis sediment in liquids; Stoicism: sub-
stance, reality; Neoplatonism: one
of the ways to be one
– φορά phora movement in place
– φύσις physis nature
– χώρα chora place, field; where the noetic is real-
ized (Pl. Tim.); that which takes in
becoming; therefore = hypodoche;
what is more elementary than the el-
ements of the Presocratics
– χωριστόν choriston separate, separable
Table 1.1.: List of terms
1.5.2. Register
Plato, Aristotle, the characters of the Platonic dialogues are not listed in the Index
of Names, nor the ocurrences of Theophrastus in the respective chapters nor these
of Plotinus in Part IV.
19 Something determined in principle whose actually realised determinations are disregarded (Meinong:
der unvollständige Gegenstand), see E. Sonderegger, 2012, 170–174.
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1.5. Notes on the Use of this Book
1.5.3. Some conventions of presentation
<being> addition to the translated text
<: being> comment
<: νοῦς> translated text
KP 1 numbering of the key propositions
Met. Λ 1.1 “the first sentence of the first chapter of Met. Λ”
numbered following the edition of W.D. Ross, 1924
Table 1.2.: Some conventions of presentation
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Part I.
Translation of Met. Λ
41

This translation is the basis for the commentary. I have used the edition of W.D.
Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Vol. II, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1924. For this
new edition, I compared his text with that of Silvia Fazzo, Il libro Lambda della
Metafisica di Aristoteles, Elenchos LXI-1, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2012. In some cases
I preferred her reading; S. Fazzo often returns to the manuscripts E and J, which she
considers more reliable.20
On some points I diverge: the intransitive understanding of μεταβάλλειν at 1071b15;
the dative ἐνεργείᾳ, at 1072b13 and 1072b4ff.; the change of the cases of ἐκείνου
and τοῦτο at 1072b23; and at 1075b18 the difference in aspect seems to me more
decisive than the lexical difference (μετίσχει). For the numbering of the phrases I
follow W.D. Ross, even when Silvia Fazzo’s punctuation differs.
In the following list, I enumerate the points in which I follow Silvia Fazzo. These
changes to Ross’ text are not mentioned again in my translation.
Stelle W.D. Ross Silvia Fazzo
1069a30f. 1.7,
KP2
οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς μία
μὲν αἰσθητή – ἧς ἡ μὲν
ἀίδιος ἡ δὲ φθαρτή, ἣν
πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν,
οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ
ξῷα [ἡ δ’ αΐδιος] – ἧς
ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα
λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε
πολλά·
οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς· μία
μὲν αἰσθητή, ἧς ἡ μὲν
φθαρτή, ἣν πάντες
ὁμολογούσιν, οἷον τὰ
φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ξῷα ἡ δ’
ἀΐδιος, ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ
στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε
ἓν εἴτε πολλά·
1069b9 2.2 ἢ κατὰ τὸ τί ἢ κατὰ τί
1070a5 3.4 τὰ γὰρ φύσει οὐσίαι καὶ
τὰ ἄλλα.
τὰ γὰρ φύσει οὐσίαι καὶ
τἆλλα.
1070a11–12 3.7,
KP5
ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι καὶ
ἕξις τις εἰς ἥν·
ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι εἰς
ἥν, καὶ ἕξις τις·
20 Having written some articles to the theme she justifies her point in “Lo stemma codicum della
Metafisica di Aristotele: Una proposta alternativa,” in: Revue d’histoire des textes, n.s., t. XII,
2017, 35-58.
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1070a13 3.8 τὸ τόδε τι τὸ τόδε
1070a16 3.8 οἰκία τε ἡ ἄνευ ὕλης οἰκία ἡ ἄνευ ὕλης
1070a36 4.3 καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι. καὶ οὐσίαι.
1070b7 4.7 οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν
στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ
ὂν ἢ τὸ ἕν·
οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν
στοιχείων, οἷον τὸ ἓν ἢ
τὸ ὄν·
1070b21 4.12 ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ ἡμέρα, νύξ
1070b31 4.16 ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς
ἀνθρώπῳ ἄνθρωπος
ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς
ἀνθρώποις ἄνθρωπος
1070b34 4.17,
KP 8
ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὡς
πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν
πάντα.
ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα ὡς τὸ
πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν
πάντα.
1071a12 5.5 ὧν <ἐνίων> οὐκ ἔστι τὸ
αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀλλ’ ἕτερον,
ὧν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ
εἶδος ἀλλ’ ἕτερον·
1071a14–15 5.5 καὶ ἔτι τι ἄλλο ἔξω καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἔξω
1071a33 5.10 ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ τῷ ἀνάλογον
1071b1 5.11 τίνες μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαί τίνες μὲν οὖν ἀρχαί
1071b7 6.2 (ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν) ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν
1071b12–13 6.5 εἰ ἔστι …οὐκ ἔσται εἰ ἔστι …οὐκ ἔστι
1071b34 6.17 οὐδ’, <εἰ> ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί,
τὴν αἰτίαν.
οὐδ’ ὡδὶ <ἢ ὡδί>, οὐδὲ
τὴν αἰτίαν.
1072a5 6.22 ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ἐνέργεια. ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ἐνεργείᾳ.
1072a15 6.26 αὐτῷ αὑτῷ
1072a24 7.3,
KP 13
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον
καὶ κινοῦν [καὶ] μέσον,
†τοίνυν† ἔστι τι ὃ
οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ,
ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ
ἐνέργεια οὖσα.
ἐπεὶ δὲ κινούμενον
καὶ κινοῦν καὶ μέσον,
τοίνυν ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ
κινούμενον κινεῖ,
ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ
ἐνέργεια οὖσα.
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1072b2 7.9 …ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ τὸ οὗ
ἕνεκα <καὶ> τινός, ὧν
τὸ μὲν ἔστι τὸ δ’οὐκ
ἔστι.
(…ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ τὸ οὗ
ἕνεκα ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔστι τὸ
δ’οὐκ ἔστι).
1072b4 7.10 κινούμενα δὲ τἆλλα
κινεῖ.
κινουμένῳ δὲ τἆλλα
κινεῖ.
1072b4–6 7.11 εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται,
ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως
ἔχειν, ὥστ’ εἰ [ἡ] φορὰ
πρώτη ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν,
ᾗ κινεῖται ταύτῃ γε
ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν,
κατὰ τόποιν, καὶ εἰ μὴ
κατ’ οὐσίαν.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται,
ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν·
ὥστ’ ἡ φορὰ ἡ πρώτη
ἀεὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστιν
ᾗ κινεῖται ταύτῃ δὲ
ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν,
κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ
κατ’ οὐσίαν.
In contrast to Fazzo I
take the 2 εἰ καὶ from
E and the nominative
ἐνέργεια of the codd.:
…ὥστ’ ἡ φορὰ ἡ πρώτη
εἰ καὶ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν
ᾗ κινεῖται ταύτῃ δὲ
ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν.
1072b27 7.22 ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια·
1073b33 8.8 [τοῦτ’ ἔστι τῶν ἀποστη-
μάτων τὴν τάξιν]
τοῦτ’ ἔστι τῶν ἀποστη-
μάτων τὴν τάξιν
1074a16 8.12 [καὶ τὰς αἰσθητάς] καὶ οὐκ αἰσθητάς
1074a38 8.20 ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ἓν
μόνον
1075a38 10.15 ὅτι ἀρχήν ὅτι ἀρχή
1075b7 10.19 αὐτῷ αὐτὸ
1075b14 10.24,
KP 26
πάντα πάντες
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1075b18 10.27 ἔτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριω-
τέρα
ὅτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριω-
τέρα
1075b24 10.30,
KP 29
εἴ τε μὴ ἔσται ἔτι εἰ μὴ ἔσται
Table 1.3.: Alterations in the text of Ross motivated by Fazzo’s text
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Chapter 1
1069a18 KP 1 (1) The present theory concerns being <: ousia, Sein>; for it is the
beings <: ousiai, Seiendes> whose principles and causes are sought.
a19 (2) For, if the all is like a total, the being <: ousia> is <its> first part; also if
<the all> is part-by-part, in this way too the being <: ousia> is first, and only then
<follow> the of-some-kind and the somehow-many.
a21 (3) At the same time these are hardly beings <: onta>, as it were, but qualities
and movements; otherwise the not-white and not-straight <would be beings too>;
for we say of these too that they are, e. g. “There is a not-white.”
a24 (4) Moreover nothing of the others <: i. e. of that which is not ousia> is sepa-
rable.
a25 (5) The ancients too testify <for this> in fact,21 since what they were looking
for were the principles and elements and causes of the proper being.
a26 (6) <Thinkers> of the present time instead rather take the universals as proper
beings <: ousias, Pl.> (for the genera are universal, and they say that these are
rather principles and proper beings because they inquire in a logical manner); but
the ancients <took> the particulars <to be proper beings>, e. g. fire and earth, but
not what they have in common: body.
1069a30 KP 2 (7) <There are> three ways of being <: ousiai, Seinsweisen>: one
<of them> is perceptible, and of this <way of being> one is perishable, on which all
agree, e. g. plants and animals, and the other eternal; of this, <i.e. of the percep-
tible way of being in general,> it is necessary to search for the elements, whether
<there is> one or many; another <way of being> is immovable, and of this some
say that it is separable, some dividing <the immovable and separable ways> in two
<types>, others putting the ideas and the mathematicals in one nature, and others
<accepting> only the mathematicals <as separable>.
21 ἔργῳ, “by what they did.”
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a36 (8) The former <: the perceptible beings> belong to physics, because they are
with motion, but the latter <: the immovable beings> belong to another <kind of
knowledge>, unless they have a common principle.
1069b3 KP 3 (9) The sensible way of being <: ousia> is changeable.
b3 (10) If change arises from the opposites or from <beings> between them, but not
from all and any opposites (even the voice is not-white) but from the <relevant>
contrary, <then> it is necessary that some <being> underlies, which turns into the
contrary, since the contraries <themselves> do not change.
Chapter 2
b7 (1) Further, something remains, but the contrary does not remain; therefore there
is some third <being> beside the contraries: the hyle.
b9 (2) But if there are four <kinds of> change: with respect to ‘What?’ or the ‘Of-
what-kind?’ or ‘How-many?’ or ‘Where?’, and if simple becoming and passing
away <are changes> with respect to this <: the individual being>,22 augmentation
and decrease with respect to ‘somehow-quantified,’ alteration with respect to the
affection <: πάθος>, movement with respect to place, then every single change
happens in the frame of <respective> contraries.
b14 (3) In fact it is necessary that the hyle changes, because it is potentially both
<extremes>; since the term ‘being’ <: on> has a double use, every <being> changes
from the possible being into the actual being <: τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν> (e. g. from a
possible white to the actual white, and similarly for augmentation and decrease),
such that it is not only by chance that something can come into being from a not
being, but also all <beings> come into being from a being, indeed from a potentially
being but actually a not-being.
22 Bonitz, Index, 495b33: ”‘τόδε omnino id significat, quod sensibus percipitur τὸ αἰσθητόν,”’ b37:
”‘itaque Aristoteles per pronomen τόδε individuum distinguit a genere et notione universali.”’
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b20 (4) And this is the One of Anaxagoras (for this is better than <his saying> “All
together”), and <it is in line with> the Mixture of Empedocles and <with what>
Anaximander <says>, and <also> as Democritus says; <correctly one should say:>
“All <beings> were <together> for us potentially but not actually”; and therefore
it seems that they have grasped the hyle; all changing <beings> contain hyle, but
each a different one; even of the eternal <beings> that have no becoming but are
changeable <only> spatially <there is a hyle>, not one for <its> coming into being,
but for <its possibility to move> from somewhere to somewhere.
b26 (5) One may ask from which non-being becoming could arise because the term
‘non-being’ <is used in> a threefold way <as with the term ‘being’>.23
b27 (6) If there something is potentially <it may become actual out of this ‘non-
being’>, but not out of any random<non-being>, but a <specific actual being comes>
out of a <specific potential> other <being>; it is not enough <to say> that all things
were together, for they <: the things> differ in hyle, since, why came into being
infinite <beings> and not <only> one?
b31 (7) For the nous is one, so that, if hyle also were one, that would have come to
be actually, of which the hyle was potentially <suited for>.
b32 (8) There are, in fact, three causes and three principles: two of these are the
opposites, one of which is the notion <: logos> and the eidos, the other of which is
the privation, and the third is the hyle.
Chapter 3
1069b35 KP 4 (1) After that <we must say> that neither the hyle nor the eidos come
into being – I mean the last ones.
b36 (2) For each <thing> changes as something and by something and into some-
thing; ‘by something’ <means> by the immediate moving, ‘as something’ <means>
23 Categorical, modal, veridical.
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the hyle, ‘into something’ <means> the eidos.
1070a2 (3) Thus, it will go into infinity if, <when a round bronze comes to be,> not
only the bronze comes to be round, but also the round or the bronze <come to be>;
but it is necessary to stop. –
a4 (4) After that <we must say> that each proper being comes into being from some-
thing univocal <with it> (for <what is> by nature as well as the others are beings;
<and this rule applies for all beings>).
a6 (5) For <the beings> come into being by productive know-how <: techne>, or
by nature, or by chance, or spontaneously.
a7 (6) So the productive know-how is a principle <of the becoming of a thing> in
an other <being>, the nature is a principle in <the growing being> itself, because
a human begets a human, and the remaining causes <i. e. chance, spontaneity> are
privations of these.
1070a9 KP 5 (7) There are three ways of being <: ousiai>:24 First the hyle, which
is a some-this25 by appearing concretely26 (for, what is by contact <: by exter-
nal connection only> and not by growing together <: not by natural and essential
connection>, is hyle and hypokeimenon), then the nature, which is a principally
determined being into which <the growing up evolves> and some state <: ἕξις
τις>, further a third, the from-them <: i. e. the being realizing the previous ways
of being>, namely the <being an> individual, e. g. Socrates or Kallias.
a13 (8) For some <beings> there is no this27 beyond the composed being (e. g. the
eidos of a house <is not beyond the material and the factual house>, unless the pro-
24 Paraphrase: If you are questioning what a certain thing properly is, then three answers are possible.
Depending on what is at stake at the moment you can give three different answers about the same.
25 For τόδε τι in 1070a10, 11 and 13 see the commentary ad loc., and the glossary; sense: a principally
determined being; cf. E. Sonderegger, 2012, 171–174; Meinong calls this unvollständige Gegen-
stände.
26 Paraphrase: If it appears it becomes a concrete thing. W.D. Ross, takes it negatively: “which is a
‘this’ in appearance.”
27 Bonitz: often τὸ τόδε corresponds to the αἰσθητόν and designates the individual; but here in a literal
sense it may also mean ‘determination,’ Bestimmtheit; cf. the remarks on τόδε τι and 1071a18.
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ductive know-how <is the separate eidos of it>; nor is there becoming and passing
away of these <: the eide>, but in a different manner are and are not the house with-
out hyle <and the factual house>, and health <and the healthy man>, and all which
is according to productive know-how), but, if it <: the eidos> is indeed <separate>,
<then this is only the case with> natural <beings>; therefore Plato said not badly
that there are as many eide as there are natural <kinds of beings>, if, at all, there
are eide different from them <: from natural beings>, e. g. fire, flesh, head; for,
all <such things> are hyle, and to the proper being in the strongest sense <: τῆς
μάλιστ’ οὐσίας> belongs the last <hyle, which, together with the eidos makes up
the individual being>.
1070a21 (9) KP 6 The moving causes are beings <: onta> that are beforehand,
while other <causes>, such as the notion <: logos>, are at the same time.
a22 (10) For when a human is healthy, then there is health too; and the shape of a
bronze sphere and the bronze sphere are at the same time; but we have to examine
whether there remains something afterwards; for with some <beings> nothing pre-
vents <this>, e.g. <we have to examine> whether the soul is such, indeed not the
whole <soul remains> but the nous; since it is probably impossible for the whole.
a26 (11) Obviously, at least for this reason, there is no reason that there are ideas;
for a <real> human begets a human, a single one <begets> any; it is the same in the
field of productive know-how <: Pl.>, for the medical know-how is the notion of
health.
Chapter 4
1070a31 (1) KP 7 In some sense, the causes and principles of some beings are these,
of other beings others; in another sense, if you speak generally and by analogy, they
are the same for all.
a33 (2) For one may ask whether there are different or the same principles and
elements of the proper beings and of the with-reference-to-something, and for each
51
of the categories in the same way.
a35 (3) But <it would> be strange if the same <were principles and elements> of all
<beings>; for then both the with-reference-to-something and proper beings would
consist of the same <elements>.
1070b1 (4) What in fact would this be?
b1 (5) For beside the proper being and the other categories there is nothing in com-
mon <for all beings>; still, the element is prior to that of which it is an element, yet
neither the proper being is an element of the with-reference-to-something nor is any
of these <i. e. of the other categories, an element> of the proper being.
b4 (6) Further, how it is possible, that for all <beings> there are the same ele-
ments?
b5 (7) For it is not possible that any of the elements is identical to that which is
composed of the elements, e. g. neither B nor A <can be identical> to BA; this is
not <possible> even in the case of the noetic elements, actually the unity or the being
<:τὸ ἕν ἢ τὸ ὄν>, for these belong to each even of the composites.
b8 (8) Therefore none of these <elements> will be either a proper being or an with-
reference-to-something; but this would be necessary.
b9 (9) So, then, there are no identical elements of all <beings>. –
b10 (10) Or, as we say, in some sense there are <the same elements of all beings>
in another sense not, as, e. g., the hot may be <an element> of perceptible bodies
in the sense of eidos and otherwise the cold as privation while the hyle is the first
<being> which in itself can be so <: hot or cold>, and these <: the things formed
by eidos, steresis, hyle> as well as the <beings composed> of these of which these
are the principles are proper beings, or <the same is the case>, whenever something
grows into a unity out of hot and cold (e. g. as flesh or bone), for, what came to be,
must be different from these <: from its elements>.
b16 (11) Thus the elements and principles of these <beings> are the same (<even
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if> of some <particular beings there are> these <elements>, of other <beings> those
<elements>), but it is impossible to talk about everything in this way, except by
analogy, as if someone were to say that there are three principles, the eidos, the
privation, and the hyle.
b19 (12) But each of these <three principles> is different following the domain
<which is at issue>; e. g. in colour, white <as eidos>, black <as privation>, surface
<as hyle>; or light, darkness, air, from which <are> day, night.
b22 (13) Since not only what is present in <a being> are causes, but there are also
some external <causes> as e. g. the moving <cause>, it is clear that principle and
element are different, although both <are> causes, and ‘principle’ can be divided
into these <kinds of causes: internal and external>, and what moves or stops is
some principle and being <: ousia>, so that by analogy there are three elements <:
eidos, privation, hyle>, but four causes and principles, but in one <being> this <as
cause>, in another that, also the first <: immediate> cause as the moving <cause>
is for one this, for another that.
b28 (14) Health, disease, body; the moving <cause is> medical know-how.
b28 (15) Eidos, a certain disorder, bricks; the moving <cause is> architecture, and
‘principle’ is divided into these kinds.
b30 (16) But because the moving <cause>, in the case of natural beings, for humans
is a human, and in those that are <made> following a thought <: cultural products>
<the moving cause is> the eidos, or its opposite, in one way there would be three
causes <: i. e. hyle, eidos, privation>, but an another way there are four <: the
moving cause in addition>.
b33 (17) For the medical know-how is in some sense health, and the architecture is
the eidos of the house, and a human begets a human;
1070b34 KP 8 yet <there is a principle> beside those <above, namely a principle>
being the first of all sets all in motion.
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Chapter 5
b36 (1) Since some <beings> are separable and others not separable, the former are
proper beings.
1071a1 (2) And this is the reason why the causes for all <beings> are the same,
because without the proper beings there are no affections and movements.
a2 (3) Then, these <: proper beings as the same causes of all beings> will be, say
soul and body, or <expressed by the functions of the soul> intellect, desire, and
body.
1071a3 KP 9 (4) Yet <also> in another way, analogically, the principles are the
same, namely as actuality and potentiality; but these too are <principles> for one
thing this way for another that way and <in any case> differently.
a6 (5) In some cases the same is at some time actual <: ἐνεργείᾳ> at another po-
tential <: δυνάμει>, e. g. wine or flesh or man (since these too belong to the afore-
mentioned causes <: eidos, steresis, hyle>; for the eidos is actual whenever there
is a separable <being>, that means the from-both, but privation is e. g. darkness or
disease, but the hyle is potentially, for this <: the hyle> is the potential to become
both <: form and privation>); again in another form to be actual and to be potential
differ if these <causes> do not have the same hyle <as the caused being>, and from
the last ones <those> which do not have the the same eidos but a different one, as
e. g. one <kind of> cause of man are the elements fire and earth as hyle, and also its
proper eidos; and also, if there is something else outside, e. g. the father, and beside
these the sun and the ecliptic, which are neither hyle, nor eidos, nor privation, nor
the same in eidos, but moving <causes>.
a17 (6) Further, one must consider, that it is possible to say some <terms> univer-
sally, others not.
1071a18 KP 10 (7) In fact, the first principles of all <beings> are the first actual
this and another <principle> which is potential.
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a19 (8) Thus those <Platonic> universals are not <principles>; for the principle of
the individuals is the individual; indeed <the eidetic> man <is a cause> of the uni-
versal man, but there is no <‘universal man’ as a thing>, but Peleus <is the origin>
of Achilles, and your father of you, and this B here <is cause> of this BA, and
generally the B of the BA quite simply.
a24 (9) Further, if indeed in the range of beings <: ousiai> these are causes and ele-
ments of these <beings> and those <ares causes and elements> of those, as has been
said, <especially> if the <causes> are not the same in kind <as the caused beings> –
<as e. g. the causes> of colours, sounds, things, quantity – <then the causes are not
the same> except by analogy; the <causes> are different even <for beings> in the
same kind, although not <different> in kind, but because <the immediate causes>
of the particulars differ, <say> your hyle and <your> eidos and <your> moving
<cause> and mine; but due to the universal concept they are the same.
a29 (10) If you are searching for28 what are the principles or elements of the proper
beings <: ousiai>, of the with-reference-to-something, of the how-qualified, <and>
whether these are the same or different, then it is clear, that, because <the terms
‘principle’ and ‘element’> are said in many ways <and if you neglect these distinc-
tions, then> for each <being> they are <the same>, but if <the ways of speaking>
are distinguished, they are not the same but different, except <that they are the same
nevertheless> in a certain way and for all; in one way they are the same, namely by
analogy, because hyle, eidos, privation, the moving <are causes for all beings>, and
that way the causes of the proper beings as causes of all <other beings, i. e. of all
other categories, are causes for all beings>, because these <: all categories besides
the ousiai> are cancelled if these <: the ousiai> are cancelled; further, the actual first
<is the one and same principle of all beings>; but in another way <, as immediate
causes,> the firsts are different, <namely as causes> like the opposites and when
they are said neither as genera nor in many ways; at last the <different> hylai <are
different principles each time>.
1071b1 (11) So, which are the principles of perceptible beings, how many they are,
28 For the Nominativus pendens τὸ ζητεῖν see E. Schwyzer, II, 1966, 66, and Kühner-Gerth, § 356, 6.
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and in which ways they are the same and in which ways different, has been said.
Chapter 6
1071b3 KP 11 (1) Since there are, as has been stated <in Λ 1.7>, three kinds of
being <: ousiai>, two natural but one unmovable, one must say about the latter,
that it is necessary that there is some eternal unmovable ousia.
b5 (2) For the proper beings are the first of the beings <: ὄντων> and, if all <proper
beings were> perishable, then everything <would be> perishable; it is not possible
that movement came to be or perished, for it has always been, nor that time <came
to be or perished>.
b8 (3) For the before and after can not be if there is no time; and then movement is
continuous <: συνεχές> in the same way as time is; for <time> is either the same
as, or an affection <: πάθος> of, movement.
b10 (4) But there is no continuous movement except in respect to place, and of this
<kind, only that> in a circle.
b12 (5) But, if something is capable to set in motion or to produce, but does not
execute anything, then there is no movement; for it is possible that that which has
the power <to move something> is not effective.
b14 (6) Therefore it is of no use, even if we assume to be eternal beings <: ousiai>,
like those who <assume to be> ideas, if there is no principle in them which is able
to change; moreover, even this <principle> is not sufficient nor another being cor-
responding to the ideas <e. g. numbers>; for, if it did not act29 there would be no
movement.
b17 (7) Further, <this principle of movement would> not <be sufficient, even> if it
was acting, if its being <: ousia, Sein> were potentiality, for then there would be no
eternal movement; for it is possible that the potential being is not <in fact>.
29 For this special use of future see Bonitz, Index, 754a55, ff.
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1071b19 KP 12 (8) Therefore there must be a principle such that its being <: ousia,
Sein> is actuality.
b20 (9) Still further, such beings <: ousiai, Seiendes> must be without hyle; for
they must be eternal, if anything else is eternal.
b22 (10) Thus <their ousia is> actuality.
b22 (11) However, <there is> an aporia: for it seems that every acting being has
also the power to act, but not every being with the power to act does act in fact, so
that potentiality would be prior <to actuality>.
b25 (12) But if this were the case, there would be none of the beings; for it is possible
to have the power to be potentially but not to be <in fact>.
b26 (13) But, if it is as the theologians say, who generate <all> from night, or as the
natural philosophers say, “All things together,” there is the same impossibility.
b28 (14) For how <something> could set in motion, if there was no actual cause?
b29 (15) For the material could not set in motion itself but architecture, nor menstru-
ation or earth <set in motion themselves> but seed and semen <can initiate move-
ment>.
b31 (16) Therefore some assume an eternal activity, like Leucippus and Plato; for
they say that there is always movement.
b33 (17) But why and what <this movement is>, they do not say, nor, whether <it
sets in motion> this way or that way, nor the cause <of it>.
b34 (18) For nothing is inmotion by chance, but it must be there always some <cause
of movement>, as now <something moves> by nature this way, <then> that way by
force or by reason or by another <cause>.
b36 (19) Further, which <principle of movement> is first?
b37 (20) For this makes an enormous difference.
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b37 (21) But even Plato is unable to say what the self-moving is, which he some-
times supposes to be the principle <of movement>; for the soul is later <than the
first cause of movement> and simultaneous with the heavens, as he says.
1072a3 (22) So to suppose that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one way correct,
but in another way not (how has been said);30 but that actuality is prior, Anaxagoras
testifies (for the nous is actual), also Empedocles, <testifies the same mentioning>
love and strife <as principles of movement>, and those who say that there is always
movement, like Leucippus; therefore there was not Chaos or Night for an infinite
time, but there was always the same either cyclically or another way, if indeed ac-
tuality is prior to possibility.
a9 (23) If indeed the same <moves> always cyclically, then something must always
remain acting in the same way.
a10 (24) But if there should be coming to be and passing away, then there must be
too something else acting differently in different cases.
a12 (25) Thus it is necessary that <it> acts in one way with respect to itself and in
another way with respect to something else; that is, then, <it acts> in accordance
with something else or in accordance with the first.
a14 (26) Indeed it is necessary <that it acts> with respect to the last <: the first which
is active in relation to itself>; otherwise that would be cause of itself as well as of
that.
a15 (27) Therefore it is better that the first <is the cause>; for that was a cause of
<being> always in the same way; another <is a cause> of <being in> different ways;
and, of what is always in different ways, clearly both together <are causes>.
a17 (28) Thus the movements behave this way.
a18 (29) So why must one search for other principles?
30 W.D. Ross, ad loc., with H. Bonitz, 1849, 492 sees that the reference is to 1071b22–26, rather than
to Θ 8, and this is the more plausible when Met. Λ is an early text.
58
Chapter 7
a19 (1) Since it is possible <to explain becoming> this way, and, if not this way,
<all beings> would come to be out of night and out of “All together” and out of
non-being, that may be solved, and there is something eternally performing a never
ending movement, which is that in a circle (and that is clear not only by argument
but also by fact); therefore the first heaven would be eternal.
a23 (2) Hence there also is something that moves <the first heaven>.
a24 (3) Since <there is a> moved, a setting in motion, and an intermediate <type of
being>,
1072a24 LS 13 then there is also some <type> that sets in motion without being
moved, which is eternal, being <: ousia> and actuality.
a26 LS 14 (4) But the longed for and the thought about move in this way; they move
unmoved.
a27 (5) The origin <: ta prota> of them <: of noeton and orekton, the longed for
and the thought about> is the same.
a27 (6) For <also> what appears to be beautiful is desired, but what is beautiful is
what is primarily wanted; we desire <something> because it seems <to be beautiful>
rather than something seems <to be beautiful> becausewe desire <it>; for awareness
<: noesis> is the origin.
1072a30 LS 15 (7) The nous is moved by that of which it is aware; perceivable in
itself is the one side of the series of coordinate pairs, and on this <side> ousia <is
the> first, and of this the simple and actual (‘one’ and ‘simple’ are not the same, for,
while ‘one’ indicates a measure, ‘simple’ <indicates> that it behaves in a certain
way).
a34 (8) But in fact also on the same side are both the beautiful and what is choosable
for its own sake; and the first is always the best, or analogous <to the best>.
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1072b1 (9) The <following> distinction makes clear that the for-the-sake-of-which
is in the domain of the unmoved <beings>; for the for-the-sake-of-which is <good
or an aim or a goal> for something <or for someone>; from these <two>, one is
<unmoved, namely the aim itself> the other <namely that for which the aim is an
aim> not.
b3 (10) In fact, it <: what sets in motion without being moved itself> sets in motion
the same way as a beloved <being>, and by means of a moved <being> it sets in
motion the rest.
b4 (11) So, if something is moving, it is possible that it is otherwise <than it is in
fact>; therefore, <even> if the first movement <: that of the sphere of the fixed
stars> is actuality, insofar it <: the sphere> is in motion, just in this respect it is
possible that it is otherwise, according to place, if not according to being <: kat’
ousian>; but since there is something setting it in motion, itself being unmoved and
being actually, this last can in no way be otherwise.
b8 (12) For locomotion is the first of the <kinds of> changes, and, of this <kind>,
the circular <is first>; it is this <circular motion> that this <: what sets in motion
without being moved itself> sets in motion.
b10 (13) Therefore it is a necessarily being; and, insofar as <it is> necessarily, <it
is> fine, and in this way an origin.
b11 (14) For ‘necessary’ <is said> in so many ways: the expression ‘by violence,’
<indicates> that it is against the <natural> impulse, further <it means> that without
which the good cannot be, and that which cannot be otherwise than in one way.31
1072b13 LS 16 (15) <Even> the heavens and the physis, therefore, depend on such
a principle.
b14 (16) We have a way of life, such as it is the best, for a short time,32 for that
<origin> is this way forever, and indeed <that> is impossible for us, for its <: the
31 See Met. Δ 5.
32 Variant: <The origin’s> way of life is such as it is the best for us for a short time. / Ross: And it is a
life such as the best which we injoy, and enjoy for but a short time…
60
origins> actuality (Wirklichkeit) is also a pleasure (and therefore being awake, per-
ceiving, and being aware are the most pleasant <states>, while hopes and memories
<are pleasant> on account of them).
1072b18 KP 17 (17) Awareness in itself is of what is best in itself, and <awareness>
in the highest degree is of <that in> the highest degree.
1072b19 (18) The nous is aware of itself, at the same time partaking in that of which
it is aware; for <the nous> becomes an object of awareness by touching and being
aware <of itself>, so that the nous and that of which it is aware are the same.
1072b22 (19) For that which can receive the noetically perceptible and the being (:
ousia) is nous: <which> is actual by having <the noetically perceptible>; therefore
it seems that nous is divine more from the latter <: its actuality> than the former
<: its receptivity>, and theoria is the most pleasant and best.
b24 (20) If, therefore, god is always well in such a way, as we are sometimes, that
is wondrous; if even more <so>, it is even more wondrous.
b26 (21) But he behaves this way.
b26 (22) And indeed life belongs <to nous>; for the actuality of nous is life, and
actuality is just this; and its actuality, in itself, is the best life and eternal.
b28 (23) Of course, we say that god is a living being, eternal and best, so that life
and permanence, unbroken and eternal, belong to god; and precisely this is <what
we mean with the word> ‘god.’
b30 (24) Those who assume, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that the most
beautiful and best is not at the beginning (because the beginnings of both plants and
animals are causes), but the beautiful and the complete are in what comes from these
<beginnings>, do not think right.
b35 (25) For the seed comes from something else, which is prior and complete, what
is first is not seed but the complete <being>; as one would say that a human is prior
to the seed, not the one that is coming-into-being from this <seed>, but the other,
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from whom the seed <comes>.
1073a3 KP 18 (26) Thus, that there is some being <: ousia, Sein>, eternal, un-
moved, and separate from the perceptible <beings> is clear from what has been
said; it has also been shown that this ousia cannot have any magnitude, but is with-
out parts and indivisible, for it sets in motion <other beings> for an infinite time
but nothing finite has an infinite power; and, since every magnitude is either infi-
nite or finite, on this account it would not have a finite magnitude, nor an infinite
one, because there is utterly no infinite magnitude; but surely <it has been shown>
also that it is unaffected and unalterable for all other motions are secondary with
respect to change in place.
a13 (27) So that is clear, why it is this way.
Chapter 8
1073a14 KP 19 (1) It must not escape our notice whether we ought to take such an
ousia as one or as many, and how many <they are>; but we also have to mention
the assertions of the others, that they have said nothing about the quantity, which
could be said quite clearly.
a17 (2) The assumption about the ideas has no view of its own <about this theme>;
those who say that there are ideas say that they are numbers, and with respect to the
numbers sometimes they speak as if there were infinite, sometimes as if they were
limited to ten; but why the amount of the numbers is such nothing is said with a
serious intention to prove <it>; we ought to discuss <this> starting from our own
premises and distinctions.
1073a23 KP 20 (3) <The basis for our reasoning is as follows:> The origin and the
first of the beings is immovable both in itself as well by accident, it sets in motion
the first eternal and single motion;
because necessarily a) (i) that which is moved is moved by something, (ii) and the
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first moving <cause> is unmoved in itself, (iii) and the eternal movement is moved
by an eternal <being>, (iv) and the single <movement> by a single <being>; b) but
we see (i) that besides the simple movement of the whole, about which we say that
the first and unmoved ousia initiates it, (ii) <there are> other eternal movements,
namely that of the planets (since the body <moving> in a circle is eternal and never
standing still; we have shown <proofs> concerning this in the Physics),33 c) <then>
it is necessary too that each of thesemovements is moved by an – in itself – unmoved
and eternal ousia.
a34 (4) For the nature of the stars is some eternal being; and both, that which sets
in motion is eternal and that which <was> prior to that which is moved, <then> that
which is prior to the ousia must itself too be an ousia.
a36 (5) So it is manifest that there must be so many beings of this kind <as mo-
tions>, which are with respect to their nature eternal and unmoved in themselves
and without magnitude, because of the reason stated previously.
1073b1 (6) That there are <such kinds> of beings, and that one of them is the first
<and another> the second according to the same order as the motions of the stars,
is manifest;
1073b3 KP 21 but we must learn the number of the movements from the mathe-
matical knowledge which is nearest to philosophy, namely from astrology; it is this
<knowledge> which considers the being <: ousia>, which is perceptible but eter-
nal; the others <in the range of the mathematical knowledge> do not deal with
ousia at all, e. g. such as that which <deals> with numbers and geometry.
b8 (7) Even for those who are concerned <with this issue> to a moderate degree
only it is clear that the number of movements exceeds that of <beings> moved; for
each of the planets executes more than one movement; but as to howmany they may
be, we refer now to what certain mathematicians say, <just> to have a certain idea,
in order to retain a definite quantity in mind; by the way, partly it is necessary that
we search ourselves partly that we obtain information from the searchers; if to those
33 H. Bonitz, ad loc.: Physik Θ 8–9, De Caelo B 3ff.
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who deal with that something contrary to what is said now seems <to be right>, <it
is necessary> to esteem both <groups of mathematicians>, but to trust those who
adhere more exactly to principles.
b17 (8) Eudoxus, then, placed themovements of sun andmoon each in three spheres;
the first of them is that of the fixed stars, the second <follows> the middle <circle>
of the Zodiac, the third <follows> the latitudinally inclined <circle> of the Zodiac;
<the sphere> on which the moon moves is inclined in a greater latitude than <that>
on which the sun moves; <he placed the movement> of the wandering stars in four
spheres for each, of which the first and second are the same as those <aforemen-
tioned, the spheres for sun and moon> (because <the sphere> of the fixed stars is
that which sets in motion all the <other spheres> and the <sphere> arranged below
that <sphere> and having its movement <following the circle> on the middle <cir-
cle> of the zodiac, is common for all <spheres>); the poles of the third <sphere> of
all <planets> are in the middle <circle> of the zodiac, the movement of the fourth
<sphere follows the circle> which is inclined towards the middle<line> of that <:
of the third sphere>; <he said that> the poles of the third sphere are their own for
each of the other <planets>, but the same for Aphrodite and Hermes;34 Callippus
has made the same setting of the spheres as Eudoxus did (I mean the arrangement
of their intervals), but for what concerns the number <of the spheres> he assigned
the same <number> to Zeus and Kronos <: Jupiter and Saturn> as he <: Eudoxus>;
but, he thought that two additional spheres must be added to the sun and the moon,
if one wants to explain what one sees, and one <additional sphere> to each of the
other planets.
b38 (9) But if all <spheres> put together should account for what we can observe, we
need to add to each planet further spheres, <which contain> one <sphere> less <than
the set we spoke about so far>, which causes to revolve <the first set of spheres>
and sets back in the same place <as before> the first sphere of each star which is
positioned below the star in question; only that way, it is possible wholly to produce
the movement of the planets.
34 For the geometry of this model see O. Neugebauer, 1969, 152–156, with instructive geometrical
drawings.
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1074a6 (10) Since, then, there are eight spheres <for Saturn and Jupiter> and twenty-
five <for the other planets> in which they <: the planets> aremoving, and from these
only the <spheres> in which the lowest <planet> is moving must not be set back, the
couteracting <spheres> of the first two <planets> will be six, those of the outer four
will be sixteen; the total number of spheres moving forward and again backwards
will be fifty-five.
a12 (11) If one did not add the movements, that we spoke of, which we have added
to the sun and the moon, the total number of the spheres would be forty-seven.
a14 (12) Let, then, the number of the spheres, be so many, then it is reasonable to
assume that there are also so many beings <: ousiai> and origins <of movement>,
unmoved and not perceptible (the compelling may be left to say to the stronger
<searchers>); if it is not possible that a movement <of a sphere> does not tend
towards the movement of <its> star and if wemust think, that every physis and every
ousia, <which remains> unaffected and reaches its best in itself, must be considered
as an end, then there would not be another physis beside them, but the number of
the beings <: ousiai> would be just that.
a22 (13) If there were other <movements of other spheres> they would move <other
beings> as the goal of the movement, but it is not possible that there be other move-
ments besides the ones as mentioned.
a24 (14) It is reasonable to assume this based on the <visible> movements <of the
heavenly bodies>.
a25 (15) For, if everything which sets in motion is for the sake of the moved and if
every movement is <the movement> of something, then no motion could be for the
sake of itself nor of another movement, but for the sake of the stars.
a28 (16) For, if a movement were for the sake of <another> movement, then this
movement too should be for the sake of another movement; so that, since it is not
possible to go on to infinity, one of the divine bodies in the heavens will be <the>
end of every movement of the moved <beings>.
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a31 (17) That there is only one heaven, is plain.
a31 (18) For, if there were many heavens as human beings, then the origin for every
<heaven> would be eidetically one but numerically many.
a33 (19) But the numerically many has hyle (for there is one and the same notion
for many <beings>, e. g. <that> of man, but Socrates is one); the first ti en einai
has no hyle, because <it is> actuality <: entelecheia>.
a36 (20) Then the first which sets in motion is conceptually and numerically one,
because it is unmoved; also the ever and continually moved is only one; so there is
also one single heaven.
a38 (21) It has been handed down to <us> the posteriors from our ancestors and
forefathers in the form of myth that they <: the stars> are gods and that the divine
embraces the whole physis.
1074b3 (22) The rest is added in a mythical form to convince the crowd and for
the expedience of the laws and the common interests; for, they say that they have
human form and are similar to certain of the other animals and other things which
follow from and are close to that which has been said; if one would differentiate it <:
thesemythical additions> and take only the primary point, namely that they believed
that gods are first beings <: protai ousai>, that would seem divinely spoken; and,
because, in all likelihood, every productive knowledge and philosophy has as far
as possible been discovered many times and then they passed away again, so these
opinions of them <: the ancestors> have survived <from then> until now.
b13 (23) The opinion of our ancestors and that of the first <humans> may be clear
to us so far.
Chapter 9
1074b15 KP 22 (1)Concerning the nous there are some aporias; <the nous> seems
to be the most divine <being> in the range of the appearent <beings>, but the
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conditions under which it is such <: πῶς ἔχων> hold some difficulties.
b17 (2) For, if it is not aware of anything – what, then, would the wondrous <about
it> be? – instead it would be just as if it were one asleep – ; or if it is aware of
<something>, then something else is more powerful than it, because awareness <:
noesis> is not its ousia but <no more than> a capacity, so it would not be the best
ousia; for, from its being aware comes its worthiness.
b21 (3) Further, if it be that either nous or noesis <: the organ or the act> is its proper
being, of what is it aware?
b22 (4) Is it <is aware> of itself or of something else? And, if of something else,
then always of the same or ever of something else?
b23 (5) Does it make a difference or not to be aware of the beautiful or of any given
thing?
b25 (6) Or is it even out of place to be aware of some things?
b25 (7) It is clear, in any case, that it is aware of the most divine and most worthy
and <doing so> does not change; change would be to the worse and something like
this would already be a movement.
b28 (8) First, then, if it is not an <actual> noesis but <just> an ability <to be aware>,
it would be reasonable <to think> that to be continuously aware is tedious for it;
further it is clear that something else would be worthier than the nous, namely that
which <the nous is> aware of.
b31 (9) For, after all, to be aware in its actual performance <: τὸ νοεῖν, Inf. Praes.>
and the awareness in general <: ἡ νόησις> would belong too to that which is aware
of the worst, so that, if this is to be avoided (some things, indeed, are better to not
see than to see), the noesis would not be the best.
1074b33 KP 23 (10) So then it <: the nous> is aware of itself if indeed it is that
which is the most excellent, and awareness3 is awareness2 of awareness1.
b35 (11) But it seems that knowledge and perception and the opinion and the think-
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ing always refer to another <being> while to itself only secondarily.
b36 (12) Further, if being aware of and being perceived <: νοεῖν – νοεῖσθαι> are
different, with respect to which of the two does it contain the good?
b38 (13) For the being-aware and the being-perceived are not the same.35
1074b38 KP 24 (14) Or, in some cases, the knowledge is the matter; <e. g.> in the
cases of productive knowledge <which are> without hyle and the being <: ousia>
and the what-at-all-is-that?-being <is the matter>; <and> in the case of the theo-
retical knowledge <where> the reasoning and the awareness <are> the matter.
1075a3 (15) If then that which the nous is aware of and the nous are not different
in the cases without hyle, they will be the same, that means that the awareness and
that which the nous is aware of, are <numerically> one.
a5 (16) Further, there still remains an aporia: in the case that what <the nous> is
aware of is composed; because then it <: the nous> could change <when it is aware
of> the parts of the whole.
a6 (17) Or, is every <being> having no hyle indivisible – as the human nous <in
general> or even36 <the nous being aware> of composed37 <beings> at a certain
time behaves (while it <: the nous mentioned in phrase 10> does not possess the
good at this time or that time, but <it posseses> the best as a whole, because it is
something else <: i. e. without hyle and without parts>, – and does the awareness
<being aware> of itself behave that way all the time?
Chapter 10
1075a11 KP 25 (1) One has also to consider in which of the two ways the physis of
the whole contains the good and the best: whether as something separated and <as
35 I use ’perceived’ for νοητόν and νοούμενον because there is no passive of ‘being aware’ but the
meaning should be the same.
36 For ἤ see Kühner-Gerth, II, 2, § 538.3.
37 composed of eidos and hyle.
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a being> itself unto itself or as the arrangement <of its parts>.
1075a13 (2) Or <does it contain the good> in both ways, as an army?
a14 (3) Since, indeed, <for an army> the good <consists> in the order as well as the
commander <is its good>, and the latter the more, for he is not thanks to the order,
but the order is thanks to him.
a16 (4) But all <beings> are arranged together in some way, but not <all> in the
same way, e. g. swimming and flying <beings> and plants; and it is not the case that
one <being> has nothing to do with the other, but there is some <relation between
them>.
a18 (5) For all <beings> are arranged together towards one <end>; but just as in a
household the free are the least allowed <to do> anything but all or most <of their
actions> are determined, while for the slaves and the animals little <is determined>
with relation to the common interest but <they can act> mostly at random; for the
nature of each is such a principle <to act>.
a23 (6) I mean: as it is necessary for all <beings> to come to differentiation, so there
are another manners <of being> such that all partake in them for the <profit of> the
whole. –
a25 (7) It must not escape our notice what impossible or strange <consequences>
follow if one speaks otherwise, and what themore intelligent speaking say and about
which there are the fewest aporias.
a28 (8) For all <thinkers> produce all <beings> out of opposites.
a28 (9) <But> neither the term ‘all’ nor ‘out of opposites’ <is said> correctly, nor
<do they say> wherein the opposites consist, <and> they do not say how <beings
will come to be> out of opposites; because the opposites <themselves> are unaf-
fected by each other.
a31 (10) But for us <that problem> is solved reasonably by <saying that> there is a
third something <beside the opposites>.
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a32 (11) But others construe the one part of the opposites as hyle, in just such a
fashion as they who make the unequal <to be the hyle> for the equal, or the many
<to be the hyle> for the unity.
a33 (12) But this too is solved in the same way: the numerically one38 hyle <which
underlies the opposites> is not opposite to anything.
a34 (13) Further, <by the reasoning of our opponents> all <beings> would partake
in the bad, except the one; because the bad itself being one of the <two opposite>
elements.
a36 (14) Some others <do not even think that> the good and the bad are principles;
and yet the good most of all is principle in all <beings>.
a38 (15) Some do <say> rightly that this is a principle, but how the good is a prin-
ciple they do not say, whether in the sense of an end or as a moving <principle> or
as an eidos.
1075b1 (16) Even Empedocles <speaks about it> in a strange way: he makes love
to be the good and this both in the sense of the moving <cause>, since it brings
together, and as well in the sense of hyle; for it is part of the mixture.
b4 (17) But even if it should be the case, that the same <being> at one time is a
principle as hyle and at another time as moving <cause>, the term ‘to be’ does not
mean the same <in both cases>.
b6 (18) In which of the two respects, then, <is> love <a principle>?
b6 (19) And it is absurd that the strife should be indestructible; just this <: strife>
is the nature of the bad.
b8 (20) Anaxagoras <thinks, that> the good is a principle in the sense of moving
<cause>, since the nous sets in motion.
b9 (21) But it sets in motion for the sake of something <else>, so that something
38 Codd. ἡ μία; W. Jaeger writes ἡμῖν, following Alexander.
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else <must be the good>; except <we take it> as we say: for the medical knowledge
is in some way the health.
b10 (22) Further, it is strange not to make something to be the opposite of the good
and of the nous.
b11 (23) All who speak about opposites are not making any use of these opposites,
if one does not arrange <their ideas oneself>.
1075b13KP 26 (24)And, no one says, why some <beings> are perishable and other
imperishable; because they construe all beings from the same principles.
b14 (25) Further, some derive the beings from the non-being; others, in order that
they not be constrained to do this, make all <beings> one. –
1075b16 KP 27 (26) Further, no one says why there will always be becoming and
what the cause of becoming is.
b17 (27) For those who make two principles another principle must be even more
powerful <than these two>; and also for those who <make it> the eide, another prin-
ciple <must be> more powerful; since, <they should explain,> why <something>
has taken part <: μετέσχεν, Aorist> or is <now> actually taking part <: μετέχει,
present tense; in the ideas>?
1075b20 KP 28 (28) And, the others must accept that something is opposite to wis-
dom and to the most worthy <kind of> knowledge, but we <do> not <have to sup-
pose such a thing>.
b21 (29) Because nothing is ever opposite to the first; all that which is opposite
has hyle and is potentially that <: one of the opposites>; the ignorance <which is>
opposite <to knowledge> should refer <to that opposite> but nothing is opposite to
the first.
1075b24 KP 29 (30) Further, if there be nothing besides the perceptible <beings>,
then there would be no principle and order and becoming and the heavenly beings,
but <there would be> always a principle of a principle, as <it is in fact> for all
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theologians and physicists.
b27 (31) If there were eide or numbers <besides the perceptible beings>, thesewould
be cause of nothing; if not <so, they would> certainly not <be the cause> of move-
ment.
b28 (32) Further, how would magnitude and continuity result from <beings> with-
out magnitude?
b29 (33) The number will not be able to produce continuous <beings>, neither as
moving <cause> nor as eidos.
b30 (34) Indeed none of the opposites can produce or move in the proper sense,
since it might be that it is not.
b32 (35) But in any case producing is secondary to <the> possibility <to produce
something>.
b33 (36) Consequently no beings could be eternal.
b33 (37) But there are <such beings>; thus something must removed from these
<cited presuppositions>.
b34 (38) How, it has been said.39
1075b34 KP 30 (39) Further, by what the numbers <are> a unit, or the soul and the
body, and generally the eidos and the thing, no one tells us anything about that; nor
is it possible to say <something about that>, unless one says as we <have said>,
namely, that the moving cause produces <the unity>.
b37 (40) Those who say that the mathematical number is primary and <let follow>
in the same way one kind of ousia after another and who <set> for each <kind>
other principles, make the ousia of the whole to be incoherent, because one <kind
of ousia> does not contribute something to another <kind> whether it is or is not;
and, <they assign> many principles, but the beings want not to be ruled badly.
39 W.D. Ross, ad loc.: 1071b19–20.
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1076a4 (41) ”Rule by many is not good, <it shall be> only one ruler.”
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2. The Traditional Reception of Met. Λ and itsDifficulties
2.1. Met. Λ as a Metaphysics of Substance
The modern literature onMet. Λ centers on two claims which enjoy broad approval.
Although these are occasionally made with some slight qualifications, they never-
theless form the communis opinio simply because of a lack of meaningful alter-
natives. The first is that the term ‘substance’ translates fairly and accurately what
Aristotle means by ousia.1 The second claim is that the essence and aim ofMet. Λ is
to prove that God is the cause of our world in some way or another.2 If there remains
any controversy in the literature, it is only about the rigor or strength of this proof.
These two claims are normally linked to a third, which states that the concept of
ousia discussed in Met. Λ 6–10 has nothing to do with the corresponding concept
discussed in Met. ΖΗΘ because the ‘middle books’ are about natural substances,
while this text speaks about divine substance, and what can be said about the one is
not applicable to the other.
What happens, if we give greater weight to the doubts about the equating of ousia
1 This view is sowidespread that it is almost unnecessary to give examples, but I will add a few anyway:
E. Vollrath, 1969; U. Guzzoni, 1975; K. Brinkmann, 1979; H. Schmitz, 1985; J. H. Königshausen,
1989; M.-L. Gill, 1989; T. Irwin, 2. ed. 1990; M. J. Loux, 1991; F. A. Lewis, 1991; C. Rapp, 1996;
W. Schneider, 2001; L.M. De Rijk, 2002; D. Fonfara, 2003; T. Trappe, 2004. Chr. Rapp / K.
Corcilius, 2011; Chr. Horn, 2016. S. Fazzo, 2016, F. Boghassian, 2019. A. Brook begins his article
“Substance and the Primary Sense of Being in Aristotle,” The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 68, No.
3 (March 2015), pp. 521-544, with the sentence: “Clearly, substance (ousia) is the primary sense in
the Metaphysics.”
2 H. Flashar, 1983, 262. On C. Horn, 2016, see fn. 76, p. 112. Over the last few years the doubts
about this claim are slowly growing, e. g. S. Broadie, A. Kosman, B. Botter, S. Fazzo; those who
reject a theological interpretation often determine as the theme of Met. Λ either substance or theory.
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with substance than to the convenience of the communis opinio?3 The doubts will
be strengthened when we trace back how this equating came about. To do this
seems all the more justified given that the literature in question hardly ever explains
what is meant by substance. The precise sense of this term is assumed as given for
readers or as fundamentally unproblematic. When, ever, can ‘substance’ be said to
habe been a clear and distinct concept? How is it that substantia became accepted
as the translation for ousia? What was the background and context that gave rise to
this translation? Are there in Aristotle’s work already indications for understanding
ousia as substance? Has the difference between the concept of ousia as discussed
in Met. ΖΗΘ and in Met. Λ to do with this transformation?
This present chapter will be pursuing such and similar of questions. One of the
conclusions of this inquiry is that the interpretation of ousia as substance did not
emerge at one specific place or time, but instead it developed over a long period of
time, in response to several independent questions, and was the result of accidental
and uncoordinated interactions between heterogeneous interests, which are beyond
the scope of this book.
It is not only the modern scholastic interpretation that assumes thatMet. Λ develops
a metaphysics of substance,4 philosophical historical research too shares this opin-
ion.5 Both, those to whom metaphysics is amenable, and their opponents, main-
tain that the outstanding subject of Met. Λ is indeed substance.6 Further, despite
the many changes, both in the appropriation of the Aristotlian Metaphysics and the
polemics against it, nothing other than substance has ever been regarded as its main
3 There have been a range of thinkers who have expressed their doubts about this equating, e. g. C.
Arpe, 1941; C. Rapp, 1996. Also T. A. Szlezák points to the problems of this translation but only to
go on to translate ousia with ‘substance’ in any case. J. Owens translates ousia with entity, which
unfortunately leads directly to theology, see footnote 90, p.116; Joe Sachs consciously and consis-
tenly avoids the Latin term in his translation of theMetaphysics, 2002. Some principles of translation
which I tried to follow in my translations of and commentaries to book Zeta, 1993, revised edition
2012, and Lambda, 2008, are very close to his principles.
4 To name but a few examples, F. Inciarte, 1994; G. Reale, in all his books and articles, esp.1994;
various books in the editiones scholasticae.– On the concept of the philosophy of substance see T.
Trappe, 2004, 93–115.
5 Represented e. g. by H. J. Krämer; M. Frede, 1987; Rapp / Corcilius, 2011, C. Horn, 2016.
6 For the criticism of metaphysics, with bibliography, see W. Stegmaier, 1977, and E. Schott, 1994.
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subject. Differences between the interpretations are restricted to more or less drastic
shifts in the understanding of this concept.
Anyone wishing to show that the metaphysics as a whole is a mistake, a mere prej-
udice or deception through seduction by language, tradition, or whatever else, must
also prove this in the case for substance, as the relevant proper being. Metaphysics
and substance were at the centre of the polemic even in older analytic philosophy.
While R. Carnap’s take was polemical, metaphysics later received increasingly pos-
itive acceptance, e. g. by R.M. Chisholm.7 In classic expositions of metaphysics
(and, not only for older ones like those of Chr. Wolff or A.G. Baumgarten), but
also for newer ones (like those of G. Martin, D.W. Hamlyn, W. Stegmaier, M. J.
Loux), it is held as self-evident that substance constitutes the core subject matter of
that discipline.
I will forgo presenting the link between metaphysics and substance, for this is a
common conviction and there are already several excellent historiographical and
systematic accounts of it.8 Philosophically relevant treatments of this connection
come down from by G.W. F. Hegel and M. Heidegger. It seems obvious from the
very nature of the concepts that substance and metaphysics are intimately related
to each other. If metaphysics is a science ‘beyond’ (μετά) physics and has some
object – of whatever kind – then this object must be more stable and independent
than any physical or natural objects. That is, for many interpreters, what is meant by
substance. Although some praise Plato as the inventor of metaphysics, it is Aristotle
who, according to tradition, is said to be the author of this discipline. Accordingly,
the two above-mentioned claims of ousia dominate the modern scholarship on Aris-
totle. Any minor doubts these modern scholars may have are only ever mentioned
in their forewords.
7 R.M. Chisholm, 1989, and An Essay on Ontology, 1996.
8 W. Cramer, 1959, W. Stegmaier, 1977, E. Schott, 1994.
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2.1.1. What would ‘Substance’ Mean?
Since the time of the Church Fathers, at the latest, Aristotle has been said to have
established the concept of substance, and Tertullianus already is using substantia
quite commonly. Still today, many think, that the particular thing can serve as the
pattern of substance, by which one was meant to have grasped the concept of sub-
stance in the Categories. On the other hand, substance is the eidos, which concept
is supposedly found in Met. Ζ.9 However, this leads to a problem: eidos seems
to be something like an universal, but Aristotle explicitly denies that ousia is uni-
versal. With the concept of individual form have some scholars tried to escape the
dilemma.10
In this book I contest the assumption that substance is at the centre of Aristotle’s
philosophy,11 I do not, however, dispute that this assumption has indeed developed
and become established over time. Prepared and developed in the Stoa, in the theory
of rhetoric, and in the legal literature of Rome, the concept of substance comes to
play an important role from the time of the Church Fathers, at least. Surprisingly,
in the very large body of literature on Aristotle’s substance in the neo-scholastic as
well as in the historiographical and philological party, the concept of substance itself
is rarely addressed. As a rule, substance as translation of ousia is tacitly assumed,
in a fuzzy sense. In any case it is understood as a given fact and assertion, hardly
ever as itself subject to critical inquiry.
Substance is said to be that which actually and truly exists, it is thus the successor
of Plato’s ὄντως ὄν (real being). It is that which bears the accidents, that which
remains unchanged, it is autonomous and independent. What remains open to ques-
tion and controversial in the standard interpretation, are the reasons why Aristotle
9 Cf. G. Martin, 1965; W. Stegmaier, 1977; W. Viertel, 1982; D.W. Hamlyn, 1984; G. Reale, 1993,
who establishes a program of 5 points for the Met.
10 E. g. M. Frede, G. Patzig, 1988, following predecessors like R. Albittron, 1957; W. Sellars, 1957;
E. D. Harter, 1975, 11, the eidos of an concrete individual, [...] it’s own particular shape, form, or
structure. However, the problem was already exposed by Duns Scotus and Suarez (for the principle
of individuation see: Disp. Met., Disp V, Sectio 6); bibliography by D. Fonfara, 2003, 10–11.
11 For further arguments on this point see my commentary on Book Z, 2012.
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apparently effects a change in the concept of substance, a transformation through
which the single thing in the Categories is replaced with eidos inMet. ΖΗΘ, and fi-
nally with god inMet. Λ. The modern pattern of such an understanding of substance
in Aristotle research can be found in the writings of M. Frede or M.V. Wedin.12
A glance at a few prominent statements about substance, beginning with F. Suarez,
should make it possible to identify the main characteristics of the modern concept
of substance. Many scholars assume that Aristotle has exactly this notion in mind
when he speaks about ousia. At the same time we will see that the term ultimately
disappears from the centre of philosophical occupation. In his Disputationes Meta-
physicae, Disputatio XXXIII, Sectio 1 (vol. 2, 330), F. Suarez summarizes the
scholastic tradition as follows:
This word ‘substance’ derives from two verbs, namely from ‘to persist’ or from
‘to stand firm’ [...]13
He explains the first term with:
this word should mean the same as to exist or to persist being; 14
the second means:
that the thing is so solid and stable that it can bear another thing. 15
The main characteristics of substance, then, are permanence and the capacity to
bear something, that is to be the foundation on which something subsists. In Met.
Z hypokeimenon, subject, has this function.
Descartes first undersood substance as esse a se.16 Of such a substance, however,
there can be ultimately only one, no different substance could fulfill this criterion at
the same time. Further, if existence is at the core of substance, but pure existence
is unable to affect us (pure existence has no content; the content of a thing is given
12 M. Frede, 1987, 72–80; M.V. Wedin, 2000.
13 Duplex est etymologia huius vocis substania, nimirum, vel a subsistendo, vel a substando [...]
14 derivatum est hoc verbum ad siginificandum idem, quod existere, seu supermanere in esse,
15 significat rem ita esse in se firmam et constantem ut possit aliam sustinere.
16 Descartes, Principia Philosophiae I, 51, quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indiget ad existendum.
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by its attributes which can affect us), then we cannot have knowledge of substance
itself, but only of its attributes. They are the basis on which we infer the existence
of substance. On this subject, Descartes further writes, Principia Philosophiae, I
51:
From the fact, that we perceive an attribute we conclude that there necessarily
is also an existent thing, or a substance, to which we can ascribe the attribute.17
With a second consideration of substance, Descartes explains that there are two
forms of substance, namely substance as res extensa and as res cogitans.
G.W. Leibniz, with Reference to Plato’s Sophist, understood substance as that which
has power.18 This was Leibniz’ final and ultimate definition of the concept of sub-
stance, while previously he had formulated the concepts of the ultimum subiectum,19
as well as that of perseverance. 20
In A.G. Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §§ 191–2, we read:
A being either can not exist except as a determination of another thing, or it can.
The first is the accidens [...] the latter the substance, a being per- sisting per se
[...] and able to exist, i. e. it is not in another being, and not a determination of
another thing. – § 192. The existence of the accidens as such is inherence, the
existence of the substance as such is subsistence.21
In Kant’s philosophy the concept of substance has lost its priority. As ultimum sub-
sistens, substance is an empty term and we cannot have any intuition of it, because
17 Ex hoc enim quod aliquod attributum adesse percipiamus concludimus aliquam rem existentem, sive
substantiam, cui illud tribui possit, necessario etiam adesse.
18 Plato, Sophist 247e δύναμις; Leibniz also refers to Aristotle, e. g. in the Specimen Dynamicum
but also in GP VI 588; De Prima Philosophiae Emendatione, et de Notione Substantiae: GP IV
468f., De ipsa natura sive de vi insita actionibusque Creaturarum, pro Dynamicis suis conformandis
illustrandisque, GP IV 504ff, 508: ipsam rerum substantiam in agendi patiendique vi consistere, “the
substance of things consists in the ability to act and to suffer.”
19 See the letter to Des Bosses GP II 457, and Discours de Met. § 8, GP IV 432–433, as well.
20 Remarque sur la lettre de M. Arnauld, GP II 43.
21 § 191 …Ens vel non potest existere, nisi ut determinatio alterius, (in alio), vel potest. Prius ACCI-
DENS, [...] posterius est SUBSTANTIA, ens per se subsistens [...] quod potest existere, licet non sit in
alio, licet non sit determinatio alterius. – § 192. Existentia accidentis, qua talis, est INHAERENTIA,
existentia substantiae, qua talis, est SUBSISTENTIA.
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all of the sensual determinations have been abstracted from it.22 Substance belongs
to the category of relation, because substance exists only together with that which
inheres in it.
The substance underlying accidents is the ultimum subjectum. Regardless of our
starting point, our questions “Of which thing does this hold true?” or “Of what is
this said of?” we must terminate somewhere. That point of termination will be
the ultimum subjectum, the last about-what. This means that there has to be a final
independent being to which we can attribute properties, qualities, and so on. Tak-
ing subsistence as a criterion of substance quickly leads to the conclusion of the
uniqueness of substance, because an absolutely independent being does not toler-
ate any competition with, or limitation by, another absolutely independent being.
The ultimate bearing and underlying all else, the substance that supports all other
comparatively independent things and all other secondary substances, traditionally
is called God.
Both, the ultimum subsistens as well as the ultimum subiectum can be conceived in
either a strict or a freer way. Strictly speaking, they only designate one substance;
in the free sense, there can be many. In general, ordinary things around us, such
as trees, houses, dogs, rocks, and the like, are considered to be substances. Many
think that they can rely onAristotle’s texts, in particular on the examples given in the
Cat. (“this horse”) and in the Met. One overlooks the fact that Aristotle uses these
examples to articulate the common opinions of his time, and that they are starting
points for the question about ousia, but by no means represent a ready solution to
this question.
In summary, the scholarship traditionally ascribes three main characteristics to sub-
stance (mostly implicitly), each of which have some connection with Aristotle’s
reflections. From the distinction between, on the one hand, the hypokeimenon,
which is said according to itself and as itself and which is not predicated upon any
another being, and, on the other hand, that which is said of other things,23 derives
22 Kritik der reinen Vernunft B 186.
23 Kath’ hauto – kat’ allo legomenon.
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the concept of substance as ultimum subiectum in the reception history. From Aris-
totle’s observation that becoming, movement, and change are comprehensible only
if there is also something that does not change, together with the completely dif-
ferent distinction between the attributes that are essential for a thing and those that
are not,24 came about the concept of substance as ultimum subsistens. Aristotle’s
concept of nature as the origin of movement has led to the concept of substance as
that which has force (G.W. Leibniz), and to the esse a se (R. Descartes). Since ulti-
mum subiectum and ultimum subsistens are no more than formal ideas and without
definite content, it becomes essential to know with which content they are filled. At
different times and within different given contexts, the individual thing, the person,
and God have been considered as content of substance.
2.1.2. ‘Substance’ in Cat.,Met. Z andMet. Λ
Within the scholarly community, there is a consensus that, although Aristotle in-
vented the concept of substance, he held various views about this concept, at times
even contradictory ones.25 Aristotle is said to have stated in the Cat. that “this
horse,” i. e. the concrete singular thing is the model of substance. According to the
standard interpretation, in the central books of theMet. as well as inMet. Λ 1–5 the
substance of natural, moved things is thematic, which turns out to be eidos, while in
Met. Λ 6–10 the immovable substance, ultimately identified with divine substance,
is thematic. Hence there is a need to explain this conflict between the Categories,
the central books of theMet. andMet. Λ 6–10. Additionally, with the central books
of the Met. the question arises as to whether eidos should be understood as a gen-
eral or a singular term. Neither of these two proposals satisfies because Aristotle
explicitly rejects universals as ousia inMet. Z 13, and the concept of the individual
form seems to be problematic.
24 The permanent attributes being essential; to kat’ hauto – to kata symbebekos legomenon
25 J. Halfwassen, 1998, Sp. 507, with lit. – For the American dispute see D.W. Graham, 1987; E. D.
Harter, 1988; M. Furth, 1988; M.-L. Gill, 1989; E. C. Halper, 1989; C. Witt, 1989; T. Irwin, 1990
2. ed.; F. A. Lewis, 1991; id., 2013; M. J. Loux, 1991 and many earlier authors. Further lit. in J.
Barnes, 1995, 350f.; M.V. Wedin, 2000; D. Fonfara, 2003; Dae-Ho Cho, 2003, also starts with the
question of the consistency between Cat. and Met. Z.
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The form of a thing is constituted by a set of attributes, i. e. of predicates, which are
always general; it follows that only a certain combination of attributes can be indi-
vidual. An eidos has only a limited number of characteristics, while an individual
thing has an unlimited number of determinations. So an ‘individual form’ would
have to satisfy contradictory conditions, that of the form and that of the individual.
In addition, it is not so clear as it is presupposed in the claims of M. Frede and G.
Patzig what an individual may be. In a certain context an individual may be a part
of an individual in another. O course, I think of myself as an individual, but for
my dentist it is not myself but rather my tooth that is the individual object during
treatment. Moreover, if the form is not general, it would have to be some singular
thing, a name or a description; none of these possibilities can be found in Aristotle’s
texts.
To search for what makes something an individual, is to search for a principle of
individuation. It was thought that the matter, space and time, and then again the
individual form could function as a principle of individuation. With respect to the
individual form F. Suarez, Disputationes V., Sectio IV, asks:
Is the forma substantialis [= causa formalis + finalis] the principle of individ-
uation of the material substances? 26
Suarez answers affirmatively, following Aristotle’s claim in De Anima B 1, that
“something is called a tode ti with respect to the eidos,” which he paraphrased
with:
it is the form which constitutes an any-this.27
Indeed, well before Suarez, Plotinus has asked whether there can be individual
forms (Enn. V 9 [5] 8,2). In the Middle Ages Duns Scotus said that the problem
of individuation could only be resolved by supposing individual form: the haec-
ceitas.
26 an forma substantialis [= causa formalis + finalis] sit principium individuationis substantiarum
materialium.
27 formam esse, quae constituit hoc aliquid (175a).
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It is precisely because philosophers in the 20th century oriented themselves so much
towards the seemingly absolute reality of the individual thing to understand to be
that the question of identification was dealt with in such detail analytically and pro-
foundly with a variety of proposals put forward, even if now the idea of substance
has proved to be irrelevant or insufficiently sustainable.28
Most interpreters see a contradiction between the statements on prote ousia in the
Cat. and in Met. Z.29 A large number of books and articles are concerned with
overturning this contradiction. Among many others, is that of D.W. Graham, where
he summarizes his ideas in the last chapter, “What Aristotle Should Have Said.” The
following two quotes from the commentary on Met. Z by M. Frede and G. Patzig,
illustrate well how the different concepts of substance in Cat. and Met. Z is seen
today:
While Aristotle in the Categories says that concrete objects are the primary
ousiai, here [: in Met. Z] he declares for the first time the form and the “What
it means to be such a thing” to be the primary ousia;30
and
[According to the general consensus] Aristotle himself, on the other hand, had
28 In newer ontologies, haecceitas has been revived with new functions, e. g. G. S. Rosenkrantz, 1993,
wanted to give a basis to an extreme realism concerning qualities by haecceitas.
29 Examples for this supposition of difference or contradiction: Ch. H. Chen, 1957; H. J. Krämer, 1974;
E. D. Harter, 1975, holds that (prote ousia inMet. means the individual form); M. Frede, 1978, now
in Essays 1987; M. Frede, 1983, 27, says that inMet. Z there are no more concrete objects underlying
all the rest but substantial forms, and he adds: “The Categories are realistic and the Metaphysics
nominalist.” D.W. Graham, 1987; M. Frede, G. Patzig, 1988. – It seems that now there is a slowly
growing resistance to the way D.W. Graham confronted the Organon and theMetaphysics with each
other, cf. C. Wildberg, O. Goldin, 1989. – Cf. M. Furth, 1988 on the relation between Cat. and
Met.: There is no contradiction insofar as Cat. is simply a didactical introduction whereas Met. Z
is for advanced students. D. Fonfara, 2003, very plausibly, demonstrastes that the difference is the
result of a distinction of respects. – Chr. Rapp, in Rapp / Corcilius, 2011, 335–342. – M.V. Wedin,
2000, 157, gives strong arguments in favor of the compatibility of Cat. and Met. Z; he says that
the former shows how the world must behave in order that our statements about it be true (because
it begins with a definition of substance as individual things) the latter on the other hand, focuses on
this very structure.
30 M. Frede, G. Patzig, 1988, Bd. II, 114, zuMet. Z 7, 1032b2: Während Aristoteles in derKategorien-
schrift von konkreten Gegenständen als primären ousiai spricht, bezeichnet er hier [: in Met. Z]
zum ersten Mal die Form und das ‘Was es heisst, dies zu sein,’ als primäre ousia.
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initially (in the Cat.) stated that individual things are the ultimate basis of all
the rest, and that everything else existed only in so far as it was based in some
way or another, on such individual things. Likewise, opinions differ as to what
should be regarded in an object as the ultimate being and the cause for the being
of the object.31
D.W. Graham has discerned two contradictory metaphysical systems in Aristotle.
The first is an “atomic substantialism,” and stands against a later developed system,
“hylomorphic substantialism.”
For some interpreters, what seems to be contradictory is only a difference of the
concept of eidos.32 Eidos in the Cat. seems to mean the universal rather, but since
according to the Met. Z 13 the universal cannot be ousia in any form, eidos inMet.
Z must mean a “particular form of a concrete individual” (E. D. Harter, 1975, 14).
This would be the “most fundamental sort of being,” the first reality, that uponwhich
change and genesis is based. E. D. Harter continues by saying that the unification
of the causa formalis and the causa finalis is traditionally called “substantial form”
(i. e. in scholasticism, 14), and that it is this primary reality that is at stake in the
genesis of ousia as a singular thing, i. e. this is the prote ousia. This “substantial
form,” however, is not universal but “individuated” (15).
When some say that in theCat. prote ousia is instantiated by the concrete individual,
but inMet. by the eidos, that is based on a particular understanding of the terms ho
tis anthropos in the Cat. and to ti en einai and eidos in the Met. It is therefore
necessary to verify, in these two points, the above assertion.33 In doing so, we
must differentiate between two questions. It is one matter to investigate whether the
concrete individual thing is at all suitable for the function that Aristotle attributes to
ousia, quite another, to investigate whether in the Cat. ho tis anthropos means the
31 M. Frede, G. Patzig, 1988, Bd. I, 37: Aristoteles selbst hingegen habe zunächst (in der Kategorien-
schrift) die Auffassung vertreten, das letztlich Zugrundeliegende seien die Einzeldinge und alles an-
dere gebe es nur, insofern ihm auf die eine oder andere Weise solche Einzeldinge zugrundelägen.
Ebenso gingen die Meinungen darüber auseinander, was denn bei einemGegenstand als das letztlich
Seiende und die Ursache für das Sein des Gegenstandes zu betrachten sei.
32 See E. D. Harter, 1975, or A. C. Lloyd, 1981.
33 The claim is presented in an especially concise way by D.W. Graham, 1987, and by M. Frede and
G. Patzig 1988.
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concrete singular thing. Here follows an attempt to justify a negative reply to the
second question. As for the first question, it must be said that, even if the question
of primary being (prote ousia) is understood as the question about being (Frage
nach dem Sein) as developed in Met. Z, we can still take beings (Seiendes) as that
which is to be investigated (although not as an answer to the question of being).
If it turns out that it must be doubted that, in theCat., Aristotle with ho tis anthropos
means the concrete individual thing, then the relationship between Cat. andMet. Z
must be reconsidered in this respect; further, it will be necessary to ask what ho tis
anthropos refers to, if not to a concrete individual thing. The linguistic arguments
that the term cannot mean the concrete individual have already been put forward
elsewhere.34 These arguments are based on the fact that the phrase ho tis anthropos
combines the meaning ‘determined,’ which is expressed by the definite article ho,
with the meaning ‘not determined in the present case,’ which is expressed by the
indefinite pronoun tis. The combination of both gives rise to the meaning ‘to be
determined in principle but not in the present case.’ This means that the phrase does
not refer to some present individual thing, because an individual thing is completely
determined (and is referred to with tode ti), while ho tis anthropos is not thus fully
determined.
This linguistic argument is supported by a number of other arguments. The first
of these relates to the associated problem history (Problemgeschichte). Modern
research has recently become more willing than before to accept a continuity of
problems between Plato and Aristotle. The consensus exists both among philoso-
phers35 as well as in Aristotelian research.36 One of the main controversies in this
area is about the content of this continuity. If (i) Aristotle realized that Plato’s cru-
cial question as exposed in the Sophist was about the meaning of being (Frage nach
dem Sein) and that this was the very question that required further investigation, and
if (ii) he subsequently set out to investigate this question once again, but using new
34 Cf. E. Sonderegger, 2012, 169–171.
35 Apart from various references by M. Heidegger, see e. g. the book by P. Ricœur, 1982, as well as
the research on the Unwritten Doctrines of Plato, which must assume a continuity of problems.
36 See the exposition on the current state of research by H. Flashar, 1983, or by Rapp / Corcilius, 2011.
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means and at the level of his own understanding (therefore the speculative sketch
in Met. Λ and the repetition of that question in Met. ZΗΘ),
and if (iii) he has understood that Plato tried to articulate our unavoidable Doxa
about being through the ‘five highest genera,’ and if (iv) he moreover agreed with
Plato that the question of the meaning of being imperatively includes the question
of speech (because to be is omnipresent in our logos and is used in many ways),
then it would be an incomprehensible loss of awareness of the problem at hand to
simply claim that ‘this real horse’ or ‘this real man’ is prote ousia, i. e. that ‘this
real horse’ or ‘this real man’ are the First and One (das Erste und Eine) with respect
to which our various ways of using to be have their unity. first, the If we persisted
in contending something about to be without reflecting on language, we would fail
to maintain the level of the question built up by Plato and we would be surrendering
the insight of the guest from Elea that it is neither possible nor meaningful simply
to oppose the old claims about to be with new ones.
Plato first showed in the Sophist that it is necessary to reflect on the logos. If, with
the Organon, Aristotle truly carries out this project – possibly much further and in
a somehow different way, with a broader scope and means other than Plato had at
hand – then the Categories, too, would be involved in this pursuit. Thus it cannot
be the objective of the Categories to claim that the concrete individual thing best
realizes what it means to be. Nevertheless, one can very well proceed from the
concrete, individual being as a suitable starting point for reflection on the nature of
being since it is the generally recognized one. This concludes, for now, the argument
concerning methodological issues.
If it we want to articulate the Doxa about being (ousia, Sein), then we must start
from what people actually believe to be true. If somebody were to assert something
other than what is actually believed, this assertion would be again no more than a
new opinion of somebody and the task of examining it would begin anew. Plato
exposes in the Sophist a kind of philosophizing according to which the reflection on
and the analysis of prevailing opinions, of the self-evident (das Selbstverständliche),
is the job of philosophers rather than proposing new opinions of their own even if
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they were acute and original. The starting point for this reflection must be what
‘we all’ consider to be true and real, and that is then as now the concrete single
thing. This is the reason why Aristotle in theMet. speaks of the σῶμα φυσικόν, the
natural body, in many places, it is used as the starting point for reflecting, it never
constitutes – nor is it intended to constitute – the conclusion. Instead, Aristotle
aims at transforming an endoxon into a thought or to find the fundamental justifying
reason for a given endoxon.
Whether one argues that the individual and corporeal thing is the best example of
being (Sein),37 or one thinks that the individual thing is that which must be investi-
gated in order to find an answer about the meaning of being (Frage nach dem Sein),
in any case it is more important to see the two different respects under which the
individual thing is examined in the Cat. and in the Met.38 The first and fundamen-
tal opinion about being (sein) that Aristotle seems to identify is that it is a basis, a
fundament, a subject (hypokeimenon). Cat. approaches being-a-subject from two
different sides, that is, as ‘subject-for-being’ and as ‘subject-for-speaking.’ Aristo-
tle combines the positive and negative instances and thus he has four positions, see
table 2.1.
is in a subject is said of a
subject
examples
- + human being in general
+ - a specific knowledge; a certain white
+ + knowledge in general
- - ho tis anthropos; (not ident. with prote
ousia)
Table 2.1.: Categories, 2
One could think that this table is made to get four classes of beings, in which all
beings can be distributed, but that is not the case, at any rate it is not used that way in
the subsequent text. Themain purpose of this classification is simply to establish the
37 Like those who think that the body is the proper being in Plato’s Sophist
38 Good work about this has been done by Fonfara, 2003.
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minimum criteria that allow us to identify and pinpoint the first instance of being, the
prote ousia. With this catalogue ofminimum criteria we can examine any statement,
concerning any topic, with regard to whether the object of inquiry is a proper being.
We may do so by simply checking whether it has at least the the character of a first
(or last) about-what (Worüber) with respect both to its being (Sein) and its use in
speech. If this is not the case, the alleged being (Seiendes) cannot be the first being,
prote ousia, Sein.
Up to this point, the arguments against the identity of ho tis anthropos and prote
ousia have been based on the environment of the problem and on method. Further
arguments from the text, however, confirm the understanding gained so far. Aristo-
tle distinguishes between an individual being and ho tis anthropos, the expression
that is the example of prote ousia. At the end of Cat. 2 Aristotle distinguishes τὰ
ἄτομα καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ (“things that are individual and numerically one”) and ho
tis anthropos, because the latter fulfills both conditions of ousia (it is neither in a
subject nor said of a subject), while the former does not do that in every case (for
it can be in a subject, e. g. a certain grammatical knowledge). If there is anything
that is an individual being, then surely it must be what is numerically one.
In Cat. 2, 1a27f., τὸ τὶ λευκόν (“the expression ‘some white <being>’ ”), which
has the same linguistic structure as ho tis anthropos is distinguished from the body
which is its hypokeimenon. So τὸ τὶ λευκόν is surely not an independent individual.
Therefore “τὸ τὶ x” is neither always nor necessarily a singular individual and a
substance.
But is ho tis anthropos a singular individual nonetheless? Let us consider fur-
ther evidence for a negative response. Prote ousia is the hypokeimenon for further
determinations like quantity, quality, etc. (Cat. 5, 2a35). But a concrete, individ-
ual being already has all its categorical determinations as a matter of fact, which
it should still receive as prote ousia. The meaning of the phrase ho tis anthropos
is, therefore, most likely that which its linguistic form suggests: ‘determination in
principle’ combined with ‘indeterminacy in the present case.’ The phrase desig-
nates the essence of the thing, along with the accidental determinations that it must
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have in principle, without taking into account the specific realization of those acci-
dental determinations (e. g. ‘it must be colored’ but it is left undecided what color
it is). R. M. Chisholm’s take on Meinong’s incomplete objects (unvollständige
Gegenstände) perfectly matches this understanding of ho tis anthropos, although
Chisholm himself connects incomplete objects to deuterai ousiai.39
What is the use of thinking about such a being? Why, alongside the being that
is concretely determined and the being without any accidents (the eidos), should
we now wish to know anything about yet another being – the being that must be
determined in principle, but whose concrete realization is left open? Is this not
exactly the same as asking the question τοῦτί τί ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμα, “What at all is
this?” Those who ask this question have the thing before their eyes, they see it but
have no idea what it could be.40 They would like to know more than the bare eidos,
but they do not need to know all the details. They are, in fact, aware of the details,
but these make no sense because they are unable to contextualize it in a broader
whole; this could be a possible meaning of the “individual form” (although not in
the sense Frede-Patzig took it). If that is true, then Cat. andMet. Z are talking about
the same thing under different titles (respectively, ho tis anthropos and eidos) and
from different perspectives, in the first, with respect to ‘determination in principle,’
and in the second, with respect to a ‘set of eidetic determinations.’
In order to appreciate what Cat. and Met. Z contribute to the understanding of
ousia, some additional considerations are necessary. Neither does it seem that ho
tis anthropos is the concrete individual and thus the prote ousia as claimed by the
standard interpretation (or this holds true only as an endoxon and as the starting
point for the investigation), nor does it seem that the statement in the Met., that
prote ousia relies on eidos, is a simple retreat to the Platonic position.
Aristotle never gives up his claim that an essential statement about something should
contain, as aminimum, also a statement about the prote ousia. Both theMet. and the
Cat., however, make it clear that it is impossible to make such essential statements,
39 R.M. Chisholm, 1982, 49–50. The deuterai ousiai seem to be too general, they are without any
accidents.
40 For the material in Aristophanes’ comedies see E. Sonderegger, 1983.
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since the prote ousia is inexpressible. That which is inexpressible (das Unsagbare)
is not an occult, mystical thing, as somemight assume, but simply that which cannot
be expressed in language: the simple essence of a present thing.
The correct answer to the Greek question Τοῦτί τί ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμα; – “What at all
is this?” – must include the full range of features of the being in its concrete and
individual givenness. Whoever tries to provide such an answer, can only anser the
question Τi estin? and, as stated in Cat. 5, 2b8–10, simply specify the eidos and
genos of the thing:
ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον καὶ οἰκειότερον
ἀποδώσει τὸ εἶδος ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ γένος,
For if someone tries to articulate what the prote ousia is, he will make it more
recognizable and be more appropriate if he provides the species rather than the
genus, <but neither of these is the prote ousia>.
In his discussions about horismos Aristotle tries to clarify the linguistic conditions
under which the prote ousia would be comprehensible. They are meant to make
clear why the prote ousia cannot be fully articulated in language. Instead we are
forced to resort to statements about the eidos and genos. This is Aristotle’s primary
intention in his speculative project, while the observations about definitions as such
form part of his logical projects. Yet the more specific issue under discussion, here,
is a type of sentence that must fulfill very specific requirements. It is made clear,
both, in the Cat. and in theMet., that, for us humans, our only option is to use genos
and eidos in our speech as substitutes for prote ousia, we never can really answer
to the question Τοῦτί τί ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμα;41
Cat. andMet. represent different stages of the investigation into the meaning of be-
ing (Sinn von Sein). They deal with the same issue, i. e. both ask the same question,
but they study their case differenttly. The Cat., and indeed the Organon in general,
examine the linguistic conditions of the question of the meaning of being. These
texts continue the inquiry Plato began in the Sophist, and in them Aristotle makes
distinctions through which “sophistical harassments” can be avoided.42 The use of
41 Cf. E. Sonderegger, 2012, III 8.
42 De Interpretatione, 6, 17a35ff. “…and all other <distinctions> like these which we have laid dawn
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to be (εἶναι) has come to be under threat not only with Gorgias’ arguments, but
just as much from people around Socrates (in the Platonic dialogues) who contend
whatever they want, and which, doing so, represent the behavior in everyday life of
all of us. This is the reason why Plato says that we need a completely new starting
point for our discourse (Soph. 242b–243c). The first result of his investigation are
the five megista gene, their goal is to make transparent the use of the verb einai, to
be.
It is at this very point that Aristotle picks up the investigation. In Met. ΖΗΘ he is
looking for the criteria that guide the endoxa about ousia. It is necessary and useful
to know these criteria because ousia (Sein) is the first in every respect (Met. Z 1), but
it is not a being besides other beings (ὄντα, Seiendes), not even God, as Heidegger
very plausibly argued, but ultimatly with little impact on the modern interpretation
of Aristotle. There is no other way to find what ousia is than to analyze the given
discourse itself, because there opinions and assumptions about to be are continu-
ously being expressed. Even those who may wish to deny this, must use words and
sentences in their arguments, and the meaning of these words and sentences must
be clarified, above all the operative sense of to be.
Many think that there is a link between the chronology of the works and the am-
plification of the content of prote ousia.43 While in the early Cat. the individual
thing is meant (“this horse”), it is the eidos in Met. ΖΗΘ, and finally by Met. Λ:
God. It should be noted, firstly, that the chronology required for this interpretation
(with the late dating of Met. Λ) has become implausible. Secondly, prote ousia as
a question-word means the same or refers to the same question here as in the other
books. What we are looking for is according to the Cat. the first about-what and,
together withMet. Γ 2, the hen in the pros hen-relation, so we can say, it is the first
and one (das Erste und Eine), with reference to which to be is used in various ways.
“Always knowledge is primarily about the first,” and, “this is in this case ousia”
against such sophistical harassments.”
43 For the dating see the handbooks and the histories of philosophy as Zeller, Ueberweg, Guthrie; see
my own remarks on the date of Met. Λ in the following Chapter ‘New Premises’; on the date of
Theophrastus’ Met. see the section in the Commentary on the first KP.
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(Met. Γ, 1003b16–18; see also Z 1). Cat. 5, 2b7–10, implies that we can only ever
approximately approach the prote ousia through genos and eidos, but do not ever
reach it itself. Genos and eidos apply to many things, but prote ousia is unique (5,
3b20). Further, genos and eidos do not describe the real being (Sein), but rather the
how-it-is (poion ti). Moreover, Aristotle maintains this distinction between the first
ousia and the second ousiai in Met. Z too.
Yet, this fact is easily overlooked if one interprets horismos simply with ‘definition.’
Aristotle always differentiates between the first, the prote ousia, and the ousia to
which we refer by means of genos and eidos. To say something about prote ousia
would require a statement under quite special conditions, to say something about
something by means of genos and eidos is the definition, both forms of statements
are called horismos. In some way we have an understanding of the prote ousia (for
otherwise we could not even raise the question), but, we cannot express it in a clear
conceptual way. The distinction made in the Cat. between that which is neither
in a subject nor is said of a subject and that which we say about a subject, remains
fundamental inMet. Z too, as is evident in Aristotle’s treatment of hypokeimenon as
the first about-what (seeMet. Z 3). Met. ΖΗΘ andMet. Λ complement each other
through the different ways that they treat ousia as fundamental. Aristotle examines
all four types of cause, including, of course, the cause initiating movement and
genesis, as early asMet. Λ, while his later books ΖΗΘ emphasize the eidos and the
hyle.44
2.1.3. Problems Arising from the Standard Interpretation of Met. Λ as aMetaphysics of Substance
The Aporiai of the Concept of ‘Substance’
There are several arguments against the generally accepted assumption that the con-
cept of ousia is equivalent to that of substance. Some of those have been discovered
44 Cf. E. Berti, 1981, 247–250.
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within that tradition itself. When Boethius in Late Antiquity, for example, wants to
explain his notion of God as a substance he says:
For, when we say ‘God’ it seems that we speak of a substance, but of one which
is beyond substance 45
God here is that paradox ‘a substance beyond substance.’46 Marius Victorinus had
already used a similar formula before and, towards the end of the Middle Ages,
Cusanus, trying as precisely as possible to define the nature of God and in line with
his tradition, says:
All theologians have seen that God is something greater than could be con-
ceived, and, therefore they have stated about Him that He is ‘beyond sub-
stance,’ beyond ‘every name’ and the like; and they did not say different things
by ‘beyond,’ by ‘without,’ by ‘in,’ by ‘non,’ by ‘prior’ with reference to God;
for, it is the same that He is substance beyond substance, and substance with-
out substance, and unsubstantial substance, and non-substantial substance and
substance prior to substance.47
This is comparable with Cusanus’ criticism of Aristotle’s concept of substance in the
same text, directed towards Dionysius Areopagita. Evidently, all of these attempts
to articulate the inarticulable may seem nonsensical at first, but quite the contrary
is true: such attempts as Boethius and Cusanus made are the best possible manner
in which to say what really is intended by the term ‘substance,’ and they show very
clearly which problems arise, when we try to articulate this.
R. Descartes and B. Spinoza have made clear that the substance can only be under-
stood through its attributes, never as itself. Substance is fundamental but unrecog-
nizable. With Kant, we have reached a stage where substance has lost its primacy,
it is merely included in the category of relation, because substance is something in
45 nam cum dicimus ‘deus,’ substantiam quidem significare videmur, sed eam quae sit ultra substan-
tiam…
46 Theologische Traktate I, 4; 14–18, (ed. Elsässer).
47 De non aliud, cap. 4: Omnes enim theologi deum viderunt quid maius esse quam concipi posset, et
idcirco ‘supersubstantialem,’ supra ‘omne nomen,’ et consimilia de ipso affirmarunt, neque aliud per
‘super,’ aliud per ‘sine,’ aliud per ‘in,’ aliud per ‘non’ et per ‘ante’ nobis in deo expresserunt; nam
idem est ipsum esse substantiam supersubstantialem, et substantiam sine substantia, et substantiam
insubstantialem, et substantiam non-substantialem, et substantiam ante substantiam.
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which another thing can inhere (see above, p. 82). For Kant substance is by no
means the hidden Ding an sich, ”thing in itself.” The subject, in the modern sense,
has replaced substance as the fundamental object of philosophical reflection.
In the Vorwort to his Phänomenologie G.W. F. Hegel identifies substance and sub-
ject:
According to my insight, which must be justified by the exposition of the sys-
tem itself, everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth
not only as substance but just as much as a subject.48
In modern philosophy, then, substance is, on the one hand, not recognizable (R.
Descartes, B. Spinoza) and, on the other, things are considered as substances be-
cause they supposed to be independent. Persons, in particular, must be substances
which are accountable for their actions, even if it is, strictly speaking, only possible
for one substance to fulfill the condition of independence. If, nonetheless, we wish
to use the concept of substance, we are forced to apply two standards. This is ex-
actly what W. Cramer very successfully demonstrates, he shows that the concept of
substance collapses, because it is no longer possible to distinguish the autonomous
substance which founds all things from the substances which are founded.49
Substance as the Autonomous Individual Thing
If, as F. Suarez states, substance is that independent thing that does not require
any other thing in order to exist, then the concept of existence is constitutive for the
concept of substance. The concept of existence, however, is also a post-Aristotelian
48 G.W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes ed. 1988, 13f.:
Es kömmt nach meiner Einsicht, welche sich durch die Darstellung des Systems
selbst rechtfertigen muss, alles darauf an, das Wahre nicht als Substanz, sondern
eben so sehr als Subjekt aufzufassen und auszudrücken.
49 K. Cramer, H.-F. Fulda, R.-P. Horstmann, U. Posthast (Hrsg.), 1987; cf. E. Schott, 1994; various
works by M. Frank, 1986, 1991, 1994. One can find other important contributions to the problem of
the metaphysics of substance in: K. Baynes (Hrsg.), 1987; W. Carl, 1988; T. Buchheim, 1990.
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development. It arose in the context of theological problems that did not confront
Aristotle. Indeed, the concept of existence has also undergone many changes over
time. Whereas in the Middle Ages, it had initially meant ‘to be part of creation,’
and ‘to be created by God,’ or ‘to be a creature,’50 existence subsequently comes
to mean only ‘to be at hand,’ ‘to be present’ in a materialistic and realistic sense,
whether with or without the presence of God. Along with the concept of existence
the concept of substance caused changes. Substance should indicate an independent
thing, but we do not know anything independent in the necessary sense. We know
of nothing that would not in some way require another thing to exist. All we know
are insufficient substances. Such ‘relative substances’ must have their ground in an
absolute substance. In this way, relative substances have lost the proper quality of
being-a-substance. On the other side, a concept applicable to only thing, loses its
usefulness.
The Person as a Model of Substance
For Boethius, beside the individual being, the person was a model of substance.
Boethius began to reflect about person because the person of Christ was a much-
debated theme in his time.51 Questions of the following kind were dealt with: How
Christ’s human and the divine nature and personmay be compatible with each other,
how may the person of the son of God be integrated in the Trinity? Late in antiquity
Boethius was rooted in different lines of tradition, of which he was aware and which
he could clearly distinguish: the ecclesiastical tradition straddles the political, the
political stands beside the philosophical, within the philosophical the Latin is ad-
jacent with the Greek, the Neoplatonic with the Aristotelian. In the ecclesiastical
and theological discourse mentioned, the term ‘person’ was simply employed (e. g.
by Augustinus, Marius Victorinus and others), but Boethius saw the need to reflect
upon the concept of the person, which he did in the Opuscula sacra. The result of
his reflections was the famous definition of person which should hold as point of
50 The word ‘creature’ has itself shifted significantly from its origin over time.
51 See his Theological Treatises.
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reference throughout the Middle Ages: naturae rationabilis individua substantia,
the person is the “indivisible substance of a rational nature.” The Middle Ages and
modern era have followed him on this point. Person remained a fundamental con-
cept until today, indeed, even in P. F. Strawson’s Individuals persons are among the
basic particulars. It is indispensable in ethical, juridical, anthropological, social and
many other discourses.52
Substance, as the core of the concept of person, vanished in modern times after
Descartes and was replaced by subject. ‘Subject’ served originally as translation
of Aristotle’s hypokeimenon, the about-what of speaking. Subject now is quite the
opposite, it indicates the person, the ego, the thinking human, which is aware and
conscious of the outer world, of the objects. The subject has replaced substance
as the foundation of all things to such a degree that, as already mentioned, by the
culmination of this development G.W. F. Hegel can say that “above all we must
conceive truth not only as substance but as subject as well.”53 We should see easily
that all this has nothing to to with Aristotle’s ousia.
Which Problems can Substance Solve?
Above all, substance is useful to solve theological problems, because the heart of
this concept is subsistence (i. e. to be self-grounded), a feature which is plausible
for gods but not for things in our world. If all things are created out of nothing
then there is reason to fear that all things may disappear without any reason (G.W.
Leibniz). They need, therefore, a fundament that keeps them in being. That can only
be God in the sense of causa sui. Aristotle and his world have not to reckon with a
complete disappearance of the world because physis is not created out of nothing nor
does physis itself act this way (i. e. physis does not create things out from nothing).
He explicitly rejects this idea as an unreasonable alternative to his own views of the
causes of becoming, e. g. in the first sentence of Met. Λ 7 (comparable with Physics
A 4, 187a34):
52 And more recently Kathleen Wilkes, Galen Strawson, Richard Wollheim, Derek Parfitt.
53 G.W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Vorrede, p. 13 (ed. Wessels/Clairmont).
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Since it is possible <to explain becoming> this way, and, if not this way, <all
beings> would come to be out of night and out of “All together” and out of
non-being, that may be solved …
Aristotle justifies the need to know something about ousia quite differently. Met.
E 2 contains the program for the text up to Met. Θ. It is his plan to go through the
various ways of using to be (εἶναι), because ‘‘to be is used in many ways’’ (to on
pollachos legetai). This variety is neither simply equivocal (Γ 2) nor has it the unity
of a genos54 Aristotle says:
τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ
ὁμωνύμως.
The term being is said in many ways, but with respect to some unique physis
and not simply equivocally.
Thus to be must have a unity of its own kind. His task, thus, is now to understand
what this ‘first and one’ which Aristotle calls prote ousia really is, and this is the
reason why ousia becomes the theme and why we have to raise the question of
being.
54 For ‘‘being is not a genus’’ see: Topics Z 6, 144b4–11: ‘‘Similarly we have to consider whether
the species or something beneath the species is said of the difference; but this is impossible because
the difference is said of more beings than the species. It will result that the difference is a species
if something of the species is said of it <: of the difference; e. g. ‘‘rational is man’’: so ‘man’ is
under the difference ‘rational’ which is absurd>; if ‘human’ is predicated <of the difference, e. g.
of ‘rational’> then it is clear, that the difference is ‘human.’ Further <we have to ask> whether the
difference is prior in relation to the species; it is posterior in relation to the genus, but difference must
be prior to the species.’’ (Transl. E.S.)
“Likewise youmust inquire also if the species or any of the objects that come under it is predicated
of the differentia: for this is impossible, seeing that the differentia is a term with a wider range than
the various species. Moreover, if any of the species be predicated of it, the result will be that the
differentia is a species: if, for instance, ‘man’ be predicated, the differentia is clearly the human race.
Again, see if the differentia fails to be prior to the species: for the differentia ought to be posterior to
the genus, but prior to the species.” (Transl. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge)
Met., B 2, 998b22–28, <7. Aporia: What is the first? Are gene the first? ‘Being’ (: ὄν) and Unity
(: ἕν) are first anyway but cannot be gene of being.> ‘‘It is impossible that there is numerically one
genos of being; neither unity nor being (: ὄν) <can be genos>. For it is necessary that differences
of each genos are and that they are numerically one each, but it is impossible to state the eide of a
genos of its own differences, or the gene without the eide, so that if unity or being were gene no
difference would be neither unity nor being.’’
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In 1985 J. Habermas and D. Henrich opened a discussion about metaphysics.55 D.
Henrich thought that metaphysics is the true successor of religion by giving life an
orientation. J. Habermas argued against this thesis, saying that today there is no use
of metaphysics at all, because metaphysics is bound to the ‘‘bewusstseinsphiloso-
phische Grundfigur des Selbstbewusstseins’’ and the subject (in the modern sense)
of this philosophy cannot bear our modern problems. The controversy broadened
(see J. Grondin, M. Lutz-Bachmann), but the notion of metaphysics presupposed
has not changed. Aristotle could not be brought to intervene in this controversy
at all, because in his later so-called Metaphysics, he neither conveys metaphysics
nor life orientation – he does not even do this in the Ethics – nor does he make the
subject (in its modern sense) the basis of being and thinking.
In conclusion, the concepts of substance and subject are not well designed to solve
Aristotle’s problems.
Methodological Reflection
Met. Λ 1 as well as Met. Z 1 (and 3) begin with the topic ousia. In both cases,
ousia is the heading for that which is in question. The traditional reading enters an
answer, namely ‘substance,’ at a moment when the word still stands for a question;
Aristotle’s question ‘‘What is ousia? What is the first and one, with respect to which
our speech or our use of to be, gets its unity?’’ is transformed into an assertion. To
replace a question with an answer is a methodological mistake.
When ousia in Met. Λ 1.1 really would mean substance, then one of the remaining
main questions in the Met. would be which substance could be the fundament of
all the rest. Until recently it was standard view that to ti en einai, to katholou, to
genos, and to hypokeimenon in Met. Z 3 are ‘candidates’ for ousia.56 The most
fundamental ousia according to the standard view was said to be the ‘First Mover’
55 J. Habermas, 1985a and 1985b; J. Habermas, 1987, 425–443; D. Henrich, 1982; id., 1986, 495–508.
Cf. K. Cramer, H.-F. Fulda, R.-P. Horstmann, U. Posthast (Hrsg.), 1987; J. Grondin, 1987, 25–37.
M. Lutz-Bachmann, 2002, 414–425. For further literature see E. Sonderegger, 2004.
56 This is still Frede’s and Patzig’s understanding in their commentary on Met. Z.
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in Met. Λ a term, we must note, never used by Aristotle. Concerning Met. Z 3
the standard view has meanwhile changed so much that even the otherwise conser-
vative handbook of Rapp and Corcilius, (2011, 338) speaks of ‘criteria’ instead of
‘candidates.’57 In fact, a careful look atMet. Z 3 shows that all these terms capture
endoxa, articulated in Aristotle’s terminology, and that they form the basis for the
search of criteria for being, ousia.
The Network of the Term ‘Substance’
The concept of substance forms a strand enmeshed with other basic concepts, to-
gether they establish an entangled world. This network is not the same for every
world. This being the case, we ask whether or not the concept of substance be-
longs to the world of Aristotle. We have seen above that in some of the worlds
wherein the concept of substance played a fundamental role, the other concepts of
subject and existence were essential too. This nexus of substance–subject–existence
is obviously not a fundamental part of the Greek world of the 4th century BCE. The
concept of substance, at least in the sense of its modern interpreters, does not belong
to the world of Aristotle.
Remarks on the History of the Concept of Substance
It is unlikely that any concepts, even first concepts or basic axioms, ‘fall from the
sky.’ Instead, they can be said to grow out. The concept of substance too has history
that may be reconstructed. Even though many would like it to be an Aristotelian in-
vention, its history begins only after Aristotle. The period of its origin is very long
and influences of very different kinds have to be taken into account, extending from
Theophrastus up to the Church Fathers. Attention must be paid to the philosophical
traditions of the Peripatos, the Stoa, Middle-Platonism, and Neoplatonism. Aside
from these, religious lines (e. g. of Philo of Alexandria) and the latin rhetorical the-
57 For more details, see my commentary onMet, Ζ, Sonderegger, 2012, II, 5.2. The older interpretation
is still alive, see e. g. E. Berti, 2016, 72.
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ory have exerted their influence. The last and decisive impulse probably emanated
from the first Greek and Latin Church Fathers. These required a concept of sub-
stance in order to manage and explain theological problems like the Trinity, the
person of Christ, and the existence of God. At the council of Nicaea in 325 CE, the
development of this concept finds a certain dogmatic conclusion, then follows the
reflection on this conclusion.
Here I can only afford to name the further stations in the history of substance. The
inguistic background for the concept was the use of the Latin term substantia and
the theory of stasis in the rhetoric. The Stoic concept of hypostasis had a decisive
influence; indeed ‘substance’ is the correct translation of hypostasis, not of ou-
sia. The Stoics identified ousia with their materialistic concept of hypostasis, and
the result was substantia. Neoplatonism, later, had a more noetic understanding
of hypostasis but this was hypostasized – in the modern sense of the word – and,
in particular, nous, psyche, physis, and most especially the One became ‘super-
things,’ so to speak. Even if the history of the origin of the concept of substance
cannot be comprehensively treated of here, su much is clear that it only begins after
Aristotle.
The Philosophical Type of Substance-Metaphysics Attributed to Aristotle
After these remarks about the problems which arise if Aristotle is attributed with
the concept of substance I would like to ask after the type of philosophy of such a
metaphysics of substance. The reconstructions of that are numerous and diverse.
I, therefore, take up the main groups interested in the research on Aristotle: the
historians of philosophy, the philologists, the neo-scholastics and the philosophers
pure. Of course my choice of examples is to some extent arbitrary, but I hope it is
nevertheless representative.
Historians and philologists seem to be the most objective of these categories, they
are less interested in the content of the text than in its external conditions, its trans-
mission, its constitution, its chronology, its historical context, its connection with
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other texts etc. Nevertheless, we must not forget that even conjectures in the text
are guided by assumptions about the content, and, that also behind the seemingly
neutral sciences such interests are working in the background. We have learnt from
hermeneutics that there is no knowledge without some background or some view of
the whole before any particular knowledge, as well as there is no knowledge with-
out an interest. Here we do not speak about the private interests and aims which a
scholar pursues with his work such as to convince his colleagues or to win fame,
money or other. It is about the impersonal interests inescapably, stemming out of
the background of his tradition, his linguistic community, his society; it embraces
all that which is apparently self-evident in his world, the endoxa as Aristotle called
these, what with respect to the sciences Th. S. Kuhn has called the ‘paradigma.’ It
was an illusion to believe that a knowledge is possible which is not guided by values
and preconditions, not only in history and philology but even in natural science.58
The ideals of historicism, positivism and objective science were bound to fail.
In the 19th century the study of Aristotle saw a revival, one of its results was I.
Bekker’s new constitution of the text of the Corpus Aristotelicum, which made pos-
sible the new and intensive study of Aristotle’s work and thought. At the same time
the scholastic wing reflected on its origins and tried to precipitate a renaissance. In
these circles not only the study of Thomas Aquinas but also that of Aristotle was
revived and remains active until today. Until the 19th century it was never doubted
that Aristotle’s philosophy forms a system.59 Only W. Jaeger’s studies showed that
the systematic view of Aristotle’s philosophy is not plausible, his key argument re-
lying on the type of text. However, the systematic view still lives, because it is pos-
sible that only the representation is unsystematic the content indeed forming a sys-
tematic whole. In his introduction to Aristoteles, Metaphysik, Die Substanzbücher
C. Rapp writes: “Book Z presents all in all a consistent theory of substance …:”60
58 See works of J. Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse, K. R. Popper, Der Positivismusstreit in der
deutschen Soziologie, 1969; some works of P. Feyerabend and Th. S. Kuhn.
59 In Ravaisson, 1837, vol. I, 347, a chapter is titled Système métaphysique d’Aristote; at several
occasions E. Zeller speaks of a System des Aristoteles, see Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer
geschichtlichen Entwicklung, II, 2; 78, 176, 797, Darmstadt 1963 [Leipzig 1921].
60 Buch Z stellt die Entfaltung einer im grossen und ganzen einheitlichen Theorie der Substanz dar …
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while D.W. Graham has it in the title: Aristotle’s Two Systems.61 Both say explic-
itly what many others implicitly think and what is the most widespread held opinion
about Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
In the second half of the 20th century a strong movement in Aristotelian research
thought it possible and sensible to use Aristotelian and in general antique ideas and
arguments for modern questions. That, perhaps, was an effect of existentialism. We
must not forget that this too is Plato’s way of philosophizing, which he showed to
be exemplary through the character of the guest from Elea. Thomas Aquinas also
practized philosophy it this way. It would be a desirable approach even today, we
must only consciously reflect upon our hermeneutic situation if we are to to avoid
anachronisms, but this current has been replaced by another, which favors neutral
historical research.62 It seems that M. Frede has contributed significantly to that
objectifying project. Those researchers have possibly tried to integrate quality and
method of analytic philosophy with historical research in explaining Aristotle.
There is scarcely any philosophical, philological or historical book or article on
Aristotle in the last hundred years that does not mention substance and the meta-
physics of substance, even if that ‘system’ was reconstructed and redesigned dif-
ferently by different scholars. Some treat it still as a system and a unitary theory in
the modern sense, and they try to improve it. Others say that Aristotle had in mind
to construe such a system but failed for different reasons. It seems that the alleged
metaphysics of substance contains various claims that are not compatible with one
another. It is seldom clear whether the science searched for only concerns first prin-
ciples, the being qua being, the highest being or substance in general. Even with re-
spect to substance Aristotle is ambiguous, it is said. First, he is reported to have said
that that which underlies all determinations, i. e. the particular thing, is substance.
Later he changed his mind and said that the form, the essence of the particular thing
is substance. Because independence is the definitive feature of substance there must
finally be one highest original substance, which fulfills this condition and which is
61 Rapp, 1996, 10; Graham, Clarendon, Oxford 1987.
62 See the article by M. L. Gill, “Aristotle’s Metaphysics Reconsidered,” in: Journal of the History of
Philosophy, Volume 43, Number 3, July 2005, pp. 223–241.
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the cause of all other secondary substances. That final substance is God and this is
said to be the main subject ofMet. Λ. Evidently, historical and philological research
both find in Aristotle’s Metaphysics a metaphysics of substance.63
Even those who do not think that Aristotle aimed at the construction of a system
and those who are fighting against metaphysics as a theory, suppose that Aristotle
ultimately had in mind to make this assertion and to give reasons for that assertion,
namely, that substance is the proper being. It is rather surprising that even philolo-
gists accept and continue to support the false translation of ousia with ‘substance’
without reservation. It is as hard to comprehend as the unchallenged repetition of
the non-existent term ‘First Mover.’64 It seems that we are too much trained to do so
because during centuries that was the doctrine. Such may be the general and vague
frame of the standard interpretation of theMetaphysics, which the majority, though
not all, historians of philosophy and philologists share.
In contrast to those the neo-scholastic scholars and philosophers have explicit in-
terests guiding their choices and focuses. They do not strive to and need not to
be ‘objective’ in the same way as historians do. But there might be a difference
with the relevance of the background of a philologist, which inspires him to make
this conjecture or another65 and a professor in Rome, Leuven, Toronto or elsewhere
who uses Aristotelian thoughts in order to provide a basis for Christian dogmas. A
philologist could even deny that he has such interests because he is not aware of
that background, but a neo-scholastic scholar has a long tradition in following in-
terests and for him it is legitimate and even a duty incumbent upon him to do so
through the encyclicals Aeterni Patris and Fides et Ratio. However, tracing the aim
63 In his Handbuch, 123, C. Rapp says what enjoys broadest acceptance: Bekannt ist die aristotelische
Metaphysik vor allem für die Entfaltung der Ontologie als Wissenschaft des Seienden als Seienden,
für die Darstellung einer philosophischen Theologie mit dem unbewegten Beweger als göttlichem
und vernünftigem Prinzip von allem sowie für die Theorie der Substanz (ousia).
64 There are very few exceptions: Düring, 1966, 209; id., 1968, 253; M. Bordt, in: C. Rapp, 2011, 367,
but he revokes his correction, because that manner of speaking is established; cf E. Sonderegger,
1996, 76ff; id., 2008, 96; also A. Aichele, Ontologie des Nicht-Seienden, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
2009, 341, insists on the neutral form.
65 Because even a conjecture finally has content-related reasons; a good example of this is the contri-
bution of S. Fazzo in the Omnibus edited by C. Horn, 2016
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of making use of Aristotelian knowledge, and not only saying what he meant, is
not tantamount to discrediting that form of scholarship. It is a legitimate approach
when the interest is made explicit.
For the religious wingAristotle is to some degree a predecessor of Christian thought:
he arrived at a certain point of insight about God but failed to make the last step.
Aristotle’s Metaphysics is essential for those because he offered material for the
proof of the existence of God. To that degree this approach is anachronistic. The
Church Fathers already began to include Aristotelian thoughts in their argumenta-
tion, another important step was made by Albertus Magnus who used the Liber de
Causis, which he took to be an genuine Aristotelian work, to understand Aristotle’s
Metaphysics.66 To be sure, here in Scholasticism we rediscover the earnest and ex-
istential commitment otherwise lost to the Aristotelian studies, but closely linked
with claims that hardly any philosopher outside these circles would support. As
philosophers we have to reflect on our opinions and on what seems to be evident
and obvious. This reflection cannot however be geared towards aims and methods
as presented in Church encyclicals such as that of Pope Leo, Aeterni patris of 4.
August 1879, or that of Pope Johannes Paul II., Fides et ratio of 14. September
1998. If we take as authoritative the works on Aristotle’sMetaphysics by G. Reale,
De Filippo, H. Seidl and many others or the publications of the editiones scholas-
ticae, then we must say that the neo-scholastic approach to Aristotle is systematic
and dogmatic to a substantial extent, the discussions taking place within narrow
dogmatic limits.
To what extent do modern philosophers deal with Aristotle’s philosophy?67 I. Kant
deplored the state of metaphysics in his time, because metaphysics – despite the
numerous attempts – never found the “sure course” of a science as e. g. logic or
mathematics did, it never did more than “grope around” (Kritik der reinen Ver-
66 See the draft Henryk Anzulewicz, Der Metaphysik-Kommentar des Albertus Magnus und das Buch
Lambda. Eine Einführung.
67 Much material in Berti Enrico, Aristotele nel Novecento, 1992, and Th. Gutschker, Aristotelis-
che Diskurse, Aristoteles in der politischen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Metzler, Stuttgart
/ Weimar 2002. The report about the impact of Aristotle’s philosophy ends in C. Rapp’s Handbuch,
2011, with the 19th century.
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nunft, B VII–XV). Kant’s conflict between the view that metaphysics belongs, as it
were, to the natural equipment of mankind and the diagnosis that the metaphysics
of his time is in no way adequate is notorious. As far as I know, G.W. F. Hegel is
the first who pointed to the deformation of the Aristotelian philosophy by the long
tradition and who tried to do something against that. In his Lectures on the History
of Philosophy he says:
“A reason why it is necessary to speak about Aristotle more widely is that al-
most no other philosopher was treated more unjustly by thoughtless traditions,
which are alive even today, …He is said to hold opinions which are quite the
contrary of his philosophy.”68
In the same lectures he translates and comments on large parts of the chaptersMet.
Λ 7, 9 and 10 (162–168). We read (162): “It is the crucial point of Aristotle’s
philosophy that thinking and what is thought of are the same – that the objective and
the thinking (the energeia) are the same”;69 and 164: “Aristotle thinks the objects
and insofar as they are thoughts, they are in their verity; that is their ousia.”70 The
first reason to write the Wissenschaft der Logik that states G.W. F. Hegel, is, that
metaphysics seems to disappear entirely in an educated nation, as the Germans are
thought to be. He compares that nation with a ‘‘well adorned temple without a Holy
of Holies.’’71 His Science of Logic ought to compensate for the loss.
For some time Aristotle’sMetaphysics has not enjoyed much interest from philoso-
68 Ein Grund, von Aristoteles weitläufig zu sein, liegt darin, dass keinem Philosophen soviel Unrecht
getan worden ist durch ganz gedankenlose Traditionen, die sich über seine Philosophie erhalten
haben und noch an der Tagesordnung sind, …, Man schreibt ihm Ansichten zu, die gerade das Ent-
gegengesetzte seiner Philosophie sind; see Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, II,
Theorie Werkausgabe Bd. 19, 133.
69 Das Hauptmoment in der Aristotelischen Philosophie ist, dass das Denken und das Gedachte eins
ist, – dass das Objektive und das Denken (die Energie) ein und dasselbe ist
70 Aristoteles denkt die Gegenstände, und indem sie als Gedanken sind, sind sie in ihrer Wahrheit; das
ist ihre οὐσία.
71 G.W. F. Hegel,Wissenschaft der Logik, Erster Band, Vorrede, Dasjenige, was vor diesem Zeitraum
Metaphysik hiess, ist, sozusagen, mit Stumpf und Stiel ausgerottet worden… (p. 3); …so schien das
sonderbare Schauspiel herbeigeführt zu werden, ein gebildetes Volk ohne Metaphysik zu sehen, –
wie einen sonst mannigfaltig ausgeschmückten Tempel ohne Allerheiligstes; …Ganz so schlimm als
der Metaphysik ist es der Logik nicht ergangen (p. 4), ed. Lasson. – “…there was seen the strange
spectacle of a cultured nation without metaphysics – like a temple richly ornamented in other respects
but without a holy of holies;” this page copyright © 2001 Blackmask Online.
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phers. Only few deal with it or make use of it to any great extent (apart from the
above mentioned exceptions). What is more, fewer and fewer philosophers are able
to read the text in Greek. Because the (otherwise useful) translations of, say J. Tri-
cot, G. Reale, D. Ross or others, add the word ‘God’ in the text without marking
that addition and they write numerous words in capitals as le Bien or Egli, which at
every instance mean God. They give the false impression that in Met. Λ Aristotle
is speaking all the time about God. M. Heidegger shows in § 6. Die Aufgabe einer
Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie in his Sein und Zeit, that it is necessary
to reflect on some seemingly self-evident ideas and convictions which are due to
the reception of Aristotelian thinking mainly in the Latin Middle Ages, which have
entered the self-conception in our everyday life. How it was received and assimi-
lated had a decisive impact on our überkommene Daseinsauslegung (“the inherited
understanding of Dasein”; 20). Its very extent, its power, its content are scarcely
noticeable today, only by reflection can we see it, therefore “We need to reduce
the traditional stock of the ancient ontology to the original experience.”72 In order
to get at the original intention of Met. Λ we must reverse what was deformed by
entering in an other world and covered by other interests during the long time of re-
ception, as we enter a different world. A particularly clear example of that process
is that it is generally accepted that ousia means substance.
P. F. Strawson differentiated between ‘descriptive metaphysics’ and ‘revisionary
metaphysics’ in the first phrase of his Introduction to Individuals, 1959, :
Metaphysics has been often revisionary, and less often descriptive. Descriptive
metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the
world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure.
What he describes as descriptive metaphysics is exactly what Aristotle did with his
analysis of and reflection on the endoxa, accordingly he mentions Aristotle and I.
Kant as examples of descriptive metaphysics without going into any further details.
This distinction is comparable with that between an assertive philosophy and a re-
72 Diese Aufgabe verstehen wir als …Destruktion des überlieferten Bestandes der antiken Ontologie
auf die ursprünglichen Erfahrungen (22).
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flecting philosophy, which does not assert the results of its reflection.73 H. Putnam
notes in the Introduction to Words & Life with respect to the historical parts of the
book where Aristotle’s philosophy too is one of the subjects:74
I am convinced that the history of philosophy is not only a history of gain-
ing insights – and I do think philosophers gain insights – but also a history of
neglecting, and even actively repressing, previously gained insights.
Too many modern philosophers simply accept the presented findings and interpre-
tations in the modern histories of philosophy and the point of view of modern re-
search. Thus the ‘substance’ and the ‘Unmoved Mover’ will persist for a very long
time even if the theological consequences are without any impact for anyone except
the mentioned dogmatically bound institutions. There are not many scholars who
think that Aristotle had speculative intentions because these come into sight only af-
ter having removed the sediments of the tradition. But almost all think that Aristotle
has construed a metaphysics, even if a scholar as eminent as J. Barnes, 1995, 67,
108, exceptionally concludes his presentation of the Aristotelian Metaphysics with
the words: that “there is (in a sense) no such thing as Aristotelian metaphysics.”
He adds that this is mainly due to the fact that in that book metaphysics is meant
to cover four subjects too different to be compatible with each other. M. Burnyeat,
2001, has tried to avoid that inconsistency by taking the four ‘subjects’ as four start-
ing points for one and same question: Which are the ousiai of the sensible ousiai?
St. Menn too argues in his draft to the Met. for a unity in that book, even for Aris-
totle as only redactor. Indeed, though some details do not match up well it seems
that the overall idea is consistent; some inconsistencies are due to the type of text,
others to the revisions made over many years, many to the fact that the text was not
intended to be published, and, as seems plausible (paceMenn), to the possible fact
that the book as it now stands was put together by a later redactor.
But in what does its unity consist? There is M. Burnyeat’s position on this, another
that by St. Menn, but there are many further possibilities (not all of these views are
73 Elsewhere I have called it ‘unbehauptendes Denken,’ thinking without assertion.
74 J. Conant (ed.), Harvard, Cambridge Mass., 1994, VI.
110
2.1. Met. Λ as a Metaphysics of Substance
dogmatic, which I will ignore here anyway). For one of these possibilities especially
I would plead: the unity of theMet. consists in the consequent focus on the question
about being (Frage nach dem Sein). This will set out from different starting points,
certainly, just as M. Burnyeat argued. In the whole of theMetaphysics book Λ is an
early speculative draft, a program, which is executed in detail in ΖΗΘ. Otherwise
the text contains introductions (A, B), historical tests, i. e. Aristotle checks other
programs for the same question in many places, some of them called doxographies,
one especially with respect to Plato in MN; there is also a list of issues (B), a vocab-
ulary (Δ), an outline (E), a treatise about the question how this knowledge sought
after may be uniform.
Different from the standard interpretation I take ousia to be the heading of a very
global question and not an answer (especially not as substance). What I mean should
not be understood as aporetic thinking as some have insinuated. Aporetic thinking
is asserting something. In contrast, my aim is to show how Aristotle abstains from
assertions, even from the assertion of the results of the analysis, at least as concerns
the core of his thinking. To give the results of the analysis is not to assert theDoxa
as if it were the final truth. The un-assertive thinking remains conscious of the fact
that it is not possible to leave its Doxa-world. But, within any such world, we are
able to differentiate very well between truth and error.
If ousia is the heading for the question about being then it can not be translated
with substance, it must be understood in the many ways Aristotle registers. At the
core of Aristotle’s reflection is being, Sein, just as it has been the theme beginning
with Parmenides and mediated by Plato’s Sophist. In theMetaphysics this question
does, of course, take many ramifications. That question includes one additional
moment not addressed by Aristotle, one not even mace explicit by Plato. Instead,
Plato dramatized that moment in the character of the guest from Elea. The question
about being is a question which is questioning the questioner himself.
The question forces him to reflect on the basic opinions of his world.
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2.2. Met. Λ as Theology
The standard interpretation finds in Met. Λ a theology, in that sense that Aristotle
wants to prove that god is the first substance, that he exists, and that he is essentially
determined as noesis noeseos and actus purus.75 Thus the standard interpretation
moves towards an onto-theology, because the supposition of a first being involves
the supposition of god.
The dispute between F. Brentano and E. Zeller is no longer ongoing; nevertheless,
it is very instructive for understanding the theological use of Met. Λ in the recep-
tion. Their quarrel was about the origin of the human soul. As F. Brentano saw
it, we must suppose that Aristotle conceived his God as the creator of the soul. E.
Zeller objected that Aristotle wanted to say that the human mind is as eternal as the
world, and neither of them can be created ad hoc. The debate between F. Brentano
and E. Zeller, along with F. K. A. Schwegler, H. Bonitz, T. Gomperz and the other
opponents against which F. Brentano engaged, presupposes a common frame: that
there is a theology at stake in Met. Λ, that is, God plays a role and is the primary
topic of Λ. The parties in this dispute share the common conviction that the text can
correctly serve as an intellectual basis for a discussion of Christian themes. Even
today it is a basic assumption of Aristotelian scholarship thatMet. permits the very
presupposition that God’s existence can be proven.76
75 For the history of the term ‘Theology’ see the bibliography by O. Bayer, A. Peters, 1998, 1085; c.f.
the remarks of A.-J. Festugière, 1949; for earlier concepts of Theology see W. Jaeger, 1947, and D.
Babut, 1974.
76 See H. Flashar, 1983, 378; W. Cramer, 1967; J. Lensik, 1991. D. Fonfara, 2003, 180, repeats that Λ
6 contains a proof of the existence of God. – Concerning the ontological proof of God’s existence
in general: D. Henrich, 1960; J. Rohls, 1987; M. Olivetti, 1990; F. Ricken, 1991; W. Röd, 1992;
L. Herrschaft, 1993, 461–476; R. Löw, 1994; G. Oppy, 1995; A.W. Kucera, 1995; the proof of K.
Gödel based on modal logic is rarely noticed and appreciated: 1995, 403. See also A. Plantinga,
1968; id., 1974 and 1975; to Anselm H. Weidemann, 2004, 1–20; once more he tries to show that
the ’proof’ of Anselm does not work. After so many ’proofs’ of the insufficiency of the proof, it
is time to ask whether Anselm’s Proslogion is something other than an inadequate proof, especially
as the form of the text stands near the meditations of Anselm. A review of the literature on Met. Λ
from 2008 to 2013 (without mention of the present book, German edition 2008, which alone plays
the role of the opposition) by Tobias Dangel, 2014, shows how evident the theological content is for
the standard interpretation; even more reactionary are the New Essays, edited by C. Horn 2016.
In the introduction (p. 3) C. Horn gives seven reasons why Met. Λ as a matter of fact must be
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Meanwhile we find timid objections.77 M. Frede stresses in his introduction (2000)
that Met. Λ does not pursue theological aims. Also, B. Botter (2005) supports the
non-theological interpretation, pointing out that the term ‘god’ in the text only func-
tions to designate a high grade of perfection. E. Berti (2008) dissociates his position
from the theological interpretation, but later returns to it (2016). For E. J. García de
la Garza (2011), the non-theological reading seems to be so obvious that he almost
forgoes giving arguments against the standard interpretation. Silvia Fazzo, in the
introduction of her commentary (2014), insists on the need to read the text anew and
without bias. Considered more precisely, the different claims, that Met. Λ contains
Aristotle’s theology are products of the history of the reception of the text, they are
regarded as a theological work.
Unfortunately they work only for those already convinced: ad 1. “Aristotle denominates the
Prime Mover, the noetic principle of the universe, explicitly as ’God (Λ 7, 1072b30)’”: The term
‘Prime’ or ‘Unmoved Mover’ is never used by Aristotle.
He uses only the neutral form, τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν, never the masculine form ὁ πρῶτος κινοῦς.
The moving cause is no more than one of the four causes. The cited place 1072b30 is not an argument
but a presentation of common opinion.
ad 2. “He provides an argument for thee existence of this God (6, 1071b12–22): in 1071b12–22
there is no mention of God, and the text contains in no way a proof of the existence of God; it is about
the origin of movement which must be unmoved, and that the being (Sein) of this origin is actuality;
the term God appears later, and in function of an example, 1072b23;
ad 3. “he develops an extensive list of ‘divine attributes’”: Horn lists ‘divine attributes’: they are
citations from Parmenides with whom his own question is linked;
ad 4.“he explains how God, as an unmoved entity, moves the celestial bodies”: Horn cannot cite
any place for his claim that his ‘Unmoved Mover’ moves the celestial bodies;
ad 5. “he describes the way of life lead by God (7, 1072b13–30)”: with the ‘way of life lead
by God’ Aristotle cites his contemporaries’ opinion concerning Gods, he aims to give a point of
reference for the understanding of to be;
ad 6.“he specifies the activity practised by God, i. e. thinking of his thinking (9, 1074b28–35)”:
Horn’s citation is incorrect because not God but the nous is the subject of ‘thinking of his thinking’
in 1074b28–35;
ad 7.“he characterizes the universe as a well-ordered unity structured by God (10, 1075a11–25)”:
his last citation, 1075a11–25, concerns order, not the claim that Godmade it. All of these ‘arguments’
are pious hopes.
77 Including relatively new ones by H. Lang, 1993; R. Bodéüs, 1992.
Especially notable is H. Lang, 1993, 258, which points out that in chapters 9 and 10 there is
simply no mention of God. If you want to interpret these as theology, you must presuppose this
theme. Likewise, that chapters 1–5 are the preparation for this theology remains an assumption.
F. Baghdassarian, 2019, argues against the theological interpretation but retains the expression
“Premier Moteur” nevertheless. L. Judson, 2019, favorizes the understanding as theology.
A. Ritschl, 1888, wants to separate theology and metaphysics on substantive grounds; P. Natorp,
1888, vehemently argues against the interpretation of Met. Λ as theology, but in vain.
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not supported by the text.
It is by no means about the pros and cons of the proofs of the existence of god.
Thus it is irrelevant if some arguments and interpretations differ from one another,
or whether they are conclusive or not. Instead, we must ask whether it is correct to
takeMet. Λ as a basis for proofs of the existence of god or for any other theological
considerations. I do not contest that in some way or other Aristotle refers to gods,
but I will dispute the value of the theological implications of these references. It
seems that over the centuries this text was no longer really considered, because
everybody read it from a theological point of view. Therefore we need to renew
the old quarrel about it. Hence our theme here is not whether god acts in Met. Λ
in this way or another, whether he must be thought of as a creator or not, whether
he is causa efficiens or causa finalis, it is not about these or similar questions of
traditional research. My aim is to call into question the suppositions thatMet. Λ has
anything to do with theology and that god has an important role to play in this text.
Since there are some scholars who agree so far, I would also like to deny that this
theology can be replaced by a metaphysics of the substance. Rather, I propose a
reading of Met. Λ as a speculative sketch about the meaning of being (ousia, Sein).
Sadly, this reading does not yet have followers, but, possibly that will change.
The standard theological interpretation of Met. Λ is presented in several variants.
In the stronger form, it is said that the book contains one or more proofs of the
existence of God.78 Then we find the weaker thesis that a proof can be drawn from
the material of Met. Λ.79 Further, the class of scholars who take Aristotle’s proofs
to be inadequate or false also understand the text as theological.80
78 So e. g. G. Reale, 1993, capitulo sesto; J. G. De Filippo, 1994; earlier, W.D. Ross, 1924, CXXX–
CLIV; K. Gloy, 1983; H. P. Cunningham, 1991; an overview on the literature concerning the onto-
logical proof by J. Rohls, 1987; G. Oppy, 1995; further literature by H. J. Krämer, 1969; W. Röd,
1992. Adam Drozdek, 2007, 164, not only maintains that Physics and Met. Λ give proofs of the ex-
istence of God, but even contends that Plato and Aristotle prepared the ground for Christianity with
their philosophy and theology. M. Bordt adds that Plato at least connected the metaphysical question
with the theological one (2006 and 2011).
79 H. Seidl, 1982, S. XXIV, says that the main sources of the proofs of Thomas Aquinas are Physics
VII–VIII and Metaphysics II and XII.
80 See e. g. H. Weidemann, 2004, 1–20.
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Indeed we have to admit that the advocates of the standard interpretation are in old
and good company. Some date this interpretation back to Theophrastus; although
this is probably incorrect, at least if his Metaphysics is not the late work they sup-
pose.81 We find sure sings of the theological interpretation in Epicurus,82 Cicero,83
in the Prooemium of Ptolemy’s Syntaxis, in the texts of the Church Fathers,84 and
in texts of the Middle-Platonic and Neo-Platonic periods.85 The commentary on
Met. Λ by Pseudo-Alexander86 is absolutely clear in its theological orientation. Fur-
ther, we can trace this theological lineage through the Middle Ages up to modern
times without interruption. The most prominent citation of the text is by G.W. F.
Hegel, who concludes his Encyclopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im
Grundrisse with some phrases of Met. Λ in Greek without any comment (Met. Λ
1072b18–30). Concerning his concept of the onto-theological tendency of meta-
physics, M. Heidegger primarily refers to G.W. F. Hegel; nevertheless much of
what he says is applicable to Met. Λ too. Our contemporary historiography of phi-
losophy speaks about Aristotle’s alleged theology no less than those in the 19th
century did.87 Handbooks and anthologies referring to theMetaphysics of Aristotle
display remnants of all this.88 Several participants of the Symposium Aristotelicum
81 Cf. J. Owens, 1963, 43ff., esp. 49; L. Routila, 1969, 15; also of course G. Reale, 1994, 316; lit. to
theMetaphysics of Theophrastus in the edition of A. Laks, G.W. Most (Budé) as well as in D. Gutas,
2010.
82 A.A. Long, D.N. Sedley, 1987, Epicurus 13, J.
83 Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes I, 28, 70 possumusne dubitare quin eis praesit aliquis vel effector,
si haec nata sunt, ut Platoni videtur, vel si semper fuerunt, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis
et muneris?
84 Minucius Felix, Octavius XIX 9, says: Aristoteles variat et adsignat tamen unam potestatem: nam
interim mentem, mundum interim deum dicit, interim mundo deum praeficit [...]; Tertullianus com-
ments in a similar way, and later Lactantius and Augustinus.
85 Middle-platonists Apuleius, De deo Socratis, 2, De dogmate Platonis; for Albinus, Atticus cf. J.
Whittaker, 1990; T. Göransson, 1995; B. Reis, 1999. Concerning Plotinus: A. H. Armstrong, 1970;
D. O’Meara, 1993. – The success of the Neoplatonic Theologia Aristotelis is most instructive for
appreciating the impact of the reception of Λ.
86 See the extensive and profound study of M. Di Giovanni and O. Primavesi in: C. Horn, 2016, 11–66.
87 Beginning with E. Zeller, 1963, II 2, 359–384 („Dualistischer Theismus“), though he had still the
neutral title „Das erste Bewegende,“ then the old and the new Überweg (H. Flashar, 1983, 378–
380), W.K. C. Guthrie, Vol. Six, 1981, Chapt. XIII, until A. Graeser, in W. Röd (ed.), History of
Philosophy, vol. II, 1993, 241–243.
88 A. Bausola, G. Reale, 1994, 589–609; in addition the bibliography of R. Radice and R. Davies con-
cerning the Met. von Aristoteles, 1997 (lit. until 1994, later in selection); a fine overview on the
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onMet. Λ deliberately placed themselves in this tradition. The last statement on this
case (see C. Horn, 2016) is even narrower in view. But other publications on Aristo-
tle and hisMetaphysics speak in the same tenor.89 And even if J. Owens designates
Met. Λ a “study of Entity,”90 this does not contradict the theological reading, for
this is just the name for theology, as he says in his preface:
[…] the whole of the Metaphysics… contains the genuine Aristotelian science
of Being qua Being, a science that treats universally of all Beings. But this
science is not an ontology. It has as its subject a definite nature. It is the
science of separate Entity, a theology. (26)
Already P. Merlan understood ens qua ens this way. For J. Owens, Theophrastus
is a proof of the theological reading of Aristotle’s Met. Λ.91 So he continues the
the tradition of interpreting ‘first philosophy’ as theology which has lasted from the
Greek commentators and the Church Fathers up to today. Besides this, he seeks
to prove that Aristotle’s Metaphysics is in the background of the thinking of the
Middle Ages in general.92 The 19th century shares those convictions.93 There are
many other examples in the 20th century. The theological content is not called into
question by W. Jaeger.94 Instead, his questions concern the changes in the theology
numerous anthologies, commemorative publications etc. in A. Bausola, G. Reale, 1994, and in J.
Barnes, 1995, 303–305. C. Rapp, 1996 and Rapp / Corcilius 2011; at last the contributions in the
Symposium Aristotelicum on Met. Λ, from August 1996 in: Frede, 2000, and the New Essays, 2016,
edited by C. Horn.
89 E. g. the older monumental presentation of I. Düring, 1966, but no less the new edited by J. Barnes,
1995, 104, cf. 355, in which we read: “Theology is the subject of part of Book Lambda.”
A chronologically arranged overview of the most important literature on the Met. in the 20th
century is made by A. Bausola, G. Reale, 1994, 548–589; cf. J. Barnes, 1995, 345–357, as well as
the bibliography of R. Radice, R. Davies, 1997. Further literature on Met. Λ we find esp. in E. J.
García de la Garza, 2011, and C. Horn, 2016, and the new commentaries by F. Baghdassarian and L.
Judson.
90 J. Owens, 1963, 543: “<Met. Λ> is a study of Entity, first in sensible Entity and then in immobile
Entity. But it shows no interest in setting up a science of separate Entity that treats universally of
all Beings. It is content with studying separate Entity in itself and as the final cause of all sensible
Entities and of all movements.”
91 J. Owens, 1963, 43f., cf. G. Reale, 1994, 316, in the same sense.
92 J. Owens, 1963, 49, with reference to P. Natorp, 1888, 63f.; cf. A. Zimmermann 1965 and 1998.
93 F.K.A. Schwegler, 1847, IV, 35: “Die einzige wahrhafte οὐσία, das wahre πρῶτως καὶ ἁπλῶς ὄν
ist die Gottheit,” H. Bonitz, 1849, 494: Summum principium movens deus est, aeterno actu se ipsum
cogitans, and E. Zeller, see above, 87, fn. 13; cf. J. Owens, 1963, 50f.
94 W. Jaeger, 1912, 122–130, and 1923, 366ff.
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over the course of Aristotle’s development, and how theology fits his system, that
is, whetherMet. Λ belongs to the period when Aristotle was closer to or further from
Plato. For W.D. Ross,Met. Λ is “the coping-stone of theMetaphysics,” and he de-
velops a cosmological proof out from the text, in this proof God plays the role of a
causa efficiens.95 Even for P. Aubenque (1962), who defends an aporetic interpreta-
tion, theology plays the role of a Science retrouvée (in the last chapter Conclusion),
although only a negative one. His argument runs like this: ontology is compelled
to put forward a double question (308), because the problem too is a double one: on
the one side, the question whether our use of to be has a unity, on the other side, if
there are further ousiai beside the perceptible ousiai (followingMet. B 1, 995b14).
What else than God could provide a unity to our use of to be, as well as guarantee the
being of non-perceptible essences? Thus the question about god is necessary. Very
typical are the considerations of G. Reale.96 If the question about being involves
the question of non-perceptible substances, namely substances that are “eternal, un-
moved, and separate from the perceptible substances,” then the question about being
transforms to the question of whether there is a first being; therefore ontology and
theology are inseparable. The opening phrase of his book on Aristotle reads like
this: “Λ è il libro ‘teologico’ per eccellenza,” and he repeats this phrase in his Sag-
gio introdutivo to the Metaphysics.97 H. J. Krämer opens his article “Grundfragen
der aristotelischen Theologie” (1969) saying: Die Theologie des Buchs Lambda der
aristotelischen Metaphysik […] L. Routila tries to show that Met. Λ develops the
programme of Met. E but that it unfortunately does not satisfy the expectations
(1969, 129). In this respect, historians speak the same language as the scholastics.
The anthology La question de dieu selon Aristote et Hegel (Paris 1991), edited by T.
De Koninck and G. Planty-Bonjour can be regarded as representative. The contri-
butions carry out by many different aspects of the programme of the title: whether
and how the question of god is comparable in the cases of Aristotle and G.W. F.
Hegel. Beside contributions on the core of the Aristotelian ‘theology,’ the famous
95 W.D. Ross, 1924, I, CXXX.
96 G. Reale, 1994, 272.
97 G. Reale, 1994, 259; and G. Reale 1993, I, 62; G. Reale’s remarks on the proof of the existence of
God in Met. Λ: I 139–152 and III, 575ff., = further explanations to Met. Λ 6.
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phrase “thinking of thinking,” this volume contains papers on onto-theology and the
god of the philosophers in general. The omnibus volume of the XIV. Symposium
Aristotelicum onMet. Λ (ed. 2000) was eagerly awaited, but unfortunately it didn’t
change anything of the style of the standard interpretation, and the aforementioned
New Essays, 2016, reinforces even further the traditional frame. It looks as if the
allowed questions in this field are decided in advance. D.W. Graham writes that
God is only a subordinate theme; nevertheless he sees theology as the core of Met.
Λ.98 Like F. Brentano,99 G. Reale, and many others K. Gloy thinks thatMet. Λ con-
tains the master plan and the coronation of Aristotle’s system.100 The peak of this
system is noesis noeseos, but here K. Gloy gives more importance to the subjective
side than K. Oehler did (1973). Yet, because both identify the peak with God, the
main target of Met. Λ remains theological.
A. Ritschl and P. Natorp are among the first to reject the theological reading of
Met. Λ.101 A. Ritschl wanted to separate the theological from the metaphysical
approach to the knowledge of god. Therefore he said that proofs of the existence of
God only lead to the assertion of a supreme metaphysical principle which cannot be
identified with the Christian God. P. Natorp refuses the theological interpretation
of Met. Λ because he rightly points out that in this book there is no theology at
all. Neither of them prevailed. One of the reasons their warnings were disregarded
may be that many scholars had an interest or even the duty to prepare Aristotelian
thought to ground central Christian dogmas. So the theological interpretation and
its consequences become convictions, contents of beliefs, which serve more ways
of living of believers than systematical or historical purposes.102 In this case it is
much easier to find what one is looking for.103
98 D.W. Graham, 1987, 266; Graham is one example of the intensive American research on Aristotle.
99 F. Brenano, 1986, 219.
100 K. Gloy, 1983, 515; G. Reale, 1993, I, 181, designates Met. Λ as il libro che risolve il problema
dei problemi della metafisica aristotelica. Its theology is the coronation of the Aristotelian system
(1993, I, 64–65).
101 A. Ritschl, 1888; P. Natorp, 1888.
102 See the Epistula encyclica de Philosophia christiana ad mentam sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris
Angelici in scholis catholicis instauranda, 14. sept. 1998 and its predecessors.
103 How far some go one can see e. g. in one of the last texts of Michael Pakaluk, Catholic University
of America: “Aristotle on God as Creator,” Meeting of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas, June
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2.2.1. The Content of this Theology
Thus there is a major consensus that Met. Λ contains Aristotle’s theology.104 But
just at this point the unanimity ends. There is controversy over Aristotle’s concept
of God, how he proves God’s existence, the possibility of such proofs in general,
and, finally it is disputed, whether a proof of God’s existence has an effect or not on
the belief. The supposed theological content of the text is self-contradictory; thus
differences remain about the exact content of Aristotle’s theology. Above all, the
status of theology in the whole of knowledge remains unclear. Theology should be
a fundamental discipline; but Aristotle typically calls his discipline ‘the searched
knowledge’ or ‘first philosophy’ in the Met. The term θεολογία or θεολογικὴ
<ἐπιστήμη> does not occur in Met. Λ, but only in Met. E 1 (and K 7) and the
θεόλογοι mentioned in Met. Λ serve to illustrate an opposing position.
Many think that in Met. Λ there is a proof ex parte motus, as e. g. W.D. Ross, and
that the ‘First Mover’ is God because he is nous.105 But J. G. De Filippo says, that
Aristotle means that a pursued and loved thing cannot be the eternal ground of the
world and movement, because it is a mere intentional object; therefore the cause of
2017, Vatican City; here M. Pakaluk mingles without any hesitation Aristotle, St. Thomas and an
encyclical of Pope Francis.
104 See the literature cited above, fn. 76. Thomas Aquinas serves as the model for the use of Aristotelian
arguments in favour of the Christian faith; also in modern presentations of Christian dogmatism, the
old patterns of argumentation are used partly as contrast, partly for confirmation. Exemples: A.
Ritschl, 1888, P. Tillich, 1956, K. Barth, 1958, id., 1975, W. Pannenberg, 1988. A very useful
summary is given by T. De Koninck, 1991, 69ff., he arranges the literature in six groups:
a) the closure of metaphysics in general with G.W. F. Hegel (the end of the Encyclopaedie); see
N. Hartmann, 1955–1958, II, 214–252 (“Aristoteles und Hegel”); cf. W. Wieland, 1970, 35, fn. 18);
b) “self-reflexion”: A. N. Whitehead, 1978; H.-G. Gadamer, K. Oehler; c) concerning noesis
noeseos: For what reason such a Narcissus? E. Zeller, (repr.) 1963; W.D. Ross, 1914;
d) intelligendo se inteligit omnia (Thomas Aquinas, in Met. XII, lect. 11, n. 2614): Alexander
of Aphrodisias, I. Düring, Themistius, Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas, Trendelenburg, F. Brentano
(cf. W.K. C. Guthrie VI, 261, Anm.);
e) finally, the position of T. De Koninck himself: noesis noeseos is neither pure self-reflexion
nor a mere logical relation, but is the activity of highest level (150) which nevertheless avoids plu-
rality and movement in god;
f) P. Gohlke, 1933, 69: Met. Λ proves that Aristotle developed “from materialism to idealism.”
Also H. von Arnim, 1931, and M. Wundt, 1953, 58, think that the ”Unmoved Mover” is a “late
discovery.”
105 W.D. Ross, 1924, I, CXLI. – Cf. J. Rohls, 1987, 15.
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the actual eternal movement must be an intelligible object, that exists independently
of the movement and reality caused by it (1994, 402–3). But even that does not
suffice to show that the ‘First Mover’ is identical to God, De Filippo adds. As the
last step we need the insight that “The First Mover is not only an object of thinking
but he is itself the intellect who thinks this object.” Insofar as he thinks he is living;
only the function of life transforms the thinking nous into the ‘First Mover’ and
God.
For some scholars it is the main point of the theological interpretation that the ac-
tion of the ‘First Mover’ is noesis noeseos. This form of thinking is said to be the
pinnacle either of Aristotle’s system (D. Ross, K. Gloy) or of all ancient philosophy
(K. Oehler). There are a variety of proposals for the content of God’s thinking of
thinking, from absolutely nothing to the whole world. It depends on what a given
reader takes to be divine. Following K. Oehler the being of the ‘Unmoved Mover’
is the thinking of thinking,106 in which the divine nous thinks nothing other than
himself, because – in the Greek antiquity – thinking cannot be without an object:
In contrast to modern thought, ancient thought does not understand itself from
self-thinking, from the free spontaneity of the self and its autonomous, sovereign
activity, but from being thought of.107
K. Gloy, sees four proofs in the text, but supposes that their conclusiveness must be
put in doubt (1983, 527); the mere postulate that the ‘Unmoved Mover’ ist für sich
is not enough for a proof of existence (542). Some identify the ‘First Mover’ with
prote ousia, which can be understood either as a single substance or as a range of
beings.108 Prote ousia, understood as a single substance, was declared as the tra-
ditional personal God or other religious manifestations, but also as sich selbst tra-
gendes Tun, which does not need another subject.109 But it seems that such claims
106 This is an early form of pure reflection as K. Oehler, 1973, 54–59, thinks; cf. on this theme H.-G.
Gadamer, 1966.
107 Im Unterschied zum neuzeitlichen Denken versteht sich das antike Denken nicht vom Sichselbst-
denken, von der freien Spontaneität des Selbst und seiner autonomen, souveränen Aktivität her, son-
dern vom Gedachtwerden.
108 F. Inciarte, 1994, 19, and his tradition; H. J. Krämer, 1969, 369f. For quite another understanding of
prote ousia see E. Sonderegger, 2012, passim.
109 F. Inciarte, 1994, 20f; cf. W.K. C. Guthrie, 1981, VI, 262, “God, however, as the perfect being, is
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are rather evocations than arguments. T. Irwin, saying that “the study of being qua
being [...] requires the study of substance” (1988, 171), and being convinced that
the question about being as being is a question about a certain class of beings (544,
n. 42) repeats the reification (Vergegenständlichung) widespread in metaphysical
literature. In his argument points of view are transformed into things. Through a
Neoplatonic interpretation, P. Merlan came to the conclusion that being as being
means the highest sphere of beings, thus God. Further, he takes theMet. of Aristo-
tle as the theological part of theMetaphysica specialis. A. N.Whitehead, in Process
and Reality, counters that it was false to think of God as a simple substance because
god is itself becoming, a process.110
While some adopt a positive stance towards Aristotle’s work in theology,111 others
are annoyed that Aristotle wasted his time with such a desperate project – but both
share the supposition that theology is the content of Met. Λ. To his remark “…a
cruel critic will urge that it [: Aristotle’s theology] is composed of five parts bad
argument and five parts nonsense” J. Barnes adds, that he had to fear to lose his
friends if he would admit in propria persona that “much of Zeta and Eta is rather
good, and most of Lambda is embarrassingly bad” (1995, 108). Of course J. Barnes
would simply be right – if theology were really at stake.
It is my goal to show that, in this text, there is no such thing as theology and that
it does not contain such nonsense. The alleged theology is no more than an effect
of the reception of the text, a tradition which is exceptionally forceful, indeed up to
today, but sine fundamento in scriptis. Some may be afraid “to lose the aura,” but
groundlessly.112 If we lose heavyweights like substance, theology etc. we are paid
back by the gain of more original questions.
pure actuality.”
110 A.N. Whitehead, 1979, 157f.; Part V, Chapter II; p. 342 he cites the ‘Unmoved Mover’; p. 615Met.
Λ, 1072a23–32.
111 So especially with the neo-scholastic wing (e. g. J. Owens, G. Reale, H. Seidl etc.) but also the
historical orientated (e. g. H. Flashar, K. Oehler), the contributors to the Symposium Aristotelicum
on Met. Λ, the participants on the conference of the Karl und Gertrud-Abel Stiftung, Bonn, the
contributions of which are edited by Chr. Horn, 2016, under the title New Essays. In the obituary on
K. Abel W. Kullmann had praised his “von den Eltern überkommene christliche Einstellung.”
112 A. Etienne, in the review of R. Bodéüs, 1995, 166.
121
2. The Traditional Reception of Met. Λ and its Difficulties
R. Bodéüs (1992) and H. Lang (1993) have shown us that a theology in Aristotle’s
sense would not be a science of gods anyway.113 Both emphasize that the explicit
theme of Met. Λ is ousia. Unfortunately, H. Lang understands ousia as substance
in line with the tradition, so sooner or later we come back to theology. It would be
an illusion to think that other authors such as J. Owens, who strengthens the ousia-
theme share our non-theological reading, because for them the ousia is finally the
divine ousia.
P. Natorp, (1888) is the most important (but not the only) predecessor of my effort
to show the non-theological side of Met. Λ. Already in the Middle Ages there was a
discussion about the possible implications of a theological use of the text. Avicenna
says in his autobiography that he was not able to understand Aristotle’sMetaphysics
before he read the interpretation of Alfarabi, that Aristotle’s book had nothing to
do with theology.114 At the same time as P. Natorp, A. Ritschl also fended off the
mixing of the two concepts, and before him so didW. Herrmann, (1876) who rightly
favoured a concept of God based on historical revelation more than on Aristotle’s
text. Even M. Lutz-Bachmann (1988) adduced arguments against the opinion that
God is the theme of Met., and the research of B. Botter (2005) about the use of
the words ‘god’ and ‘divine’ confirms very well the non-theological sense of these
words in Met. Λ.
2.2.2. Onto-Theologie
The controversy over whether Aristotle’s first philosophy is ontology or theology
has lasted a long time, without any definitive result. Some considered the system-
atic side of the question, some focused onMet. E 1. The idea of onto-theology was
a way to avoid the dilemma of the apparently contradictory conception of first phi-
losophy as pursuing the question about being as being (insofar it is ontology) and
as pursuing question about the first being (insofar it is theology). Onto-theology
made it possible to escape the ambiguity and to transform ‘either A or B’ into ‘A
113 R. Bodéüs, 1992, 334.
114 Cf. D. Gutas, 1988, 238ff.
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as well as B.’ W. Stegmaier says that L. Feuerbach was the first to use the concept
of onto-theology.115 But Kant, KrV B 660, already used the term in the paragraph
“Kritik aller Theologie aus spekulativen Prinzipien der Vernunft” in the course of
the classification of theology in general. By this term he identifies the transcen-
dental theology which “thinks to recognize its existence <sc. the existence of the
original being> by means of mere concepts without any experience [...]”116 It seems
that Kant used the term rather incidentally – either way, it plays no role in the KrV
subsequently. The Kantian sense of onto-theology includes the proofs of the exis-
tence of God, especially the ontological proofs.
M. Heidegger understands the proofs of the existence of God in a narrower sense.
Metaphysics in general, insofar as it supposes a first being and substance, searches
for proofs of its existence, and connects the concept of the first substance with that
of the cause. So the question about being necessarily leads to the question about
God. In this sense onto-theology existed already avant la lettre. So, text VIII of the
Philosophische Abhandlungen of Leibniz also exhibits an onto-theology.117 Ac-
cording to Leibniz from the principle quod nihil fiat sine ratione [...] follows the
ens necessarium as ultima ratio rerum, which to name “God” is a mere formality.
Of course, some tried to trace back the concept of onto-theology to Aristotle, while
P. Aubenque stood up against this claim (1991). But only with M. Heidegger does
the term come into general use.118
Since then, many books and articles on this topic are published, partly with respect
to the contradictory statements in Met. E 1.119 They offer different solutions for
115 W. Stegmaier, 1977, 13, fn. 9. – L. Feuerbach, 1837, now in: 1910, 212.
116 “glaubt, durch blosse Begriffe ohne Beihilfe der mindesten Erfahrung, sein <sc. des Urwesens>
Dasein zu erkennen [...]”
117 G.W. Leibniz, GP VII, 289–291, M. Heidegger named it “24 Thesen zur Metaphysik.”
118 M. Heidegger, 1957; id., 1961, II, 321, 348f.; id., Antrittsvorlesung 1929, in: 1967, 1–19; id., 1949,
in: 1967, 195–211.
119 A. Ritschl, 1888; G. Patzig, 1960–61, 185–205; W. Class, 1974; K. Kremer (Hrsg.), 1980, (herein
the speeches of K. Kremer, F.-P. Hager, J. Möller, B. Welte, F. Ricken SJ, on the occasion of a
conference of the “Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Fachvertreter für Philosophie innerhalb des Studiums
Katholischer Theologie”;
D. Melcic, 1986; M. Lutz-Bachmann (Hrsg.), 1988; in: H. Ruf (Hrsg.), 1989, is willing to defend
onto-theology and thereby religion; H. Gripp-Hagelstange, 1990; P. Aubenque, 1991; J. Derrida,
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the problem of the topic of metaphysics – sometimes ontology, sometimes theol-
ogy, sometimes both. Logic in the sense of G.W. F. Hegel is metaphysics, as M.
Heidegger says, because it is “that form of thinking which everywhere explores and
grounds the being as such and on the whole from the being as ground (Logos).”120
Thus, insofar metaphysics “ergründet” (: explores), it is ontology and remains in the
frame of the question about being. But insofar metaphysics “begründet” (: grounds,
provides a basis) it is theology and becomes an assertion about beings. So meta-
physics tries to found the existence of God. In Heidegger’s view it is is a phase
in the history of being (Seinsgeschichte), that being (Sein) reveals itself as basis,
ground. Another important approach to the concept of onto-theology can be found
in P. Aubenque, in E. Berti and Markus Gabriel.121 P. Aubenque, as well as E.
Berti, resist tracing back onto-theology to Aristotle; nevertheless, they recognise an
immanent theological trend in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
M. Heidegger’s argument that any metaphysics necessarily leads to a theology and
any theory of substance to an onto-theology seems well-founded. The question re-
mains, whether Aristotle indeed maintained such a metaphysics of substance. In
this context, substance is what enables something to have qualities and to be de-
termined. Substance is able to “stand in itself,” to subsist, and this way it is the
core and essence of a particular thing. As witnesses for this reading of Met. Λ
my suffice S. Broadie,122 T. De Koninck123 and the literature cited in the review
of L. Herrschaft.124 F. Suarez summarizes the tradition of the Middle Ages by
defining substance as ultimum subiectum or ultimum subsistens.125 But because
obviously no substance in our world is an ultimum subiectum, we have to ask for
another substance with this quality, i. e. God. The same is true for subsistence. All
substances which we know of have only a relative subsistence, their real existence
1992, 3–24; R. Theis, 1993, 315–336; E. Berti, 1994, 117–143; F. Inciarte, 1994, 1–20;.
120 dasjenige Denken, das überall das Seiende als solches im Ganzen vom Sein als dem Grund (Logos)
her ergründet und begründet (1957, 50).
121 P. Aubenque, 1991; E. Berti, 1994, 117–143; M. Gabriel, 2009.
122 S. Broadie, 1993, 365–411.
123 T. De Koninck, G. Planty-Bonjour (Hrsg.), 1991.
124 L. Herrschaft, 1993, 461–476.
125 See S. 85.
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must be granted by another substance whose subsistence is absolute and definitive.
All things around us need for their being another thing. Indeed we find the ulti-
mum subiectum in Aristotle’s text, the hypokeimenon fulfills this function, the first
about-what, be it of speech or of determinations of being.126 But the concept of
subsistence is found in no way in Aristotle’s text.
2.2.3. Theology as a Form of Knowledge
The apologists of an Aristotelian theology can point to the fact that Aristotle occa-
sionally speaks of theologians or of theology – more precisely of theologike <epis-
teme> – so we must ask what he means by these words.127 As a rule, he mentions
theology while distinguishing forms of knowledge. Let us begin with a short list of
some relevant texts, of which I will examine three in greater detail. Aristotle gives
a division of knowledge in Met. A 1–3. The theme at this place is the difference
between theoretical knowledge and the knowledge needed to produce something.
Another place isMet. Γ 1–3 (and K 3); some have said that Aristotle in these chap-
ters has presented his ontology. He treats the relation between different parts of
philosophy and ousia, the relation between dialectic, sophistry, and philosophy, as
well as the difference between first and second philosophy. In Met. Z 11 Aristotle
mentions physics as second philosophy. Met. E 1 (together with K 7) is the most
relevant chapter; here he discusses the differences between practical, productive,
and theoretical knowledge; the last is divided into theologike (that is, first philoso-
phy), physics, and mathematics. Met. Z 1 looks at the sort of knowledge that has
always been sought, and ΖΗΘ at first philosophy in general, whose object is prote
ousia. In Physik B 2, Aristotle takes a position on the difference between mathemat-
ics and physics. Finally he articulates the dianoetical aretai at Nicomachean Ethics
Z, 3 (1139b14ff). To complement this list, we will see below (part III, chapter 5),
in the commentary on the first sentence of Met. Λ, what is meant when Aristotle
says περὶ οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία (“the theory concerns being”).
126 Cf. E. Sonderegger, 2012, III, 5.2, in the commentary to Met. Z 3, 291–303.
127 For this theme cf P. Natorp, 1888, more current R. Bodéüs, 1992, and B. Botter, 2005.
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From this multitude of places let us focus on three, Met. A 1–2, Γ 1–3, and Ε 1,
with the goal of clarifying the position of theology within knowledge as a whole.
In Met. A 1–2 Aristotle tries to work out the concept of the “first” knowledge by
examining the current opinions (endoxa) about knowledge. This discussion is less
about describing a hierarchy of knowledge, than about determining which knowl-
edge is first, decisive, and fundamental. Which knowledge is necessarily involved
in and presupposed by any sort of knowledge whatsoever? What must we already
know in general, or in principle, before we are able to know something in detail?
What must we know already if we want – or have – to justify or argue about some
particular knowledge or opinion? Since we are seeking the origin of knowledge,
our everyday forms and methods of knowing cannot be applied. We need a method
that allows us to advance to the foundations of our opinions (endoxa); this method
could be named ‘first philosophy.’128 Aristotle summarizes his results in Met. A
2, 982b7–10: this knowledge concerns the first causes, and it must be a theoreti-
cal knowledge (in contrast to practical and productive knowledge). He comes to
this conclusion through a critical review of the opinions about knowledge of his
time, i. e. what common sense considers to be a characteristic of knowledge. Ad-
ditionally, he introduces an analogy with practical knowledge at 982b10: καὶ γὰρ
τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν ἓν τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν, “the good and the for-the-sake-of
is one of the causes too.” H. Bonitz and H. Seidl link this sentence to the sought
knowledge (W.D. Ross does not comment on this phrase).129 This is because they
suppose that the sentence gives evidence for the two aforementioned characteristics
of first knowledge. According to H. Bonitz and H. Seidl, Aristotle means that the
supreme knowledge is precisely the knowledge which knows the for-the-sake-of
for all things. – But H. Seidl confuses what is distinguished as practical and the-
oretical knowledge, crucial in A 1–2, and H. Bonitz overlooks the function of the
analogy between practical and theoretical knowledge. Thus this passage does not
128 Not to forget, that ‘first philosophy’ denotes the method to find the searched knowledge as well as
the result of this research, the first knowledge with its contents.
129 H. Bonitz, 1849, 51, with reference to Met. Λ 7; H. Seidl, 1980, I, 272, “...Endzweck alles Han-
delns...”
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give a justification for the two mentioned characteristics, but it refers back to A 2,
982b3 and other passages, which deal with practical knowledge. Later, at 983a4–11,
we can find a similar case for theology; but here, 982b3–7, Aristotle only reminds
his listener or reader of a point of practical knowledge, which was evident to his
contemporaries, with the purpose to link this with the searched first knowledge.
With practical knowledge, it is evident that all singular aims must refer to some
first aim. However, in the tradition it is already evident what this first is: the good,
in Aristotelian terminology the for-the-sake-of. The sentence beginning with καί
(at 982b10) implies that theoretical knowledge as well as practical knowledge must
refer to a first cause; in Plato’s language, the name for this is ‘the good,’ and in his
own, it is the for-the-sake-of-something.
Philosophical tradition and Aristotle’s contemporary opinions as well provide clear
indications about what is held to be the first in theoretical knowledge: it is ousia
(Sein). But what to be means is not yet decided. It is the job of the first knowledge
which Aristotle is searching for to find just this meaning. Of course, the knowl-
edge searched for is a not productive knowledge. Productive and theoretical knowl-
edge differ in that productive knowledge has a defined purpose, it is practical in our
modern sense. Aristotle compares the relation between theoretical and productive
knowledge with that of a slave and a free man. As the free man – in Aristotle’s
time – is of a higher value than a slave, so the free knowledge is of a higher value;
theoretical knowledge is for the sake of itself, as the free person is, and not for the
sake of something else. The mention of wondering (thaumazein) also refers to this
freedom. A wondering person desires to know, he or she is not conditioned by some
necessity or some purpose to achieve. He or she wants to know, and nothing else.
Continuing the comparison (A 2, 982b28), Aristotle says that it is doubtful whether
such a knowledge is humanly possible. In comparison with the ideal of absolute
freedom involved in first knowledge, human knowledge is limited and conditioned
– most of all by common opinions. However, even within its limits and conditions,
this form of knowledge is the best knowledge possible for us, “because the most
divine knowledge is the most precious” (983a5). The reference to god is clearly
made as a point of comparison, since the use of the superlative (“most divine”) for
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the knowledge of god sensu proprio would be strange.
Why does Aristotle speak of a “most divine knowledge”? According to the stan-
dard interpretation, this implies that Aristotle assumes the existence of the Gods,
because this proposition be about the knowledge of the gods. Against this, we must
say that the leading question of the text is not whether there are gods or not, but
how free human knowledge can be. The outlined ideal of knowledge seems hardly
achievable for humans; if anything, the gods could reach it. So Aristotle compares
gods with humans, as was natural for Greeks since Homer. Plato, too, uses this sort
of comparison of gods and humans at the beginning of the Sophist, using the same
common opinions as Aristotle does here. There is nothing asserted about gods or
their knowledge, they are not the subject now. We must not forget Plato’s cautious
remarks in Phaedrus (246c–d) that our knowledge about gods is only very vague
and uncertain. Should Aristotle be so much more ill-considered than Plato?
Aristotle here refers to a current belief (endoxon). The knowledge attributed to the
gods illustrates the freedom of theory, the ideal form of a knowledge that is for the
sake of itself. For us it may be impossible to achieve this state, but we suppose that
it would be possible for gods. The “most divine” knowledge belongs to the field of
endoxa and is for the purposes of comparison, therefore the use of the superlative. It
is an image of an absolute demand for knowledge, which Aristotle knows cannot be
fulfilled by humans; he does need to assert or believe anything about the existence
of gods or their factual knowledge to make this statement. Besides, it would be
notably inconsistent to contend such factual knowledge about gods immediately
after having claimed that we humans are restricted to our Doxa.
Let us return to Met. A 1–2. In the phrase “the knowledge of gods” the genitive
‘of gods’ can be understood either as gen. subiectivus or as gen. obiectivus. Thus
Aristotle continues at 983a5 – always in the context of his comparison – by saying
that the phrase has a double meaning. On the one side it means that there is a
knowledge about the gods (in this case it is a gen. obiectivus), because following our
opinions about gods in some way they seem to be principles (δοκεῖ πᾶσιν, a8–9, cf.
a16). Either way, that god is a cause is an endoxon (as Aristotle explicitly says) that
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must be taken into account (a7), if we are to speak about causes and grounds. But the
expression can also refer to the knowledge that the gods have (in this case it is a gen.
subj.), such that – if anything – they would realize the most free and unconditioned
knowledge conceivable, just as we believe they do (a8). – Aristotle concludes with
a remark on the inversion of wonder. One who knows would be wondering if things
were otherwise than what he has understood with grounds (a11–21). So the essence
and the aim of the knowledge searched for is determined.
Why does Aristotle mention gods in this context? By no means did he intend to as-
sert anything about gods or about their knowledge – aside from other reasons, this
is excluded because he recognized that mere assertions can no longer be the philo-
sophical way of speaking. On the contrary, he uses common beliefs to show the
characteristics of the searched knowledge. His readers or listeners have some com-
mon opinions about the differences between slaves and free individuals, also about
the difference between humans and gods. Nowwemust apply these differences over
the three forms of knowledge, the productive, practical, and theoretical knowledge.
Through these comparisons, we arrive at the ideal of an absolutely free knowledge.
It is a common belief that gods are causes and causes are at stake now.130 That
Aristotle speaks about gods does not mean, then, that this is a theological discourse;
the question about ousia sufficiently provokes this theme.
Let us now examineMet. Γ 1–2, where Aristotle also studies the division of knowl-
edge. Here Aristotle does not explicitly speak about theology, but about ‘being as
being.’ Following a few remarks in Met. K this expression is regarded by some
scholars as another term for god,131 such thatMet. Γ too would essentially be about
130 P. Natorp, 1888, 52:
Der Grundgedanke der Stelle erklärt sich vollständig aus der Parallele A
2. Dass nämlich ‘das Göttliche’ im Gebiete der fraglichen Wissenschaft
liege, ist gewiss gut aristotelisch; …also die Gottheit gehört in die Funda-
mentalphilosophie; aus welchem Grund aber? Nur, weil Gott eine der Ur-
sachen, eines der Prinzipien ist, Ursachen und Prinzipien überhaupt aber
den Gegenstand der fraglichen Wissenschaft bilden.
131 E. g. P. Merlan, 1953; F. Inciarte, 1994.
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God. F. Inciarte says that the reason for this is the connection of the principle of
non-contradiction with the concept of divine substance.
We ask now what makes ‘first knowledge’ first. For the first knowledge it is essen-
tial
– that it includes in its consideration all beings (Met. Γ 2, 1004a34–b1);
– that it is able to distinguish between ‘Socrates’ and ‘sitting Socrates,’
– that its theme is ousia because ousia is something first (etwas Erstes),
– finally, that it can articulate the distinctions and criteria which are essential for
the question about ousia.
Clarification is needed with regard to the last point, because scholars hardly ever
acknowledge the fact that Aristotle here follows the programme of the Sophist. The
text of Met. Γ, especially chapter 2, is full of references to the megista gene of
the Sophist.132 Let’s have a glance at this dialogue. The first of the megista gene
is being (to on). By this, Plato designates what is at issue now (: Problemtitel).
The first determinations of being, Plato says, are movement and rest (kinesis and
stasis), derived from the opinions of the ‘earth-borne’ giants and the ‘friends of
ideas’; number four and five are identity and difference (tauton and thateron), the
concepts of reflexion (Reflexionsbegriffe), these concepts are necessary to speak
about kinesis and stasis. In Met. Γ Aristotle proceeds exactly in the same manner
and even using the same terms. Somewhat pointedly (but nevertheless in the spirit
of the Aristotelian example with ‘Socrates’) we can say that it is not the one who
knows something about god who has the first knowledge (which would then be a
knowledge higher in degree than physical knowledge), but rather this one who is
able to distinguish between ‘Socrates’ and ‘sitting Socrates.’133 With such exam-
ples, Aristotle indicates that the first knowledge is about the distinctions of being
(sein). Only in the reception of Aristotle this is transformed to the knowledge about
substance, and as a consequence, to the knowledge about ‘absolute subsistence’ and
132 Cf. Met. Γ 2, 1003b30–1004a2, 1004a17–31; 1005a11–18; theologia, theologike: Meteorologica
B 1 353a35: “what the ancients did”; Met. E 1, 1026a10ff., a19. K 7, 1064b3, a33.
133 Met. Z 6, 1032a4–11: we must be able to counter the sophisms and to distinguish ‘Socrates’ and
‘being-Socrates’; cf. Z 11, 1037a5–10: ‘Socrates’ and ‘the soul of Socrates.’
130
2.2. Met. Λ as Theology
God.
If we want to understand the sense of the question about the first knowledge, we
have to take into account what is asked for at the beginning of Met. Γ. We should
know whether the searched knowledge about first causes and principles of being
and the knowledge about the features of being as such, is a single or homogeneous
knowledge or not.134 In Met. Γ 3 Aristotle combines this question with the fur-
ther question (inspired by the second aporia in Met. B, 996b26–33) of whether
the knowledge about principles also belongs to this same knowledge (τὰ ἐν τοῖς
μαθήμασιν καλούμενα ἀξιώματα, “the so-called principles in knowledge”); the
principle of contradiction is only an example of the type of principles in question,
and is in no way the central theme ofMet. Γ. To ask for the first principles is difficult
because to be is said in many ways which at first seem to have no unity. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to give an answer although the diversity of our use of to be is
not simply a linguistic diversity with an univocal meaning. It has the unity of the
pros-hen-relation, as paronymous words differ in meaning but have a focus in one
and the same being or meaning (thus G. E. L. Owen called it “focal meaning”).
However differently to be is meant in the particular cases (Aristotle distinguishes
categorical, modal, and veridical uses; today we could add predicative, inclusive,
and existential uses, and maybe others as well), in any case to be is said in relation
to a first.135 Looking for ‘the first’ in the multiple ways of using to be Aristotle
has in mind the fundamental opinions about ousia, that is, theDoxa. Even if these
fundamental opinions about ousia are the content of a fundamental knowledge, they
remain opinions. We can generalize this structure beyond the Greek world, then a
respective tradition defines what to be means in a given world. By referring partic-
ular perceptions, informations etc. to a first of this kind, i. e. to a respectiveDoxa,
a consistent understanding in a given world is possible. That’s why the first plays
a crucial role in Met. Γ. Anyway the first always is the theme of philosophers.136
134 Met. Γ 1–2; see the summary in the last phrase of chapter 2.
135 This is the main difference with the modern conception of to be. For most modern philosophers, to
be means primarily to exist, and the other meanings have no link with each other.
136 Met. Γ 2, 1003b16f.; cf. Met. A and Z 1.
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This knowledge of the first is superior to the physical knowledge, which always pre-
supposes a knowledge of an other kind, which is therefore a “second philosophy.”
The standard interpretation took this first to be a being, namely God. That is right
if we seek for a first substance, but it is false, if the first we are searching for is the
Doxa about being (to be; seeMet. Γ 2, 1003b17 and passim). Whoever substitutes
God for ousia in passages like 1005a35–b2 reaches his aim very fast and easily. But
they must overlook that ‘the first’ is no more than a formal designation. The first
ousia is determined by ourDoxa and it is the first in relation to which we use to be
in controlled diversity.
That all concerns are about being is supported by Met. Γ 2, 1004b17–26, where
Aristotle distinguishes between sophistry, dialectic, and philosophy; all deal with
to on but they do it differently and with different goals. Later on, at Met. Γ 2,
1004a31–b4 the discussion about the possible unity of knowledge reaches a certain
conclusion. Following this argument, it is legitimate and sensible to search for a
knowledge that concerns all beings. This knowledge must not be confused with
the false sophistical claim ‘to know all things’ (see Plato, Sophist 233a), because
it does not aim at propositions about generic, specific, or other determinations of a
particular being, but it aims at the first in being and knowledge, which is general
because every sentence (logos) – though in many different ways – makes use of it
as its point of reference (pros hen legetai, “it is said with respect to one”). –
In our everyday life we do not deal with ‘beings’ but with this person, this table,
this dog etc. Everything belongs to a range, depending on the pertinent interests,
and each range has its proper knowledge. Now we change the horizon; it is no
more this cat or this dog that we have in mind, nor the generic class of animals in
general including dogs, cats, humans, gods. Instead, we stop considering beings as
this or that following the specific needs or purposes (as we always do in everyday
life) and we look for a universality of quite an other kind, that of being as being.
The searched knowledge should cover being as being (as has been said Met. Γ 2,
1004a31–b4). In this sense it is a knowledge of all beings: it considers the features
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which each being has as being (and not as cat, table etc.).137 A knowledge which can
make distinctions within this universality will be able to distinguish and to decide
whether ‘Socrates’ and ‘sitting Socrates’ are the same or not, and it will also be able
to reflect on determinations such as ‘identical,’ ‘different,’ ‘opposed,’ and so on.
The sophists show how decisive this is. Their surprising and paradoxical claims
work only if no distinction is made between the manifold uses of to be and if the
possible diversity of references to ousia is not considered. They speak and argue and
draw conclusions as if to bewere univocal. Very quickly this leads to contradictions.
Gorgias’ book On Non-Being may serve as an example. The surviving fragments
of this book convincingly show how essential and necessary the project, common
to Plato and Aristotle, is to protect the use of to be in the logos.
Through their approach, the sophists confirm the philosophical relevance of their
practice (Met. Γ 2, 1004b17–22). They want to be able to speak about everything
and to be competent on every theme (Plato, Sophist 233a). This seems to be the same
move that Aristotle considers characteristic of wisdom in Met. A 2, ἐπίστασθαι
πάντα, “to know all.” The sophists clearly must miss their purpose, (i) if they take
‘all’ in the sense of ‘all particular things’ instead of ‘beings as beings’ and (ii) if
they do not have a point of reference to order the diversity of things.
Let us summarize the argument that physics is sophia but not the first one (Met. Γ 3,
1005a32–b2). Aristotle asks inMet. Γ 3 whether the same knowledge is competent
for the question about being (Sein) and “for the so-called axioms in mathematics”
(τὰ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν καλούμενα ἀξιώματα). The case of mathematics does not
serve as a proof, but as an example to introduce the problem. Mathematical theo-
rems are valid irrespective of the contents. Such theorems pertain to the searched
knowledge too, an example of them is the principle of contradiction. This principle
must be accepted if we want to speak with each other, no matter what is the topic. If
a certain knowledge deals with some given type of beings, say with animals, plants,
illnesses, numbers, etc., then certainly it is inadequate to take recourse to the prin-
ciples of being as being. That is another case if one wants to think about being as
137 Met. Γ 1, Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τὶς ἡ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συμβεβηκότα καθ’ αὑτό, “there
is a <type of> knowledge considering being as being and all its features.”
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being. Obviously not many people do that (today as little as in Aristotle’s time),
nor do many deal with the principles now at stake, except some physicists, Aristotle
says (Met. Γ 3, 1005a29–33). Anyway, the examples Aristotle cites confirm the
general character of the searched knowledge. Because ‘the ancients’ thought they
were discussing being as a whole and in general when they focused on physis, they
choose this theme. They have the same intention as Aristotle, but they differ in their
concept of physis. For them physis is ‘all things,’ while for Aristotle physical beings
are only one portion of beings, namely the beings that have their principle of move-
ment in themselves, opposed to other beings that have their principle of movement
in other beings; beside them he takes into account also other areas of beings, e. g.
beings which emerge by chance or our actions. Therefore physics cannot be the first
knowledge we are searching for. Sure, physics is theoretical like the first knowl-
edge, but it differs from that insofar as the searched knowledge should be universal,
in the sense that its subject is being as being, and insofar it should be a knowledge
of this first to which all our discourse refers and gets its unity, i.e. the prote ousia.
The reason why physics is not first philosophy is not that it is not theology (which
would be the case if prote ousia were understood as god), but because its subject is
not the hen in pros hen legetai.
But one could counter that the texts we have been discussing are altogether am-
biguous. The main text in favour of the theological interpretation has always been
Met. E. Let us examine if our interpretation holds for this text, too. We have to
take into account that the knowledge about which Aristotle speaks in Γ 1 might be
no more than a programme which is not yet realized, and hence is called ‘searched
knowledge.’138 It is possible that Aristotle is doing no more than drafting a concept
in Met. Γ and E, then we should try to understand this draft. For the moment, it is
not necessary to decide whether these texts refer to Met. Λ or not.
The riddle of the apparent contradiction between the conception of a first knowledge
described in Met. E that should have as its theme – as many think – one singular
138 Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις…, “there is a certain knowledge…”; see L. Routila, 1969; J. T. Desanti, 1988,
27, 35, only asks the question of whether the science in Γ 1 is a programme, but the whole of his
considerations, and his claim that theoria passes episteme suggests that this is a rhetorical question.
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being, one ousia, god, and the conception of a first knowledge that should be univer-
sal gave rise to never-ending questions. Certainly many scholars found ‘solutions.’
Their weakness is that they are many. Their strength is that these solutions very
faithfully reflect the beliefs of their time. It is not my claim to solve that riddle, that
would be much too pretentious and even not sensible. But I can try to show that in
the text another issue is at stake.
The first knowledge that properly and primarily can be called philosophy and that is
searched after in Met. E is supposed to satisfy incompatible conditions. In Met. Z
13 the idea is rejected, with good reasons, that the first knowledge which concerns
prote ousia can be a knowledge about universals; we can add that neither it can be a
knowledge about a singular thing (already in the Plato’s Sophist the ‘first’ to know
was not a particular thing but the ‘five highest kinds’). The division of knowledge
inMet. E 1 is developed in the context of the questions concerning which genos of
ousia is first and which knowledge referring to it is the first knowledge. The answer
clearly is: it is no genos at all, but rather it is the first that guides our manifold uses
of to be and that is to be found when we ask after the fundamentals of ourDoxa.
Given this background, we can proceed more quickly, even if Met. E 1 is a hotly
contested battleground.139 Physics, as well as other dianoetic knowledges, is in
search of causes (E 1,1025b6–7). In Met. E 1, 1025b17–1026a7, Aristotle leads
the reader to the statement “Physics is a theoretical knowledge” differing from pro-
ductive knowledge (techne) and from practical knowledge (concerning our actions).
The criterion for dividing these kinds of knowledge relates to the degree of freedom
supposed by each, as we have seen in A 1–2. The next question concerns the rank-
ing of the different forms of theoretical knowledge, and the status of physics in this
hierarchy. This division follows the ranking of the treated subjects, the different ou-
siai. Differences in ousia lead to differences of knowledge. The more fundamental
the ousia of a knowledge is, the more fundamental and primordial the knowledge
must be. The subjects of physics and mathematics can be arranged by two criteria,
i.e. by the separateness and the movement of the ousia they look at. Combining
139 Cf. C. Kirwan, 1971, and J. Barnes, 1995, 345f., and 355f.
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these criteria, we can conceive another ousia and, with it, a corresponding theoret-
ical knowledge, that of a “separate and unmoved being” (E 1, 1026a10–18). This
would be the first knowledge because it is the most free knowledge and its subject is
the most fundamental. Any other knowledge must presuppose it. We might wonder
whether the list given in Met. E 1, 1026a18–22, is complete or not: “[…] if the
divine is anywhere then in any case it is in such a physis […]” (Aristotle refers to
the unseparated and unmoved ousia). Is the divine the unique being of this type of
physis or not? Given the function of the divine inMet. Γ we must assume the later.
Considerations on numbers (Z 11, 1037a10–13) or ideas which have comparable
features as the divine show that other beings beside the gods in the same category
are possible. The divine is named because there is a common opinion about it but
they do not make up this type of being (Seinsbereich). By referring to the divine,
Aristotle appeals to an everyday understanding with the aim to have an example for
this category of beings that everybody knows. A knowledge that exclusively would
refer to gods would be a knowledge about a certain genus of beings (peri genos ti,
1025b8) and not the required, universal knowledge, although its subject may be the
most honored genos (τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος, 1026a21). 1026a24 Aristotle repeats the
question whether the first philosophy is universal (that means about being as such)
or only about a definite genus.
The first knowledge must be more than generic. It cannot be demonstrated by prin-
ciples (E 1, 1025b14) because this knowledge itself is precisely in search of these
principles as is said in the first sentence in E 1. In the last sentence of E 1, Aristotle
contrasts physics and first philosophy by indicating the different ousiai they deal
with: ”If there were no other ousiai than the natural ones then physics would be the
first knowledge […]”’ If we do not have to speak about every ousia in the same
manner as about τὸ σιμόν (E 1, 1025b32, “the flat-nosed,” an example of a natural
being which includes the hyle), if we meaningfully can speak about a being (ousia)
without hyle, then the class of perceptible ousiai is neither the unique nor the first.
If, on the contrary, perceptible beings cannot be without an ousia prior to them and
whose function is just that, that perceptible beings can be, then the knowledge about
this ousia will be the first.
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Some features of this ousia and the knowledge corresponding to it have parallels
to topics in Met. Λ. When Aristotle speaks about an ousia akinetos, an “unmoved
being,”140 then this reminds us of the discussion ofMet. Λ. Still, I want to emphasize
that it is in no way necessary to take this ousia immediately as god, for Aristotle is
seeking an understanding of to be which has yet to be discovered. As a result,
we will see in the Commentary that this understanding, developed by Aristotle in
Met. Λ 6–10, can be summarised in the formula {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια /
Doxa}.141 Rightly, and without false profundity, Aristotle can say at the end of
E 1 that a knowledge dealing with this type of ousia (i. e. this first in reference
to which our speech has the pros-hen-unity) is prior to all other knowledge and
may be named ‘first philosophy.’ As a knowledge of the first it concerns all what
is secondary vis-à-vis this first, and in this sense it is universal. We may take the
relation between the first and the second categories as a model of this sort of priority.
So it is the task of this knowledge to consider what belongs to being as being .
In Met. Λ neither the name nor the concept of theology plays a role. The term the-
ologike is never used, but only theologos,142 and with this term Aristotle designates
the ancient poets and thinkers who pursued a different project. We might think of
poems of Hesiod or some of the other texts of the Presocratics.143 If we pay atten-
tion to the text, the core of Met. Λ in fact is not about theology,144 nor about god or
gods, but it presents a speculative sketch of ousia (Sein). When J. Barnes alludes
to “his friends”145 then he gives us here (as he is probably well aware) an essential
reason why many think, up to today, that Met. Λ is about theology. Nobody dares
to look squarely in the eyes of his friends – that is, of the leading tradition – and to
say what they really reads and understands; rather one prefers to sell the Emperor’s
New Clothes.
140 Met. E 1,1026a29, cf. Met. Z 11, 1037a13–17 οὐσία κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
141 For the details see the Commentary on the Chapters 6, 7 and 9.
142 Met. Λ 6, 1071b27, Λ 10, 1075b26, N 4, 1091a34, B 4, 1000a9.
143 To the named places and for the problem on the whole see P. Natorp, 1888, 55–65; now R. Bodéüs,
1992, M. Bordt, 2011, and the omnibus review of T. Dangel, 2014.
144 Some scholars agree on this point; some of them say that Met. Λ is about ousia in the sense of
substance, others that it is about theoria.
145 J. Barnes, 1995, 108, fn. 34; see above, p. 121.
137
2. The Traditional Reception of Met. Λ and its Difficulties
To reach a new approach to the text, we should stop imputing a systematic and
dogmatic mind to Aristotle. Of course, from time to time there are results that can
be asserted, there are opinions to defend, and assertions to hold. But these are by-
products, or, in more important cases, they are starting points, and are never the
ultimate aim of Aristotle’s reflection. The job of philosophy is the analysis and ex-
amination of opinions and assertions, patiently performed again and again. It is not
the aim of the examination to reach new and interesting opinions (this is the lesson
of the Sophist); rather, with respect to such new opinions our examination ought to
start anew. Briefly, we must understand the role and function of endoxa in order to
examine our prejudices about Aristotle’s philosophy. The traditional interpretation
is right only under the presupposition that the main aim of Aristotle’s philosophical
efforts is to reach new and better conclusions, that is, a theory in the modern sense,
as innumerable titles of articles and books prove.146 This presupposition has proved
to be wrong.
2.2.4. Difficulties Arising from the AssertionMet. Λ Contains a Theology
In advance we can admit that the question about God is ‘natural,’147 inasmuch as a
religious attitude is normal if not indispensable. Through religion respective com-
munities express and handle fundamental experiences. In the Greek context ques-
tions about god or gods belong either to the cult or to literature or to physics (because
gods are living creatures that have a soul and the soul is a natural being). But Met.
Λ does not treat any of these subjects.
Let us examine some reasons why it is improbable thatMet. Λ has god or theology as
its theme. The first one is very simple. In a text about god, this word should appear
with a regular cadence. But in Met. Λ we count only five occurrences of theos or
theios in chapter 7 and two in chapter 9 (in addition 5 ocurences in chapter 8, but
146 E. g. J. Owens, 31978; cf. besides the bibliographies in: A. Bausola, G. Reale, 1994; J. Barnes (ed.)
1995; R. Radice, R. Davies, 1997; M. Frede, D. Charles, 2000; Chr. Rapp / K. Corcilius, 2011; Chr.
Horn, 2016.
147 However what does this mean exactly? Not even the gender difference turned out to be a ‘natural
fact.’ – “All what is, is constituted by sense” Husserl. – Cf. W. Pannenberg, 1988.
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they refer to the traditional Greek gods and are left aside also by the defenders of
the theological interpretation). In contrast to this, the translation of J. Tricot has 14
appearances of ‘Dieu,’ or ‘divine’ to which we have to add some words in uppercase
letters like ‘le Bien’ or ‘l’intelligence’ or ‘l’Être premier,’ ‘le premier Moteur’etc.
This way the translation gives the impression that the author speaks continually
about god. But this impression is false in front of the text. S. Fazzo also pointed out
this fact (2014, 373). – G. Reale went so far as to claim that just the lack of explicit
statements about theology itself is an argument that the theological character is self-
evident (G. Reale, 1994, 259). Anyway, his translation has even more hints to god
than that of J. Tricot, not only because he writes ‘Egli’ in uppercase letter.
Furthermore, the question concerning the existence and the characteristics of god
mainly needs content-related concepts, but inMet. Λ mainly functional and sorting
concepts are used.148 The spiritual development of the ancient Greeks is often de-
scribed as a movement from a ‘natural religion’ and ritual scheme into a ‘rational’
counter-movement. Myth as a reference point for life and action was replaced by
the logos, one says.149 Surely it is at least right that the work of the Presocratics, the
Sophists, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle established a view of the world which com-
peted with traditional religion. Some claim that this new view, also, has a strong the-
ological component.150 According to others, there was a strong scientific element in
this development. M. Bordt , (2006), tried to reconcile the metaphysical, cosmolog-
ical, and theological aspects by saying that in Plato’s Republic the Good is identical
with god as well as the nous in the Laws. Both the theological and the scientific
claims might raise the suspicion of anachronistic backdating. Without a doubt, the-
ology made use of philosophy at least since the patristic period. To some degree,
the Church Fathers themselves developed the philosophical means, and some con-
currence arose between theology and philosophy concerning the claim to truth and
the claim to explanation of reality. Later, sciences developed which were partly
cooperative and partly in competition with theology. Because only what is already
148 For this difference see p. 179.
149 W. Nestle, 1940; E. g. F. Solmsen, 1942.; R. Buxton (Hrsg.), 1999, reacts against this view.
150 Cf. W. Jaeger, 1947; even before W. J. Verdenius and G. Reale some saw in Plato’s demiurge a
prefiguration of the Christian God, cf. L. Brisson, 1994.
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practiced can become a subject for reflection, the question about the difference be-
tween the theological and the philosophical questions about god can be put in such
epochs. Philosophy, then, is the method of analysis and reflection on our Doxa
while theology searches and defends rational reasons for a belief which is able to
guide our everyday life.151
We can summarize the difficulties in a list.
1. The theological interpretation ofMet. Λ is a source of problems because the Aris-
totelian proof of the existence of god is insufficient according to most interpreters,
it is conclusive only in the form Thomas Aquinas gave it. Aristotle’s text meets the
expectation as little as does Plato’s Phaedo, if interpreters look for a proof for the
immortality of the soul in this dialogue. Interpreters claim that Aristotle saw the
problem but did not have the means to solve them.
Of course no philosopher is perfect and infallible. But to aim at a proof of the exis-
tence of god and to miss it so obviously is more than mere imperfection, especially
when the this problem vanishes if the text is read without this presupposition.
2. If we leave aside the reception and look at the text itself, it becomes evident that
god is not the main theme, he simply does not come up with sufficient frequency,
and when he is discussed, it serves as an example.152
Communities have opinions about god’s knowledge, he is a content in the endoxa,
a πάτριος δόξα, a “belief of our fathers.” And this knowledge is used by Aristotle
to make some things clear. On the whole, god serves as neither an argument nor
something to be demonstrated inMet. Λ. Instead, the topics are becoming and being
(genesis, ousia).
3. Aristotle speaks of cosmological issues with extreme reluctance. The cosmolog-
ical interest, that is the question about the first in our actual world, is a secondary
151 See M. Heidegger, 1970, on the difference between theology as a ‘positive science’ and philosophy.
152 This observation is confirmed by H. Lang. But we have to go further than H. Lang, 1993, went. She
accepted the theme ‘god’ for chapters 6–8. But here, too, god is only an example for knowledge as is
assumed in contemporary belief. Nothing about god must be proved. Besides H. Lang, many others
replace the topic of ‘god’ with the theme ousia in the sense of substance.
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concern and must not be mingled with the first one, the speculative question about
the first.
4. In ancient Greece gods are no more than living beings. That is not enough for
the Christian concept of God.
5. The standard interpretation asserts that Aristotle tries to prove that there must
be an ‘Unmoved Mover,’ who can be identified with god. But while the masculine
form of this expression was traditionally chosen by nearly all interpreters – because
in this form it is all too easy to identify it with the personal Christian God – Aristotle
never uses the masculine term. The moving cause, to proton kinoun, is one point
in a list of four causes, beside to ex hou, to ti estin and to hou heneka. Aristotle
reflects on the first in all the four points, because that is the philosopher’s job (Met.
E 1, Z 1); the moving cause has no priority in the group of causes.
‘First Mover’ or ‘Unmoved Mover’ is simply a false translation for to proton ki-
noun, as already I. Düring said, unfortunately with no effect.153
6. If god as the ‘Unmoved Mover’ is to hold the position defended by the tradition,
he must not be nous because nous is moved by the noeton (Met. Λ 7.4).
7. In Met. Λ god does not have the characteristics of a creator. He creates neither
hyle nor eidos (this is an important point for the later quarrel between Philoponos
and Simplicius), neither time nor space. But in a Christian framework, a proof of
the existence of God is urgent in its function as creator. 154
For Aristotle, it would be plainly ridiculous to try to prove that Zeus, the heaven,
153 I. Düring, 1966, 209; id., 1968c, 253; cf. E. Sonderegger, 1996, 76ff.; W. Schneider, 2001, 245. E.
Zeller, 1921, titled rightly his chapter on theology with Das erste Bewegende. – Anyway, there are
some scholars who begin to realize the difference, e. g. A. Aichele, 2009, 341, who points expressly
to the neutral form, even if the ‘divine’ remains as central. M. Bordt, in Rapp (Hrsg.), 2001, 367, says:
Den Ausdruck ‘unbewegter Beweger’ gibt es bei Aristoteles nicht, nevertheless the judeo-christian
tradition uses the masculine noun (370) and neither the contributors in Horn, 2016, nor C. Horn
himself changes anything in this matter.
154 It is a trend to overlook the distinction between that what a creator does and that what the demiurge
does in Plato’s Timaeus ordering existent things, see e. g. Rheins, Jason G., THE INTELLIGIBLE
CREATOR-GOD AND THE INTELLIGENT SOUL OF THE COSMOS IN PLATO’S THEOLOGY
AND METAPHYSICS (2010). Publicly accessible Penn Dissertations. Paper 184.
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or Helios, the sun, or Demeter, the growing of cultivated nature, exist, just as it is
“ridiculous to want to prove that physis exists” (Physics B 1, 193a3), because this
belongs to the range of the first and to the range of causes that every proof must
already presuppose.155 If someone wants to find in Met. Λ a proof either must
reduce the fourfold concept of cause to the one causa efficiens, a process that at last
ended with Thomas Aquinas or it is necessary to establish a hierarchy of the causes
and to give the first position to the causa efficiens. Yet there is no such thing in
the texts. Already Simplicius argued against Philoponus that the concept of cause
is different when it is about coming to be in nature and when creatio ex nihilo is the
subject.156
8. Both the view thatMet. Λ is about god or about substance presuppose that ousia
means substance. For a reconsideration of this prejudice, see the previous Chapter.
Only if we want to talk about substances with the characteristic that they can ‘stand
in themselves’ the question of a first Standing-in-itself (i. e. God) arises. Without
substance, the question about the existence of god as asked by a long tradition no
longer serves any purpose although it may be that other questions about god remain
reasonable.
G.W. F. Hegel demonstrates the essential connection of ousia as substance and ou-
sia as subject (in the modern sense), but this attests only the anachronistic character
of this interpretation.
9. Finally, the concept of existence does not play the necessary role in Aristotle’s
texts, that it would need if the existence of god were at stake. If the concept of
existence is absent, there is no need to question the existence of anything, let alone
the existence of god. It seems that the concept of existence, like the concept of
substance, belongs to a world that is not that of Met. Λ.
It is possible to show the opposite position. For the understanding of Met. Λ it is of
great importance to understand its relations to Plato’s Sophist to the Timaeus, and
155 See B. Botter, 2005, who very well shows that it is senseless to seek for a proof of the existence of
gods in ancient Greece.
156 This is discussed in greater detail in the following Chapter, ‘Cosmology’ in Part II, 5.1.1.
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to theMetaphysics of Theophrastus. The Platonic texts give reasons for an interpre-
tation of Met. Λ without substance. Concerning the Metaphysics of Theophrastus,
we need a new approach to its interpretation, because this text is not the late one
traditionally supposed, but instead it is approximately contemporary with Aristo-
tle’s text. It is not the late criticism of a student disappointed with his master, but
an early text, possibly shortly after Aristotle left Athens.
Apart from this, it is a very laborious but instructive task to look for the way the-
ologians in Antiquity treated their theme. Perhaps Hesiod could be an example, but
surely Epicurus, the Stoics, Philodemus’ Περὶ θεῶν, Cicero’s De natura deorum
and De Mundo, the Theologia Aristotelis and various Neoplatonic thinkers are the-
ologians. Everybody will see that those texts have quite other things at stake than
the themes of Met. Λ.
J. Mansfeld has given a list of questions characteristic of any theology:157
1. questions about the existence and the attributes of gods,
2. questions about divine providence, about the relation between the gods and
humanity,
3. questions about our possible knowledge of the gods.
We do not find any of these questions in Met. Λ.
157 J. Mansfeld, 1999, 453.
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2.3. Cosmology inMet. Λ
In this chapter we ask after the place and function of cosmological considerations in
Met. Λ. Questions concerning the origins and form of the world as a whole imposed
themselves on peoples of all times and places and all respectively told stories about
the coming into being and formation of the world. The starry sky, the sun, the ever
procreating living beings were always prime examples of things which man could
never itself produce or master.158 All this is given and belongs to our world, so it
is only natural to ask what its beginning and essence may be. Hesiod presented the
Greeks with an especially poetical and profound presentation using the genealogical
principle to describe and account for cosmic origins. The Presocratics treated of the
same theme under the heading of to pan, the whole of being or ‘the All.’ In their
view the material elements formed the basis of the whole. Plato for his part took up
that theme and placed it on a higher level in his Timaeus showing that if we ask after
the origin of the material things, the elements of the Presocratics are insufficient as
answer because these too themselves are no more than forms of matter, even if of a
kind other than that of plants and animals.
Met. Λ pursues this topic. The standard interpretation says that Aristotle had devel-
oped not only a metaphysics of substance but a suitable cosmology too which both
are designed to found his theology. Metaphysics and theology were the theme of
the foregoing chapters. Now we must deal with the question of whether Aristotle’s
158 Cf. I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, (A 288):
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more
often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral
law within me. I do not seek or conjecture either of them as if they were veiled
obscurities or extravagances beyond the horizon of my vision; I see them before me
and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence.
Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüt mit immer neuer und zunehmenden Bewunderung
und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: Der
bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir. Beide darf ich nicht als
in Dunkelheiten verhüllt, oder im Überschwenglichen, außer meinem Gesichtskreise,
suchen und bloß vermuten; ich sehe sie vor mir und verknüpfe sie unmittelbar mit dem
Bewußtsein meiner Existenz.
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cosmological considerations serve the same function as they do in the proofs of the
existence of god. A brief reminder of how Plato organized his cosmology will pro-
vide the background for the evaluation of its place in Aristotle’s text. As a reference
point for what should be understood by a ‘proof of the existence of God’ I take the
Quinque viae of Thomas Aquinas.
2.3.1. Thomas Aquinas’ Proofs for the Existence of God as Model
Thomas Aquinas himself designates his considerations as quinque viae in the Re-
spondeo-section of the Summa Theologiae, Pars prima, quaestio secunda, articulus
tertius.
The introductory sentences run as follows: Prima autem et manifestior via est, quae
sumitur ex parte motus, “The first and most obvious way is that from the argument
of motion.” From the fact of movement we can conclude that there must be an
Unmoved Mover, which can be identified with God. On this point in particular
Thomas and his followers likewise feel to be entitled to refer to AristotleMet. Λ 7.
–
Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis, “The second way derives from the
argument of the efficient cause.” The series of all secondary causae efficientes
must have its origin in a first causa efficiens. The series of causae would otherwise
be prolonged into infinity and thereby we would have given up the explanation of
what is before our eyes. –
Tertia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario, “The third way is taken from possi-
bility and necessity.” If a possible being becomes a real being this cannot be without
the help of an other real being. It is obvious that some common objects could exist
just as well as not exist; they are contingent. But it is impossible that all things are
contingent, because in that case nothing at all would be. From the reasoning that
a contingent being needs a real being for it to come into being the proof named ex
contingentia mundi was later developed. Met. Λ 6 served as a model for this proof.
–
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Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur, “The fourth way is taken
from the gradation found in things.” Things are perfect in different degrees. Thus
we can form a concept of a most perfect thing which could be the cause of beings
that are restricted in their perfection. –
Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum, “The fifth way is taken from the gov-
ernance ot the world.” Even natural things like plants or animals without reason
act or behave in a manner to achieve a given objective and it seems as if they were
arranged to follow a purpose. But this can only have been achieved by a higher
intelligence. –
ThomasAquinas’ quinque viae as awhole could be designated ‘cosmological proofs’
insofar as they start off empirically from our experience of things in our actual
world. All five proofs make our experience the subject of discussion in different
respects and thence lead ultimately to a highest or first principle.
The point of view from which the proof is presented is either the movement of
things, their conditionality, their contingency, their degrees of perfection or their
purposive organization. Thomas Aquinas’ proofs have the logical form of conclu-
sions. God’s existence is neither presupposed as evident nor put forth simply a
priori as a given fact, but it is instead arrived at by inferring from its effects. From
a world as creation is inferred a God as creator; from a dynamic cosmos – an Un-
moved Mover; from the universe as contingent – a necessary being; from beings
having different degrees of imperfection – a perfect being; and, finally, from the
purposive constitution of things – a reasonable organizer.159 Insofar as these are
logical deductions, they can be examined as to their conclusiveness and of the va-
lidity of their premises.160 The existing literature shows that this has already been
sufficiently well. There is no need to repeat that here, especially because it is not
the validity of these conclusions at stake here. We are asking, instread, whether or
not in Aristotle’s considerations on cosmology and teleology there is to be found
159 Briefly as I. Kant explained the idea to be the unconditioned which completes the conditioned.
160 Cf. G. Scherrer, 1990; lit. concerning the proofs of the existence of God see above, fn. 76, p. 112,
fn. 78, p. 114 and fn. 104, p. 104; summaries by H. Seidl, 1982; D. Henrich, 1960; J. Rohls, 1987;
W. Röd, 1992; G. Oppy, 1995.
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anything that has a function comparable to the Thomistic proofs for the existence
of God.
2.3.2. Astronomy and Cosmology in Plato
After the well-known series of similes in the central parts of the Politeia (the simile
of the sun, the line and the cave) Plato discusses the curriculum of the philosophers
who should govern the state. As propaedeutics they must first study arithmetics,
geometry, stereometry, astronomy and harmony (Pol. 521ff.), a curriculum that
corresponds approximately to the later quadrivium. The main course of study will
be in dialectics. The aim of the preparatory study is the “reversion of the whole
soul,” Plato says. The disciplines are, therefore, to be taught and learned in an
unusual manner. Plato explains the difference of the aims in the Politeia as well
as in the Philebus (56c–57a). There is a particular form of knowledge required by
politicians and military leaders (Pol. 522c). Astronomy too has a similarly practical
use: it helps to determine seasons in advance and it is useful for navigation means
(527d). Future members of the government simply do not need this kind of skill in
observation of the actual stars. Plato has in mind a “pure astronomy,” which treats
the “being speed” and the “being slowness” because the aim of all disciplines of
his propaedeutics is the same namely to direct the soul to the being which is ever
the same way and which rests as it is, and to turn away the soul from things that
are uncertain and different at any given moment. – It is obvious that an astronomy
with such aims and designed for future rulers is inappropriate for describing in any
way the genesis of the world. The astronomical remarks in the Politeia cannot, as a
consequence, have a cosmology as their aim, and thus are they not suitable for use
in proofs of the existence of god.
The locus classicus of Plato’s cosmology has always been the Timaeus. In the first
part of his speech Timaeus tries to reconstruct a pure noetic cosmos based on the
distinctions between the being and the becoming, between identity and difference,
between the paradigm with respect to which the demiurge arranges the world and
the resulting image. To be sure Plato does speak about becoming, but the natural
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process of becoming is constructed through pure noetic concepts. What, in the first
part, is something like an intellectual game (although in Plato’s view it is the most
real basis) is repeated in the second part as a realization of the phenomenal world.
In order to make possible this transition from the noetic to the real, he introduces as
“a third genus” the chora. Chora is the where-in of all phenomenal becoming, the
elemental of the elements.161
The Presocratics had asked after the principles of the phenomena. Plato repeats this
questioning and transcends it with the idea that the elements are not of the material
nature, which they thought them to be. Presocratic elements are changeable and
therefore not fundamentally distinct from the things that are around us. They are
not sufficiently elementary and cannot be the stable being which Plato is searching
for. Chora is of a very different character than things and elements and can therefore
replace them. Aristotle continues this line of the Presocratic and Platonic question
in giving it a new turn, when he asks in a speculative way which being (Sein) is the
basis of becoming.
Even in the Timaeus cosmological and speculative considerations stand side by side.
But it soon becomes clear that these do not have the function they would have in
proofs of the existence of god. Plato, to be sure, says that the demiurge forms (but
does not create) the cosmos, the soul and the traditional gods under certain limi-
tations and conditions. These gods have the task to shape the rest guided by the
paradigma and using the chora and the given matter. First of all, Plato says that
what is said about the demiurge must not be taken literally but as a mythical tale
or “likely account” (eikos logos). Later, due to its reception, the Platonic Timaeus
entered the same theological maelstrom asMet. Λ. Because the theological interpre-
tation of both the Platonic Timaeus and the Met. Λ is based on the same reception,
neither of them can be used as an argument in favour of the theological interpreta-
tion of the other: such reasoning would be circular. In no way are the cosmological
considerations in the Timaeus premises for the deduction of the existence of god as
161 Chora is comparable in its function to Kant’s aether and heat substance (Wärmestoff ), see E. Son-
deregger, 2015. Concerning chora see D. Miller, 2003, who claims that the “receptacle,” “chora”
and the “third genus” are not the same as was assumed up to now.
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Thomas Aquinas understood it. If there are sentences that suggest that idea, they
must be attributed to the eikos logos and the mythical form. The aim remains to ex-
plain the “real” cosmos. Starting from the noetic cosmos in the first part the “real”
cosmos should become understandable by means of the chora in the second part.
Timaeus says that it is difficult to find the “maker and father” of the whole but at
least we can try to look for the ‘paradigma’ with respect to which he made it (28c3).
That means that Plato is looking less for the maker of the image wherein we live
than for the ‘paradigma’ of this image. It is, furthermore, not the existence of this
‘paradigma’ that is in question but its characteristics or its mode of being. The
Timaeus then, does not in fact contain a cosmology, as often is claimed.162
Plato often refers, of course, to the cosmological knowledge of his time but this
inclusion has primarily philosophical interest. The whole discourse on nature is in-
dexed as eikos logos. The so-called cosmology displayed in the Timaeus, therefore,
has no scientific or theological goals but Plato wants to make understandable the
transition from the noetic to the phenomenal and perceptible world, this transition
is the theme. Notes and comments on science, cosmology, mathematics and geom-
etry are made in order to improve our insight into the nature of this transition.
2.3.3. The Function of Cosmology in the Corpus Aristotelicum
Where do cosmology and astronomy play a role in the Corpus Aristotelicum in gen-
eral and in Met. Λ in particular and what is their function in the argument? What
does Aristotle mean by these terms? What is the relation between cosmology and
the leading speculative question in Met. Λ? Are these questions on the same level,
is cosmology an integral part of the speculation, or do we have to separate them
strictly?
We find cosmological considerations which are near to those in Met. Λ in terms
of content and time, especially in the De Caelo and in Physics Θ. Theophrastus’
162 F. Cornford, 1937; F. Solmson, 1942; A. P. Bos, 1989; T. Ebert, 1991 et alii.
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Metaphysics is in the same timeframe.163 Aristotle takes up this topic anew in the
subsequent book De motu animalium. First, I will briefly summarize these refer-
ences in order to compare them withMet. Λ 6–8 so as to find out what the function
of cosmology and astronomy is in these works (for the interpretation in detail see
the commentary ad loc.). The relation of Met. Λ to the Presocratics would play a
role too, but to treat of that separately would be out of place here, our treatment of
the Timaeusmust suffice. We must not forget that we are seeking after the function
of astronomy within the ambit of the question concerning being (Sein) and not for
its contents per se.
The standard interpretation assumes that Aristotle uses astronomy for its proof of
the existence of god. Since many of the assumptions of the astronomy of that time
are belied by our current knowledge the standard interpretation has to answer the
question as to what the value of this proof could be. The texts mentioned above
share some questions, such as concerning the heavens, its uniqueness or plurality,
the nature and origin of its movement. These questions, however, are asked in dif-
ferent contexts and with different goals. In De Caelo Aristotle asks how natural
bodies move and what the principles of their movement may be. Subsequently, he
asks what the first body could be, since it must be of a nature other than our every-
day objects (269a30–32; 270b1–3). That corresponds to the question of what the
ouranos as the origin of all mundane movement, could be. Some further questions
are whether the heavens and their movements have a beginning and whether the
actual variety of movements is to be explained by the visibly circular motion of the
heavens. In just these references, 270b3 and b23, we have to note the restrictions:
[…] if our premises are credible,
[…] how we can say if we accept what is believable for man […]
The use of this reference in a famous history of philosophy is very typical.164 We are
told there that Aristotle tries “tomelt together his own cosmological concept with the
163 Theophrastus gives cosmological considerations throughout the text; for astronomy § 27 is particu-
larly relevant.
164 H. Flashar, 1983, 396.
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pre-philosophical astro-theology.” If we stay close to the text, we see that Aristotle
stresses here the endoxical character of the astronomical statements; within this
frame and with these restrictions alone, are his proposals sensible, but not simply
false, as they would be following the standard interpretation.
The ouranos as such is the topic of De Caelo A 9. It is said to be unchangeable and
eternal. The ancients said beings having these predicates to be divine. The reference
to the divinity of the heavens here, as in De philosophia and other early texts too,
is no more than a citation of existing endoxa. In De Caelo B 1 Aristotle gives us
a summary of the results. The ouranos has neither a temporal beginning nor can it
pass away. It is, therefore, immortal and eternal. Aristotle says:
Therefore we rightly are convinced that it is true what the ancients and our
fathers said, that something which moves but without ending is immortal and
divine (284a2f.)
After a remark on the limitations of our experience he speaks in B 3 about the di-
vine:
God’s actuality is immortality; that is eternal life. Therefore god necessarily
has eternal motion. Since the heavens have just this quality (it is somehow a
divine body) and therefore it has a circular body that, due to its nature, always
is in a circular motion (286a9–12).
In this text the eternality is connected with the divinity and from this association
follows the eternal, circular form and motion. Eternality and divinity ares premises,
they are not the demonstrandum but they belong to the range of endoxa.
“Motion is the actuality of the movable as movable” (Physics Γ, 202a7–8). In
Physics Θ 6 Aristotle asks if we can imagine an origin of this movement. If mo-
tion is defined that way no temporal origin is possible, we must, then, deny the
question. Movement in this sense is eternal and without any break and must be
based on an eternal proton kinoun akineton, a “first unmoved moving.” Differ-
ent scholars have seen a contradiction between the thesis formulated in Physics Θ
claiming an eternity of the world and the proof in Met. Λ that movement cannot
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be prolonged infinitely but must begin with a ‘First Mover’ (as they name it). One
of them celebrated Philoponus as the first to detect this contradiction.165 But the
alleged contradiction results from a specific understanding of the concept of eter-
nity of the proton kinoun, the first moving. Only if eternity is a concept in contrast
to creation and if proton kinoun is a creator, will contradiction arise. Thus runs
Philoponus’ argument, at any rate. It remains for us to test whether these premises
are to be found in Aristotle’s text.
In Physics Γ and Δ Aristotle develops the concepts of movement and time. Time is
determined by the series of prior and anterior timepoints, movement is determined as
the actuality of the possible as such. In Physics Θ he uses these theoretical concepts
of time and movement.166 The consequence is, that, if time and movement are
conceived this way, there really cannot be any beginning for time and movement.
A starting point of time could not have a prior point in time: the first point in time
would, therefore, not be a ‘point in time,’ i. e. it would not be time at all, because
it would not have a predecessor and would not itself be a successor. If time had
a beginning it would become something like a thing in time. The transition from
possibility to actuality had to presuppose an other actuality, but actuality should
only just begin.
In contrast to this the theme of Met. Λ is not the concept of movement but the fact
of movement, the movement we experience. With respect to factual movements we
must accept a first causative movement, which itself is not caused and not movable
because otherwise a regressus in infinitum begins, and that is not acceptable in the
range of factual experience. What the modern scholar thought a contradiction be-
tween different texts reveals itself as a distinction developed by Aristotle. We must
distinguish between the concept of time (here no beginning is conceivable) and time
in its factual mundane context, time as phenomenon (here we have to acknowledge
that it cannot be conceived without a beginning). At the very beginning of De motu
animalium (698a),167 Aristotle cites Physics Θ, with respect to “the first moving,”
165 R. Sorabji, 1987, 6 and chapter 9.
166 Cf. how he speaks about the same theme in De Motu Animalium 1.
167 A late text with many references to earlier ones; references in I. Düring, 1966, 296, fn. 37.
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which we have to presuppose for actual movements. He distinguishes the theoreti-
cal treatment of movement in the Physics from the treatment that he has in mind in
De Motu Animalium, cf. 698a12–14. He says that all that
has to be grasped not only in a conceptual and general manner but that we have
to go further to the particular and perceptible.
Thus we must ask after the factual and perceptible movements. This means that the
question now is of the possibility of movement experienced phenomenally. This
distinction corresponds exactly to the division of the Timaeus, whose first part de-
velops the noetic structure of the world and the second part its mundane realization.
On the other hand, it also corresponds to the difference betweenMet. Λ and Physics
Θ. In the theoretical treatment of the question about being (Sein), it is about the
stasis as a cause of becoming, i. e. about the cause of kinesis and genesis. Here,
in terms of the cosmological question, we must ask which resting being, itself not
subject to external movement, may be the primary source or basis for motion in our
phenomenal world.
In De Motu Animalium Aristotle says, concerning the inanimate moving beings,
that there must exist a resting being beside and for them. As for living beings, there
must, in addition, be a resting point inside of them. If we do not take the Earth
as a part of the whole but as a separate being, then the Earth could be the resting
point beyond motion. It could serve as the resting point for the movements of the
heavens (699a32). The mythical corollary for this would be Atlas. But Aristotle
rejects this idea, because the earth is finite and no finite being can serve as a support
for the infinite heavens (699b16–18). On the other hand it could be that the heavens
too are fixed on an unmoved being (perhaps the sphere of the fixed stars).168 As
its literary figuration of this, Aristotle cites Ilias 8, 19–22, where Zeus says that he
cannot be pulled down by anything even if all goddesses and gods would try it with
a golden chain.
168 ἤρτηται, the same expression as in Met. Λ, 1072b13 and De Motu Animalium 4, 700a3–6. Dante
cites the phrase in Divina Commedia, Par.XXVIII, 1–42; see the article of Philip Merlan, ”‘Two
theological problems in Aristotle’sMet. Lambda 6–9, in: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy
and Science, Vol. 1, No. 1 (July 1966), pp. 3-13.
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2.3.4. Why do Cosmological and Astronomical Remarks Appear inMet. Λ?
After these preparations we consider the impact of astronomy in Met. Λ. A great
part of the standard research is devoted to the cosmological or astronomical content
of this book. It is claimed that cosmology in connection with a certain teleology
founds the doctrine of the ‘Unmoved Mover.’ The relevant literature on cosmology
normally treats also the position of astronomy in the proof of the existence of God
and in the metaphysics generally as well.169 There are further important questions:
If chapter 8 is of a later date, and interpolated afterwards, how is the geometry of the
spheres of the planets to be understood, how many spheres are necessary to explain
the actual movements, do the planets have divine souls or not, and how does the
‘First Mover’ move the second movers?170 The relation between the ‘First Mover’
and the second movers must be accounted for, and, how motion is transferred from
the second movers to the sublunar movements. What, in general, is the connection
between the first movers and the mundane movable, and finally, what is the order
and number of the spheres and their associated divinities? The question of how the
planets are ruled by gods in the literature serves as an example of how Aristotle has
drawn far-reaching conclusions from insufficient astronomical knowledge.
All these questions concern the concrete and peculiar realization and coherence of
the cosmology of Met. Λ. From questions of this type, we must distinguish the other
question: What is the position and function of cosmology in general inMet. Λ? We
ought neither to forget that this book is a θεωρία περὶ οὐσίας, a theory concerning
being (Sein). The first part, Met. Λ 1–5, develops the question about ousia on the
basis of ousia aisthete. Aristotle asks how beings come into being, which being
(Sein) can cause the hic et nunc being (Seiendes), and he unfolds this question into
169 P. Duhem, 1914–1959, vol. II; W. Jaeger, 1923; A.-J. Festugière, 1949; D. J. Furley, 1955, in the
edition On the Cosmos; H. J. Krämer, 1969; B. Effe, 1970; W. Pötscher, 1970; W.K. C. Guthrie,
1981, Kap. VI; F. Solmsen, 1982; D. T. Devereux, 1988; B. Manuwald, 1989; T. Ebert, 1991, 43–
54; L. Brisson, 1994, with bibliography; G. Reale, 1994. István Bodnár 2016, 247–267.
170 E. g. H. J. Krämer, 1967, 318f.: the first mover is imagining a range of beings which is the same as
that of the second unmoved movers. This thinking or imagining is identical with the noesis noeseos.
– R.W. Sharples, 2002, mainly treats the question how the ‘Unmoved Mover’ and the other movers
are related to each other (it is remarkable that B. Botter, 2005, begins with the same three quotations
as R.W. Sharples).
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two directions, the speculative and the cosmological one.
Aristotle uses the concept of becoming in different ways (cf. Physics 225a12–20,
Met. Z 7). ‘Becoming’ can mean the coming-to-be of a thing by means of an other
thing, either as becoming-simply or as becoming-such. On the other hand, both
can be becoming as natural process (γένεσις φύσει), or by process of production
(τέχνῃ). Finally, something can come into being spontaneously and even by chance.
But when Aristotle asks on which being (Sein) becoming is based, then it is about
quite a completely different becoming. There he is inquiring after the transition, of
which Plato treats in the Timaeus, the transition from the idea (in Plato’s sense, not
the modern one) to the real being of our everyday life (Werdendes!).
“Becoming <takes place> from physis into physis” (γένεσις ἐκ φύσεως εἰς φύσιν)
this is Aristotle’s decisive concept of becoming, supplemented by the remark: “fur-
ther, the-so called physis as becoming is the route into physis” (ἔτι δ’ ἡ φύσις ἡ
λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὁδος ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν).171 Becoming is the realization of an
eidetic nature in a hyletic nature.
The question concerning being is itself manifold in its meaning, and there are, there-
fore, manifold answers too. In the present case we can distinguish a theoretical
answer and a worldly side of the question (approximately corresponding to the dis-
tinction between ontological and ontic questions). The theoretical answer says that
to be as {being← awareness → actuality} is the for-the-sake of becoming and thus
causes a becoming entity to be. The worldly answer is that the sphere of the fixed
stars sets in motion like an unmoved moving. Both answers concern a first, the
theoretical answer says which being can found becoming, the worldly answer says
which is the first physical object that sets in motion.
Here as well as inDeCaeloB 12Aristotle qualifies his explanations concerning cos-
mology or astronomy remarking several times that they are provisional and open to
revision.172 He is deliberating about the manner in which the visible universe, with
171 Physics B, 193b12–13; Concerning hyle and eidos cf. De Gen. et Corr. 317a23–24 ἐν γὰρ τῷ
ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ μέν ἐστι κατὰ τὸν λόγον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην.
172 See especiallyMet. Λ 8; cf. the polemics of G. Reale against W. Jaeger, 1994, Prefazione, and 296ff.
155
2. The Traditional Reception of Met. Λ and its Difficulties
its sun, moon and stars, is to be understood in its various movements. The question
about being as the basis of becoming, and, the question of how the being which
remains stationary, in relation to which the moving beings can move, is not treated
separately. Met. Λ on the whole has as its subject the explanation of natural move-
ment. Aristotle is asking which being (Sein) can found becoming, in its theoretical
and in its cosmological sense. Chapters 1–5 demonstrate that natural phenomena
do not suffice for this explanatory end. Chapters 6–7 offer the speculative answer
that to be in the sense of {being← awareness → actuality} is the for-the-sake of
becoming and underlies becoming. Chapter 8 is a cosmological digression on the
same question; while chapters 9 and 10 treat certain related questions.
Although his question is finally a speculative one, Aristotle has to consider natural
beings too: on the one hand, because they are common starting points for many
questions and, on the other because there we can find some provisional answers.
In this way, moreover, he can discuss what has been considered for a long time as
the first moving beings, namely the sun and the sphere of fixed stars. It turns out,
however, that although the eternal circular movement of the protos ouranos (Met.
Λ 7.1) is a special case of movement, it cannot be the first unmoved moving he
requires. Afterwards he makes the famous speculative considerations, which are
soon raised again at Λ 7.3, with a list of the features of that being, which itself is
unmoved but can set in motion. The astronomical side of the questions does not
play any further role. As late as Λ 7.10 Aristotle returns to this theme. The sun
seems to be an unmoved moving being (as already mentioned in Met. Λ 5.5) but it
does not satisfy all conditions, not in fact being unmoved, since it has a measurable
size and undergoes changes of place. Chapter 6 makes clear that only an ousia
akinetos can fulfill the required function, but it must be of a type other than the
eide (6.6), because these cannot initiate any movement. The philosopher, therefore,
seeks for the conditions which this ousia akinetos must satisfy, now following the
theoretical line of thought. In 6.8 there is one result of this research, it must be an
origin (arche) whose being (ousia) is in the mode of actuality which is not derived
G. Reale thinks that Met. Λ 8 is by all means compatible with the rest; cf. W. Schadewaldt, 1952,
and further lit. on Eudoxus and Callipus, fn. 199; D. T. Devereux, 1988, too is relevant; on Physics,
De Caelo, De Motu see B. Manuwald, 1990.
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from a potentiality. Hence this ousia cannot have any hyle (6.9). This presents the
first speculative climax inMet. Λ, where obviously the cosmological point of view
is abandoned now.
The speculative high-point is followed by some glances at the already mentioned
alternatives of the theologians, the physicists and of Leucippus and Plato (6.13–21).
Here again, of course, and until the end of the chapter, cosmological and physical
considerations dominate. One of the problems in this context is that it is not enough
to prove that something has a totally constant movement because in nature we see
many more irregular movements. How can a constant moving cause, which we
know only by inference, produce an irregular movement, which we in fact observe?
It seems to be contradictory that an eternal and unmovable being should act dif-
ferently at different times with irregular effects. This leads to an new distinction
concerning the causes of movement. Unto itself that being acts always in perfectly
the same way, but in relation to or in contact with other beings, its effect can dif-
fer.
Not only Aristotle but Theophrastus too treats the theme from a speculative and
adjacently from the empirical approach. Theophrastus asks the question in the first
paragraph of his Metaphysics how the first and the perceptible can be connected;
how the transfer from the being (Sein) of the first to the becoming of the second
is possible; how the factual movements of the natural beings are to be explained:
Theophrastus, then, is asking the same question as Aristotle.
In the cosmological context Aristotle often speaks about concrete things like the
protos ouranos, phora and the like (e. g. Met. Λ 7.15). But theoretical knowledge
too has to take into account what is ‘at our fingertips’ as well as what have the oth-
ers said (e. g. Pythagoras or Speusippus or others; 7.25), because the endoxa are the
starting point in this case too, when we seek for the transition from the ousia (Sein)
to the onta (Seiendes). Against this background we can understand the remark in
Met. Λ 8.7. Astronomy is competent to answer the question concerning the astro-
nomical first being, but the astronomical first is not identical with the theoretical
first. These are two distinct types of arche and if we want to know what they are,
157
2. The Traditional Reception of Met. Λ and its Difficulties
we require different methods: namely, the astronomical observation and the theory
respectively.
In order to identify the first being, unmoved, that is, therefore never having a coming-
into-being, being that which could be a basis for the becoming, we must know,
firstly, what in the process of becoming comes to be and what does not; and, sec-
ondly, what can at the same time found becoming. In the search for this, Aristo-
tle checks the four causes. It is evident that hyle has no coming-to-be, because it
must already be in place for any possible becoming. Could hyle be the primary
sought after? No, it could not, because hyle cannot initiate becoming, being itself
no more than ‘suitability for…’ (Heidegger: Geeigentheit zu…). The eidos too has
no coming-to-be, but it cannot initiate any movement. This was the main point in
Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s ideas. The telos for something is prior to that which
it is the telos of. Insofar as the for-the-sake-of is pursued by an other being, it initi-
ates movement without being moved or changing itself. Certainly, at the time when
it is setting in motion another thing, it does not become itself in this respect, but it
has been moved previously. That means that the telos which sets in motion is itself
only a moved one, so it can cause only a relative becoming not becoming in and
of itself. The primary, therefore, which sets in motion, while being itself unmoved,
remains to be found. Hyle and eidos are already excluded as the primary, which sets
in motion unmoved itself, but now we see that this will have to combine the char-
acteristics of two other sorts of causes: as moving cause it must have the form of
the for-the-sake-of. A being with these features seems to fulfill the conditions of a
unmovedmoving: namely to be prior to the moved being and to remain unmoved.
AtMet. Λ 7.15 we read “on such a principle heavens and nature depend.” This for-
mulation can be understood in both ways, in the cosmological and in the theoretical
one. The standard interpretation follows H. Bonitz, 1849, 498:
Thus the highest principle is the eternal substance, immovable, pure act, nec-
essary, conceivable and desirable, and precisely because it is desirable causes
motion.173
173 Summum igitur principium est substantia aeterna, immobilis, actus ipse, necessaria, cogitabilis
eademque appetibilis, eaque propter id ipsum, quia est appetibilis, motum efficit.
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That means that Aristotle is saying that the heavens and all nature depend on the
‘First Mover,’ i. e. on God. – In the cosmological reading the phrase means that
heavens and nature depend ultimately on the sphere of fixed stars. A parallel that
supports this reading is found in the De Motu 4, where Aristotle uses the same verb.
But the distinction between the heavens and the fixed stars must seem artificial, for it
was implausible that the earth should not belong to the whole simply in order to form
the necessary fixed point for movement of the heavens (see above). In any case, the
sentence has a theoretical sequel, which suggests that the cited sentence itself yields
a theoretical significance. If we follow this line, Aristotle is here dismissing the
idea that the heavens or nature could be the principle for which we are searching.
They are not the primary we seek for, since both depend on another principle, on
being (Sein). This means that Aristotle is here leaving the cosmological path. If the
heavens and nature cannot stand as the primary being sought after, then that will not
be found by cosmological considerations at all.
It follows from this review that the cosmological or astronomical considerations in
Met. Λ 8 do not lead to any theological or speculative principles. They are instead
considerations in a range, which although indeed having connections with the main
question about being (Sein), because they having to do with the problem about the
transition from the noetic to the mundane world, they do not bring us to any con-
clusions concerning the theoretical part of the question. Aristotle takes them into
account because they played a role in his time and because they were used as argu-
ments by others. He wishes, simply, to eliminate them. Astronomy and the like give
perspectives for the transitions from pure theory to physics which inevitablywe have
later to face. In a cosmological respect, the proton kinoun is a being (Seiendes), it
is a οὐσία πρώτη καὶ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, “an elementary being and in ac-
tuality,” but as to be it is the speculative {ousia← noesis →energeia}. How they
come together cannot be entered into at this point.
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2.3.5. The Difficulties of the Cosmological Thesis
If a cosmology ought to be an argument in a proof of the existence of god and if god
is considered as ousia (Sein), then ontic arguments must be accepted as premises for
ontological conclusions. But that much is clear, in that Aristotle distinguishes very
well the question concerning the movements of the heavens as a physical and astro-
nomical question from the question concerning primary knowledge and the question
about being (Sein).174 Theophrastus too distinguishes in the same way:175
It may be that astronomy too contributes something <to these questions, sc. about the first
moving, about the for-the-sake-of,…> but surely not primarily because this <question>
is prior to nature and the leading <question>; and as many say this line of thought doesn’t
belong to physics or at least not the whole.
Aristotle asks what the first is, under two aspects:
– On which being (ousia, Sein) does becoming does rest? (θεωρία περὶ οὐσίας),
and
– Whence originate actual movement and becoming do result? (πόθεν ἡ κίνησις,
πόθεν ἡ γένεσις),
The second question, referring not only to eternal and uniform motion, but to the
ever changing movements with which we have primarily to do, is clearly subordi-
nate. Since both agree that astronomy does not help in the question concerning the
primary, astronomy deals with physical questions.
If one wanted to contend that Aristotle in Met. Λ has construed a cosmology in
order to prove the existence of god, one must overlook the difference between the
theoretical and the cosmological question as the first and the second question. Aris-
totle is aware of the difference between empirical and theoretical questioning and
he makes clear that a theoretical question cannot be answered by empirical means.
We cannot, therefore, impute to him the intention to answer with astronomical ob-
servations the theoretical question about being (Sein). On the contrary, in Λ 8.7 he
174 Cf. above, Part II, 2.2.3 the references concerning the division of knowledge.
175 Theophrastus, Met. § 27
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systematically assigns to physics and astronomy a definite place within the whole
of knowledge. Astronomers are thus competent for questions about the necessary
number of movements, of spheres and the like, but not in the question concerning
the primary into which he is enquiring: that being (ousia, Sein) which is capable to
found coming-to-be. Whoever wished to know what Aristotle’s cosmological ques-
tions were, can find these in De Caelo: What is the coming to be and the passing
away of the world as a whole? How the structure of the world must be conceived?
What are space and time, what is the body of the ouranos and which are its features?
How the sky of the fixed stars is composed? What is the first in the cosmos? What
is its first moving? –
Here too we can distinguish “the first” in two ways, by analogy with the concepts of
becoming just discussed above. One is “the first being” in the cosmos, this belongs
to the physical question. Another “first” is a noetic first being, not a part of the
cosmos: this belongs to the theoretical question. It is evident, then, that the theoret-
ical question does not ask after a first being in the range of beings but after ousia,
Sein. The proton kinoun in Met. Λ is ousia as a for-the-sake of the coming to be.
The question about a “first moving” arises in Met. Λ because the moving cause (to
kinoun) is part of the list of four causes, which must be applied in any case, and it is
the philosopher’s task to ask the question what the first is, in any case, also in that
of to proton hothen he kinesis. Concerning the present question, “that which can
set in motion” was marked up in this list as a pivotal factor (see above, p. 141, Nr.
5, and the following page). Because motion here means natural motion it provokes
cosmological questions. Aristotle asks the question about the motion of natural be-
ings in Physics B, and there he gives the answer that the beginning of this motion is
physis. This answer too is a theoretical not a cosmological one because physis is not
one being among others (Seiendes) but ousia, the being (Sein), of natural beings.
That Aristotle discusses astronomy in Met. Λ is due to the fact that cosmology is
one side of the question about movement and the beginning of natural movement is
linked with the question of the transition from theoretical to natural being. Aristotle
sets out this question in De Motu Animalium in the very first chapter. It is the same
transition from theory to physics as in the Timaeus where the point of transition is
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marked by the difference ‘with chora –without chora.’ This transition is comparable
with the “Übergang” which Kant speaks of in the Opus postumum. In short, it
is the transition from Sein to Seiendes where being is not to be understood in its
Parmenidean sense.176
Wemay consider the whole under the aspect of the classification of knowledge (see
on this what is said in the chapter about theology, 2.2). At various points Aristotle
discusses this question, his goal being to establish “the first” in knowledge, i. e. that
knowledge which is required by any other knowledge. In Met. A 1–2 he presents
the fundamental distinction between theoretical and productive knowledge, which is
enhanced inMet. E 1 by the practical knowledge (in the ancient sense of the word).
This threefold division results from the activities involved: to produce, to act, to
reflect upon. Reflective knowledge is further divided according to the differences
of the beings contemplated in physics, mathematics and theology or first philosophy.
Physics B 2 presents the difference between mathematics and physics, Met. Z 11
between physics as second philosophy and first philosophy whose subject is prote
ousia. If the being (ousia, Sein) of natural beings were the first, then physics would
be first philosophy. We must ask therefore, whether there is another being (ousia)
prior to natural being. If that was the case then the knowledge of that being would
be prior to the knowledge of natural beings. Pertinent to this, Aristotle distinguishes
different dianoetic aretai in Nicomachean Ethics Z 3.
It results from all these classifications, firstly, that Aristotle distinguishes differ-
ent ways of knowing, which can be hierarchically organized; and secondly, that
in the hierarchy of knowledge, astronomy is not of the first order. In the quarrel
concerning the eternity of the world between Philoponus and Simplicius there is an
analogous distinction between two types of questions about two types of becoming.
Simplicius is on the point of explaining natural becoming because he is interpreting
Aristotle, Philoponus in contrast argues for creation out of nothing, which is surely
not the natural becoming which is thematic in Aristotle’s Physics. Simplicius says
(CAG X, 1145, 27f):
176 More on this correlation in E. Sonderegger, 2015.
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Anyhow, if god, as he <: Philoponus> says, causes <the beings which> came to
be directly by him without time <: ἀχρόνως> and without a genesis, then it is
clear that those <beings> don’t have their being by becoming <διὰ γενέσεως>
and (CAG X, 1150, 30f.):
Aristotle says, what is produced by god immediately are fully eternal beings
and they do not have a coming to be at all (only those things have a coming to
be in a part of time which can vanish).
If one were minded to construct a cosmological proof of the existence of god with
the text ofMet. Λ, one would be forced to ignore at least 6 references, which express
severe reservations (see table 2.2).
Met. Λ 8.9 (at the end);
8.13 εὔλογον ὑπολαβεῖν, “it is reasonable to accept
this,” but not necessary,
ἀναγκαῖον – τὸ γὰρ
ἀναγκαῖον ἀφείσθω τοῖς
ἰσχυροτέροις λέγειν,
“to say what is necessary we
leave to the stronger ones,”
8.15 τοῦτο
εὔλογον...ὑπολαβεῖν,
“it is reasonable to accept
this”;
8.22 ἐν μύθου σχήματι, “in the form of a story”;
8.23 μυθικῶς ... προσῆκται, ὅτι
θεοὺς ᾤοντο τὰς πρώτας
οὐσίας εἶναι,
“it is added in mythical
form…that one believes that
gods are the first beings”;
8.23 πάτριος δόξα, “the belief of our fathers.”
Table 2.2.: Reservations about astronomy
Discussion of the first quotation may suffice. In Met. Λ 8.7 we read that there are
several movements of each planet, but:
…but as to how many they may be, we refer now to what certain mathemati-
cians say, <just> to have a certain idea, in order to retain a definite quantity in
mind; by the way, partly it is necessary that we search ourselves partly that we
obtain information from the searchers; if to those who deal with that something
contrary to what is said now seems <to be right>, <it is necessary> to esteem
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both <groups of mathematicians>, but to trust those who adhere more exactly
to principles.
From this we may at least conclude, that his cosmological statements are not Aristo-
tle’s own claims and that they do not have the status for him of premises from which
to infer conclusions about the existence of gods. They are starting points for con-
siderations. Aristotle is willing to reconsider his statements if better observations
arise. Aristotle, in sharp contrast to Simplicio in theDiscorsi of Galilei, would have
been glad to look through the telescope.177
The connection between Met. Λ and Timaeus is obvious. So many scholars have
identified the demiurge of the latter with the ‘First Mover’ of the first. What is
more, the Christian Creator was brought in a line with those two with the result that
some statements about the Aristotelian god were applied to the Christian God.178
The dogmatic parallel was even extended to the claim that the ‘First Mover’ (as
they wrongly name it) is the goal of all mundane movements. It remains an open
question how we are to understand this, seeing as how we observe everywhere the
very contrary. If god is the goal of the world, then it is no long way to the idea
of a creation, for which the creator sets its goal for. Creation, then, retains its own
teleology.
We must set aside the old premises179 and ask entirely anew what it was that Plato
had in mind with his eikos logos and the demiurge. In the reception of these cosmo-
logical statements inMet. Λ, Theophrastus’Metaphysicswas read from the times of
Neoplatonism for a very long period as an introduction to Aristotles’ Metaphysics,
until the renaissance the texts were even transmitted together. Theophrastus em-
phasizes right at the beginning that one of the main questions in philosophy is the
connection between the noetic and the natural. Some thought that Theophrastus
would speak about the cosmos and its first mover. Theophrastus concretizes this
177 Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche, intorno due nuove scienze attenenti alla mecanica & i movi-
menti locali
178 With many others H. J. Krämer, G. Reale, Herzberg, 2013, Horn, 2016,.
179 See e. g. Rheins, Jason G., 2010; in his dissertation he made an attempt to defend the standard
interpretation.
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theme with ephesis, “desire,” which is his theme from § 7 until § 25 (of 34 §§ in
total). There, then, is a correspondence in terminology.
Anyone who may wish to understand how a theology based on cosmology is con-
strued may read De mundo, a text that was considered “until modern times as an
epitome of the Aristotelian cosmology.”180 De Mundo is a pseudo-Aristotelian text,
probably written between 40 and 140 AD (Lorimer), or not long after Andronicus’
edition. The book was translated by Apuleius who thought it to be an Aristotelian
text. It complies with all conditions a cosmology must fulfill if it is to serve as a
proof of the existence of god. Just this was the reason why G. Reale took it as an
authentic Aristotelian book in his edition (1974). But that would be valid only if one
were conditioned exactly by De Mundo, by Theologia Aristoteles and by Liber de
Causis to readMet. Λwith theological content and otherwise it is not valid.181 In the
first chapter the anonymous author of De Mundo says that the contemplation of the
whole, i. e. of the cosmos is the philosophers task, because it is the most noble thing,
and this is his subject: “Let us theologize about this.”182 The text starts with the de-
cision to bring together cosmology and god.183 It is meant to describe the world as a
creation of god. There are not to be found analytical questions about ousia etc. that
are characteristic for Met. Λ, not to mention theoretical considerations concerning
arche, energeia, noesis. Though he treats the concepts of cosmos, of the aether, of
the heavens and its eternal movement. We can see very well what the anonymous
author means by “theologize” in chapter 6, where he describes cosmic causation
by god through several levels; and in chapter 7, where he treats the uniqueness of
god even though he is worshipped under several names, a theme dealt with later by
Dionysius Areopagita.184 Apuleius’ translation of that work greatly influenced the
180 H. Flashar, 1983, 289.
181 Cf. R. Arnzen et al., 2007, 271–3, on Liber de causis; 273–4, for the Theologia Aristotelis.
182 391b4; on the juxtapositon of cosmology and theology in De Mundo see A.-J. Festugière, 1949,
341ff.
183 See A.-J. Festugière, 1949, 341ff.; K. Oehler, 1969; W. Pötscher, 1970; B. Manuwald, 1989; A. P.
Bos, 1994; H. Seidl, 1995.
184 Dionysius Areopagita, Περὶ θειῶν ὀνομάτων; Lit. on De Mundo: W. L. Lorimer, 1933, 2. ed. re-
vised by L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges 1965; D. J. Furley, 1955 (repr. 1965), 331–409; an important
article by H. Strohm, 1952, 137–175; see its translation with introduction, commentary and bibliog-
raphy in the Akademieausgabe (together with the Metereologie, Darmstadt 1984 (3. ed.). Cf. A. P.
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reception of Met. Λ during the Middle Ages.
Copernicus refers in the introduction of his Commentariolus (1514) only to Callip-
pus und Eudoxus, but his first sentence goes very well with the Aristotelian tradi-
tion:
I see that our ancestors have adopted a multitude of celestial spheres mainly
for this reason, in order to bring the apparent movement of the stars under
regulation.185
Of course, Aristotle stands in the background when cosmoc regularity must be pre-
served as well as when his astronomic construction is rejected in detail. This be-
comes clear in I. Keplers translation of De Caelo B 13–14. Met. Λ is also affected
by this criticism as it contains similar theses. Depending on the level of astronomic
knowledge of the time of the interpreter, the statements inMet. Λ were given more
or less weight, accepted as observations or derided. Today too this is a problem for
interpretations which would attribute some importance to the cosmology of Met. Λ.
Rarely has this been expressed as clearly as it was by H. Flashar, 1983, 395, but in
fact it is the permanent background of the standard interpretation:
Aristotle’s presentation of the cosmology is hampered by the fact that his sys-
tem, as is well known, is ‘false’ in substantial parts[...]186
The standard interpretation simply prolongs this line of thought and reads Met. Λ
in the view of the De Mundo.
Bos, 1994, 289–318, on De Mundo expecially 289ff., 300f.
185 Multitudinem orbium coelestium maiores nostros eam maxime ob causam posuisse video, ut appar-
entem in sideribus motum sub regularitate salvarent.
186 Die Darstellung des Kosmologie des Aristoteles ist durch den Umstand erschwert, dass das Weltbild
des Aristoteles in seinen wesentlichen Teilen bekanntlich ‚falsch’ ist [...]
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2.4. Teleology inMet. Λ
If Aristotle is known for anything it is for his teleology.187
There will likely not come about any teleological explanation of nature, which
does not in some form or another transfer onto the world the conception of ends
of its proponent, or to put it another way, place the human mind simultaneously
in the role of creator of the world.188
Such statements testify the extent to which Aristotle’s teleology is accepted in the
standard interpretation and the direction in which it is tending. In fact, considera-
tions about telos play a crucial role in Met. Λ.189 The concept of telos only allows
Aristotle to determine the first moving as unmoved and distinguish it from other
beings that can set in motion other beings. According to the standard interpretation
this makes possible the teleological proof of the existence of god.190
But apart from this specific function Aristotle’s teleology received much attention
from three sides in the last hundred years. Firstly, at the turn from the 19th to the
20th century, much emphasis was laid on teleology by the vitalists; secondly, at the
end of the 20th century we observe a new interest in issues pertaining to sense and
ends.191 This can perhaps be understood as a (Christian) reaction to the postmodern
trend in which such large-scale considerations were less plausible. And finally,
187 A. Gotthelf, J. G. Lennox, 1987, 199; see A. Gotthelf, 204–242, with a comprehensive discussion of
the concept of telos. – J. G. Lennox, 1985, 143–163, tries to corroborate the thesis that Theophrastus
criticizes Aristotle in his Metaphysics, he assumes that Theophrastus takes telos in a realistic way.
188 This is the opening phrase of a famous work by W. Theiler, 1925: Es wird wohl keine teleologische
Naturerklärung geben, die nicht in irgend einer Form die Zweckvorstellung ihres Verfechters auf
das Weltganze überträgt oder, anders ausgedrückt, den Menschengeist gleichsam in die Rolle des
Weltschöpfers versetzt.
189 See Met. Λ 7, 1072a26–b4.
190 Cf. K. Gloy, 1983, 527ff.; she finds inMet. Λ a final-teleological proof; 531: Gloy says that Aristotle
identifies the moving cause and the final cause in order to explain the origin of movement; cf. H. P.
Cunningham, 1991, 5–35. – A. Mansion, 1946, 35: the principle of teleology dominates Aristotle’s
whole physics completely; K. Düsing, 1988, 541: In der Ontologie als der Lehre vom Seienden nimmt
die Teleologie bei Aristoteles und allen, die ihm nachfolgen, eine beherrschende Stellung ein. Ch.
Horn, 2016, intends to prove that according to Aristotle the whole cosmos is teleologically ordered
by God.
191 Some impluses by R. Spaemann, R. Löw, 1981.
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teleology has played a role in modern efforts to explain the metaphysical vocabulary
through biology. In addition, we must not forget that in ethical and hermeneutical
discussions purposes and aims are at the centre of interest.
2.4.1. Some Modern Interpretations of Aristotle’s Teleology
Themanner in which the standard interpretation takesAristotle’s teleology is shaped
mainly by two traditions: on the one hand by the medieval concept of creation and
on the other by the Kantian idea of purposiveness (Zweckmässigkeit). This could
be more or less efficiently disguised, but ultimately, the modern understanding of
telos corresponds in principle with Brentano’s 20. thesis about Met. Λ:
Purpose means something that is intended.192
In the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1995) ‘Teleology’ is defined in the
following way:
The philosophical doctrine that all of nature, or at least intentional agents, are
goal-directed or functionally organized.
In the given context teleology usually means the claim that ‘goal’ or ‘sense’ are prin-
ciples by means of which God or nature ‘produce’ things, be it literally or metaphor-
ically. God as the highest and first being establishes ends for his ‘creatures.’ Beside
other goals on a lower level, these creatures all have one common goal in God, be-
cause God has connected not only the created things with each other in that they have
purpose, but in a special way He has established Himself as the goal of the whole
creation. Of course, the medieval concepts of the ‘purpose of creation’ vary one
from another to some degree, but we retain the fundamental idea, which is clearly
articulated by Thomas Aquinas, for example, in the Prooemium of the Summa the-
ologiae:
192 F. Brentano, 1986, 251, Zweck heisst Beabsichtigtes. – R. Spaemann, 1988, 549, in turn thinks that
it is eine wissenschaftlich schwer plausibel zu machende Position, if teleology in its proper sense is
restricted to human purposive action while the rest would be teleological only by analogy.
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…because the main purpose of this sacred doctrine is to convey the knowledge
of God, and this not only what He is in Himself but also with respect to his
being the cause and the end of the things, especially of the rational being. 193
And in contemporary formulation:
God is the origin and the aim of His creatures, especially of humans.194
Wemay consider the Kantian position in more detail. Kant often thematised the dif-
ference between the material and the formal way of speaking about nature. This is
the subject in the Preface to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B XIX; where it arises
in a discussion of the difference between the concepts of world and nature Kritik
der reinen Vernunft, B 446f. It is furthermore a fundamental distinction in the
Prolegomena concerning the questionWie ist Natur selbst möglich? (§ 36; see also
§ 14–17); and it is with just this distinction that Kant opens his book Metaphysis-
che Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft.195 Beside these, the main source for
193 quia igitur principalis intentio huius sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitionem tradere, et non solum
secundum quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et finis earum, et specialiter
rationalis creaturae.
194 On creation see G. Scherrer, 1990: Gott ist Ursprung und Ziel seiner Kreaturen, ganz besonders des
Menschen.
195 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Vorrede:
If the word Nature be merely taken in its formal signification, there may be as many
natural sciences as there are specifically different things (for each must contain the
inner principle special to the determinations pertaining to its existence), inasmuch as
it [Nature] signifies the primal inner principle of all that belongs to the existence of
a thing.[1] But Nature, regarded in its material significance, means not a quality, but
the sum-total of all things, in so far as they can be objects of our senses, and therefore
of experience; in short, the totality of all phenomena—the sense-world, exclusive of
all non-sensuous objects. (Transl. Ernest Belfort Bax)
Wenn das Wort Natur bloss in formaler Bedeutung genommen wird, da es das er-
ste innere Prinzip alles dessen bedeutet, was zum Dasein eines Dinges gehört, so
kann es vielerlei Naturwissenschaften geben, als es spezifisch verschiedene Dinge
gibt, deren jedes sein eigentümliches inneres Prinzip der zu seinem Dasein gehöri-
gen Bestimmungen enthalten muss. Sonst wird aber auch Natur in materieller Be-
deutung genommen, nicht als eine Beschaffenheit, sondern als der Inbegriff aller
Dinge, so fern sie Gegenstände unserer Sinne, mithin auch der Erfahrung sein kön-
nen, worunter also das Ganze aller Erscheinungen, d. i. die Sinnenwelt, mit Aus-
schliessung aller nicht sinnlichen Objekte, verstanden wird.
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teleological considerations is his Kritik der Urteilskraft.
When nature is considered materialiter, Kant says, this will mean the total of nat-
ural things and the Inbegriff der Gegenstände der Erfahrung (“the epitome of the
objects of experience”) and we are looking at the unity of natural things in their
existence; but prior to nature materialiter is nature as das erste innere Prinzip alles
dessen,…was zumDasein eines Dinges gehört. Nature in this formal sense is prior to
experience in two respects. First because nature as the formalGesetzmässigkeit aller
Gegenstände der Erfahrung is apriori and necessary (features not derived through
experience). The Gesetzmässigkeit must be based on the Beschaffenheit unseres
Verstandes (Prolegomena § 36). Secondly any singular phenomenon is empirical
only and empirical perceptions remain as unconnected as they are when acquired.
Empirical acquaintance cannot transcend itself, so no singular experience can give
unity to the multitude of our perceptions. Yet, we require this unity in our reasoning,
if we wish to live sensibly in our world and, still more, if we wish to understand such
things as nature. Experience requires this unity in order to become knowledge.
If we did not know wherein our perceptions have their unity we could not under-
stand anything, because no particular perception could be meaningfully situated.
We cannot achieve this unifying knowledge through experience. On the contrary,
this knowledge is the basis of any given particular experience. The totality or unity
of knowledge is beyond any particular experience and must precede it, its logical
form of representation is that of the idea but not that of the conception; and the
required idea giving this sort of unity is purposiveness (Zweckmässigkeit).
Indeed, the Kantian idea of purposiveness has some connection with the medieval
concept of creation although the former’s function and its ‘reality’ are quite differ-
ent. In the Middle Ages the natural finality was considered primarily as a visible
expression of God’s goodness and omnipotence, the Kantian purposiveness on the
other hand has nothing to do with God and it is no more than an idea. If we can-
not recognize God by means of our conceptions or representations in general and
God as the last and highest subject establishes ultimate or highest purposes, then
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His purposes too, which He had established, will be unrecognizable to us. That we
cannot know these purposes results from the destruction of the possibility of the
proofs of God’s existence. A natural goal, therefore, can no longer be conceived
any more as a goal established by God. Nevertheless the idea of a purpose cannot
be surrendered, because we require it to unify our particular experience (for through
objective there becomes construed a link between things). The first laws in nature,
insofar as being epitomes (Inbegriff ) of the natural phenomena contribute to this
requisite unification.196 That alone, however, is not sufficient, empirical laws too
must contribute. It is the idea of purposiveness that unites these laws. The idea of
purpose gives unity which transcends experience to the experience.
So much for the concealed background of our concept of the goal. Following, I add
some notes on the three modern references to the Aristotelian teleology (mentioned
above), in only a few selected examples only. Vitalism claims that teleology is a
real and immaterial principle working out through nature. Of this form of vitalism,
H. Driesch is an exponent.197 E. Zeller represents a weaker form of vitalism when
he speaks of the “[…] inherent striving for form in the material.”198 This is taken
up together with many others by H. Happ according to whom telos is a kind of a
principle of power, an impulse seeking a realization, an ‘inner’ causa efficiens, as it
were. N. Hartmann attacked such ideas: “the ultimate nexus is a determining force,
which runs against the current of the flow of time and process.”199 By inverting the
relation between cause and effect teleology becomes nothing but a kind of inverted
form of causation, as N. Hartmann observed.200
R. Spaemann says that in the view of Thomas Aquinas finality as well as the other
three causes are real principles on which the world is constructed in the form it has
in fact. He adds that according to Aristotle teleology is “a precondition for the com-
196 As an example I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, B XXXII, says: Z. B. der Verstand sagt: alle Verän-
derung hat ihre Ursache (allgemeines Naturgesetz).
197 H. Driesch, 1905.
198 E. Zeller, 1921, 339: […] dem Stoff innewohnende Streben nach der Form….
199 N. Hartmann, 1951, 3, […] der Finalnexus ist eine Determination, welche der Richtung des Zeit-
flusses und der Prozessabläufe entgegen läuft; cf. W. Stegmüller, 1983 (2. ed.), 679.
200 1951, 21, 24, 65–68.
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prehension of natural phenomena,”201 and that according to Thomas Aquinas the
obvious orientation of things towards purposes can only be explained by a purpose-
setting mind, ultimately by God.202 This gives the basis for the teleological proof of
the existence of God. R. Spaemann contrasts his view of the Aristotelian teleology
(that the processes in nature follow a given goal) with the mere teleonomy which
seeks only to explain the emergence of successful programmes.203 He sets Aristo-
tle, however, against the idea “of universal connectedness of external objectives, in
which all events in the world are related one to another and everything somehow
good.”204 His main task was is to reconcile the different concepts of teleology in
biology and philosophy. That should be possible because not concerning a “dif-
ference between two biological theories” but merely one “between tow disciplines,
biology and philosophy.”205
H. P. Cunningham treats the criticism concerning the physico-theological proof of
the existence of God, as conceived by D. Hume and I. Kant, because he thinks that
by this criticism Aristotle falls equally under criticism, insofar as only Aristotle’s
‘First Mover’ can ensure the purposeful coordination between things we see oper-
ating in fact. H. P. Cunningham tries, therefore, to defend the proof of the existence
of God (and Aristotle with it) by pointing out that the concept of chance in the argu-
ments of D. Hume and I. Kant does not have the same function as in the Aristotelian
arguments.206
Some scholars have proposed an understanding of the Aristotelian teleology by
showing that some metaphysical concepts (such as genos and eidos, but especially
telos) have their origin in biological research. By investigating the biological texts
of Aristotle they hoped that these concepts should become more comprehensible.
201 R. Spaemann, 1981, 79, eine Bedingung für das Verständnis natürlicher Phänomene.
202 R. Spaemann, 1981, 85.
203 R. Spaemann, 1988, 550.
204 eines universellen Zusammenhangs äusserer Zweckmässigkeit, in der alle Ereignisse der Welt
aufeinander bezogen sind und alles irgendwozu gut ist (551).
205 It does not concern the Differenz zwischen zwei biologischen Theorien but only a Differenz zwischen
zwei Disziplinen, zwischen Biologie und Philosophie.
206 H. P. Cunningham, 1991, 35. Cf. the references in K. Gloy, 1983; W. Cramer, 1967, and J. Moreau,
1975, had been treating the subject before yet.
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This method seemed to be all the more appropriate since Aristotle’s results and
insights in the field of biology are considered important even today.207 These at-
tempts presuppose that fundamental concepts like class, kind, goal become more
understandable if metaphysics starts issues from biology. They assume that it is
easier to understand the ‘form of an animal’ than the metaphysical concept of form
in general, which derives from abstraction.
Again and again, then, and in a variety of ways to be sure, we see that the concept of
telos plays an important role in the context of the teleological proof of the existence
of God, in cosmology as in biology. It is indispensable, therefore, to ask what the
function of this concept in Met. Λ may be.208
2.4.2. The Difficulties of these Interpretations
Thomism, old and new, incorporates Aristotelian thoughts in order to rationalize
Christian dogma. In this tradition teleology means:
The directedness of the being in function and form upon an end, in which the
being discovers the completeness and perfection proper to itself, but also the
‘end’ […] of its essence.209
In this medieval context ends can be established only by a reasoning agent, be it
human or divine. This reasoning sets the ends for the world as a whole and for the
207 D.M. Balme, 1975; W. Kullmann, 1981; F. Büchner, 1981; W. Kullmann, 1998; G. E. R. Lloyd,
1991; W. Kullmann, 1979 (now in W. Kullmann, 1998). A. Gotthelf, J. G. Lennox (eds.), 1987, here
is the elaborate contribution to the Aristotelian telos by A. Gotthelf, 204–242; W. Theiler, 1925;
D.-H. Cho, 2003. The anthology edited by D. T. Devereux, and P. Pellegrin (ed.), 1990, includes
some important contributions, among others those of G. E. R. Lloyd, P. Pellegrin, D.M. Balme.
208 Some lit. on ‘goal’: H. Driesch, 1905; id., 1928 (4. ed.); H. Conrad-Martius, 1944; ead., 1969;
N. Hartmann, 1951; K. Bartels, 1966; I. Düring, 1969; W. Kullmann, 1972; id., 1974; J. Moreau,
1975; I. Craemer-Ruegenberg, 1980; R. Bubner, 1981; R. Spaemann, 1981; id., 1988; J.-E. Pleines,
1991. Comprehensive: W. Kullmann, 1998. “Zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Teleologieprinzips” in:
H. Blumenberg, 1955, 637–648; id., 1957, 61–80 und 266–283; H. Poser, 1981; A. Preus, 1990,
471–490 (esp. on Met. Λ ); J.-E. Pleines, 1991.
209 W. Brugger, 171976, 396, Die Ausrichtung des Seienden in Struktur und Funktion auf ein Ziel, in
dem das Seiende seine wesensgemässe Erfüllung und Vollendung, aber auch das ‘Ende’ [...] seines
Wesens findet
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things therein. These ends are real principles for the construction of the world and
its beings, as it was argued by F. Brentano in his 20th thesis. If we ask “What is
the goal of this or that?” we are doing so in terms of a particular thing, but the
quite distinct question “What is the goal of the whole?” implicitly underlies it. This
question is possible and even necessary in respect of a world, which is not itself
a whole but requires God to be truly complete. The answer will necessarily be a
religious or a theological one. The Christian answer is in both cases “It is for the
sake of God.” But we cannot ask further “And what is God for?” We have to note,
that, just as in the Christian context we do not ask “What is God for?” so in the
Aristotelian context we ask not “What is the physis for?” because physis is origin
and goal of movement as God is cause and goal of His creation.
I. Düring says that Aristotle is claiming that man is the telos of all of nature,210 while
I. Craemer-Ruegenberg tries to refute this.211 She too sees a first principle in Aris-
totle’s system but one that is the end as such in contrast to the end of something. She
says that in the proof of the ‘UnmovedMover’ Aristotle identifies the moving cause
and the final cause. Only in this way can the series of the particular ends culminate
in an ultimate moving end, which is end only and nothing else. Especially, it is not
also an instrument, as are the other ends. God as a first mover is this surmounting,
ultimate cause.212 Both, I. Düring and I. Craemer-Ruegenberg, agree that Aristotle
establishes a telos for the nature as a whole; the former sees man as the telos, the
latter God. Here it becomes evident that Aristotle’s concept of and function for the
end varies widely in its modern (often contradictory) interpretations. By the stan-
dard interpretation teleology becomes an explanatory principle for the whole of the
world, and because Aristotle is attributed with a realistic position, it is at once also a
constructive principle.213 As a result of this development it became possible to see
the subject of metaphysics precisely in this interweaving of substance, reason and
210 In: RE Suppl. XI, 322, with reference to Aristotle, Politica A 8, 1256b15–22.
211 In: H. Poser (Hrsg.), 1981.
212 This is a generally maintained idea, see H. Seidl, G. Reale, J. G. De Filippo, 1994, H. Flashar, 1983,
and many others.
213 K.Düsing, 1988, 542, thinks that it is legitimate to expand the teleological question auf dasWeltganze
and that an answer is possible; moreover he says that the objections of N. Hartmann (partly criticising
metaphysics, partly categorial, partly sceptic) can be rejected (542–544).
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teleology.214
To take all causes in some way as efficient or productive was another important
change in the conceptualization of cause. That is the reason why we are not used
conceiving the matter (hyle) as a cause, and that telos seems to be no more than a
variant of the causa efficiens. That change was prepared for by the Stoics215 and it
became definitive with Thomas Aquinas. In his texts causa without specification
stands for causa efficiens. Up to the present, the standard interpretation adopts this
habit until today by assuming that hyle, telos, eidos too have an effect one way or
another such as the causa efficiens. The modern use of teleology implies that any
end is founded by a conscience and that the world is totally organised by ends.216
Kant has shown that the extrapolation from the experience of purposiveness in sin-
gular cases to the purposiveness of the whole is a result of the antinomy of pure
reason. Human reason is urged to ask such questions concerning the whole (be-
cause it needs a frame for its understanding) but by giving the totality of conditions
to a given conditioned thing and by pretending to grasp the “absolute totality in the
synthesis of appearances,”217 reason succumbs to an illusion and captures not a real
object but no more than an idea. Purpose is a “merely subjective principle to the
appropriate use of the cognitive faculty,”218 by which alone we have the idea of the
nature as a system of purposes (KdU § 67). By means of this idea we transcend
particular experience. It is not possible to deduce something real from this idea of a
purpose: the idea, therefore, has no theoretical but nevertheless practical value.
The concept of the subject is fundamental for the Thomistic as well as for the Kan-
tian manner of understanding ‘end.’ Thomas Aquinas takes God as the fundamental
subject, while I. Kant replaces this with human reason in general. Even if the Kan-
tian concept of the end as an idea, which provides our experience with unity, is not
expressly attributed to Aristotle, the current understanding of an end is that of end
214 Cf. K. Ulmer, 1971, 16; cf. W. Stegmaier, 1977, 16.
215 Cf. A.A. Long, D.N. Sedley, 1987, vol I, 340.
216 Cf. the discussion by W. Wieland, 1970, 265.
217 Kritik der Urteilskraft § 69,…die absolute Totalität in der Synthesis der Erscheinungen …
218 KdU § 69, 312, …ein bloss subjektives Prinzip zum zweckmässigen Gebrauche der Erkentnisvermö-
gen…
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of a subject. Thus we can see the fundamental difference between this concept of an
end and the Aristotelian use of telos. The Aristotelian telos is not constitutive for
the world, neither in the realistic nor in transcendental sense, it is not ‘made’ by a
subject. It is, instead, an item in a set of necessary questions about causes. Aristotle
draws this list from the different forms the Greek of his time use aitia or aition in
their arguments.
W. Kullmann, J. G. Lennox, A. Gotthelf, D.M. Balme, and Dae-Ho Cho, have made
several attempts to explain the Aristotelian metaphysics by means of biology. They
start from the fact that certain concepts like ends, genus and kind play a role in
biology. Thence they contend that Aristotle translated their functions from the field
of life to the field of being in general, certainly as a principle of reality and existence.
In this way, those concepts became metaphysical terms. If we take into account the
Aristotelian way of handling the issue, we will see that this argument is circular. It
is sure enough hat Aristotle does refer to biological examples in order to illustrate
certain things, but he does so in aiming at discovering the fundamentals of just of
those concepts we use in everyday life, whether be it in biology or elsewhere. He
is interested in the fundamental opinions on which our everyday and our technical
language are based. It is permitted only to everyday life or biology to presuppose
the meaning of eidos, not to reflection. For reflection such opinions are starting
points for research. It is the aim of reflection to make these concepts clear and
well-founded.
If there had been any Aristotelian metaphysics at all, it would not have been an
abstractive project or a discipline mandated to make fundamental statements about
things beyond natural beings. It would, instead, have been the name for research
into the principles and fundamentals of our language and our opinions about beings.
In this research, it is important to see that when we think or speak, we cannot help
but use to be. Ousia, being, Sein, therefore, is at the core of all these efforts.
We could apply the ‘biological’ method if these concepts were abstractions. But
if Aristotle analyses in “topical attitude” (topische Einstellung) the diffuse every-
day opinions in order to get at their fundaments as causes, categories, predicables,
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genus, kinds, actuality, potentiality etc., and if these can be used in a purified form
as terms, then it is circular to say that the ‘metaphysical’ concepts would be eas-
ier to understand if they are explained by their biological origin, because this use
were more natural or more fundamental. The concepts of genus, kind, goal etc. in
biology are the raw material for reflection and analysis, they are presuppositions
(Vormeinungen) that are still not clarified, they remain to be to be clarified. It is not
possible to clarify the results of the analysis by means of these still unclarified opin-
ions. It is quite another issue that these opinions can serve very well as illustrations
anywhere.
The ‘descriptive teleology’ tries to protect Aristotle from the direct attribution of
our modern concept of purpose – an evident anachronism – because this concept
depends totally on the concept of a subject. In an article on Aristotle’s teleology W.
Kullmann proposes as definition of teleology:
With the notion of teleology (or final purpose) we connect the idea that cer-
tain movements, in particular certain technical or organic processes are goal-
driven.219
Here and elsewhere he wants to meet certain reproaches that have beenmade against
the Aristotelian teleology, especially against the connection of the telos with a con-
scious reason.220 Quite the contrary, he says, Aristotle’s teleology is descriptive
only, without any reference to a designing reason. In a similar way S. Broadie
(1990) argues that Aristotle’s teleology does not have any psychological implica-
tions. A descriptive teleology does no more than ascertain “that it is good how it is;
that it is convenient,” it does not entail a claim that any subject arranged or planned
it.
S. Broadie argues that Aristotle formed his concept of natural teleology by anal-
ogy with human handicraft, but that this does not mean that teleology is contam-
219 W. Kullmann, 1979; jetzt in: id., 1998, 255ff., Mit dem Begriff der Teleologie (oder der Finalität)
verbinden wir die Vorstellung, dass bestimmte Bewegungsabläufe, insbesondere bestimmte technis-
che oder organische Prozesse zielgerichtet sind.
220 W. Kullmann, 1979, now in: id., 1998, 12–15; cf. id., 1981, 23.
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inated by psychology,221 because “even the artisan does not deliberate.”222 What
the craftsman does is not determined by his own deliberations but by professional
rules (techne).
Examining De Generatione Animalium A. Preus too concludes that teleology has
nothing to do with a deliberative behavior.223 According to Aristotle natural things
have the principle of movement in se therefore there is no need of a creator as an
external principle. We would, otherwise, have a double causation for one and the
same being. Aristotle avoids determinism and does not know of evolution (249ff.).
We can state, at the least, that A. Preus’ arguments support the understanding of the
ends as a functional concept (257).
Some of the problems arisingwith teleologymay be conceivably be obviated through
emergentism, but I am not aware of anyone who has yet attempted, as much in the
Aristotelian context. All the same, it is worth a glance, because of the relationship
of emergentism with vitalism. Emergentism seeks to bring into account the hierar-
chical organisation of things (in different varieties, to varying degrees to be sure),
together with the fact that in the course of development there come about new func-
tions and new things. In order to make this account, emergentism is unwilling to
ground this finality upon a supernatural entity, be that the conscious and deliberate
creation of a god or some immanent metaphysical principle beyond material nature.
Emergentism forms an early 20th century reaction against the inadequacy of mate-
rialism as well as of vitalism (e. g. S. Alexander, C. L. Morgan, W. Sellars), in the
second half a response to the defeat of the reductionist approach (e. g. H. Putnam, J.
Fodor, N. Block, K. R. Popper, M. Bunge).224 Emergentism, then, may be seen as
221 S. Broadie, 1990.
222 S. Broadie, 1990, 398: Aristoteles, Physics 199b26–28. !Physics!199b26–28
223 A. Preus, 1975.
224 Some important literature on emergentism: W. Krohn, G. Küppers (Hrsg.), 1992; A. Beckermann, H.
Flohr, J. Kim (ed.), 1992 (contributions of a conference in Bielefeld, 1990); M. Tooley (ed.), 1999
(a collection of classical articles from 1950 to 1992); A. Stephan, 1999 (an overview of positions
and issues). On the concept of emergence: Elanor Taylor, “An explication of emergence,” Philo-
sophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 172, No. 3
(March 2015), pp. 653-669. Bedau, Mark, and Humphreys, Paul (2008). Emergence: Contemporary
Readings in Philosophy and Science, Cambridge: MIT Press.
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a modern method for resolving problems, which in the past were solved by means
of teleology. Its main tool is the concept of self-organisation. That this theory still
pertains is due to the issues it seeks to explain. How can we understand that nat-
ural objects have life? How can we understand the genesis of mental activities?
And yet, even the chemical or perceptive features of things require explanations
beyond what is given, beyond description of their corporeal features. Many an-
thologies, even instituted competition (such as the Essay Prize offered by the The
Philosophical Quarterly, 1997), and endless controversy testify to the fascination
of this approach.
2.4.3. An Alternative Understanding of Aristotle’s Teleology
The standard interpretation sees in Aristotle’s teleology a constructive principle, by
which our world as it is may be built up. If we pay attention to the use Aristotle
makes of the term telos or more precisely to hou heneka, then we see that this
is simply one of four causes, which are no more than answers to four classes of
questions (along with the claim, that any question is reducible to one of these four).
The four classes of answers express our opinions about the causes of beings. And
just as in any other case it is the philosopher’s task to ask after the first. Aristotle
asks in Met. Λ about the first which sets in motion in the same way as he does for
the first with any other of the four causes.
Aristotle uses different types of terms. The difference between functional and content-
related concepts is of particular importance. Concepts such as ‘soul,’ ‘nature,’ ‘cos-
mos,’ describe a concrete subject, they name respective themes with which to deal.
They refer to beings, events, facts in our world. By contrast, functional concepts are
tools with which to analyze questions and issues, which are implied in the content-
related concepts. Using them we can provisionally hold off from content and reflect
exclusively on that which is given in the employed expression, in the underlying
thoughts, in the presuppositions concerning content. Functional concepts differ in
most cases from the content-related concepts by their linguistic form. As a rule
thematical concepts are substantives, adjectives, verbs, but functional concepts are
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formed on words constructed from prepositions, pronomina etc.225
Plato had early isolated such ‘hinges’ of the structure of sentences by means of the
article. So this expression is a quotation and refers to the function the term has
in a sentence. The most famous examples in Plato’s Sophist are the terms tauto,
thateron, to ou which designate identity, difference, negation. The quotational
function of the article is used in everyday Greek too, there is nothing artificial in it.
In this way are formed the terms of the four causes. Aristotle does not argue with
the objective of constructing the world upon these four causes, but he does claim
that there is no question, which cannot be ranked with one of them. All questions
fall in one of the classes which state what any given thing is made of (to ex hou, he
hyle), whence it is set in motion (hothen he arche tes metaboles, to proton kinoun,
or kinesan), what it really is (to ti en einai, to eidos), and for the sake of what it is
(to hou heneka, to telos). It is an additional condition that these four causes are not
reducible to one another. In this sense they are four corner points. Aristotle did not
obtain them empirically, through physical experiments and research, but through
reflection on the use of these expressions. So these terms reflect opinions about
causes, which lie in the language itself (not in the personal or private opinion of
somebody about this or that). They, therefore, cannot be said to construct a world
in any realistic sense. The train of Aristotle’s analyzes are not preserved in our
texts, we have only the results (concerning the causes see PhysicsB 3 andMet. Δ 2).
That Aristotle can introduce these terms without any further explanation suggests
that terms like to ti estin? to ti en einai, to ex hou, to hou heneka, to hoti etc.
were self-evident in their linguistic structure to every contemporary native speaker,
because they were constructed by the means of everyday language. The linguistic
background of the terms to ti estin and to ti en einai is especially evident. The
former quotes the question “What is that?” the latter the question τουτί τί ἦν τὸ
πρᾶγμα; “What at all is this?” common in the colloquial language.226 Aristotle
treats other opinions about the causes (e. g. that tyche, chance, or tautomaton,
accident, are causes) in the same analytical way (Physics B 4–7).
225 Many examples and references by E. Sonderegger, 2012, 3.2., Anführungen.
226 For references in the Aristophanes’ comedies see E. Sonderegger, 1983.
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The linguistic form of these terms gives strong evidence for their functional char-
acter. They all quote parts of sentences. All these terms: “The out-of-which?” or
“The where-from-of-movement?” or “The for-what-reason?” or “The meaning of
to be as used in the question ‘What at all is this?’” are reminiscent of the functions of
these expressions in sentences like “Out of which is that made?” “What is it made
of?” “Where does the movement of this thing come from?” “For what reason is
that here?” “What is it really about?” This connection gets lost, of course, when for
centuries the abbreviated forms, removed from their living speech context (such as
e. g. hyle, telos, already coined by Aristotle) and then their Latin translations – e. g.
causa materialis, formalis, efficiens and finalis – become current, and all that with
a solid realistic background. We drift very easily into realism anyway; especially
in this case when the original context of the expressions has been lost. Plato has
pointed out this fact in the Sophist in the context of the defenders of the body as the
proper being.
That, in any case, seems to be the reflex attitude for us all, and rightly so since it
enables us to get on with the business of living life. It enables and entitles us to
be realists, to care about the facts, without wondering too much about what is not
immediately given, about the frame which we live in (as language, culture, educa-
tion, world, prevailing opinion in general) and where things and facts are coming
constantly into being. This pragmatic move seems to be a predominant feature, at
least in European culture. Indeed, the reflectiveness is not always the most useful
attitude, at any rate, not invariably the appropriate response to any given situation.
But Aristotle’s concern is not everyday life, it is precisely reflection. And here we
cannot afford to take functions and elements of sentences for realia, that is for things
and objects.227
In the course of time these concepts have been understood in many different ways.
The concept of the end, in particular, is one that became subject to several different
influences. Some cultural changes gave the term a special turn. The Stoics were
realists, and their conception of hypostasis, in the sense of a materialistic existence,
227 Already W. Wieland, 1982, 262, had argued that way.
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became the core of their ousia. So philosophy has confirmed the common sense.
In the Christian era some leaders felt the need to maintain and to prove the reality
and existence of their God in the face of other gods. Philosophy was also deployed
as a weapon in this battle. By philosophical argumentations it became possible ‘to
prove’ that God is the supreme for-the-sake-of the world. In this way, an analytical
and heuristic tool became hypostasized, a thing or embodiment.
Textual tradition contributed its part in this process. So Theophrastus’Met. (written
in a realistic attitude) was transmitted as introduction to Aristotle’s Met.. Further-
more it was read up until almost the present day as a late text and as a criticism of a
disappointed student, with the teleology of its master as the main target. This made
it easier to find this teleology in the criticized texts too. New findings seem to ques-
tion the traditional assumptions. Theophrastus’ Metaphysics is neither a fragment
nor of late date. It was probably written in the same period asMet. Λ, which means
shortly after Aristotle left Athens after the death of Plato, possibly accompanied by
Theophrastus. Both texts reflect the contemporary status of problems treated in the
Old Academy: one, however, in a realistic the other in a speculative manner (see
below, 5.1.2).
One of these functional concepts is to hou heneka, with the abbrevation to telos.
The term to hou heneka is compound of a relative pronoun and a preposition. Rel-
ative phrases may open with it (without article of course) having the sense ‘for the
sake of’ or ‘because of’ or ‘thanks to’ or ‘due to.’228
228 Platon, Phaedo 67b, Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ
οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ
(10) πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἥ γε (c1) ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι
προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὃς ἡγεῖταί οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι
τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην.
‘Well then, my friend,’ said Socrates, ‘if that is true, I may well hope that when I have reached
the place wither I am bound I shall attain in full measure, there at last, that for which I have spent the
effort of a lifetime; therefore it is with good hope that I set out upon the journey now appointed for
me, as may any who deems that his mind is made ready and purified’ (R. Hackforth, 1952).
Platon, Theaetetus 184a, καί μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. φοβοῦμαι
οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα συνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ
μέγιστον, οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος ὥρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι τί ποτ’ ἐστίν, ἄσκεπτον γένηται (5) ὑπὸ
τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις αὐτοῖς πείσεται·
…and I thought there was a sort of depth in him that was altogether noble. I am afraid we might
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Such relative phrases are part of Greek colloquial language, they are the starting
points for understanding the functional term. To hou heneka equates to: “Think
of that which you think every time you use the phrase ‘Something is for the sake
of something else.’” Through the article it becomes a reference and a term. Terms
like for-the-sake-of are not content-related conceptions but only functional ones,
they help to articulate a question or to analyze a given problem. As a quotation to
hou heneka cannot have a fixed content like ‘world-order,’ ‘god’ or the like. But in
not understand his words and still less follow the thought they express. Above all, that for the sake
of which our discussion started – the nature of knowledge – might be thrust out of sight, if we attend
to these importunate topics that keep breaking in upon us (following Cornford, 1935).
Platon, Philebus 54c Sokrates: Οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστιν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ
ἀνάγκης γίγοιτ’ ἄν. Protarch: Τί μήν; S.: Τό γε μὴν οὗ ἕνεκά του γιγνόνμενον ἀεὶ 10 γίγνοιτ’ ἄν,
ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρα ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὦ ἄριστε, μοῖραν
θετέον. Pr.: Ἀναγκαιότατον.
S.: Then there must be some Being with a view to which pleasure comes to be, if it is true that
pleasure is Becoming. Pr.: Of course. S.: That for the sake of which every thing may come to be falls
under the heading of Good; while the means, my excellent friend, must find a place under another
heading.Pr.: Most decidedly (after R. Hackforth, 1945).
Platon, Symposium 220c, Τὸν οὔν Σωκράτη, Νήφειν μοι δοκεῖς, φάναι, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, οὐ γὰρ
ἄν ποτε οὕτω κομψῶς κύκλῳ περι(5)βαλλόμενος ἀφανίσαι ἐνεχείρες οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα πάντα
εἴρηκας.
Then Socrates said, ”‘You are sober, in my opinion, Alcibiades, for otherwise you would never
have so elegantly cast a screen about yourself and tried to conceal why you said all this (Benardete).
Platon, Protagoras 316b, Τί οὖν ἐστιν, ἔφη, οὗ ἕνεκα ἡκετε;
He said ”‘What is it wherefore you come?”’
Platon, Gorgias 467c, Sokrates: Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὃ
ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκαστοτε, ἣ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθ’ ὃ πράττουσιν;
Then is it your view that people wish merely that which they do each time, or that for the sake of
which they are doing what they do?
Platon, Politeia 410c, Ἇρ’ οὖν, ἦν δ’ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ καθιστάντες (c1) μουσικῇ καὶ
γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν οὐχ ἕνεκά τινος οἴονται καθιστᾶσιν, ἵνα τῇ μὲν τὸ σῶμα θεραπεύοιντο,
τῇ δὲ τὴν ψυχήν;
Then may we not say, Glaucon, said I, that those who established an education in music and
gymnastics did so for the sake of something namely to treat the body by one and the soul by the
other?
Aristotle, Protrepticus, B 12 (Jamblichus, Protrepticus 9), Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνομένων
οὐδὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, οὐδ’ ἔστι τι τέλος αὐτοῖς· τοῖς δ’ ἀπὸ τέχνης γιγνομένοις ἔνεστι καὶ
τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα (ἀεὶ γὰρ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων ἀποδώσει σοι λόγον δι’ ὃν ἔγραψε καὶ οὗ
ἕνεκα), καὶ τοῦτο [ὅτι] βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ 5 διὰ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον.
Now of the things that come into being by chance none comes into being for the sake of anything,
nor have they an end; but in the case of things that come into being by art there is an end and an object
of purpose (for he who possesses the art will tell you the reason why he wrote, and for what purpose
he did so), and this is better than that which comes into being for its sake.
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a given situation it may be well that if we know the teloswe know the answer. Even
so, the answer would be only a partial one because for a full answer we have still to
ask the further questions about the other causes too. Telos together with the other
conceptions in this group give structural guidelines for the research, they constitute
a set of questions which functions as a heuristic principle.
In order to see more clearly its function, we shall examine some of the texts where
Aristotle uses telos. In the Physics the concept plays a role when he develops the
concept of nature. If we come to understand the function of telos in this context we
shall be able to decide, whether Aristotle had developed a teleology in the sense of
the standard interpretation or not. In a short outline of the question of what nature
is, as developed in the Physics, we can locate the starting point of this question, then
we may consider the function of telos in this question. Beside some references in
Met. Λ (esp. chapters 7, 8 and 10) we find important remarks on telos in Physics B
2 and 8, in De Partibus Animalium and in the so-called scientific texts in general.
To understand what natural beings are, means to understand the ousia of these be-
ings. Certainly, there are few assertions in thePhysics that Aristotle wants to uphold,
but the following ones certainly belong to this group:
– The being (Sein) of the natural beings is physis, nature.
– Physis is the principle of natural beings.
– Natural beings cannot be without movement.
– Physis is the principle of movement and rest of natural beings.
– All agree that natural beings realize to be (ousia, Sein) in an exemplary way, be
they particular beings or parts of it or their elements.
What we have to ask in Physics, therefore, is: In what sense is physis the principle
of the movement of natural beings? In several overviews of opinions of former
thinkers Aristotle shows that they too understood physis as a principle and a cause
(see PhysicsA andMet. A). But those have grasped the cause only in the form of the
‘out-of-what-is-that-made?’ For them physis was primarily hyle (see summary in
Met. A3, 984a16–18). It is true that for movement an underlying being is necessary,
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something which persits through change. But nevertheless we have to ask whether
this is sufficient to take hyle as the definitive principle of natural beings and of
their movement. If we consider what hyle is, we must deny so. Hyle means ‘to be
appropriate for…,’ it has not any determinations; nothing can be said about it; it is
not a particular thing; it is pure possibility; it is, what it is only with respect to or
in relation to another being. That hyle cannot capture physis as cause and principle
of the movement of natural beings does not imply that that answer is totally wrong,
the answer is only incomplete; the other causes must, consequently, be considered
too. Is not physis cause or principle in the sense of the telos or the eidos? The cause
in the sense of ‘origin of movement’ had already been taken into account by the
Presocratics even if only vaguely (see summary in Met. A 4, 985a10–14).
At several places Aristotle speaks about the turn from physis as hyle to physis as
telos, e. g. Physics B 2 and B 7–8. In Met. Z 3 too, the question concerns the same
turn in the context of the question about ousia (Sein). Let us try to pick out the main
points. In Physics A Aristotle asks what are the principles of natural beings and
what is already known by others; in book B he asks how and in which ways physis
is a principle. Asking the second question he examines claims of common sense,
namely that the out-of-which is the nature of beings and then that nature is the form,
the eidos, of beings (B1–2). He then proposes his own distinctions, gained by the
analysis of colloquial language. The result is the four aitia. But there were other
opinions concerning the causes, namely that chance or accident could be a cause,
these too are treated (B 4–6). In B 7 he concludes that there are no more causes
than the four, for, yes, tyche and tautomaton are causes too, but only incidental
ones. What is meant by them is not a cause itself but must be considered as ‘as-if-
appropriateness.’ Both presuppose the concept of telos, they cannot found it. By
the endoxa themselves it is clear that hyle cannot be what natural beings properly
are and can’t be the principle of their movement. Nobody would accept the answer
to the question “What is that made of?” if he had been asking “What is that?” or
“What is that for?” If somebody would like to know the form of a bed he will not
be content with the answer “It is made of timber.” Already in situations like these
the eidos is more essential than hyle.
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And in our everyday life we take the actual being to be ‘more being’ (seiender), i. e.
to be in a truer sense than the possible thing. The completed bed realizes the sense
of bed better than the planks in the stock of the carpenter. The out-of-which of a
being is this being as potentiality; only when the eidetic determinations are realized
is the being really. That all this has to do with colloquial language is confirmed
by the considerations in Met. H and Θ. After all hyle being a mere possibility is a
principle, but, compared with the eidos, only in a weaker sense.
The analogy between the production by artisanal knowledge and the coming to be by
physis is another cause for taking eidos more fundamentally than hyle. The artisan
has to know the appropriate material and the form of the work. Insofar as handcraft
imitates and pursues nature, must physis be a principle not only as hyle but as eidos
too. In fact telos, eidos and the origin of movement are often the one and the same
being (Physics B 7), with the effect that the knowledge about eidos includes the
knowledge about the telos and the origin of movement. What comes to be, turns
from something into something else. That out of which it becomes is nature and
that into which it turns, its essential form, is nature too. Even the way from the
out-of-which into the result, the process proper of coming to be is physis, and that,
perhaps, in the most proper form (“The so-called nature as becoming is a way into
the nature”).229 What comes to be reaches its end in its nature.
What is it that we understand, when we say that we understand the telos of a being?
What does it mean to state that physis is a cause in the sense of for-the-sake-of? As
a coming-to-be physis intends to its being. Actuality is the essential modus of the
ousia of beings (des Seins des Seienden). What comes to be has a relative being
(Sein), it is provisional, directed, it points beyond itself. An everyday example may
illustrate this: children play, learn, grow up etc. Certainly all these activities have a
sense in themselves, through them children evolve, they reach adulthood. By them
children are, what they do is not at all inconsequential. Nevertheless, it would not
be sensible to say that all what they do is for its own sake, without any aim beyond
this particular activity. It is not completely irrelevant, whether the baby becomes
229 Physics B 1, 193b12–13, ἔτι δ’ ἡ φύσις ἡ λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὁδός ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν.
186
2.4. Teleology in Met. Λ
an adult or not. We say of a baby “This is a human being” but we take the sense of
human from the adult and developed being and we distinguish the meaning ‘baby’
from the meaning ‘human being’ because they do not share all determinations in
common. The baby is a potential human being because he is on the way to becoming
a human being.
We will not draw far-reaching ethical conclusions from this, otherwise we should
have to take into account more than the mere concept of man, but the example ought
to make clear only that there is a difference between the being in the course of its
realization and the being which has reached its eidos and which is this eidos in fact.
I think Aristotle would like to give a relative right to both modes of being (the baby
and the adult) but nevertheless to define the one as the for-the-sake-of the other.
Natural beings have their periods, over several periods things come to be.
After its origination becoming continues up to its culmination – in Greek this is
called its akme – with all its essential determinations. In this actual phase of being,
becoming comes to its end and this end is not a termination but a fulfilment. Then
it passes slowly away to its temporal end and dissolution.230 In this culmination the
being finds its achievement. The end of becoming (i. e. the akme) is the beginning
of being (Sein). Therefore Aristotle names this actuality its telos, the turning point
of becoming. And, we remember, actuality does not signify existence but ‘to have
the determinations belonging to its eidos.’ The result of becoming is again nature,
230 Physics, B 2, 194a27–33:
ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα. ἡ δὲ physis
τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα (ὧν γὰρ συνεχοῦς τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης ἔστι τι τέλος, 30 τοῦτο
‹τὸ› ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· διὸ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς γελοίως προήχθη εἰπεῖν ‚ἔχει
τελευτήν, ἧσπερ οὕνεκ’ ἐγένετο’· βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος,
ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον)·
Further, it belongs to the same study to know the end or what something is for, and
to know whatever is for that end. Now nature is an end and what something is for.
For whenever there is a definite end to a continuous change, that last thing is also
what it is for; whence the comical sally in the play ’He has reached the end for which
he was born’ – for the end should not be just any last thing, but the best (Transl. W.
Charlton, 1970).
187
2. The Traditional Reception of Met. Λ and its Difficulties
physis. In its completeness being can present itself. So, what was only possibility,
now is actuality. This actuality is the for-the-sake-of becoming, but all the rest is
for the for-the-sake-of.
Some say that they find in the first sentences of Timaeus’ lecture (Timaeus 29de)
the preparatory stage of teleology, combined with theology:
Let us, then, state for what reason becoming and this universe were framed by
him who framed them. He was good…
We shall return to this below, 5.1.1, in dealing with that dialogue.
The difference in Theophrastus’ conception of the goal compared with that of Aris-
totle is especially well visible in paragraphs 15, 24–27, 28–34 of his Metaphysics.
Afterwards, in the view of the reception this became the pupil’s angry reaction to
the exaggerated use of teleology by his master in explaining things. What were four
points in a list of questions and a hermeneutical principle in Aristotle’s thinking
became for Theophrastus (or for the Old Academy) a constructive principle of the
world, even if one with a non-realistic basis, of course.
Indeed, in the view of Theophrastus these questions are also closely tied to discourse
and opinion. Further, the beginning of his text and his evaluation of astronomy in
§ 27 show that he is well aware of the speculative aspect of the case. On the other
hand, the way he treats the question of how numbers may be related to perceptible
things or of how numbers can produce life and movement, reveal a realistic mood (§
3). Aristotle treats the same question in Met. Λ 10.30–10.41. Here again he stands
in strong contrast to Theophrastus.
When we consider how Theophrastus in § 6 deals with the question which forms the
speculative apex for Aristotle – that the origin is actuality and being (Sein; Met. Λ
6.8), further indivisible, not quantifiable, divine (Met. Λ 7.27, in the summary, using
Parmenidean terms) – we discern with ease the difference between the realistic and
the speculative view.
Theophrastus often speaks about telos. The main question, he says, is how far we
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can (or must) go into details in the search of the goal of something and in the deduc-
tion of causes and, whether or not it is possible to asssign a goal to all things. He
says it is decisive to find the criteria for the limit on how far we can assert something
about the telos (§ 24). Not onlyW. Theiler, 1929, but present scholars too take those
questions as a criticism of the use of the telos by Aristotle.231 In this line of recep-
tion, Aristotle’s telos is a constructive principle, something with an active power in
reality. This is quite incorrect in the case of Aristotle, and not fully adequate even
in the case of Theophrastus.
Aristotle himself does not claim that there is a deducible telos for everything, be-
cause he distinguishes between different forms of causes. If we wish to state the
causes of a being, we must consider all four types of causes. For some questions it
is correct to claim the hyle as cause, for others the moving etc. And finally Aristotle
often says that “we see that some beings are ever the sameway, but other beings only
mostly,” and it is evident “that some becoming things are for the sake of something,
but others not” (see e. g. Physics B 5). If Theophrastus had intended to criticize
Aristotle his criticism had missed its mark.
Let us illuminate once more, in a different manner, how physis can be a principle
in the sense of for-the-sake-of without being a constructive teleological principle.
There are many things in nature about which we can say “X is good for Y.” Be
X a feature or quality of an animal, Y an ability to act (e. g. “Legs are good for
walking.”). If activities result in a thing (“The carpenter made a table”), then Aris-
totle calls that kinesis, if in the realization or actualization of the animal itself an
energeia. If you say “X is good for Y” then this means “X is good for the actuality
of the eidos Y,” because the respective activity is part of the eidos of the respec-
tive being (note that here too ‘actuality’ does not equate simply to existence). The
change from possibility to actuality is constitutive for the concept of actuality (see
Physics Θ, conclusion). The actual being is that which has the eidos, the more it
has the determinations of its eidos the more it is and is real or actual. Step by step a
being grows into its completed form which is the last for-the-sake-of of becoming.
231 See the Handbuch, edited by Rapp und Corcilius, 2011, 406, where Theophrastus’ Metaphysics is
still a Fragment.
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This is not established by any conscious reasoning.
In De partibus Animalium (A 1, 639b21) Aristotle distinguishes different types of
necessity. One of them is the hypothetical necessity, which we encounter in nature:
“If there should be an eidos of a natural being, then there must be that-and-that
before.” The same can be said with identical sense in terms of the for-the-sake-of:
“The former possible being is for the sake of the actuality of the eidos of a natural
being.” The last for-the-sake-of is the actuality of a respective being, so that growing
up or developing becomes nature.
Now we touch on the use of telos in two other sectors of Aristotle’s philosophy.
First telos has an essential function in ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics begins with
considerations on telos. For the sake of the good we do anything. The goals and
purposes of our actions are diverse, we have, therefore, to ask how they relate to
each other, if they have some order and which is the highest or the proper purpose of
man. In order to give an answer Aristotle separates activities which have their goal
in themselves and activities which have their goal beyond themselves. Activities
of the first type take place for themselves. They are named energeiai – to go for a
walk, to think and to recognize are examples of energeiai. The second type has a
result beyond its own activity, these are named kineseis, of which craft activities are
examples.
A few deliberations on endoxa lead to the insight, that the proper good and the
highest telos of man is eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is not outside or beyond the ac-
tivity or state which makes a man eudaimon. It is the purpose which is the goal of
all other purposes, and it has nothing beyond itself. All other goals and purposes
have to comply with it. If we look more precisely at what eudaimonia consists in
(Nicomachean Ethics A 9), we see that it is energeia, actuality, in fact the proper
and best actuality of man. The ethical considerations, then, conclude with the same
result, namely that the telos is the realisation of nature.232
What about the use of telos in the concrete research of natural beings? It is neither
232 T. Schirren, 1998, addressed a book in this connection.
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possible nor necessary to summarize all the texts which deal with science, I shall
take as examplary Physics B 8, 199a20ff. Here Aristotle discusses some instances
from this domain, in some detail the example of the spider, which makes its web
as appropriately as the swallow builds its nest. Two remarks from the outset: these
examples are neither designed to prove some superior reason of any kind nor to
show nature as a mysterious agent of goals. They should make clear, however, that
to declare the telos often facilitates better understanding some features in nature.
We understand some things much better when we know their for-the-sake-of than
anything other given quality. The telos therefore is a heuristic principle and not,
importantly, a means to create the cosmos.
Let’s look at the text in more detail (Physics B 8, 199a26–30):
If, then, the swallow’s act in making its nest is both due to nature and for some-
thing, and the spider’s in making its web, and the plant’s in producing leaves for
its fruit, and roots not up but down for nourishment, plainly this sort of cause
is present in things which are and come to be due to nature. And, since nature
is twofold, nature as matter and nature as form, and the latter is an end, and
everything else is for the end, the cause is that for which must be the latter.233
The circle closes. The spider spins its web. The spider has a nature. Its nature is
the principle of movement of the natural being. This nature causes the spider to
make its web. That the spider makes its web is part of the realization of the spider’s
nature. It is part of the actuality of the spider to make its web. The perfect actuality
of man is the eudaimonia as is said in the Nicomachean Ethics. This actuality is
not like a possession, but obtains continuously, at every respective moment (je und
je). Man is and lives having perceptions and thoughts (Nicomachean Ethics A 9)
by ‘actualizing his being’ he realizes his nature.
So far we have looked at the Aristotelian teleology without reference to Met. Λ.
233 Transl. byW. Charlton, 1970. – Wenn denn die Spinne ihr Netz [...] von Natur aus und um einer
Sache willen <sc. um der Nahrung willen> macht, dann ist klar, dass ein Grund dieser Art <sc. das
Worum-Willen als Grund> im Werdenden und im Seienden ist. Und weil die Natur zwiefach ist, zum
einen als hyle, zum andern als Gestalt, diese aber das Telos ist, um des Telos willen aber das andere,
dann wäre dieses der Grund, das Worum-Willen. – W. Charlton tends to a view of teleology with a
basis in re, see p 121.
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Our observations should serve as a basis for interpreting respective places in the
commentary. We will close with some preparatory remarks on the function of telos
in Met. Λ. First, I recapitulate some points belonging to the standard view, which
say that Aristotle inMet. Λ, speaking about god, must speak too about the relations
between god and the world, and that he does so by means of his concept of telos.
It is said that god is the ultimate telos of all beings,234 that all beings are orientated
towards him and seeking for him. As natural processes in general drive on towards
their end (telos), so the world as a whole drives towards God because, as its Un-
moved Mover, He is the telos of the world. The primary function of the telos is to
make possible the teleological proof of the existence of God.
When we examine the text we see, that in Met. Λ 1–5 Aristotle speaks of aitia and
archai, in general. In Λ 5.11 he summarizes four kinds of causes: the eidos and the
steresis, the hyle and the moving cause. Telos is thematic only in an indirect way in
chapter 6, namely insofar as the goal is a characteristic of the concept of actuality,
which, again, emphatically does not mean existence, but the fact that a being reaches
its end by realizing its eidos. Only with Λ 7.1–7.4 is telos the theme, because
we have to understand how an unmoved moving must be conceived; without an
234 See Thomas Aquinas, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria, Nr. 2521:
Dicitur autem primum movens movere sicut appetibile, quia motus caeli est protper
ipsum, sicut propter finem, causatus ab aliquo proximo movente quod movet propter
primum movens immobile, ut assimilet se ei in causando, et explicet in actum id
quod est virtute in primo movente. Non enim est motus caeli propter generationem
et corruptionem inforiorum sicut propter finem, cum finis sit nobilior eo quod est ad
finem. Sic igitur primum movens movet sicut appetibile.
In the secunda via of the proofs of the existence of God Thomas Aquinas says that God is causa
efficiens, see Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Quaestio 2, Art. 3. – H. Seidl, 1995, 61, denotes him
as höchster transzendentaler Zweck. – E. Berti, 2000, 202–203, confirms the standard interpretation
slightly modifying it:
What is clear,…, is that the unmovedmover is an efficient cause, and not a final cause
in the sense of the standard interpretation, i. e. as final cause of the heaven.
And: …the unmoved mover itself, which is the final cause of itself and moves the
heaven having itself as aim, i. e. the same unmoved mover.
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unmovedmoving cause the actual movements would disappear in infinity. There are
already in our everyday experience, Aristotle says, examples of unmoved moving
causes, namely τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν, “that which is aimed at and that which
is thought of” (Met. Λ, 7, 1072a26). That which is aimed at and that which is
thought of, the beloved for instance, move our striving and our thinking evidently
without any movement of themselves. Such is the feature of the for-the-sake-of, it
can move other beings without itself being moved (1072b1); we strive for the sake
of the strived at, we think for the sake of the thought of (um des Gedachten willen).
So in Met. Λ the function of the telos consists in enabling us to understand that
and how the first moving is unmoved. The first moving moves “like a telos” and is
capable of moving something else, itself unmoved.
We cannot presuppose here the meaning of the designations ‘being’ (Sein), ‘aware-
ness,’ ‘actuality’ in Met. Λ 7 (ousia, noesis, energeia). We have to ask entirely
anew what is the meaning of the thesis that ousia, Sein, is the first moving and that
it moves unmoved itself, that it moves like the for-the-sake-of. In these considera-
tions we must not forget that ‘being’ is not isolated but correlated with ‘actuality’
and ‘awareness’ in a way which is still to be explained. I refer to the respective
places in the commentary, which suggest that teleology in the sense of the stan-
dard interpretation must be dispatched of, it remains, in fact, inappropriate to the
speculative drive in Aristotle’s thinking.
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2.5. Met. Λ as Noology
It is common practice to attribute Aristotle with a noology in Met. Λ insofar as
the ‘first’ there is often identified with the nous, the activity of which is the noesis
noeseos. The etymology of nous remains unclear.235 But the use of the word since
Homer is explored very well by K. von Fritz and by B. Snell.236 Its use shifts from
nous as an organ to the nous as a function as B. Snell said (1955, 33). It seems
that the sense of sight is central to it, the Greeks are in other ways too a highly
visual people. Nous will be translated hereafter mostly with ‘reason’ or ‘intellect,’
noesis first with its usual translation ‘thinking’ but later, in the context of Aristotle’s
speculation with ‘awareness’ (Bemerken) and ‘perception.’
For all those interested in this text, the noesis noeseos stands at the center of all
considerations. Indeed this is a strong common assessment, which I too share. In
almost an equal number, on the other hand, are those who concur in understanding
this term as denoting ‘God’s thinking’ although this is nowhere in fact stated in the
text. This claim is supported only if the explicit theme of chapter 9, the nous, is
implicitly identified with God. That identification would entail the problem that
the nous is moved by what it thinks, so it is on the wrong side of the systoichia (see
Λ 7.7). That should not be the case for God. Almost all interpreters seem to take
the noesis in the famous sentence (Met. Λ 9, 1074b34), once as intentio prima then
as intentio secunda. In this case, then, it seems to represent a reflective attitude. In
fact the term is employed three times. As far as I can tell, this fact has perturbed no
one up to now. The whole phrase reads as follows:
Therefore it <: the nous> thinks itself, if it is the strongest <being>, and <its>
thinking is the thinking of thinking.
235 See P. Chantraine, 1968, s. v.; some suggestions of etymologies by H. Frisk.
236 K. von Fritz, 1945, 223–242 and 421; id., 1946, 12–34; B. Snell, 1955 (3. Aufl.), 27–35 on nous, psy-
che, thymos (mind, soul, courage); cf. J. Lesher, 1973. There is a new book about the nous, edited
by Giovanna Sillitti , Fabio Stella, Francesco Fronterotta (edd.), Il nous di Aristotele, Academia Ver-
lag, Sankt Augustin 2016, but concerning the problem of the origin of the word there has been no
substantial progress. The contributions to the understanding of nous in Aristotle’s work remain very
much within the frame of the standard interpretation.
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or, in the translation of D.W. Ross:
Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most
excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.
The standard interpretation takes two occurences as identical (so one of them can
be omitted), and the ‘is’ as defining. So the the phrase means: “The ‘thinking
of the nous’ is to be understood as ‘thinking of its own thinking’ by definition.”
Neo-scholastic authors and authors close to them without hesitation give to sub-
vene in the term a personal God (see e. g. the translation by D.W. Ross). In that
way nous becomes a conscious subject explicitly. Many authors who do not men-
tion these presuppositions share them too. This conviction is widespread not only
in neo-scholastic literature237 but representatives of philological and historical re-
search hold to it too.238 All these schools or circles effectively prolong the medieval
line of thought.
The exceptional speculative (or theoretical) statements in Met. Λ 7 and 9 concern-
ing nous and noesis have some themes in common with De Anima (esp. Γ 4–6) and
with Plato’s Timaeus. Some cryptic, at any rate extremely terse statements have
given rise to different psychologies and noologies. But the noesis noeseos was al-
ways at the core. The two first named presuppositions make the broad consensus,
about the meaning and the status of noesis there is some discussion. Some consider
whether it refers to a merely formal or instrad to a content-related reflecting. Some
seem to fiercely disagree with one another (as e. g. H. J. Krämer und K. Oehler,)
but nevertheless share the common opinion that Aristotle is speaking about reflec-
tion. Following on Thomas Aquinas, it is proposed that God creates the world in
His thinking of thinking.239 the world comes into being through God’s only think-
ing of thinking, whether it be in detail or in principle. Some others maintain that
by his formula Aristotle is expressing that it is a ‘pure act’ or an ‘ultimate activ-
237 See e. g. F. Brentano, J. Owens, G. Reale, H. Seidl and others.
238 Like e. g. W.D. Ross, H. Flashar, K. Oehler, H. J. Krämer, or some participants of the XIVth Sym-
posium Aristotelicum, 2000, and contributors to the New Essays, 2016.
239 In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria, Cathala, p. 736, nr. 2614 [...] patet quod cognoscendo
se omnia cognoscit; cf. Summa theologiae, Pars prima, Quaestio 2, Articulus 3; id., Pars prima,
Quaestio 14.
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ity.’ In different papers K. Oehler defended the formal interpretation of the noesis
noeseos.240 But despite his formal view of noesis noeseos he says that Aristotle
thinks that noesis noeseos is in fact God’s thinking and “the being of the highest
Mover.”241 From the title and the quotation (1973, 49) K. Oehler argues that the
noesis noeseos is to be equated with the “transcendental unity of apperception,”242
which is for I. Kant “the highest point” of the transcendental philosophy (Kritik der
reinen Vernunft B, 132ff.). As K. Oehler maintains, both Aristotle and Kant, in fact,
ask how an “identity of consciousness in the representations of the consciousness
itself”243 may be possible, taking into account, of course, the differences of time and
culture. God cannot arrive at his own essence going through finite things as human
beings do, he cannot have any subject other than himself (K. Oehler, 1973, 50). The
Greeks had a concept of self-awareness (57), it is, therefore, false to contend, that
such a concept originated first with Descartes (58). With the noesis noeseos the
antique philosophy reaches its summit, because it denotes the transcendental reflec-
tion, which is objective (gegenständlich) but without having any concrete content.
The self is that which is thought of in this reflection, it is the subject (Gegenstand)
and the starting point. “The thinking becomes what is thought of and object”244
K. Oehler says. That has been derisively called All-Unwissenheit (an omniscience
without any knowledge).
InVorgestalten der Reflexion, 1966, H.-G. Gadamer explained the thinking of think-
ing as absolute Reflexion as did before him G.W. F. Hegel, referring to Plato’s
Charmides. The thinking of thinking stands beyond self-consciousness. In a previ-
ous article he designated the noesis noeseos as “the true speculative identity of sub-
ject and object”245 and as “the highest point of its <: Aristotle’s> metaphysics”246
(H.-G. Gadamer, 1961). The “citation from Aristotle’s theology without any com-
240 As it seems, already in his dissertation, 1953, then 1962; see further K. Oehler, 1973, 45–59, and the
article Der unbewegte Beweger des Aristoteles in the collection 1984.
241 das Sein des höchsten Bewegers (1973, 55).
242 transzendentale Einheit der Apperception
243 Identität des Bewusstseins in den Vorstellungen des Bewusstsein selbst.
244 Das Denken wird Gedachtes, wird Gegenstand.
245 wahrhaft spekulative Identität des Subjekts und Objektes.
246 die höchste Spitze seiner <: Aristotle’s> Metaphysik.
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ment”247 at the end of Hegels Encyclopädie is sometimes used to support this inter-
pretation.248 German idealism, as it seems, felt itself endorsed by this text no less
than the thinking of the Middle Ages.
K. Gloy too called the noesis noeseos, identified with God, “the highest point” of
Aristotle’s theoretical philosophy.249 She attempted to outline a theory of nous hav-
ing two elements in its self-knowledge: as self-knowledge of perishable substances
it is externally referring, as self-knowledge of eternal substances it is self-referring
(537). Both factors together give the substantiality in general. Referring to nothing
other than to the divine self-knowledge itself makes possible human knowledge of
things and of knowledge of itself (541). Aristotle’s noesis noeseos is neither filled
with contents nor is it the mere process of self-explication, even if it goes to deter-
mine itself absolutely. This noesis noeseos is a final point but it is not achieved by
mere formal considerations in order to avoid a regression. It is, instead, a kind of
a theory of origin as it was conceived later in the history of philosophy by Fichte
or more generally in German Idealism (542). K. Gloy argues against the use of this
theory of origin (her own interpretation of noesis noeseos) as a proof for existence:
“To postulate only to be for itself as a representation of substantiality is not enough
to prove the existence of a being for itself.”250 She thinks, nevertheless, that it is a
merit of Aristotle’s considerations that he aligns ontology and epistemology in the
noesis noeseos.
H. J. Krämer opted for a content-related interpretation as hadK.Oehler before him.251
He says that God thinks, “insofar he is thinking his contents, himself and thinking
itself, and, therefore he is the thinking of thinking,”252 (169) and adds that Aristotle
247 kommentarlose Zitat aus der Theologie des Aristoteles.
248 H.-G. Gadamer, 1966, 143; S. Herzberg, 2013, does not mention Hegel in his monograph on that
text. See below on Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 400.
249 K. Gloy, 1983.
250 Das blosse Postulat eines Für-sich-Seins als Repräsentation von Substanzialität reicht nicht aus zum
Existenznachweis eines solchen Für-sich-seins.
251 H. J. Krämer, 1964, 127ff., the loci cited by H. J. Krämer, 1967, 315: Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics,
H 12, 1245b16; H 14, 1154b25; K 8, 1178b21; Politica, H 3, 1325b21; Metaphysics A 2, 983a6;
Magna Moralia B 15, 1212b37.
252 sofern er seine Inhalte denkt, zugleich sich, das Denken selbst, und ist infolgedessen Denken des
Denkens
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does not know a “pure thinking apart from any concreteness.”253 H. Flashar too
points out that the thinking of thinking must be gegenständlich, because the ancient
concept of consciousness is object-oriented.254 He says that in chapter 8 Aristotle
contends a plurality of divine unmoved substances (318), which form the content
of God’s thinking: “The god is thinking primarily the series of essences inherent
in him.”255 God too cannot think otherwise than in an object-oriented manner and
finally the thinking of Aristotle’s God is based “on the objective structure of the
first sphere of being”256 and takes place by means of objects (331). The theology
of Met. Λ, it may be added, is not exactly original either. It was preformed long
before in the Academy, especially by Xenocrates.257
T. De Koninck’s observations are of special interest.258 First he gives a very infor-
mative overview of the reception of Met. Λ from antiquity up to the present.259 In
particular, he wants to show that noesis noeseos is, indeed, reflection but that, nev-
ertheless, does not involve a sheer narcissism. Asking whether God as First Mover
is causa finalis or causa efficiens, he thinks that God is at once both, but causa
efficiens either way and this by means of noesis noeseos. His activity in highest
perfection and as pure act of being is the origin of all the world and all things. F.
Inciarte argues roughly the same way.260 H. Seidl agrees arguing that:261 “Because
the divine intellect is the first cause of all beings as a pure act of being, […] he
becomes aware of himself, how he is the first cause of being for all things,”262 and:
“In Met. Λ 7 and 9 noesis means the intuitive actuality of recognizing, which is,
in the case of the divine intellect, i. e. the first principle of being, at the same time
253 Cf. H. J. Krämer, 1967, 317, reines, von der Gegenständlichkeit isoliertes Denken.
254 H. Flashar, 1983, 379.
255 Der Gott denkt offenbar primär die Reihe der in ihm einwohnenden Wesenheiten (319).
256 auf der objektiven Struktur der ersten Seinssphäre.
257 Cf. H. J. Krämer, 1967, 332; see H. J. Krämer, 1969, too.
258 T. De Koninck, 1991.
259 E. J. García de la Garza, 2011, also presents a new and extensive documentation of the reception of
Met. Λ, especially in antiquity, in the 19th and the 20th century. His presentation is structured by
aspects of reception.
260 F. Inciarte, 1994, 1–20.
261 H. Seidl, 1987, 157–177.
262 Da die göttliche Vernunft als reiner Seinsakt erste Ursache für alles Seiende ist, […] erkennt sie von
sich selbst, wie sie erste Seinsursache von allem ist (158)
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pure actuality of being.”263 In this way H. Seidl thinks to avoid the contentless re-
flection, given that God creates the world. In his commentary on Met. he writes:
“So the term noesis noeseos means that the divine intellectual being is activity of
recognition and object of recognition at once, being perfect actuality.”264
It is worth noting that the proposals for understanding noesis noeseos offered by
the interpreters never transcend the line of aporias formulated by Aristotle himself
in Met. Λ 9: What does the nous think? Does it think something or nothing? Does
it always think only itself or other things? If other things, then always the same
things or different things in succession? Does it think of accidental things or of
beautiful things? Isn’t it better not to think of some things at all? All ‘solutions’
remain within the frame established by these aporias. Met. Λ has been landed
in a dense and almost inextricable net of interpretations, which were not seldom
expressed through a questionable vocabulary and with an incorrect translation of to
proton kinoun. The task now is to trace and understand the thematic references in
Met. Λ to other Aristotelian and Platonic texts and to do so without the dogmatic
determinations resulting from the history of reception.
I would like to demonstrate some of the problems that result from the theological
interpretation. Some sentences inMet. Λ 7, which are to be found liberally cited in
that sort of interpretation and seem to support it, will serve the purpose. This section
will serve only a critical function, the positive aspect will appear in the commentary.
1072b3 κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον, “it moves like the beloved.” – In the standard in-
terpretation the ‘beloved’ is God. The sentence then means that God is the ‘First
Mover’ in the sense of a beloved being. – Against this we can say that the sen-
tence should be understood the same way as its parallel in 1072a26, where Aristotle
speaks about the for-the-sake-of. That which is thought of, which is strived for,
which is beloved are examples from our everyday life, which facilitate understand-
263 InMet. Λ 7 und 9 hat die noesis die Bedeutung intuitiver Erkenntnisaktualität, die in der göttlichen
Vernunft, dem ersten Seinsprinzip, zugleich reine Seinsaktualität ist (164).
264 Vol. II, 579: Der Ausdruck noesis noeseos besagt also, dass das göttliche Vernunftwesen als reine,
vollendete Wirklichkeit zugleich Erkenntnistätigkeit und höchstes Erkenntnisobjekt ist.
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ing of the claim that there are unmoved moving beings. In no way they are meant
to be taken as the real determination of the unmoved moving being (Sein), which
Aristotle is searching for. To take ‘beloved’ as an attribute of God in this sentence
is simply arbitrary.
1072b7 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστί τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν – ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς, “Because there is a moving <being>, itself unmoved, in ac-
tuality, this can never behave differently.” – The standard interpretation says that
Aristotle means God in this sentence. – To that we may reply, that Aristotle here is
shifting from the theoretic to the cosmological view, as the immediate continuation
shows: φορὰ γάρ [...], “for the movement [...]” Aristotle remains in the cosmologi-
cal range until sentence 10.15 (1072b14). From 10.16 on again the speculative view
is predominant.
The part ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς, “of such an origin [...],” in phrase 10.15 points
to the same as ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν in sentence 11 (“because
there is an unmoved moving [...]”). This is said in a cosmological context. It never
refers to God.
1072b15 διαγωγὴ δ’ ἔστιν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ
ἐκεῖνο, “The way of life which is best <is possible> for us only for a short time.
For that <being> is this way for ever.” The standard interpretation maintains that
Aristotle here is drawing a conclusion by analogy from our short-lived happiness
through an insight into God’s enduring happiness. – And to this we may respond
that Aristotle cites an endoxon as below, b24. Whoever assumes that there are gods
quite naturally assumes too that they are happy. Homer already named them ῥεῖα
ζώοντες (“easy living”), and even Epicurus would not modify that. No Greek needs
a proof that gods are happier than we, a proof like this would be superfluous and
ridiculous as it would be ridiculous to prove “that there is a nature” (Physics B 1,
193a3). The comparison works the other way round: the ‘way of life’ should mo-
tivate us to turn our view from Seiendes to Sein, the evident happiness of the gods
given by the endoxa should offer a clue as to the goodness of noesis1.
1072b19f. αὑτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς, “The nous thinks itself.” – According to the stan-
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dard interpretation the nous is to be identified with God, the sentence speaks of a
specific divine activity, of the thinking of itself. – To this we would reply, that the
nous cannot be God, because the nous is moved by that on which it thinks about.
God as nous is, on principle, on the false side of the systoichia (1072a30–31). If one
would wish to avoid this logical consequence, one has to invent a special arrange-
ment for God. This applies all the more if the immediately following sentence (b23)
should have a connection to it. Here Aristotle refers either to the human nous or to
the nous in general. Aristotle is asking what the nous can have as divine feature:
this question would be senseless referring to the divine nous.
1072b23–26 τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ
ἄριστον. εἰ οὗν οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτε ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ, θαυμαστὸν, εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον,
ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. “It seems that the nous has just this divine fea-
ture, i. e. the theory is the most pleasant and the best; if god behaves that way always
as we sometimes do, that is wonderful, if even more so, it is the more wonderful.
– But it behaves in the following way: […]” Here, for once, the standard interpre-
tation felicitously finds employed the word for god, theos, in the text. It assumes,
therefore, that Aristotle concludes from our way of life to the divine way of life.
This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the last sentence, which it takes as a
summary of the previous text. – To this supposition we may respond that god may
be mentioned but he is not the subject. The subject is the question which are the
divine features of the nous. The divine characteristic of the human nous is that it
is actual (wirklich), ‘having’ in it what it has thought of and the ousia. If this is
the case, we have an example of theoria. The last sentence “But it behaves in the
following way” does not have god as its subject but it is impersonal and refers to the
following text. Ὧδε points ahead (“in the followingway…”); the wordwhich points
backward is οὕτως (“as just said”). The sentence is not the closing of a considera-
tion but the opening of a new one. W.D. Ross, II, 381, saw this and tried to elude
the problem (other commentators have not felt equally troubled by it): “for ὧδε ret-
rospective cf. a 26.” But this ὧδε too refers to the following κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα
as an explanation.
1072b30 τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεὸς, “Just that is god.” – The standard interpretation sees
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here the concluding and confirming seal in favour of the theological interpretation
of the whole text. All the previous considerations have this last sentence as their
goal. – Thomas Aquinas strengthened this interpretation by repeating this sentence
as a refrain after each proof of the quinque viae.265 He, however, spoke even more
carefully than his followers saying et hoc dicimus deum, which in effect is just what
Aristotle had in mind to say: that corresponds to our opinions about gods. Here as
Met. A 2, 983a8–10, Aristotle refers to prevailing opinions. Even T. De Koninck
seems to understand it that way when he translates the phrase (1992, 119): Du reste,
c’est bien ainsi que l’entendent les humains … Aristotle makes it explicit that we
have to do with an endoxon b28, φάμεν δή, “we say that…”.
This view of the result to be achieved later on should give the background for that
which now could seem arbitrary. In the commentary we will find the reasons for
this. We normally think of noesis as a thinking of a subject, of a consciousness, of
a person. But we have now to think of a noesis without a personal subject endowed
with consciousness. How are we to speak about noesiswithout asking “Whose noe-
sis is this?” We look at the world and see many things. Why is it that we are able
to see something? – We see something because we have already seen what there is
to be seen, not in detail but in principle. A particular being, which we have seen,
activates a network of associations or an order which has been seen before. By this
‘before’ is meant the basic distinctions, the basic concepts and values of prevail-
ing opinions which go to forming a world (Grundmeinungen einer Meinungswelt).
What is seen before as the world, in this sense: this is the noesis1. This noesismakes
possible another noesis, which consists in our particular understanding, seeing, rec-
ognizing. We see in actuality what has in fact already been seen as a structure, this
is the meaning of noesis noeseos. Finally we are brought to consider that it is not
noesis that is the final point in Met. Λ, but the sense of to be as {ousia← noesis
→energeia / Doxa}.
265 Summa Theologica, Prima Pars, Quaestio 2, Art. 3.
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3.1. General Motives to Replace the Old ones
The energy with which the standard interpretation is defended again and again, even
if occasionally with some slight qualifications, is really surprising.1 To be sure, this
can in part be explained by the fact that the text is used in the service of living reli-
gious interests. Again and again we find some large and potent groups of scholars
organizing and defining the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages in order to establish
some religious doctrine. In this way a certain interpretation of Aristotle’s philoso-
phy strongly retains its Sitz im Leben. In fact there are other scholars beyond the
Scholastic and Christian who defend the standard interpretation. And why do they
one may well ask. What does it matter that Aristotle has developed a metaphysics
with a closely related theology, in whatever form that it may have taken? It would be
less astonishing if the reconstructed theology had any relevance to anyone beyond
those mentioned. This is simply not the case. The old gods were already toppled
by 384 C. E. in the battle over the altar of Victoria, fought between Ambrosius and
Symmachus. Efforts in the 20th century to revive the old gods in a modern manner
have failed too. Leaving aside the negative stance adopted against K. Kerényi many
scholars were only bemused byW. F. Otto’sDie Götter Griechenlands (1929), who
tried quite rightly to take seriously theWirklichkeit der Götter.2 The history of reli-
gion is permitted a rather unconcerned positivism as exemplified by M. P. Nilsson
in his work.
1 At the beginning of this chapter I rely on ideas and formulations already published in my: “Aristote-
les, Met. Λ – eine Theologie?” in: Methexis 9, 1996, 74–76, and on the opening of an article in:
Information Philosophie, 2001. Many thanks to the publishers for permission to do so.
2 Some texts edited posthumously 1963 by E. Grassi.
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Beside the neo-scholastic wing, for which our text is of some existential importance
I do not know of any fervent defender of Aristotle’s theology who would put into
practice the results of his research. To what end these efforts to prove that Aristotle
developed a theology? May it be that this is an inadvertent diversion from something
else in the text, something which may bear upon and challenge us, as readers? It
seems that no new version of any ‘Aristotelian theology’ bothers anyone, save other
scholars with their own reconstructions of that subject.
Some may appeal to the legitimacy of historical studies. We have, beyond doubt,
to continue to endeavor to study the history of humankind, the history of ideas is of
highest importance. Wewould do best, however, to refrain from positivist historical
claims and simplistic historicism, in the case of Aristotle no less. No one can rightly
appeal to the legitimacy of historical studies without reflecting on how his question-
ing is itself conditioned by history. Why does our own historical situation lead us
to studyMet. Λ? Why should we study an irrelevant and otiose theology, which on
the one side rests on evidently false scientific presuppositions and on the other on
contradictory metaphysical concepts3 and that, thirdly, is without any impact on our
lives?If we cannot or do not wish to justify the relevance of historical questioning
against the background of our time, then we should at least have some idea about
why, in precisely the 5th and the 4th century BC just this ‘theology’ emerged. These
questions must be worth asking afresh today, questions that concern us, that we can
repeat, with answers that may potentially change the asker.
Against my attempt to replace the standard interpretation, with its rich tradition,
with another shifting the main premises, there may arise certain objections. Any
standard interpretation has its own right in its time as it is grown up by itsWirkungs-
geschichte, the long history of its reception, which will reflect more or less perfectly
the spirit of its age. Many wise and learned scholars are involved and anyone who
thinks that only he has knowledge – qui solus sapit – would only be discredit him-
self by the very assumption. What improves with a quite different understanding of
3 An American Professor of a University of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints tried to
resolve this contradiction in his Aristotle’s Two Systems, 1987, with a final chapter entitled “What
Aristotle should have said.”
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this ancient text, what reasons could justify any a radical change?
Some reasons and motives appear right from the outset, with the construction of
the standard interpretation itself. In Part II we studied these showing the difficul-
ties intrinsic to some of the main themes in the reception. The content of Met. Λ
is often reported in language pathetic and elevated, but that conceals only insuffi-
ciently the very weak and even tendentious connection with the text itself. There
are, moreover, many differing voices, within the set constituting the standard inter-
pretation, even granted that they share certain common fundamental convictions.
Despite the dawn of new research in the 19th century the current understanding of
Aristotle remains an understanding determined by presuppositions arising during
the Middle Ages, its pillars being substance and realism. In its time this was a good
appropriate understanding. It helped people to lead a good life, but it became rigid
and stereotypical, without connection to our contemporary world and its exigencies,
even leaving aside the fact that the historical correctness of that earlier understand-
ing is open to doubtful reservations. If, interpreting Aristotle, we sustain premises
deriving from the Middle Ages, then we maintain an obvious anachronism.
We may well ask why there obtains a permanent dispute over a metaphysics of sub-
stance the uselessness to our context of which is demonstrable? M. Heidegger alone
took the effort to articulate and clarify his own hermeneutical situation in relation to
Aristotle in his “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles.”4 There is no
comparable effort in the historical or philosophical research on Aristotle. Scholars
simply assume the validity of their unreflective and immediate understanding and
the critique derived from that. Unsuccessfully did P. Natorp argue on the basis of
the composition of the Met. Λ that there is no theology to be discerned there. It
seems that his thesis finds an opportunity for revival today. R. Bodéüs, has pointed
to some dubious bassic issues in the standard interpretation (1992, 72), and H. Lang
too resists that interpretation. B. Botter, 2005, reaffirms this doubtfulness about
the theological standard interpretation in her investigations of the use of the words
theos and theios. S. Fazzo, 2014, has recently contributed further arguments against
4 M. Heidegger, ed. by H.-U. Lessing, in: Dilthey-Jahrbuch 6, 1989, 235–274.
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the theological interpretation, although she adheres to the notion of ‘Primo Motore’
and only substitutes a metaphysics of substance for the theology as so many others
have done.
One earlier, notable scholar on the scholastic branch of research, seems to be in
agreement with my proposal. E. Gilson wrote in his introduction to J. Owens’ Doc-
trine of Being (1951, 7–8):
To practically all the men of the middle ages, he <sc. Aristotle> was The
Philosopher, but because they themselves were Christians and theologians,
they held a general view of the world very different from his own[…] One of
the present tasks of history is to give back to Aristotle what is Aristotle’s[…]
These two phrases exactly express the essentially required turn. This remained,
however, only a programme. Scarcely anyone can be said to have carried out this
task, J. Owens himself included. As E. Gilson has said the issue is about under-
standing a different world, the world in which Met. Λ was composed, appreciating
the questions to which this text was seeking to provide answers, but in such a way
that these questions and their respective answers have something to offer us. With
the character of the guest of Elea Plato shows in the Sophist that this question calls
the questioner into question. The guest had the objective of refuting the sophist (the
fundamental arguments and convictions of that class of persons) and in doing so he
realized that the question of what non-being is becomes unavoidable. He must give
up his examination and turns to the question of what being is. This very question
proves that he himself does not know what to be means.
In standard histories of philosophy there is broad agreement concerning the central
claims mentioned above. Monographs, companions, articles and collections con-
firm them again and again. The very comprehensive bibliography on Aristotle’s
Metaphysics of R. Radice and R. Davies gives an overview of the extensive but
surprisingly homogenous literature on the themes treated in Part II, 2.5 The highly
anticipated volume with eleven papers by “a distinguished group of scholars,” par-
ticipants of the XIVth Symposium Aristotelicum in 1996 and published in 2000,
5 R. Radice, R. Davies, 1997.
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represents, unfortunately, was a reactionary step backwards.
Today, research on Aristotle’s Met. can be divided mainly into two branches. The
older is the scholastic branch, with such prominent exponents as e. g. E. Gilson,
J. Owens, G. Reale, H. Seidl, and the so called Louvain school. Then, there is a
philologically and historically inclined branch; leading figures were of which are
W. Jaeger, I. Düring, W.K. C. Guthrie, H. J. Krämer, H. Flashar and Ch. Rapp.
Scholars like M. Frede and J. Barnes are masterful philological as well as historical
researchers. Besides these there are dozens and even hundreds more of important
scholars.6
If there are still philosophers interested in Aristotle’s thought, that is another ques-
tion. Apparently, there are not many: E. Berti, (1992), for one, presented some ma-
terial. Some other philosophers one may mention would be M. Heidegger, H.-G.
Gadamer, P. F. Strawson, H. Putnam, and J. L. Austin. Not all, to be sure, but most
of philosophers citing Aristotle do for one or another reason relay on the standard
interpretation prepared by philological or historical research. It was M. Heidegger
alone, who distanced himself from that construral, even as he tried to establish a
new approach to Aristotle’s philosophy. People find arguments or forms of proof
for their own ideological persuasions in Aristotle’s texts. A look at the Index auc-
torum in the bibliography of R. Radice and R. Davies reveals that amongst those
most cited, scholars teaching at Christian universities or affiliated institutions pre-
dominate.
Supposedly disinterested philologists and historians, for whom all of this – and not
only the astronomical presuppositions – is evidently not to be taken as philosophical
truth but of only ‘historical interest,’ deal with the advantages and disadvantages of
this research. What remains is the historical interest, but, the content of the findings
of that research is not even worth refuting. Avowedly neutral observers too assented
to the defining of the text by theology or its ‘cementing in place’ (Einbetonierung)
in a new and foreign world. We urgently require an understanding of Met. Λ disen-
cumbered from theological presuppositions, because it is absolutely useless to study
6 See the index in Radice-Davies.
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the text with the aim of finding any information about God. Findings about God are
results of the presuppositions established by the reception (Wirkungsgeschichte) not
results of the reading the text. If we abandon these medieval premises, we can ask
completely anew what the text actually wanted to say. If there is still any struggle
over some alleged Aristotelian positions, that is only really about the historically
more accurate, the more sophisticated, or acute contemporary view. Contention is
no longer over the Aristotelian content but instead the relative positions of vying
scholars.
It would seem then, that there are reasons to re-examine the whole affair. Whether
it would be worth trying so and taking seriously the philosophical contents we will
only know by doing. This experiment compels its own questions. I wish to inquire
about some of the presuppositions and conclusions of the current understanding,
which has been determined mainly by the Middle Ages. I do ask whether they
pertain for our understanding of Aristotle’s thought, but I do not deny that some
questions, which were asked in other times and worlds can have an important im-
pact on us. When we take into account the differences of worlds, we have to ask
how it is possible that the ideas of one world can retain meaningfulness for another.
The world of the Ancient past is not so entirely passed away, as little as the world
of the Middle Ages. There may be questions posed during the Middle Ages and the
Ancient world, which survive temporal change. It may be that they become more
abstract the more time elapses. The test will tell. Instead of merely repeating the
theological readings of the text – in its time good and useful – we ought to try in-
terpreting it cognizant of our own particular hermeneutic position and consider the
possibility that Aristotle here is asking a question quite different other than what
had been imagined. If it proves true, that in Aristotle’s thought, substance and ev-
erything related to these, do not play any role, then Aristotle’s philosophy could
serve as an example for us today of something in which we are of need: a thinking
without substance and subject.
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Of course, it is impossible to turn back time or undo the effects of theWirkungsge-
schichte, but if we can make explicit the premises of the current standard interpre-
tation, then we may suspend their effectiveness during our study. We are entitled to
do so all the more sinceMet. Λ itself offers some clues to its reading. “We have to
study being (Sein) …” In this opening phrase Aristotle announces his main theme:
What is ousia, being, Sein? Obviously, the standard interpretation makes another
reading. It takes the phrase as an answer, not a question and supplies as solution
its preferred subject, the highest substance: God. I, by contrary to this, try to show
that this reading is misguided (see Part III, 4. First Key Proposition). The sentence
condenses the thoughts of a long tradition to a single theme, ousia; and this is not
an answer but the name for that which is asked after (Problemtitel). Its function is
similar to that of a phrase in the middle of the Sophist, 242bc, where the guest from
Elea says, that we have to start from the scratch, with apparently the simplest and
clearest thing, because just this has become unclear: the question what to bemeans.
We cannot meaningfully answer any other question before this one is answered.
This opening phrase of Met. Λ is far from being the claim “That is so and so,”
quite otherwise it is the summary of a long-term discourse, in which have partici-
pated Presocratics, Sophists, Plato, the Old Academy. The phrase also denotes the
method to be followed in that inquiry: theoria. Sometimes theoria means the same
as methodos but in Met. Λ it refers to a special method. The word appears only
three times in this text, here at the beginning, Λ 1, 1069a18; then at the speculative
high point, Λ 7.19, 1072b24; and again at Λ 8.6, 1073b6. Two references are
highly exposed, that at the beginning and the occurrence at Λ 7.19, where, as later
in the Nicomachean Ethics K 8, 1178b29–32, it is the name for the highest possible
realization of us human beings. The second phrase names the respect in which the
theme will be treated. The ousiai, the beings, shall be investigated with respect to
ousia, Sein, which is their principle and origin. That corresponds exactly with the
aim formulated by Theophrastus, in Met. § 1. Further Theophrastus points out
that the theme ousia has become urgent in the context of the question about becom-
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ing; and finally he names the same key factor in the present issue as Aristotle does,
namely, metabole, change.7
Aristotle says that we have to examine the reasons of becoming (Met. Λ 2.2). It
has resulted from the previous investigations that being came to be seen as the first
cause of becoming. Thus the next question to be asked is: How can being (Sein)
be the first cause of movement? In Met. Λ Aristotle gives an answer in three steps.
Being (Sein) is primary in becoming and it is the cause of becoming
1. as actuality (energeia, Met. Λ 6.8), then
2. as a moving cause like a goal which is not moved itself (Met. Λ 7), and finally
3. as noesis, awareness, (Met. Λ 7 und 9).
These answers must not be understood as if they had to be added together. What I
called ‘three steps’ is, in fact, to be understood as a climaxwhichmakes it possible to
understand by speculation what ousia is. Energeia, proton kinoun akineton, noesis,
“actuality, first unmoved moving, awareness” are three manners of speaking of the
same, namely ousia (being, Sein), under three different aspects.
3.3. Dating of Met. Λ
What was the ongoing discourse (Gesprächslage) in which the first sentence ofMet.
Λ was uttered? What were its themes and who its participants? In which part of this
general discourse is Met. Λ located? What are its content-related conditions and
its intellectual surroundings? Here I wish to lay out reasons for a dating of Met. Λ
shortly after Aristotle left Athens, after the death of Plato in 347 BCE. Next after
this we shall seek to identify the partners in that discourse. His immediate partners
are, of course, the members of the Academy. We have, therefore, to check which
texts in this environment are most suitable for revealing the background of Met. Λ.
We must trace the contents, the theses and accompanying opinions relevant in this
discourse, following Aristotle’s topical rule προτάσεις λαβεῖν, “to state theses and
7 Theophrastus, Met. 4a5 corresponding to Met. Λ 1.9.
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opinions in my own terminology.” Such theses begin to speak to us modern readers
when they are looked at against the horizon of questions that gave rise to them.
Knowing them, we have access to the fundamental opinions of that community of
discourse (Gesprächsgemeinschaft). We attempt to give this background in Part
III, 5.1 “The textual basis of the Academic Background” where I prepare for the
commentary of the first key proposition, KP 1.
We will see that fundamental concepts and opinions of this background are guided
by the thinking of the Presocratics, Sophists, Plato and the Old Academy; we shall
be interested in their bearing on the distinctions made in Met. Λ 1.1. In particular,
we have to set out the relevance of these opinions for the fact that Aristotle thinks,
first, that the correct approach to the question of being (Frage nach dem Sein) is
that of theoria; second, that he distinguishes ousia in singular from ousiai in plural
and finally the ousiai from their archai kai ta aitia. The result will be that Met. Λ
with its connections to Theophrastus and the Old Academy fits better the intellec-
tual situation at the earlier date than that at the end of Aristotle’s life (he died 322
BCE).
We begin with some considerations concerning the dating of Met. Λ. The history
of reception of Met. Λ clearly shows how important the dating of a text is. The
meaning of the work will differ toto caelo depending on whether it is considered an
early text or one of Aristotle’s last. Along with the date the respective discursive
context (Gesprächslage) changes. At the end of his life the discourse is in large part
determined by himself, if early it is determined by Plato and the Old Academy (and
their forerunners). It has not been very long that we have been asking after the dates
of Aristotle’s texts. Until the 19th century his thoughts were considered a timeless
system, as many still seem to regard it today. It was W. Jaeger, who achieved a
breakthrough in this issue with his works of 1912 and 1923.8 He made clear that
8 For a summary of the question see I. Düring, 1966, 189–199, as well as M. Frede, 2000, 47–49.
Further informations by A. Mansion, 1927, 307–341 und 423–466, esp. 327–341. G. Reale, 1993, 6.
ed., 280ff., tried to refute the arguments of W. Jaeger for the early date, without success; H. Wagner,
1959, 129–153; D. T. Devereux, 1988, 166–188; G.W. Most, 1988, 224–233. Even E. Berti, 2016,
72, says that comparing Met. Z and Λ, we see that Λ is to be considered as “earlier sketch.” I think
Gutas, 2010, has summarized the decisive arguments for the early date.
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Aristotle’sMet. on the whole is not of the looked for type of systematical work, but
that there are distinguishable layers from different periods of his life and that the
text was re-edited several times and evolved as a manuscript for lectures. We have
to recognize that the place of Met. Λ in the Metaphysics has nothing to do with the
sequential order of the work. Researchers have taken adopted the well-founded con-
clusions of W. Jaeger and attempted, as in the similar case of the Homeric poems,
to sort out and to date the different strata. What else could one do for lack of histor-
ical references in the text? As a criterion for dating the statements, W. Jaeger had
chosen how near or how far away from Plato’s thinking they were. W. Jaeger was
the first to make the argument for an early dating of Met. Λ. Many were dissatisfied
with this dating, because even in the 20th century its systematic pole position and
with is the late dating, were considered as evident. With its unsurpassable theolog-
ical content (even if that required some correction by its defenders and was based
on translation erros) the text had to remain the highlight and the culmination of a
system. Only a mature Aristotle could think and write such things.
For historical reasons, it is easy to understand why G.W. F. Hegel thought that way,
but it is surprising that such contemporary scholars as K. Oehler, N. Hartmann,
W.D. Ross, H.-G. Gadamer, G. Reale, H. J. Krämer, further, most participants of
the XIVth Symposium Aristotelicum XIV in 2000, or the contributors of New Essays
in 2016, and, in general, most contemporary interpreters of Aristotle do so. They
cannot imagine that Met. Λ is the work of a young philosopher, if it is the “coping
stone” (W.D. Ross), der höchste Punkt (K. Oehler, K. Gloy et al.), of whole a
system, be it of Aristotle’s philosophy or be it of Ancient Philosophy in general
(Aristotle was about 37 when he leaved the Academy). We see that the dating of
Met. Λ is crucial. As a late work it is the closing copstone of a theologically oriented
philosophy, if an early work it can be read (as I wish to show) as a speculative sketch
and a program to be carried out.
To my knowledge, nobody beforeW. Jaeger thought that the work was an early one.
W. Jaeger put it concesely when he said that Met. Λ is not Aristotle’s last but first
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word on theology.9 – I include his list of reasons:10 inMet. Λwe find no reference to
other books ofMet. (122); nor do we find the terms prote philosophia and theologia
as titles for his own project, which seems improbable if it had come after ΖΗΘ (123);
if Met. Λ 1–5 should be late it could be no more than a summary of ΖΗΘ, but the
question about ousia is not asked the same way there as here, therefore it is not a
mere recapitulation; it would, furthermore, be rather extensive for a recapitulation
as compared with the text of supposed reference (124). Another argument is the
one from composition. Met. Λ stands as a lecture on its own, it forms no part of the
‘main lecture on metaphysics’ either by content or by style (124–5); the perceptible
ousiai are not thematic in the main lecture but in Met. Λ they take up about half of
the space (126). And finally, as W. Jaeger says, the second half contrasts sharply
with the first, it presents mit treffsicheren Hammerschlägen (“with precise hammer
blows”) the outline of his thought, “without worrying about details” (1923, 228).
H. Flashar accepted the early date inUeberweg (1983, 378). G. Reale has discussed
W. Jaeger’s arguments and has tried to counter his arguments against the late date.
His main idea is that a theology like that in Met. Λ comprehends all the rest in its
entirety and cannot stand at the beginning of the project.11 Many modern schol-
ars verify the connection missing between Met. Λ and the rest, beginning with H.
Bonitz, going on toW. Jaeger up to H. J. Krämer, who calls it an erratischer Block.12
L. Elders (1972, 44), says that he sees few references to other books in Met. Λ but
in the rest of the Corpus Aristotelicum no mention of Met. Λ at all, whereas B.
Manuwald (1989) sees one express reference (ausdrückliche Rückverweisung) to
Met. Λ, namely in De Motu Animalium 4, 700a6–9.13 The arguments of G.W.
Most in favor of the early date of Theophrastus’ Met. resting on biology, are very
9 Further arguments in favour of the early dating we find in H. von Arnim, 1931; I. Düring, 1968a, and
in H. Flashar, 1983, 378. – G. Reale, 1993, 594f., gives an unsatisfactory summary of W. Jaegers
arguments, see below, p. 217.
10 W. Jaeger, 1912, 122–130.
11 G. Reale, 1961, 1994, sixth ed. – D. T. Devereux has carefully examined the arguments of G. Reale;
his negative results seem to me definitive, see footnote above, 8, and p. 218.
12 H. Bonitz, 1849, 9; W. Jaeger, 1913; H. J. Krämer, 1964, 191.
13 B. Manuwald, 1989, 9.
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important. G.W. Most can show plausibly that it is more likely that Aristotle cites
Theophrastus than vice versa.14 To find out the date of Met. Λ it is crucial to know
how the relation is betweenMet. Λ and Theophrastus’Met.15 The consensus is that
both texts have to do with each other, even if the absolute dating is controversial or
the fact is interpreted in a different way as for example, by G. Reale compared with
D. T. Devereux.
The Metaphysics of Theophrastus has been considered: (i) as a late work, written
after Aristotle’s death; (ii) with the intention to criticize Aristotle, especially his
teleology; and (iii) as fragmentary. All three presuppositions have proven to be
wrong. H. J. Krämer has already named some points in Theophrastus’ Met., which
show “ideas which are to be set in the early period of Aristotle or even before him
and common in the Academy.”16 There are no exact quotes in either text from the
other, but sufficient clear references in content. It does not seem that Theophrastus is
familiar withMet. ΖΗΘ at this time, he does not take into account distinctions made
there, such as the distinction between actuality and potentiality, nor the categories
or the four causes. If the text were late he could scarcely do without reference to
these sets of concepts.
We can see some themes and questions common to both texts: What is primary in
knowledge and being? What is the relation between the first (the principles) and the
second (the perceptible beings)? Into what kind of detail can we go in the search
for the causes for something? For W.D. Ross, J. Tricot, even for Th. A. Szlezák
the text was a fragment. The careful examination by A. Laks and G.W. Most in the
introduction of their edition of the text proves definitively that the text is complete,17
M. van Raalte says that this is communis opinio today.18 If Theophrastus’ text too
is written shortly after Aristotle left Athens, it is a near contemporary text and both
14 G.W. Most, 1988, 224–233; D. Frede, 1971, 65ff. too argued for an early date.
15 On the chronological relation between both see M. v. Raalte, 1993, 23–24.
16 H. J. Krämer, 1973, 206–214, esp. 211–212; früharistotelisches, ja voraristotelisches und gemein-
akademisches Gedankengut.
17 D. Gutas, 2010, does not contradict even if he is a little bit more reluctant concerning the structure
of the text given by Laks and Most.
18 M. van Raalte, 1993, 7.
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must be understood against the same Academic background. In this context the
possible intention of the text may be quite other than has been thought so far.
Contrary to what A. Laks und G.W. Most argued M. van Raalte would like a later
date for Theophrastus’ Metaphysics. I add a short comment to her five arguments
(25). ad 1: M. v. Raalte emphasizes the content links between, on the one side, the
Met. of Theophrastus and Met. Λ and, on the other, the biological books. – With
respect to the former, it must be noted that the common themes in these books result
from the common Academic background. With respect to the biological writings
G.W.Most has shown that it is more plausible that the reference runs from Aristotle
to Theophrastus than the other way round (1988, 224–233). – ad 2: In Aristotle’s
work we find no response to Theophrastus’ criticism, neither that concerning the
teleology nor that concerning the ‘Unmoved Mover.’ – If the texts are contempo-
raneous then no reaction is needed. It is even possible that Theophrastus’ text is a
work commisioned by his senior, Aristotle. Then it would be natural that they do
not mention each other, even if other Academic members are mentioned. Met. Λ is a
more speculative answer to the Academic discourse in the background, Theophras-
tus’ Met. is more realistic. – ad 3: M. v. Raalte observes that the conceptions of
αἰθήρ (ether) and σύμφυτον πνεῦμα (natural breath) are more consistent and more
developed in Theophrastus than in Aristotle; and ad 4: that in general in De Caelo
and in some biological works there are grave inconsistencies. – The difference re-
sults from the fact that Theophrastus follows the more concrete line of research,
Aristotle in Met. Λ the more speculative. – ad 5: At last M. v. Raalte says that
Theophrastus aims at unifying the particular and the principles right from the start.
– In just this respect both texts correspond mutually very well, especially in their
opening chapter.
That both texts converge in content to some degree is for G. Reale an argument
in favour of the late dating. It would be unimaginable, he says, that Theophrastus
refers in his work – in his view obviously written after Aristotle’s death – to an early
work. G. Reale repeats the traditional understanding of Theophrastus’Metaphysics:
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namely that a frustrated student much later criticizes his already dead master,19 but
if Theophrastus wrote his work at about the same time as Aristotle, this argument
no longer applies.
In Met. Λ 8 Eudoxos and Callippus are mentioned, that raises special dating prob-
lems for the book.20 A new era in the research on Aristotle began with the works of
W. Jaeger, 1912 and 1923, in general; but there are also new insights into Met. Λ
8 in particular. W. Jaeger thought Met. Λ on the whole an early work, but chapter
8 inserted later, because in that chapter Callippus, who died 330 BCE, is referred
to in the imperfect tense (1073b32–38).21 That means, so W. Jaeger says, that at
the moment when Aristotle wrote his book Callippus was already dead. He looks,
then, for stylistic, content-related or historic arguments which will plausible a late
dating of this chapter. He says that in the chapters 1–5 there is a sketchy style,
but that chapters 6–10 are written in a höheren Schwung,22 chapter 8 alonr being
vollkommen ausgearbeitet, “completely finished.”23 Chapter 8 disrupts the line of
argument with its astronomy.24 And here again the method is that of physics instead
of the previous and subsequent spekulativen Gedankenreihe (speculative sequence).
Finally, he says that the conception of metaphysics is different from that in the other
chapters, where it signifies the science of the highest being. InMet. Λ 6–7 the theo-
logical speculation leads to the ‘Unmoved Mover’ but in chapter 8 he speaks again
of many movers.
Chapter 8, then, seems to be the terminus post quem ofMet. Λ. If it is consistent with
the line of thinking and if the sentence was written after the death of Callippus’, then
19 It is an interpretation like that of W. Jaeger, W.D. Ross, F. H. Fobes, 1929, XXV, W. Theiler, 1958,
102–5.
20 For Eudoxus and Callippus see: F. Lasserre, 1966; R.M. Dancy, 1991; T. Heath, 1959, 190–224;
K. F. Ginzel, in: RE XX, 1662; A. Rehm, in: RE Suppl. IV, 1431; W. Schadewaldt, 1952 (: he
attributes the dogma of the ‘Unmoved Mover’ to Eudoxos); K. von Fritz, 1978; lit. on this theme in
the article ‘Eudoxos’ by M. Folkerts, 1998, Sp. 225; on Callippus see F. Heglmeier, 1988; the article
‘Callippus’ by W. Hübner, 1999, 202–203.
21 “Callippus put the same arrangement of spheres as Eudoxus [...]”
22 W. Jaeger, 1912, 126; also W.D. Ross says that the text is written “[…]in the maturity of his powers
[…],” 1924, I, CXXXI.
23 W. Jaeger, 1923, 369.
24 W. Jaeger, 1923, 371.
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the whole book must be late. I. Düring already has pointed out that the imperfect
tense can mean “formerly present,”25 not necessarily “he who lived formerly”26 and
“the use of the tenses cannot be a criterium when he mentions contemporaries”27
This observation is confirmed by D. T. Devereux.28 M. Frede too does not wish to
rely on the ‘Callippus imperfect.’ Nevertheless he thinks Met. Λ is late; but not so
late as M. Burnyeat had proposed (: “at the end of his life, [...]”); except that, in his
view, chapter 8 fits in very well with the rest (2000, 47–49), his reasons partly based
on content partly on stylistic features (such as the use of hiatus). Many interpreters
think that this chapter abruptly interrupts the line of reasoning extending between
chapters seven and nine. It must trouble those who hew to the standard interpretation
that Aristotle speaks of many movers and considers anew a polytheistic solution,
after having so successfully offered a monotheistic one. There was, therefore, some
debate over whether the theorem of the ‘Unmoved Mover’ was early or late.29 L.
Elders presents the dispute in outline, but – disappointingly – concludes that chapter
8 is spurious due to its polytheistic inclination, whereas the rest of Met. Λ is late.
G. Reale defends a scholastically inspired philosophia perennis, so the stakes are
high concerning the question of the date of Met. Λ.30 Early on and in detail he
discussed W. Jaegers’s arguments. I use one of his later papers 1994, 296–317 (cf.
1993, III, 595). Here he takes up W. Jaeger’s arguments in favor of the late date of
chapter 8, but against W. Jaeger tries to show that this chapter fits in very well with
the line of thought of the rest. The conclusion is that the whole book is late. That is in
accordance with his understanding of Met. Λ as il libro ‘theologico’ per eccellenza
(1994, 259). But, some points in his presentation of W. Jaeger’s arguments are not
correct. He speaks of content (301) whereas W. Jaeger does about style; G. Reale
contends (303), that metaphysics and astronomy in Met. Λ 8 both deal with the
25 den früher hier anwesenden
26 den, der früher lebte
27 [...] der Tempusgebrauch bei Erwähnungen von Zeitgenossen ist daher wertlos als Kriterium.
28 See below, Part III, 4. Erster Leitsatz; I. Düring, 1968a, 330b45 on the imperfect tense; I. Düring,
1966, 191f.; D. T. Devereux, 1988, 173, on the dating of Callippus’ finding.
29 Concerning the ‘Unmoved Mover’ see the bibliography of R. Radice, R. Davies, 1997; cf. G. Oppy,
1995., too; newly the Handbuch edited by Chr. Rapp und Corcilius,, 2011, and Chr. Horn, 2016.
30 Cf. A. Bausola, 1994.
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eternal substance, so that there is no difference with the concept of metaphysics in
Λ 1, as W. Jaeger has claimed. Finally, he thinks that the restrictions in Λ 8 apply
only to some few specific points, but not to astronomy in general, as W. Jaeger and
probably most readers do rightly think. Whereas W. Jaeger takes up the differences
in scientific reliability and rightly points to the phrase “we say that only to have some
idea about that” (1073b13, ἐννοίας χάριν λέγομεν), with which Aristotle labels the
less reliable character of astronomical theses, G. Reale emphasizes the four cases
of ananke in 1073a23–b1, which is something quite else. By saying that Aristotle
‘comes back’ in chapter 9 to the theme of the chapters 6–7, G. Reale only confirms
that there is a break. Concerning the difference between the one ‘mover’ and many
movers he argues, that on both occasions Aristotle is referring to the same, there
being no contradiction because his argumentation is working on different levels.
W. Jaeger thinks that, what Aristotle says about the celestial mechanics in chapter
8, constitute an interruption of the reasoning concerning the First Mover who thinks
himself, but G. Reale says that Λ 6 und 7 dimonstrano… l’esistenza e la natura del
Motore immobile, Λ 8 dimonstra la molteplicità dei motori, and, that Λ 9 returns
to the theme of Λ 7, in order to dissolve some theoretical difficulties (1994, 308f.).
– G. Reale’s refutation, it seems, remains unconvincing, he often simply has not
taken W. Jaeger’s meaning.
D. T. Devereux too – after many others – has taken up the issue.31 His arguments
again justify the early date of book Λ. The verb in the imperfect tense proves noth-
ing, the findings of Callippus could have taken place well before and Aristotle have
been informed about them.32 For D. T. Devereux it is important that inMet. Λ Aris-
totle uses only analogy not the pros-hen-method, and the hierarchy of sciences in
Met. Λ 8 corresponds with the hierarchy of substances in chapter 1. The concept
of metaphysics is the same here as there, which means it is not a general ontology.
Still, the question in Λ 8 needs to be understood in the context of the question about
movement. Even the first philosophy has to deal with sensible substances. In his
extensive and careful study D. T. Devereux took into consideration too the relations
31 D. T. Devereux, 1990.
32 Cf. D. T. Devereux, 1990, 173 and I. Düring, 1966, 191f.; id., 1968, 330b45.
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of Met. Λ with Theophrastus’ Met. – with negative results:33 Chapter 8 cannot be
dated by any of the arguments used so far. D. T. Devereux prefers the concept of
metaphysics as criterium for dating. He takes up the possible development from
analogy to ‘focal meaning’ as methodological principle, a proposal made earlier by
G. E. L. Owen. Relying on analogy Λ becomes a metaphysics of more primitive
form and therefore earlier in date, D. T. Devereux argues. Insofar as metaphysics is
first philosophy its subject is not only the supra-sensual substance but perceptible
substance too and it has to ask after the cause of their movement (180). In Met. Λ
there is no science of being at all, as later in ΖΗΘ and there is no evidence that the
first philosophy ought to be a general ontology (it is limited to theology and cos-
mology). It is more plausible that Met. Λ must be dated before ΖΗΘ than the other
way around and Theophrastus’Met. could have been written in the time between Λ
and ΖΗΘ (182).
To summarize: as concerns the chronology I follow the arguments of W. Jaeger,
G.W. Most and D. T. Devereux (but not his concept of metaphysics) in favor of
an early date of Met. Λ. This means that if we wish to understand the text from its
origin and from its context then we must understand it against the background of the
Academy. Met. Λ and Theophrastus’Met. are written at about the same time, prob-
ably shortly after Aristotle and Theophrastus left the Academy, soon after Plato’s
death. Both authors try to get clarity on questions and issues resulting from the dis-
course in the Academy. H. J. Krämer and E. Berti saw that the understanding of
Met. Λ presupposes knowledge of the Academic discourse.34 Such being the case,
a dating soon after Plato’s death seems to be more plausible than twenty years later.
Even if the early date of Met. Λ and of Theophrastus’ Met. cannot be definitively
proved but only shown to be plausible – the same applies to the late dating – this
early dating will be one of the premises of my account. Nevertheless, my main the-
sis, thatMet. Λ is a speculative sketch about ousia, Sein, is unaffected by the dating.
It is very well possible that, at a later time, Aristotle was referring to the texts which
form the background of the speculation.
33 D. T. Devereux, 1988, 167–188.
34 H. J. Krämer, 1964, Kap. II “Struktur und geschichtliche Stellung der Aristotelischen Nus-
Metaphysik,” esp. 146–147; E. Berti, 1981, 227–252.
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3.4. Context and Problem Area of Met. Λ
3.4.1. Themes and Issues in the Academy
If Met. Λ is the early work I think it is, then its background is the Academic dis-
course.35 What are its themes and in which texts will we seize these?36 The main
topics and the leading questions in the Academy were established by the Presocrat-
ics and the Sophists whose texts were still available. Plato too has discussed many
of the abiding themes in his dialogues. His dialogues the Sophist and the Timaeus
are particularly relevant for Met. Λ. That there are many connections between the
Academy and Aristotle is scarcely controversial and H. J. Krämer’s overview con-
tains so much material that it would be useless multiply it.37 It is obvious that the
Timaeus is a starting point for many Academic questions. It seems that Aristo-
tle referred to that dialogue as early as in his Protrepticus (ca. 354 BCE.).38 The
references in Met. Λ to the Sophist are less well observed. They concern not so
much details in content, as the two very central points, which I will discuss below.
J. Dillon has devoted an impressive study to Plato’s followers until Arcesilaus.39
He provides us with a very informative list of “the principal problems left by the
Timaeus” (p. 24f.) which were treated afterwards by Plato’s successors (see be-
low 284). Apart from that the ‘Late Plato’ has been the theme of many studies,
certainly, with contradictory results.40 When we include books and articles on the
35 That is S. Fazzo’s opinion too, 2014, 75ff., 2016, 198.
36 Overviews of the Old Academy: W.K. C. Guthrie, IV, 1975, 19–24; V, 1978, 446–492; M. Isnardi
Parente, 1979; H. J. Krämer, 1983,1–174, resp. new edition 2004, 1–165; F. Wehrli, 1983, 459–599,
resp. new edition 2004, 493–666; J. Dillon, 2003.
37 H. J. Krämer, 1983; on the Timaeus in Antiquity see L. Brisson, 1994, 533–4; on theMiddle Platonists
see R. T. Wallis, 1995; L. E. J. Deitz, 1986; the loci where Aristotle cites the Timaeus are given by
H. Bonitz, 1870, 598a60–b19.
38 I. Düring, 1957.
39 J. Dillon, 2003.
40 As a small selection: H. Teloh, 1981; K.M. Sayre, 1983; W. J. Prior, 1985; C. Gill, M.M. McCabe,
1996; R. G. Turnbull, 1998; F. von Kutschera, 2002; Gill, Mary Louise. 2015. “Method and Meta-
physics in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy edited by
Edward N. Zalta.
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esoteric Plato the range of theses becomes even more varied.41 Moreover, Plato’s
Parmenides (130c–134d) and De Ideis (reconstructed from Alexander’s commen-
tary on theMetaphysics) have many themes in common, their reasoning concerning
the possibility of the ideas being very similar. It is not important if it is Aristotle
who refers to Plato or the reverse.42 In any case, it would not be the only time Aris-
totle and Platon can be seen to relate to each other. G. Fine thinks that Aristotle
wrote the De Ideis during the time that he was still in the Academy.43
3.4.2. The Texts where we can Find the Academic Discourse
The Academic discourse must be captured through the texts of the members of the
Academy. We know many of their names, a most comprehensive list was compiled
by E. Zeller, II, 1, 982, Anm. 1. The first volume of Friedrich Ueberweg, Karl
Praechter, 1926 (reprint, Basel 1967) 341–347 und 100*–101* also contains much
material and we are happy to have the new presentation of the Old Academy by H. J.
Krämer in H. Flashar, 1983, (new edition with supplements 2004). T. Dorandi has
provided a new philological basis for the whole discussion.44 As a rule, Aristotle
and Theophrastus are left out of discussions of the Old Academy, but it is clear that
they too belong to that group no less than for instance Heracleides Ponticus. It is
for technical reasons alone that they are excluded, because we have a large body of
texts of them and including them in that context would be simply unmanageable.
Of course, they do form a separate branch within the Academy, but that is true of
others too, of Speusippus or of Xenocrates, for example.
There are several collections of the fragments of the members of the Old Academy.
These differ essentially in their objectives, but also in the volume of reported frag-
41 See T. A. Szlezák, 2004; Mirbach, D. (Ed.), Krämer, H. (2014).
42 CAG I, Hayduck, 1891, parts of it are edited by D. Harlfinger, 1975; O. Gigon, Aristotelis Opera,
1987; an edition with English translation and commentary by G. Fine, 1993; an edition with German
translation by A. Graeser, 1998, 122–143.
43 Cf. G. Fine, 1993, 41.
44 T. Dorandi, 1999; he can draw upon his edition of Philodemus’ papyri (Pherc. 1021 e 164), 1991,
stützen; K. Gaiser, has treated the same subject immediately before him, 1988
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ments.45 In connection with Plato’s so-called ‘Unwritten Doctrine’ other collec-
tions of fragments have been made.46 We have at our disposal, further, collections
of fragments of particular members of the Academy: Speusippus,47 Xenocrates,48
Heracleides Ponticus,49 Eudoxus of Cnidus,50 Philippus of Opús,51 Theaitetus.52
I wish, now, to justify why I do not use such texts to illustrate the Academic dis-
course which I have been invoking, but do the texts of Aristotle and Theophrastus.
Let us consider, firstly, some reasons why collections of fragments seem not to be a
good basis. The comparison of different collections will clearly show that not only
the gathering of the fragments but also the reconstruction of the works from which
they are cited is controversial and problematic. All collections of fragments, suffer
from an inherent inadequacy. They pretend to present a text while only in fact of-
fering a quotation from a particular context, which will have its own specific ends.
The editors, of course, are well aware of that fact, they know the context and take it
into account considering the beginning and the end of the quotation, but some users
may be not aware of this fact, and they run the risk of misunderstanding the text.
We can understand a quotation only if we know its function in its original setting.
There is usually not enough space for providing this information or the context of
the cited text is simply not at our disposal. A. A. Long and D.N. Sedley, in their
book Hellenistic Philosophers (1987), divised an approach to, at least in part, cir-
cumvent the dilemma. There they always but very briefly, note the context of the
cited text. These issues of collections of fragments were the subject of books by
G.W. Most and W. Burkert some years ago.53
45 W. Nestle, 1923; C. J. de Vogel, 1973; H. Dörrie, 1987ff.; J. Dillon, The Heirs of Plato, Oxford 2003.
46 J. N. Findlay, 1974; M.-D. Richard, 1986; K. Gaiser, 1988.
47 P. Lang, 1911; E. Bickermann, J. Sykurtris, 1928; M. Isnardi Parente, 1980; L. Tarán, 1981; A. F.
Natoli, 2004.
48 R. Heinze, 1892; M. Isnardi Parente, 1982.
49 F. Wehrli, 1953; O. Voss, 1896.
50 F. Blass, 1887; F. Lasserre, 1966.
51 L. Tarán, 1975.
52 E. Sachs, 1914.
53 See the methodological observations made by G.W. Most and W. Burkert, 1998; very instructive is
the introduction of G.W. Most in: G.W. Most, 1997; in this book I. G. Kidd gives a good example
for the problem how to get and to handle fragments in the case of Poseidonius.
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Collections often also show an ideological defect. It is not reasonable to include
only those quotations confirmed by name. On the one hand the naming may be
deliberately or inadvertently incorrect (it is the work of source criticism to decide on
this). On the other hand there are many verified and identifiable quotations without
name. Moreover, the beginning and the end of quotations are often uncertain, just
as is how literally the quotation is to be taken. In drawing theirs conclusions about
the quotation, editors are guided by their own given interests and objectives, and it
is unavoidable that the collection will confirm their leading intention.
Next, I present some reasons why the early texts of Aristotle and Theophrastus seem
much better suited for the characterizing of the Academic discourse in the period
around the death of Plato. Nobody can deny that it is methodologically more cor-
rect to base an interpretation on transmitted than on reconstructed texts. If there are
any such texts, this is the question. For some time, it has become more and more
plausible that Aristotle’s Met. Λ and Theophrastus’ Met. are early works, written,
that is, not long after Plato’s death. If that is the case, they are better witnesses
of the Academic discourse than the fragmentary testimonies of other members of
the Academy. In them we have authentic contemporary texts instead of the uncer-
tain and contradictory reconstructions of modern scholars, however acute these may
be.
Met. Λ 1.1 is part of a discourse determined by Plato’s late dialogues (as noted
above), especially the Parmenides, the Timaeus, the Sophist. We can trace this
discourse in Theophrastus’ Met. and in Aristotle’s early work. Works of particular
relevance are De Caelo,Met. A 6 and 9, Physics H 1 and Θ and in addition to these
the Categories, De philosophia and De Ideis.54 We keep in mind that the present
section has no other goal than to make clear the Academic background of Met. Λ
1.1: We wish to know which the fundamental opinions and beliefs, the problems
and the driving questions in the background are, which give the first phrase of Met.
54 W.D. Ross, gives some indications to content-related references between Met. Λ and the Academy
in his commentary, 1924; but see H. Bonitz, 1870, too; very valuable are the lists compiled by G.
Reale, 1993; J. Tricot, 1974; further informations in the histories of philosophy by H. Flashar, 1983,
and W.K. C. Guthrie, vol. V, 1978.
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Λ its weight and meaning.
Finally, we have to reflect on the different positions of the partners in this discourse.
A new situation of discourse had developed in the Academy insofar as it was a
school. In our everyday life, we think and credit things according to our life situ-
ation, say as human being, as citizen, as professional. The school produces a new
life situation, we are compelled to think and hold certain beliefs about the thoughts
and beliefs of others. The original process of making meaning and examining that
meaning it begins anew. Whatever is said is no more than another new proposition
or belief. This is the process that unfolded in the Academy. The findings of K.
Gaiser and H. J. Krämer confirm the dogmatic character of the school. It seems, at
least, that Theophrastus, Speusippus and Xenocrates began again to contend their
ideas and tried to establish a system of deduction of natural beings from principles.55
The guest from Elea showed that we have other possibilities to choose from. We
do not need to set our own opinions against those of others, we can afford to refrain
from contention and do no more than reflect on the fundamentals of given opin-
ions. In this situation Theophrastus has chosen to contend his own view, Aristotle
the way of reflection instead of contention (unbehauptendes Denken, a ‘thinking
without claims’).
If we accept the arguments for the early date of Met. Λ, then Aristotle is referring
to the contemporary Academic discourse.56 Further places where Aristotle asks
the question about becoming are Met. A 3–9 and Physics A. In this discourse
Aristotle focuses on ousia, the question of the meaning of being. That is a particular
choice, other members preferred other questions. In repeating the question of the
Sophist, being becomes the subject for understanding. His question thereby forms
a speculative turn, treatable only theoretically.57 As point of reference, he uses the
obvious variety in colloquial language of the senses of to be and of ousia. The
question about being is not absolutely out of nowhere, without any past. With this
55 Entirely in the line of what H. J. Krämer and others said; compare e. g. Theophrastus, Met. §§ 3–4
and 11; on Xenocrates and Speusippus see e. g. H. J. Krämer, 1964, 31f.
56 For the details see below, Part III, 5.1 The Academic background.
57 See E. Sonderegger, 2013, I. 2.
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question Aristotle resumes the question about becoming, put by the Presocratics
and by Plato. Plato is partly following on from the Heraclitean theorem that all is
movement (see Theaetetus) and his own critical position with respect to this, partly
Parmenides’ statement in the Sophist, that it is not for us even to ask whether there
is non-being. The Timaeus belongs to the same context, where Plato investigates
the connection between becoming and being.
The question about becoming remains. Each epoch puts it in its own form. To real-
ize how general and how varied this question is over time, we can compare Hesiods’
Theogonia with the idea of creation in the Middle Ages, the scientific approach in
modern times, the beginning of G.W. F. Hegels’ Wissenschaft der Logik,58 or the
§§ 86 ff. of his Encyclopaedie; in the 20th century there are examples of how the
issue of becoming and the question of its origin was treated by A.N. Whitehead in
philosophy or by S. Weinberg in physics.59 These examples testify to the extent and
the unfading interest of this question. For reflecting people, how to conceptualize
and understand becoming has always been one of the most important questions.
That Aristotle asks after the being on which becoming can be founded, is the differ-
ence between his questioning and that of the others. The question about the mean-
ing of being is asked in order to attain knowledge about becoming. Becoming is the
given and what we would like to understand, being belongs to its conditions and is
what is now at issue. The question is asked primarily with philosophical, secondar-
ily with a cosmological objective. The result does not come about through physical
experiments or calculations, it is the outcome of reflection on contemporary opin-
ions about becoming and being. Within this range Aristotle tries to establish the
principal and primary with the method of topical attitude.60 If being is the basis
of becoming, we must be certain that being is neither, in whatever way, a part of
a thing becoming nor even a becoming itself. The arguments for a first unmoved
moving in Met. Λ, but in Physics Θ 5–6 too, have the aim to prove just this. Aris-
totle summarizes different contributions to the question about being as the basis of
58 G.W. F. Hegel, ed. 1934, Wissenschaft der Logik, 1. Abschnitt, 1. Kapitel.
59 S. Weinberg, 1977.
60 See below, p. 228, extensively E. Sonderegger, 2012, 154–156.
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becoming. He orders them as follows: being must be a basis and a principle in
the categorical sense as in the modal sense as well; the Presocratics have found the
hyle: hyle, to be sure, is a being on which becoming rests, but taken alone it is not
a sufficient cause, which Aristotle shows in Met. Z 3. The whole book Z proves
that the (non-Platonic) eidos is prior to the hyle. In Met. Λ Aristotle had already
pointed to these thoughts, but the core issue in this book is the question about being
as the cause of becoming, especially about the first moving (as in Physics Θ). The
telos as cause makes understandable why and how the being as cause of becom-
ing can move without itself being moved, namely like a for-the-sake-of-something.
The sentence Met. Λ 7.26, “That there is a being (ousia tis), eternal and unmoved
[…],” must be understood in this context. The sentences before this one refer to
other opinions about the first in becoming. Some say that the perfect and the best
is not from the beginning, that is only the result. Against this 7.25 objects, offering
as an example that the first in becoming is not the seed but the complete animal.
This is a theoretical statement not a scientific thesis. It only instances with an ex-
ample the theoretical insight, that becoming rests on being. The complete animal
has the eidetic determinations, which the seed does not have. And in this sense it is
‘more real,’ ‘more being.’ Therefore, states 7.26, there is an ousia, which has the
Parmenidean determinations of being.
That becoming was the crucial topic for Theophrastus, for the Old Academy and
the early Aristotle is due primarily to the influence of Plato’s Timaeus and then
also the Presocratics. In this dialogue, Plato juxtaposes the pure noetic and the
mundane-aisthetic being and asks, how the transition from the first to the second is
possible.61 Theophrastus and other members of the Academy paid more attention
to the concrete aspect of the problem, Aristotle more to the cosmological and the
speculative. The question about being is an example of the continuity of issues
between Plato and Aristotle.
61 I. Kant reflected on the same theme in the Opus postumum (Übergangsschrift), see E. Sonderegger,
2015.
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3.5. Character of Philosophy
At the end of this chapter I present a list of new presuppositions for readingMet. Λ.
For the new beginning it is still more important to see the character of Aristotle’s
philosophy than its particular points. It is a widely shared view that philosophy
in general has as its ultimate aim to discern some theses which are true and can
be safely, obvioulsy with sound reasoning, maintained and that it is desirable that
philosophy develops a system or at least the outline of a system. Most scholars in
Aristotelian research share this view. Hardly anyone can imagine another alterna-
tive to this dogmatic view than an agnostic, sceptic, aporetic or vague, postmodern
outlook.
In the Aristotelian context, then, many think, that by prote ousia Aristotle means
the particular thing (“this horse”). Plato attributed this type of thinking to those
who “refer all things to the body.”62 Even if occasionally there is some opposition
to that view, it is not easy to really take the opposite side, since we are realists by
nature. As R. Rorty or G.W. F. Hegel or others say, we are naturally realists, the
reflective position is always and necessarily a secondary one. Aristotle performs this
reflection using the opinions and beliefs of his time (endoxa). He does not develop
and sustain a system, does not argue an aporia, he intends to analyze the Doxa
in order to get its fundamental conceptions and distinctions. He tries to transform
contemporary opinions into concepts in topical attitude.
3.6. New Premises for ReadingMet. Λ
These premises seem new only compared with the premises of the standard interpre-
tation, in fact they are old, because they take into account the reading aids in the text
and the topical attitude which guided Aristotle writing. Based on these premises,
I try to work free of the distortions of the history of reception. It has already been
said above and some share this view that ousia is the subject of the book. But it is
62 Pl., Sophist 246c9 …τῶν εἰς σῶμα πάντα ἑλκόντων …
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not consensus that Aristotle, by asking after ousia, asks after that which is primary
in being and that which gives unity in the multiple use of being (ousia) and to be
(einai).
The method by which to accomplish is theory in topical attitude. The long-term aim
is to know which the causes of becoming are, more precisely which being is the first
cause of becoming and how this process is possible. Becoming is considered in two
respects, first as the becoming of natural beings (as Simplicius had already tried to
explain to Philoponus) and second as the speculative transition from the noetic to
the mundane state of the world. We have, further, to take into account the kind
of text and its date. Approximately contemporary with Theophrastus’Metaphysics,
it is Aristotle’s early Programmschrift, in its function comparable with the Ältestes
Systemprogramm of German Idealism. It is not the alleged apex of a system but
a starting point. Together with Theophrastus’ Metaphysics, Plato’s Timaeus and
Aristotle’s other early writings it brings together the issues of the Old Academy.
Aristotle focused on his main point, the question about the meaning of being, and
he gives a speculative answer which differs from the answers Plato and the other
members of the Academy had offered. As early as in Met. Λ Aristotle is applying
the method of topical attitude. Firstly, he collects and orders the current opinions
(endoxa); he, then, gives them a conceptual outfit formulating them in his own ter-
minology (προτάσεις λαβεῖν; the quotations, Anführungen), in order to identify
their fundamentals. The noesis as structure becomes visible, if the opinions on the
surface are traced back to their foundations.
He answers the crucial question about being saying that being is ground of becom-
ing:
– as energeia, actuality,
– as first moving, which sets in motion unmoved itself, like a for-the-sake-of-
something, and finally
– as noesis, awareness.
Being as the first ground of becoming must be energeia, actuality (6.8), which
does not mean existence, but ‘having arrived at its complete form.’ That {being–
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actuality} is a cause in the sense of the for-the-sake-of-something because, as Plato
had seen (Philebos, 54a–c), becoming is for the sake of being and not the reverse
(Met. Λ 7.5–7.9). But in the natural process of becoming being is a result and the
last while the eidos is its origin and the first (Met. Θ 8). Being achieves its actuality
nowhere other than in noesis which is not that of the human subjective thinking.
Our human thinking can only recognize something if it has recognized itself before
any mundane activity. In this noesis which is the structure of a world, the actuality
of the nous becomes the actuality of being.
Here a summary of the results and a presentation of the new premises in the form
of some theses.
1. A theological reading of Met. Λ must assume that Aristotle had developed a
metaphysics of substance. That tends to a theology whether including a concept
of creation or not and having proofs of the existence of god or not. –
Against that, we must counter that such ideas appear later in the history of the
text. Aristotle’s Met. does not develop any metaphysics as a discipline. It is,
in its main parts, a revival of Plato’s question about being (see the Sophist) and
consequently no resulting theology.
Where Aristotle speaks of god or gods, he is not aiming to prove anything about
gods, but those serve as examples and they are drawn from the range of endoxa.
The intention of the text is to enable us to practize speculation.
2. Met. Λ and Theophrastus’Met. are broad collections of problems and questions
treated in the Old Academy and both try, to provide answers to these questions.
What is at issue is natural genesis, not creation by God, whether that be out of
nothing or otherwise.
3. In Met. Λ 1.1 and in Met. Λ 7.21 Aristotle provides aids to interpretation (cf.
above, 3.2) and we must take advantage of them. If the text is a theoretical one
and written in topical attitude, then it must be read in the corresponding fashion.
4. The book opens with a presenting of the question about being. For Aristotle
this question is the result of the discourse of his philosophical tradition, of the
Academy, in the final instance. This question becomes urgent if it has been seen
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that becoming cannot establish becoming nor make it understandable.
5. Considerations about the causes, those which have a genesis and those which do
not, have led to the insight that the manner we speak about becoming (i. e. our
endoxa about becoming) will be reasonable only when we complement becom-
ing with an unmoved moving cause.
6. What must we think of that which, itself unmoved, sets in motion, i. e. about the
first with respect to becoming?
a) The ousia which Aristotle names in Λ 1.1 is completely open, it is not yet
fixed in its content, we only know that it is spoken in multifarious ways;
b) the being of the unmoved moving for which we search, must be conceived as
actuality (Met. Λ 6.8);
c) actuality, energeia, means that the being in question has reached its complete
form (but not that it exists or that it is at hand, vorhanden sein). This {being–
actuality} is a cause in the sense of the for-the-sake-of-something (Met. Λ
7.5–7.9);
d) the causa efficiens is not the main cause or the core of the four causes. Ac-
cordingly the main part of becoming is not played by a god as a creator. That
becomes even clearer if we consider the sense of to proton kinoun, kinein
does not mean efficere;
e) beside other uses being is used in two opposite but correlated ways: genet-
ically it is the word for the last, the result and the for-the-sake of a process,
but eidetically it is the word the first (Met. Θ 8);
f) in the noesis there is no distinction anymore between the actuality of the nous
and the actuality of being; nous and noeton are distinguishable no more be-
cause noesis is prior to both, nous and noeton;
g) if and only if noesis has recognised itself, can the actuality of the nous (ἐνέργεια
τοῦ νοῦ) become the actuality of being (: {energeia–ousia}, seeMet. Λ 7.17–
7.23);
h) to be, expressed in the formula{
being← awareness→ actuality
Doxa
}
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is not a thing, not an event, not a fact, not a state of affairs; it is, to speak of it
only in an inaccurate way, the for-the-sake-of becoming, attracting (metaphor-
ically) the becoming to become a being, but in no way is it anything like a
causa efficiens.
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4.1. The Commentary is Guided by a Selection of KeyPropositions
4.1.1. General Remarks
In this chapter I will make some preparatory remarks concerning the content of Met.
Λ, the method I follow in commenting upon it and finally, I present an outline of its
content as I see it.
In commenting on a text there exist different possibilities. We have continuous
commentaries and we have also monographs concerning the book as a whole. The
continuous commentary seems not to be useful in the present case, because in that
form we must consider many details which distract from the main line of thought
and this is what is here at stake. There are, moreover, many commentaries which
help us better to understand a particular word, phrase or sentence, such as those of
H. Bonitz, A. Schwegler, W.D. Ross, L. Elders, S. Fazzo, S. Alexandru, F. Bagh-
dassarian, L. Judson.1 Many questions are common to all comments, but some
claims of the standard interpretation are less treated: that ousiameans substance re-
mains untouched and the so-called ‘Unmoved Mover’ is not questioned at all. The
intellectual background of the Academy is not dealt with in depth.
Today it is more problematic how to comprehend the whole, rather than particular
words or sentences in isolation. Themonograph, then, would have been a good form
for explaining the contrast between mine and the standard interpretation. With that
1 The commentary by M. Bordt (2006) is designed for an overview; some contributions in the Sympo-
sium Aristotelicum, 2000, and in the New Essays, 2016, are useful too.
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form, however, we sail too far from the text. In our case, it is pivotal to develop the
line of thought through closest possible contact with the text. In that way alone can
I show that the new understanding hews more faithfully to the text itself than does
the standard interpretation. Thus, have I resolved to offer a commentary following
a series of key propositions. In this chapter I present them and give the reasons for
my choice.
In Part II, 1, Traditional Reading, we learnt that, if we wish to understand Met. Λ,
it is crucial that we not allow our understanding to be obstructed by the traditional
premises and presuppositions left unexamined. We, thus, consider first the horizon
of questions (Fragehorizont), which determines the framework of our reading. We
make explizit this framework with our new premises presented in Part II, 2, New
Premises. Further argument justification follow in the commentary.
Aristotle’s reflections in Met. Λ lie within the framework of the question of the
meaning of being. This question is not a naïve one, it is conveyed in many ways.
We have, therefore, to look for the emplacement of that question in its tradition
and take into account that Aristotle asks this question against the background of
the insight in Plato’s Sophist that new answers are useless, because each of them
would be no more than a new claim having to re-examined just as the old ones did.
It seems possible to perform the test but, as the Eleatic guest shows, with the cost
that the examining person is not less examined than the contention he examines.
The examiner must give up the intention to contend and the whole question must be
reoriented. We can do no more than reflect on the prevailing opinions.2
The result of Plato’s analysis of the prevailing opinions, carried out in the Sophist,
are the “five highest genera.” The first, ‘being’ (to on), names the subject. The
main features of to be in the prevailing opinions (i. e. of those who identify being
and body and of the friends of the ideas) are movement and rest (kinesis, stasis).
Reflecting on these features of to bewe find two concepts of reflection: identity and
difference (Reflexionsbegriffe). Without these we cannot think or speak intelligibly
2 Some mistake this for an aporetic approach (e. g. W. Mesch, C. Rapp, D. Fonfara). This results from
the view that a philosophy with solid results is much more interesting than a philosophy that asks
questions.
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about to be.
Aristotle takes up this project, to ask the question about being as Plato did in the
Sophist. Under this condition we cannot expect him to be proposing new answers to
the question but seeking to clarify the sense of the question, considering the method,
analyzing the given contentions and the opinions, which underlie the colloquial
speech. In addition, Aristotle’s question about being has a concrete connection.
He does not ask out of the blue “What at all – all other things aside – does to be
mean?” Quite the contrary, his question is asked in the context of the question
about becoming. This question was immediately urgent in his days, no less than
it is in ours (see above, p. 225). Asking the question about the meaning of being
he wants to know which being becoming is founded on and how this works. There
are answers to this question and, not only those of the Presocratics on hyle (be that
understood as the elements or Democritus’ atoms), but the Parmenidean one too:
that being is pure being, without any negation. Aristotle, of course, is familiar too
with the different answers by which Plato tried to determine the being capable to
ground becoming, namely the idea, the principles of hen and of the aoristos dyas
(about which we know very little) and finally the good. He knows, too, how Plato
tried to trace the transition from the noetic world to the factual world in Timaeus’
metaphoric speech. The demiurge, the chora and geometry played a prominent role
in that Platonic attempt.
Met. Λ is to be read taking into account this background. Collecting and analyzing
the opinions about being, Aristotle leads us to the insight that the being (Sein), which
is the ground of all becoming is: {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια / Doxa} (for the
exact sense of this formula see the Commentary, Part III. esp. 6, 7 and 9). The
answer or better, this analysis, which must not be contended as a new opinion about
reality and truth, has as its background questions like these: What is primary in
being (Sein)? With relation to what “to be” is said in many ways? In which sense
of being is being the ground of becoming? What does it mean to be the ground of
becoming? Searching for answers to questions of this kind, we will come to the
difference with the standard opinion that ground or cause is essentially to be found
in the causa efficiens, best represented by the ‘Unmoved Mover.’ Aristotle asks
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after the connection between that which we must think about primary being and
that which we see as perceptible things. It is the same question Theophrastus is
asking at the beginning of his Metaphysics. The question is always posed in close
contact with Plato’s questioning. Aristotle, then, is trying to make understandable
the first that sets in motion. With his speculative answer that being is noesis as
the for-the-sake of becoming Aristotle is able to remedy the insufficiency in Plato’s
ideas, which cannot account for the initiating of movement.3
4.1.2. Outlines of Met. Λ
First I give an outline of the whole text of Met. Λ in a shorter version, representing
the ‘bone structure’ only, afterward in more extensive version (see below 4.2), this
will be ‘fleshed out.’ Both versions are designed to give a first orientation of the
line of thought as I see it and to lay out reasons for my choice of the key propositions
(KP). In the last part of this chapter (4.3) I gather together all these sentences in a
list.4
Sentence I
The first sentence is so fundamentally important that it must be separated from the
rest. In this sentence Aristotle concentrates the complex and broad discourse of
the tradition on the question of the meaning of being. The appropriate method for
treating with this question is theory, he says, and the point of view which guides
the question is what is being as the primary. At the same time, he integrates the
insight obtained in the Sophist, that theDoxa about being underlies all other opin-
ions because, being ourselves in a certain world, we cannot do other than follow
3 See the remarks at the end of a series of first considerations about becoming. If external moving
causes and causes, like the logos, are distinguished (Met. Λ 3.9), we do not need ideas as causes of
becoming (Met. Λ 3.11); cf. too Met. A 9, 991a8–11, 991b3–9 et al.
4 It is useful to compare this outline with other outlines in different contributions in the Symposium
Aristotelicum onMet. Λ, 2000 and with the dispositions given by M. Bordt, 2006 or by Garcia, 2011;
also the new commentaries by F. Baghdassarian and L. Judson provide us with very useful outlines
of the text; of course, there are many commonalities but divergences too, which find their reasons in
the different goals of the authors.
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its prevailing opinion about being. A large part of the Commentary is devoted to
the explanation of this one sentence, because we must make explicit the different
lines of tradition which are hidden in this sentence. We must understand what it is
a consequence of and of what it is an altenative. Because Met. Λ is, as it were, a
parallel text to Theophrastus’Met. we have to consider its relation to that text. And
lastly we must keep in mind Aristotle’s other early works which belong to the same
horizon of questions.
Group of sentences II
The chapters 1 to 5 have an introductory character and purpose. They explain the
sense of the question about being. They set out, further, which other questions this
question is connected to, they show the method to follow and state that the endoxa
are its basis. Aristotle displays his repertoire of concepts, which makes possible the
asking of the question. He wants to make understandable the being of the beings
starting from endoxa. The first five chapters are incomplete and they show it. They
make clear that by the means they use, the theory which the first sentence calls
for cannot be provided and that, if we cannot determine being, then neither can we
determine becoming.
Group of sentences III
In the chapters 6 and 7 we find a third group of sentences containing two speculative
highlights. The first seven phrases of chapter 6 prepare for the first speculative high
point, presented in Met. Λ 6.8 (= KP 12 ). This sentence designates a kind of unity
of ousia and energeia as the first outcome of the theory; the following text draws
out some conclusions from this result. The next key propositions, KP 13–16, have
partly cosmological content, partly they consider the connection between noesis and
ousia. The last key proposition in this group, KP 17, unites, in a second speculative
high point the insights thus far reached, in a thought which can be represented in
the formula {οὐσία← νόησις→ἐνέργεια /Doxa}, and Aristotle calls, what he has
done, ‘theory.’ In these chapters Aristotle tries to make comprehensible ‘the first,’
which as being (als Sein) is the cause of becoming, but itself has no becoming. Here
we find the central point of the speculative sketch.
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Group of sentences IV
In the fourth and last part we find additions, independent of each other, to the theory
of the foregoing chapters. Chapter 8 has cosmological interests, chapter 9 presents
clarifications and reflections on some concepts and sentences used in the specula-
tive sketch of chapters 6 and 7. The questions mainly concern nous und noesis.
Chapter 10 deals with some aporias, the first being the most important. It concerns
the question of how it is possible to concile his speculative sketch with Plato’s idea
of the good. After this short summary, I add a more detailed outline, which should
make plausible my selection of the key propositions.
4.2. Establishing the Key Propositions (KP)
4.2.1. The First Key Proposition,Met. Λ 1.1 = KP 1
In this section I omit translation of the key propositions, which can be found above in
the translation of Met. Λ. In the Commentary they will be re-introduced to facilitate
reading.
The first sentence of Met. Λ must be selected as a KP. It is only seemingly simple
and short. If we try to uncover its background we see how complex it really is
and how rich its content is and how manifold its relations. At the same time it is a
synthesis of the whole philosophical tradition and offers an alternative against it. In
the first chapter of the commentary, Part III, 5, “First Key Proposition,” I will show
the historical background of this sentence. First, it names the subject of the inquiry,
peri ousias: “What is the meaning of being?” then it names the appropriate method,
theoria. The second sentence names the point of view from which the question has
to be asked, namely in which sense being, Sein, is primary.
Plato had shown in the Sophist that there are certain opinions about being: partly as
in the opinions of philosophers, partly because to be is used in current language in
many ways. That is the reason why it is necessary to examine the logos (Soph. 259e
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ff.). The Topics prove that Aristotle is well aware of this fact. In this book he reflects
on the use of predicates and in theOrganon, in general, he tries to clarify the use of to
be and to guard the discourse against the effects of sophisms. Among the multitude
of opinions we cannot expect a harmonious agreement between the different users of
to be because everyone continues to maintain his opinion about to be, explicitly or
implicitly. If we do not want to continue merely setting opinion against opinion, we
must desist frommaking any contentions about being. New contentions about being
could be nomore than new variants of the old contentiousness. There is no other way
out of the difficulty of the philosophical discourse, than to reflect upon that which
has previously been asserted about being and to analyze these contentions. We have
especially to reflect on the implicit meaning of to be, hidden in our speaking where
a latent contention lies which we hardly can be aware of, which, nevertheless, is
implied in every statement. The guest from Elea in the Sophist (242–244) found
precisely this to be the case and this observation was the inspiration for Aristotle to
make being, Sein, the subject of Met. Λ. The opening sentence of the book is the
first key proposition.
KP 1 Met. Λ 1.1 (1069a18) Περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία· τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αἰ ἀρχαὶ
καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦνται.
4.2.2. The Group of Sentences inMet. Λ 1–5: KP 2 up to KP 10
Met. Λ 1.2–1.8.
The first sentence is a result of the discourse in the Old Academy, in the time before
Plato died. Its traces can be tracked back in particular in the Sophist, the Timaeus,
in Theophrastus’ Metaphysics and Aristotle’s early work. The question about the
use of to be (εἶναι), had become the most urgent question to ask. It is always the
philosopher’s task to ask after what is primary, the same is true asking the question
about being, the question Aristotle took on as the subject of Met. Λ. In contrast to
all other questions this question asks for a ground which has no other ground. Being
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cannot be grounded, but its structure can be detected.
In the first five chapters the question is limited to the being of natural beings, be-
cause these are the least contested. The first questions are: How are being and
becoming related? What is primary in being, what primary in becoming? In the set
of becoming beings, what has itself a becoming and what not? Which are grounds
and elements of becoming? When we consider the different ways the Presocratics
treated their theme – to pan – and how Plato spoke about being and becoming in the
Timaeus, then we see that ousia remains the most urgent theme in the background.
In the following sentences (Λ 1.2–1.6) Aristotle gives three reasons, why being is
necessarily the first topic for his inquiry. Ousia is the first with respect to which
something is said. Further, it is only about ousia that we can speak in an indepen-
dent way, apart from all other beings and, finally, the ‘ancients’ too have always
asked after the causes of being. Modern thinkers,5 by contrast, think that it es more
the universals that are the ousia, while the ancients (i. e. the Presocratics) more the
particular things.
Aristotle extends the last doxographic remark to a little chart summarizing the pre-
vailing opinions about being. He combines the criteria of perceptibility and perisha-
bility and designates four groups of beings (1.7). If we look around us – taking into
account both immediate perception and prevailing opinions – then all beings can be
classified as perceptible things, some of them perishable, others not (as far as was
observable at the time). Beside these there are beings perceptible and not perish-
able. In this list there are also beings not perceptible but perishable, but it seems that
this class of beings is empty or that they play no special role. – This classification
is not part of an Aristotelian system, it is no more than an organized collection of
opinions, set up along the lines of his own terminology. Aristotle does not draw
further conclusions from his list. From the text we can deduce the following table
4.1 “Classification of beings.”
In this table, 1. means beings around us; 2. the heavenly bodies; 3. would be
5 He is thinking of Plato and the members of the Academy. Cf. the opinions about the reference
reported by E. Berti, 2016, 73f.
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ousia perishable not perishable
perceptible 1 2
not perceptible 3 4
Table 4.1.: Classification of beings
perishable things below the threshold of perception; 4. a group exemplified by the
ideas and mathematical entities.
The second key proposition gives this classification of endoxa:
KP 2 Met. Λ 1.7 (1069a30–36) οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν αἰσθηθή, ἧς ἡ μὲν φθαρτή,
ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἡ δὲ ἀΐδιος, ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ
στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πολλά· ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ταύτην φασί τινες
εἶναι χωριστήν, οἱ μὲν εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες, οἱ δὲ εἰς μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ
εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, οἱ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων.
Afterwards we must look for the principles, on which these opinions are based.
Met. Λ 1.9–5.11
With sentence 1.9 a long section opens, which continues up to the end of chapter
5. From the given list Aristotle treats the way of being of perceptible beings, ousia
aisthete, and its causes. He translates the common opinions into his terminology.
That is the content of the third key proposition:
KP 3 Met. Λ 1.9 (1069b3) Ἡ δ’ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή.
The sentences 2.3 to 2.8 contain a reflection on the conceptual core of perceptible
beings, namely metabole. If we wish to know the cause, which has no becoming
we have to clarify which features of beings have a becoming and which not. The
fourth sentence gives a partial answer, which will be justified in the subsequent
sentences:
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KP 4 Met. Λ 3.1 (1069b35–36) Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος,
λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα.
If hyle und eidos have no becoming it must be asked, whether they are the being
(Sein) which is searched for. If that should prove not to be the case, what else has
no becoming in the process of genesis must be clarified. What is primary in this
process, what can initiate it? To give an answer, Aristotle analyzes the structure of
becoming: something becomes something by means of something else. In 3.4 he
formulates the principle underlying this structure: Every being comes to be through
another synonymous being. InMet. Λ 1.7 Aristotle spoke of three groups of beings
to give a first orientation. Now the question shifts from the being in general to the
proper being. The fifth key proposition lists up three manners of proper being:
KP 5 Met. Λ 3.7 (1070a9–13) οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἡ μὲν ὕλη τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι
(ὅσα γὰρ ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει, ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον), ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι
εἰς ἥν, καὶ ἕξις τις· ἔτι τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἡ καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷον Σωκράτης ἢ
Καλλίας.
In this case, too, we must not forget that Aristotle presents in this sentence not a
system of his own but only endoxa, conceptualized in his terminology. If we asked
someone “What do you think this actually is?” we would receive just these three
answers, depending on the situation in which we have posed our question: it is
what it is made of (“that is flesh”), or it is the essence of the thing (“this is a man”),
or it is the particular being constituted by both (“this is Socrates”). Afterwards he
studies the finite and changeable natural being with respect to its coming to be and
the causes for that process, provided that the natural being can be captured with the
concepts of hyle, eidos and to ek touton. Now it is obvious that hyle and eidos are
causes but do not come to be (3.1); and, neither of them can initiate the process of
becoming. Aristotle is widening, therefore, the range of causes with the distinction
that there are causes, which come together with the caused being and others which
are prior to the being caused. That is the sixth key proposition:
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KP 6 Met. Λ 3.9 (1070a21–23) τὰ μὲν οὖν κινοῦντα αἴτια ὡς προγεγενημένα ὄντα,
τὰ δ’ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἅμα.
The following sentences which conclude the chapter partly explain this sentence and
partly analyze the claim that ideas could be causes in the sense which is relevant
here. We have seen that only to ek touton is an ousia, which comes to be. Up
to this point ousia has been a thematic concept, derived from endoxa, now it is
used as a terminus, namely insofar as ousia is a category, determinable by the other
categories. If ousia is the first category, then the question of whether its causes and
elements are also causes and elements of the other categories or not may be posed.
This question underlies the seventh key proposition:
KP 7 Met. Λ 4.1 (1070a31–33) Τὰ δ’ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι
δ’ ὡς, ἂν καθόλου λέγῃ τις καὶ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ταὐτὰ πάντων.
In 4.3–4.9 Aristotle presents a negative answer. The first and the second categories
cannot have the same causes, because we cannot find anything that could be more
general than the categories. In 4.10–4.17 he gives a second conciliating answer,
namely that in some sense there is a common ground for all beings in some sense
there is not. In 4.13 he resorts to the distinction of causes from 3.9. He asks anew
the question whether all categories can have the same causes by the light of distin-
guishing the causes into internal and external ones. This section ends abruptly with
an addendum, the question about the first moving cause: I select this sentence as
the eighth key proposition.
KP 8 Met. Λ 4.17 (1070b35) ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα ὡς τὸ πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν πάντα.
In chapter 5 there is a third answer to the question about the common causes of all
categories. The basis of this answer is the idea that that which is a cause for the
ousia is a cause too for the other categories, but only in a mediated way because
ousia is choriston but the other categories cannot be without ousia. Aristotle calls
this answer a ‘first way.’ In the ninth key proposition (5.4) he presents a secondway;
that is the fourth answer to the question of how all beings can have the same aitia and
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archai. This answer is based on the distinction between actuality and potentiality.
KP 9 Met. Λ 5.4 (1071a4ff) ἔτι δ’ ἄλλον τρόπον τῷ ἀνάλογον ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί, οἷον
ἐνέργεια καὶ δύναμις· ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλως.
Sentence 5.6 points to the fact that it is not the same thing, to take something as a
cause in a general way or not. – Aristotle introduces the concluding review with the
tenth key proposition, which is about the first causes:
KP 10 Met. Λ 5.7 (1071a18f) πάντων δὴ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ πρῶτον τοδὶ καὶ
ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει.
The rest, 5.10–5.11, is summary.
4.2.3. The Group of Sentences inMet. Λ 6–7: KP 11–18
For most interpreters the chapters 6 to 10 form a second section within Met. Λ,
both in style and content.6 The dividing difference in content is, following the stan-
dard interpretation, that in the first chapters the perceptible ousiai are the subject,
whereas in the second five chapters Aristotle develops his theology.7 As for style,
chapters 1 to 5 have rather more the character of notes, as do many other parts in
Aristotle’s pragmaties.8 Many sentences are incomplete and written in mere se-
ries without connecting particles. In contrast, chapters 6 to 10 are elaborated more,
many sentences connected with connecting particles.9 While the division into two
stylistically different parts is evident and not contested, this is not the case for the
theological content of the second part. Chapter 8 has a cosmological subject, a
theological sense is arrived at only by detours and in chapter 9 too the word ‘god’
is neither used nor does god play any role. The word ‘god’ is used four times (first
6 L. Judson tries to minimize the difference between the two parts, but the linguistic arguments for the
difference are stronger than his.
7 See e. g. W. Jaeger in the critical apparatus ad loc.: c. 1–5 physicas substantias, c. 6–10 theologiam
tractans.
8 W. Jaeger, 1912, 125–6; id., 1923, 229.
9 ἔτι, οὖν, ἄρα, ἀλλά, ἀλλ’: in chapters 1–5: 0,175 per line, in 6–10: 0,315 per line.
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at 1072b24) in chapter 7. Each time it is used as an example, such as in chapter
8 where Aristotle speaks about god ἐν μύθου σχήματι (“in a mythical manner,”
1074b1; see above, fn. 2.2.4, p. 139).
The leading question of how we are to understand the unmoved being (Sein), which
is capable of setting in motion, remains the same in both parts. This question, how-
ever, is treated with a theoretical and a cosmological interest. As concerns the cos-
mological side it is the search for the first being in the realm of natural beings that
can set in motion something. In this ontic range it is legitimate to give the question
a theological turn even if theology is not the subject proper of Met. Λ. Nearer to the
issue is Theophrastus’ question at the beginning of his Metaphysics or that result-
ing from the Timaeus and even that which Kant considered in his Opus postumum,
namely how to understand the transition from the noetic world to the factual world
of our everyday life.
Precisely this question is the focus of Aristotle’s research. If the endoxa are reduced
to their fundamentals then we are compelled to ask for the connection of these noetic
concepts and distinctions to our perceptible world. The results of our reflection on
the fundamentals of our opinions must have a connection with what we perceive.
Cosmological interests exclusively dominate chapter 8. In chapter 9 Aristotle treats
some theoretical questions following the considerations about noesis, in chapter 10
he returns to Platonic questions. Aristotle tries to integrate Plato’s thoughts about
the good, because the Platonic good is in some way comparable to his own concept
of {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια / Doxa}. Here too we divide the whole text in
two parts as the standard interpretations does, but the second part must itself be still
further divided into the chapters 6 and 7 with their speculative highlights and the
following chapters 8 to 10, which contain addenda, reflections, specifications of
what has been previously said.10
10 P. Donini, denotes chapters 9 and 10 as annexes, see “Il libro lambda della Metafisica e la nascita
della filosofia prima” in: Rivista di storia della filosofia, (2002), 181-199.
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4.2.3.1. Met. Λ 6
In chapter 6, Aristotle first reflects on the results of the five foregoing chapters. He
does not set out a new approach in this second part, but continues the question about
the being which is able to ground becoming on a higher level. The leading questions
remain: “How the movement of natural beings (ousiai physikai) is possible?” or
“What sort of being (Sein) can ground the emergence of natural beings?” Now
Aristotle asks which conditions underlie that being. The concept of movement is the
same as in the Physics: “Movement is the actuality of a possible being as such”; this
concept of movement must not be restricted to the cosmological aspect of movement
or even tomotion in a scientific sense or in the sense of creation. Further wemust not
forget that Aristotle switches without further notice between the different views, the
view on natural beings and the theoretical view of the question about the meaning
of being.
Met. Λ 6.1–6.8
KP 11 Met. Λ 6.1 (1071b3–5) Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαὶ μία
δ’ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀΐδιόν τινα οὐσίαν
ἀκίνητον.
Considering the three manners of being (mentioned in Met. Λ 1.7) Aristotle starts
with the thesis that there must be an unmoved eternal being. The reason at that
point is that, if becoming must be grounded in being (Sein), one manner of being
(Seinsweise) must be eternal, unmoved and necessary, for otherwise either a regres-
sion begins or all things would be perishable and in consequence have perished. In
conceptual terms we can conceive a beginning or an end neither for the movement
nor for time. This contention, that movement cannot end, only means that we cannot
think of a beginning or an end of movement, it is not a physical statement. If we try
to formulate the beginning or the end of time or movement, we inevitably run into
contradiction. That we cannot conceive a consistent concept of the beginning of
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movement in some sense means the same as the problem in modern physics, which
says that there is no possible equation for the ‘point zero.’ This means that there is
no equation possible ‘for the time before’ the Big Bang, out of which the Big Bang
would have been the result. That is simply not calculable. The same is true for the
beginning of movement.
We can summarize the first seven sentences of the chapter in the following way:
The answer to the question whether and how natural movement initiates is that, on
the one hand, we cannot conceptually define such beginning of movement in time
on the other that “eternal ousiai” such as for example, the Platonic ideas are of no
use, and nevertheless the natural movement cannot be conceived without an actual
moving. This is what Aristotle maintains in the eighth sentence, which forms the
first theoretical high point, formulating the necessary and sufficient condition of the
ousia for which he is searching:
KP 12 Met. Λ 6.8 (1071b20) δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια.
Aristotle later repeats the claim that the movement without a temporal beginning
needs an origin whose being is actuality, e. g. inMet. Z 9, 1034a31f. and 1034b16–
19, saying that without actual being there cannot be any becoming.
Met. Λ 6.9–6.10
The sentences 6.9–6.10 draw out the consequences of 6.8: Any such ousiamust not
have hyle. Only then will it fulfill the conditions of being eternal and actual. Such
an ousia, however, is not capable of producing the mixed or irregular movements
of the natural beings around us. Aristotle will treat this problem at the end of the
chapter, 6.22–6.28.
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Met. Λ 6.11–6.12
In the sentences 6.11–6.12 Aristotle reflects on the result of 6.8 and adds some
further considerations. If the principle’s way of being (Seinsweise) is actuality we
are confronted with the aporia whether or not actuality really is prior to potentiality.
Some could say that actuality requires potentiality, because only what was potential
can become actual; if that were true, potentiality would be prior and the principle,
whose being is actuality, would not be the first.
Met. Λ 6.13–6.22
In 6.13–6.22 Aristotle considers some alternatives to his thesis in 6.8, for example
what theologians and physicists or Leucippus and Plato have said (especially in
Timaeus 30a). What if everything originates “out from the night,” or if it would be
right to say “Everything is in everything” or if the origin were the self-movement?
Aristotle can reply that even the contrasting theses must accept in addition an actual
being as the origin.
Met. Λ 6.23–6.29
Aristotle raises an issue with the theoretical insight of 6.8. A being remaining un-
changingly itself can produce only a movement which is always the same. In fact,
we do see different and changing movements in the nature around us and even in
the heavens. What is the reason for the change and the alteration of these move-
ments? To explain this Aristotle uses his distinction between καθ’ αὑτό and κατ’
ἄλλο (‘with respect to itself’ and ‘with respect to other beings’). The being named
in 6.8 acts with respect to itself in always the same way, with respect to others dif-
ferently.
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4.2.3.2. Met. Λ 7
Met. Λ 7.1–7.3
In chapter 7 we find some considerations about the meaning of “setting in motion
while being unmoved.” The sphere of the fixed stars can set in motion eternally,
because it moves in a circle (according to the state of knowledge at that time). All
other natural movements (the movement of the sun in the first instance) must be
derived from this first movement, in amediated fashion, of course. The other natural
movements on Earth are, for their part, derived from the movement of the sun. In
De Generatione et Corruptione, B 10, Aristotle discusses the same fact. To the
question “Why is there life?” he answers “Because of the sun and its movement.”
Here, in Met. Λ, he tries to refer the theoretical insight to the natural beings: it be
necessarily possible to realize the theoretical condition (formulated in 6.8) in the
actual cosmos. It thereby becomes immediately evident that the sphere of the fixed
stars cannot fulfill the required condition because it is moved, even if eternally and
in a circular motion. In a cosmological sense that sphere may be an origin, but not
in the speculative sense. The first being, unmoved but setting in motion, must be
unmoved in any form. In the combination of the positive and negative positions
of ‘setting in motion’ and ‘being moved’ we look for the ‘setting in motion while
being unmoved,’ which denotes a further criterium for the primary being sought
after. The 13th key proposition lays out this position:11
KP 13 Met. Λ 7.3 (1072a25f.) [...] τοίνυν ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ
οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα.
We know that this first being is eternal, being (ousia) and actuality. But we cannot
find such a thing neither in the range of astronomical nor in the range of terrestrial
beings. Therefore we have to give up the astronomical view of the problem in favor
of the speculative. What else, if not the sun and the sphere of the fixed stars can
move in the required manner?
11 Fazzo writes ἐνεργείᾳ, I prefer the nominative of the maniscripts.
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Met. Λ 7.4–7.15
These phrases do not continue the previous line of thought, they start another anew:
we must get beyond the sun, the stars and the like to a more essential primary. – In
which sense does the first setting in motion do this while remaining unmoved itself?
If one takes the term ‘which sets in motion itself unmoved’ in a naturalistic sense,
one must say that such a thing cannot be since the possibility of being in motion
is essential to natural beings. To make understandable what he means Aristotle
is pointing to an unmoved moving ‘thing’ in our everyday experience. He wants
to show that ‘to set in motion while itself unmoved’ is no mystery. What we are
striving for, what we are expecting, even what we think of does move us exactly
that way. That is the 14th key proposition:
KP 14 Met. Λ 7.4 (1072a26) κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν· κινεῖ οὐ
κινούμενα.
If we distinguish the setting in motion and the moved as the two aspects of move-
ment, then that which we think of and that which we strive for are on the unmoved
side as the for-the-sake-of our thinking and striving, while the nous or the orexis
(desire), are on the moved side. That means that the noeton, the perceived, is on the
unmoved side, the nous on the moved side. The noeton is, then, more original and
principal than the nous, because the latter is moved. Noesis is the primal unity of
both, noeton and nous. And this noesis, not nous, is the unmoved origin, whereby
it is essential to take noesis not as the activity or behavior of an active being or of a
subject.
KP 15 Met. Λ 7.7 (1072a30–32) νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα
συστοιχία καθ’ αὑτήν· καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ
κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ( [...] )
Another consideration confirms that it is correct to place the for-the-sake-of with the
unmoved (7.9). That for which the for-the-sake-of is a for-the-sake-of, is moved,
the for-the-sake-of itself is not. We must find the transition from the first mov-
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ing cause which sets in motion as does a ‘strived for’ or a ‘thought of,’ and which
moves as a telos, to the factual natural movements, which we see around us (7.10).
Therefore the cosmological interest comes to the foreground. The section ends with
the famous note “The heavens and the physis depend on such an origin” (7.15). I
choose this as the next key proposition, because it shows that even the heavens and
the physis depend on ‘something,’ they are not the first origin we look for. They
are origins, to be sure, but only cosmological or astronomical ones. The speculative
origin cannot be found elsewhere in the cosmos or in another area of beings, but
principally outside of it.
KP 16 Met. Λ 7.15 (1072b13f.) ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ
φύσις.
Met. Λ 7.16–7.23
Aristotle now considers what ‘actuality’ of the first origin can mean. Here we find
the second speculative highlight, where being, actuality and noesis are joined. He
reminds us about our opinions about god, as before he had reminded us of the un-
derstanding of the strived for, thus can he make more plausible what he means by
‘setting in motion unmoved.’ A common opinion about gods should make evident
and understandable the speculation about being.
The distinction between a thing that sets in motion and a moved thing (7.7–7.8) is
no more valid. In this noesis nous and noeton can no longer be distinguished as
they are in everyday life. The actuality of the noesis is at once also the actuality
of the ousia and this actuality of the ousia is the goal of becoming. But that is not
that which we can describe a posteriori in the case of the becoming of a particular
natural being and in which many material processes are involved. No, it is instead
the noesis in which the transition from steresis to eidos takes place; something like
a thought a priori. The three sentences which state this may be classed the 17th key
proposition:
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KP 17 Met. Λ 7.17–7.19 (1072b18–24) ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ’ αὑτὴν τοῦ καθ’ αὑτὸ
ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. αὑτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν
τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ
νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων,
ὥστ’ ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ
ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον.
Met. Λ 7.24–7.25
In the following sentencesAristotle discusses the alternatives given by the Pythagore-
ans and Speusippus. They think that the best and most beautiful cannot be at the
beginning, but must be as a result at the end.
Met. Λ 7.26–7.27
The chapter concludes with an extensive and typical final sentence (ὅτι μὲν οὖν
[...]). Aristotle recapitulates there the determinations of the being (Sein), which is
being sought. They are determinations, which Parmenides has used to denote being.
They are not designations for a thing, a being (Seieindes), not even for god, but for
{οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια / Doxa}; in short, for being. This is the 18th key
proposition.
KP 18 Met. Λ 7.26 (1073a3–12) ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος
καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· δέδεικται δὲ
καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ’ ἀμερὴς καὶ
ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν (κινεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δ’ ἔχει δύναμιν
ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον· ἐπεὶ δε πᾶν μέγεθος ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πεπερασμένον,
πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι μέγεθος)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀπαθὲς
καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι κινήσεις ὕστεραι τῆς κατὰ τόπον.
This sentence is only a summary of problems discussed, nevertheless it includes
a novelty with regard to the criteria for being named so far, namely kath’ hauto
legomenon, choriston, energeia, aletheia. Here Aristotle adds the criterion τὸ
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πρῶτον κινοῦν ὡς τὸ τέλος (“the first setting in motion in the sense of a goal”).
This last is the determination for that which initiates movement, which is not god,
even less the nous, but being (Sein). choriston energeia
4.2.4. The Group of Sentences inMet. Λ 8–10: KP 19 until 30
The three last chapters toomust be read from the perspective of the leading question:
What can be the basis for becoming? But in these chapters we have only some
additions to issues discussed already previously. There is no connection on the
subject such that, for example, the themes in chapters 9 or 10 could be seen to
follow from what is said in chapter 8.
In chapter 8 Aristotle takes up the cosmological and astronomical concern of the
question. In this chapter the speculative view is scarcely present. It deals mainly
with the first cause that can set in motion in a sense comparable to its treatment
in De Caelo, De philosophia and Physics Θ, because it is mainly about the fac-
tual movements of the natural beings and the manner of their connection with the
speculative first moving. In Met. Λ 1–7 Aristotle has developed the sense of the
question about the being which grounds becoming as its for-the-sake-of. This ques-
tion has found its answer in two speculative high points, I summarize this answer in
the formula {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια / Doxa}. Now, in chapter 8, it follows
a cosmological answer to the question about the being which grounds becoming.
In Met. Λ 9 Aristotle gives some specifications of what had been said concerning
noesis and nous in Met. Λ 7. The argument in Λ 9 is completely independent from
the cosmological digression in the foregoing chapter.
In Met. Λ 10 Aristotle wishes to include Plato’s thoughts concerning the good as
expressed in the Timaeus. This is very reasonable since, for Theophrastus too, it
represented a major question in his Metaphysics. The reason for this, as it seems,
was that it was a much debated subject in the Academy, as can be seen by Speusip-
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pus’ divergent theses.12
Met. Λ 8
Met. 8.1–5
In the first section of chapter 8 Aristotle treats the question of how many “such
ousiai” we have to accept in order to explain the observable movements. He puts
the question in 8.1, our 19th key proposition:
KP 19 Met. Λ 8.1 (1073a14–17) Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ
πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων
ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι περὶ πλήθους οὐθὲν εἰρήκασιν ὅ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν.
It has been noted ever since as a problem that here Aristotle admits a plurality for
something which seemed clearly to be unique. The difficulty disappears when the
question in this chapter is not considered as a speculative but as a cosmological one
concerning the factual movements of natural beings, which is very different from
the speculative question about the ousia. It is not, of course, the cosmological aspect
that is at the core of the overall project. Instead, because the subject is important
and there are definite opinions about it does Aristotle wish to consider it under this
aspect too (8.2). But nothing of what he reports about these cosmological conditions
is said as his own thesis. He often he repeats his reservatio mentalis, on which we
shall see more detail in the commentary. A first part of the answer is the 20th key
proposition:
KP 20 Met. Λ 8.3 (1073a23–25) ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον
καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν
κίνησιν· [...]
12 See A. Graeser, 1999, 2002 und 2003.
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Met. Λ 8.6–8.16
Aristotle opens the second section asking which kind of knowledge can be appro-
priate in these issues. From here I draw the next key proposition:
KP 21 Met. Λ 8.6 (1073b3–6) τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης
φιλοσοφίᾳ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας·
αὕτη γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν ἀϊδίου δὲ ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, [...]
Saying that astronomy is the appropriate science to determine the number and form
of heavenlymovements Aristotle shows that he is clear about the difference between
the subjects of chapters 6–7 and 8, because here it is cosmology not theory. Aristotle
offers three answers. It is not his aim to sort out ‘the right one’ from among these,
his aim is to make more concrete the general cosmological considerations (8.7).
Aristotle presents the models of the spheres: that of Eudoxus, that of Callipus and
his own model, with several reservations. All models should explain the transitivity
of the movement from the first setting in motion to the last moved from, as it were,
the sun’s orbit to the trembling leaf in the wind. In this section there is also nothing
about theology and even the cosmological remarks are made as examples.
Met. Λ 8.17–8.20
For the question of whether the heavens are unique or not compare De Caelo, De
philosophia and in Physics Θ.
Met. Λ 8.21–8.23
The sentences 8.21–8.23 conclude the chapter. Here we find some remarks concern-
ing traditional views of the stars and the gods. Aristotle makes it as clear as possi-
ble, that he wants to speak about tradition in the common sense (1074b9 ὅτι θεοὺς
οἴοντο τὰς τρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι, “…that they believed, that gods are the first in
being;” 1074b13 πάτριος δόξα, “what our ancestors believed” etc.). It ought, then,
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be clear that no theological or speculative conclusions can be drawn from these re-
marks. What is being said here is of a different kind, its object is cosmological and
it refers to traditional opinions and beliefs.
Still, it is very important to ask how the speculative result fits together with cosmo-
logical reality. Plato asked this question in the Timaeus and for Theophrastus it was
the leading question of his Metaphysics. We have thoughts and we have percep-
tions. Our thinking does not produce what we see, but, nevertheless it determines
what we see in particular in that we had seen it in principle in advance. Going
back to Aristotle’s formula in Λ 9.10 we may say: we can perceive3 only because
we have perceived1; “to perceive3” means our particular and factual perception,
“to perceive1” means the noetic structure which underlies a given set of prevailing
opinions (i. e. the fundamental opinions which form a world).
The cosmological question has its own rightful place beside the theoretical question,
but, it is of a completely different kind of questioning. The one is theoretical, aiming
at the fundamentals of given opinions; the other is astronomical science, having
provisional presumptions, able to be revised at any time through the findings of
new observations. Therefore Aristotle expresses his reservtions in Met. Λ 8.9 and
13 as well as in 8.22–8.23. Astronomy is not about being (Sein) but about beings
(Seiendes). In the range of beings too there is, of course, a first or primary and there
is a transmission of movement from former to later. In the commentary on this
section I will explore in detail the parallels between this distinction and the division
of the Timaeus into a first part ‘without chora’ and a second part ‘with chora.’
The concordance of this division with Kant’s different aims in the Metaphysischen
Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft and in the Opus postumum as “Übergangs-
problem” has been the theme of my work elsewhere (2015).
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Met. Λ 9
Met. Λ 9.1–9.7
The ninth chapter can be divided into four sections. The first section (9.1–9.7)
develops some alternatives to the question of what the nous is thinking about using
some simple distinctions. The starting point for these considerations is 9.1, our next
key proposition:
KP 22 Met. Λ 9.1 (1074b15) Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ
εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον, [...]
Met. Λ 9.8–9.10
In 9.8–9.10 Aristotle gives an answer to the question asked in 9.1, he says that the
nous thinks himself. This answer is a reformulation of what the second speculative
highlight has prepared (7.16–7.20 = KP 17). The tenth sentence of this chapter is
rightly one of themost famous sentences of thewholeCorpus Aristotelicum and can-
not be omitted from our the list of key propositions. It confirms that the noesis now
is at the core of the formula for to be: {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια / Doxa}.
KP 23 Met. Λ 9.10 (1074b34) αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν
νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.
Met. Λ 9.11–9.15
In the third section a possible objection to the reflexivity of the nous presented in
9.10 is adduced. The objection becomes the more plausible the more the reflection
is thought to be without content. A valuable knowledge normally refers to some-
thing else than to itself. I choose the consideration which introduces the speculative
counter-reaction as the next key proposition:
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KP 24 Met. Λ 9.14 (1075a1–3) ἢ ἐπ’ ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν
ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ
λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις.
It seems that the distinction between knowledge of a the thing and thing itself is not
always as easy to make as we might.
Met. Λ 9.16–9.17
The chapter concludes with some considerations on another aporia (9.16–9.17).
Aristotle asks whether his theory holds true even if the object of our thinking is
composed. We must not forget that the result in Met. Λ 7 was not a divine mind.
No question and no problem following such a line of interpretation could contribute
anything to the matter. It does not matter whether there are gods at all or what gods
think or do not, because the theory about being is at stake, its result is representable
in the formula: {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια / Doxa}. The subject is the noesis
as the for-the-sake-of becoming which moves unmoved.
Met. Λ 10
The tenth chapter opens with a question, which is immediately answered in 10.2.
The rest of the chapter consists of a loose compilation of critical remarks on other
views, partly in a series of questions which are relevant for the question about the
first cause that sets in motion. The speculative insight is not expanded. The key
propositions are thus only loosely connected to one another, the main point of the
list is that they be retained in mind.
Met. Λ 10.1–10.6
The question and its answer are:
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KP 25 Met. Λ 10.1 (1075a11–13) Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις
τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό, ἢ
τὴν τάξιν. (10.2) ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα.
This question, how the nature of the whole contains the good, whether as something
separate or as the order of the whole, immediately follows the last sentence of the
forgoing chapter (9.17), in a mediated form picking up the question of the Timaeus.
For Theophrastus that question is at the core of hisMetaphysics. It seems to be an
eagerly debated question in the Academy. Aristotle examines whether it is possible
to combine his insight with what Plato has said about the good. Some interpreters
say that the concept of the pros hen does not play a role in Met. Λ. It may be that
this is not quite so true as they strongly propose. At any rate, this thought is to be
found in 10.5 (“All things are ordered to one thing [...]”). The first and one, with
respect to which all other beings are, is the prote ousia, now grasped in the formula
{being←awareness→reality / Doxa}. Beside this we have to take into account
other ‘firsts’ depending on the context.
Met. Λ 10.7–12
The sentences 10.7–10.12 deal with other views on the causes of becoming; they
employ the opposition in their account, but have nevertheless some shortcomings.
Met. Λ 10.13–10.25
In these sentences we have to do with the question of where in becoming the good
can be found, whether at the beginning or at the end of becoming. To the same
context belongs the question why some things are perishable and others not. That
is our key proposition 26:
KP 26 Met. Λ 10.24 (1075b13) καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ’ ἄφθαρτα οὐδεὶς λέγει·
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Met. Λ 10.26–10.27
The short section 10.26–10.27 asks two questions in some way only pro memoria.
Aristotle gives no answer, it may be that he thinks that the answer can be drawn
from the foregoing considerations.
KP 27 10.26 (1075b16–17) ἔτι διὰ τί ἀεὶ ἔσται γένεσις, καὶ τί αἴτιον γενέσεως οὐδεὶς
λέγει.
What is the cause of becoming? Aristotle points out that it is insufficient to use only
the two priniciples (on the necessity of relying on three principles see: Physics A 6,
Met. Λ 5, at the end) and that Plato’s ideas will not do (see also Met. Λ 10.31).
Met. Λ 10.28–10.29
The form of our knowledge of the primary is the subject of these sentences. Others
must accept an opposition in this knowledge, Aristotle not, which seems the better
position.
KP 28 Met. Λ 10.28 (1075b20–21) καὶ τοῖς μεν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ
τιμιωτάτῃ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναί τι εναντίον, ἡμῖν δ’οὔ.
Met. Λ 10.30–10.38
KP 29 Met. Λ 10.30 (1075b24–27) ἔτι εἰ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἴσθητὰ ἄλλα.
Aristotle points to the consequences if we assume that there is nothing beside the
perceptible beings, on the other hand he says negative consequences entail if we
assume ideas as non-perceptible beings beside the perceptible beings.
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Met. Λ 10.39–10.41
KP 30 Met. Λ 10.39 (1075b34–36) ἔτι τίνι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἓν ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ
ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲν λέγει οὐδείς·
The last sentences ask after the cause of unity, be it of numbers be it of body and
soul, be it of eidos and thing. In particular, Aristotle speaks about the problems
which arise, when we declare numbers as causes. This is in continuation of what
had been said about the theory of ideas, 10.30–10.38.
The book concludes with a citation from Homer: “It is not good, when many rule,
one alone should rule” (Iliad II, 204). It has been often said, that Aristotle here con-
firms his monotheism, to which conclusion his considerations about the Unmoved
Mover should lead. The cause of unity is probably deeper. It points to the unity,
which the world has in the noesis. The citation in 10.41 is inspired by the example
‘army’ in the second sentence of the chapter.
4.3. List of the Key Propositions
See the translation of Met. Λ in part II for the translation of these sentences. In the
commentary the translation will be repeated for the reader’s convenience.
Treated in Part III, Chapter 5:
KP 1 Met Λ 1.1 (1069a18–19) Περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία· τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ
καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦνται.
Treated in Part III, Chapter 6:
KP 2 Met Λ 1.7 (1069a30) οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν αἰσθηθή, ἧς ἡ μὲν φθαρτή,
ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἡ δὲ ἀΐδιος, ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ
στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πολλά· ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ταύτην φασί τινες
εἶναι χωριστήν, οἱ μὲν εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες, οἱ δὲ εἰς μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ
εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, οἱ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων.
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KP 3 Met Λ 1.9 (1069b3) Ἡ δ’ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή.
KP 4 Met Λ 3.1 (1069b35–36) Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος,
λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα.
KP 5 Met Λ 3.7 (1070a9–13) οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἡ μὲν ὕλη τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι
(ὅσα γὰρ ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει, ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον), ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι
εἰς ἥν, καὶ ἕξις τις· ἔτι τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἡ καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷον Σωκράτης ἢ
Καλλίας.
KP 6 Met Λ 3.9 (1070a21–22) τὰ μὲν οὖν κινοῦντα αἴτια ὡς προγεγενημένα ὄντα,
τὰ δ’ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἅμα.
KP 7 Met Λ 4.1 (1070a31–33) Τὰ δ’ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι
δ’ ὡς, ἂν καθόλου λέγῃ τις καὶ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ταὐτὰ πάντων.
KP 8 Met Λ 4.17 (1070b34–35) [...] ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα ὡς τὸ πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν
πάντα.
KP 9 Met Λ 5.4 (1071a3–5) ἔτι δ’ ἄλλον τρόπον τῷ ἀνάλογον ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί, οἷον
ἐνέργεια καὶ δύναμις· ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλως.
KP 10 Met Λ 5.7 (1071a18–19) πάντων δὴ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ πρῶτον τοδὶ καὶ
ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει.
Treated in Part III, Chapter 7:
KP 11 Met Λ 6.1 (1071b3–5) Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαὶ μία
δ’ ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀΐδιόν τινα οὐσίαν
ἀκίνητον.
KP 12 Met Λ 6.8 (1071b19–20) δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια.
Treated in Part III, Chapter 8:
KP 13 Met Λ 7.3 (1072a25–27) [...] τοίνυν ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ
οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα.
KP 14 Met Λ 7.4 (1072a26–27) κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν· κινεῖ οὐ
κινούμενα.
KP 15 Met Λ 7.7 (1072a30–32) νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα
συστοιχία καθ’ αὑτήν· καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ
κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ( [...] )
KP 16 Met Λ 7.15 (1072b13–14) ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ
φύσις.
KP 17 Met Λ 7.17 –19 (1072b18–24) ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ’ αὑτὴν τοῦ καθ’ αὑτὸ
ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. αὑτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν
τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ
νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων,
ὥστ’ ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ
ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον.
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KP 18 Met Λ 7.26 (1073a3–5) ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος
καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· δέδεικται δὲ
καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ’ ἀμερὴς καὶ
ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν (κινεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δ’ ἔχει δύναμιν
ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον· ἐπεὶ δε πᾶν μέγεθος ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πεπερασμένον,
πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι μέγεθος)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀπαθὲς
καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι κινήσεις ὕστεραι τῆς κατὰ τόπον.
Treated in Part III, Chapter 9:
KP 19 Met Λ 8.1 (1073a14–17) Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ
πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων
ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι περὶ πλήθους οὐθὲν εἰρήκασιν ὅ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν.
KP 20 Met Λ 8.3 (1073a23–25) ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον
καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν
κίνησιν·
KP 21 Met Λ 8.6 (1073b3–6) τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης
φιλοσοφίᾳ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας·
αὕτη γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν ἀϊδίου δὲ ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, [...]
Treated in Part III, Chapter 10:
KP 22 Met Λ 9.1 (1074b15) Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ
εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον, [... ]
KP 23 Met Λ 9.10 (1074b33–35) αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν
νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.
KP 24 Met Λ 9.14 (1074b38–1075a3) ἢ ἐπ ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν
ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ
λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις·
Treated in Part III, Chapter 8:
KP 25 Met Λ 10.1–2 (1075a11–13) Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου
φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ’
αὑτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν. ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα·
KP 26 Met Λ 10.24 (1075b13) καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ’ ἄφθαρτα οὐδεὶς λέγει.
KP 27 Met Λ 10.26 (1075b16–17) ἔτι διὰ τί ἀεὶ ἔσται γένεσις, καὶ τί αἴτιον γενέσεως,
οὐδεὶς λέγει.
KP 28 Met Λ 10.28 (1075b20–21) καὶ τοῖς μεν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῆ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ
τιμιωτάτῃ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναί τι ἐναντίον, ἡμῖν δ’οὔ.
KP 29 Met Λ 10.30 (1075b24–27) ἔτι εἰ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἴσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται
ἀρχή, ὥσπερ τοῖς θεολόγοις καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πᾶσιν.
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KP 30 Met Λ 10.39 (1075b34–36) ἔτι τίνι οἱ ἀριθμοι ἓν ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ
ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲν λέγει οὐδείς.
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5. The First Key Proposition: Met. Λ 1
The first sentence of Met. Λ is at once also its first key proposition.
KP 1 Met. Λ 1.1 (1069a18–19) Περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία· τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ
καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦνται.
The present theory concerns being <: ousia, Sein>; for it is the beings <: ousiai,
Seiendes> whose principles and causes are sought.
Because Met. Λ is an independent book, its opening cannot be connected with the
previous books, its backgroundmust be looked for elsewhere. Since the early dating
of Met. Λ is most likely, it becomes clear that its background is the Old Academy
and its origins.1 Of this context and its significance, we ought to take note. A major
reference point of the Academy is the Timaeus, insofar as this dialogue recapitulates
the Presocratic efforts to identify the principles of becoming at a higher level. As
concerns the question about being the Sophistes is essential, thus shall we examine
the relationship between Met. Λ and these influential dialogues. Since it is beyond
any doubt thatMet. Λ and Theophrastus’Metaphysics are contemporaneous works,
the relationship between these must be considered too and, finally, we must take
into account the point that Aristotle’s early works belong to the same context.
5.1. The Academic Background of KP 1
The Timaeus, Theophrastus’ Met. and Met. Λ stand on the ground of a common
question. Given the distinction between becoming and being in the Timaeus Plato
has sought to mediate between both in order to make understandable the world as we
1 See above, 3.3. But the dating does not touch the argument essentially; if someone would date the
book otherwise, the same texts could nevertheless be its background as an ideal the point of reference.
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experience it day by day. That mediation is achieved through the chora. Theophras-
tus’Metaphysics takes up the same theme, asking after the connection of ‘the first’
with ‘the second’ (§ 2). His conclusion too, that this connection is founded on the
fact that the second ‘aims at’ the first, is compatible with Plato’s that becoming is
for the sake of being, as well as with Aristotle’s answer: becoming is not possible
without being, and, the manner in which the ‘unmoved moving’ sets in motion is
comparable to the manner in which a desired being sets in motion.
Every philosophical theory must undergo the test of if and how it can explain what
is obvious in its respective world. Met. Λ too faces and meets this challenge, be-
cause here too Aristotle asks what we can experience and know, how and why that
is possible. The question about being as the ground of becoming is answered spec-
ulatively here, namely that to be means {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια / Doxa}.
Aristotle takes into account primarily the theoretical aspect but he is not completely
neglecting of the cosmological either.
“What is the origin?” can be asked in at least three ways. Either that question asks
after the beginning of this or that, or it asks after the beginning of the whole, or
it asks after the origin as such. The question is common to all three texts in the
different ways to ask it. In this chapter I try to substantiate the connections between
Met. Λ and the Timaeus, Theophrastus’ Met. and Aristotle’s early work.
5.1.1. Plato’s Late Dialogues
Let us consider at first the relationship obtaining between Met. Λ and the Timaeus.
What is the theme and the aim of this dialogue of Plato? What may it contribute to
the leading question, if Aristotle’s sentence περὶ οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία does correctly
summarizes its own tradition, a tradition in which the Timaeus too stands? There
are many different common themes shared betweenMet. Λ and the Timaeus, indeed
these are just the themes treated above in Part II, 2.
The tradition, which the standard interpretation follows, emphasized theology. Of-
ten Plato’s demiurge was identified with Aristotle’s ‘Unmoved Mover’; one de-
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scribed the gods populating the planets, the formation of the cosmos, the circular
movement of the stars and teleology as the ruling principle in the cosmos. While
not all of these claims can be verified, the nous is a common theme of both texts
without doubt.
Theology: the Demiurge
If the Timaeus is read as a text on the creation of the cosmos, as has been done
and as continues to be a great part of interpretative tradition,2 the demiurge will
inevitably be seen as a parallel to the Judeo-Christian God. Because in Met. Λ in
the standard interpretation to proton kinoun was changed into the masculine form
as the “First Mover” (a personal form never once occurring in the whole Corpus
Aristotelicum), it became considered as an anticipation of Christian theology and
suitable for serving as a philosophical fundament of its theology up until today.
The demiurge, the first moving cause and the Judeo-Christian God come to form a
lineage.3 That lineage can be drawn together only under the following conditions:
- if we are not to take into account the eikos logos in the Timaeus,
- when we reduce the four causes to the causa efficiens,
- in changing the neuter noun to kinoun into the masculine ho kinous,
- by reading the Timaeus, manifestly against the grain of the piece as a story about
creation.
I shall refrain from naming scholars who militate for these falsifying conditions of
interpretation. They stand, in any case, very much for the communis opinio, I add
only, that these assumptions are results of the long history of reception (Wirkungs-
geschichte), from which we must come clear. We do well to pay attention to the
function of the demiurge and ask what it is exactly that initiates mundane move-
2 As an example for many others see J. Rheins, 2010.
3 M. Bordt too opposes this view in his “Why Aristotle’s God is not the Unmoved Mover,” in: Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. XL, Summer 2011, 91–110. In Rapp, Handbuch, 2011, 367, he
points to the fact of the neuter form of the term, but resigns himself to the established traditional use,
370.
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ment in the Timaeus. That is by no means the demiurge, who creates only what is
immovable (69c). Movement begins only from the soul. That is the first cause, that
sets anything in motion. If the tertium comparationis must be the ability to initi-
ate movement, then the demiurge is not the right candidate to be Aristotle’s kinoun
akineton. The demiurge is a mythical character, the usefulness of which being that
it makes it possible to speak of the noetic foundation of the world-order in the form
of a story. The whole story is comparable, to some degree, with that of the gods in
Hesiod’s Theogony, insofar as their genealogy represents the world order.
It is completely fallacious and against both the spirit and the letter of the Timaeus
to take the chronology of the story as the record of the constructing of the cosmos,
Plato himself explicitly excludes this understanding (34e).4 Speaking of what the
demiurge does and says Plato describes the world from the point of view of the
nous. Telling that story in the form of an eikos logos he can show what a purely
theoretically constructed world is like. With the involved teleology Plato is able to
demonstrate the idea of optimization of functionality. Both demiurge and teleology
are no more than means of representation.
Teleology
If it is plain that the demiurge belongs to the metaphorical structuring of the story
then next we must ask what he does in fact signify in a non-mythical account. At the
beginning of the dialogue Socrates ties in with the talk about the state the discussants
had had “yesterday” and sums up its content. He recalls the ‘state in rest,’ that means
its idea, with the main point that rulers must not be interested in power in order to be
able to govern, then other circumstances of the talk are mentioned. The partners in
the current conversation are presented, Critias explains where he has his knowledge
about Atlantis from, and that it is necessary that before him Timaeus tells about the
formation of the world until the appearance of mankind (27a).
4 Nevertheless this possibility is entertained again and again in the scholarship, see e. g. L. Dean-Jones,
2000, 104, referring to D. T. Devereux, 1998, 226.
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Then Timaeus begins with his lecture. He names the theme, περὶ τοῦ παντός
(“about the universe,” 27c), he invokes the gods to assist him in this difficult issue
(27cd) and he presents the methodological and content-related guidelines he wants
to follow. Socrates calls this introduction a “proem” (29d5). Timaeus raises as his
first question: why the demiurge made the world the way it actually is. He answers
his own question with “because he was good” (29e1) and so wanted everything to
be good (30a2). Being and goodness are the ultimate for-the-sake of coming-to-be
and about things that come to be we cannot speak as we speak about the ideas but
only in the form of the eikos logos.5
When the demiurge takes into account the for-the-sake-of, that is part of themythical
form, at the center of which is the demiurge. Timaeus infers from the goodness of
the demiurge in general the goodness of his actions in a particular case. We cannot
draw metaphysical, theological or cosmological conclusions from that statement.
A second and still more important result is that the question about the for-the-sake-
of (certainly in its manifold sense) belongs to the question about the connection of
being and becoming. This is its systematic place, independent of the mythical story.
That is why the question itself remains an essential one for Aristotle.
If one asks after the origin of the ‘beings’ that grow, one must ask too after their
end, because the question of the origin (arche) is a question about order whose
cornerstones are origin and end are. Order is the opposite of aimlessness. Timaeus,
Aristotle and Theophrastus ask, therefore, after the telos and the hou heneka. That
question is inevitable if one asks the question about being. Plato asks both questions,
that about the origin and that about the for-the-sake-of-which, in two directions, as
questions about this or that and as questions about the whole.6 Aristotle adds the
question about the for-the-sake-of-which as such. These questions about the origin
5 Timaios 29d2–30b7; Plato explicitly says, that becoming is for the sake of being and that the good is
the for-the-sake of the rest in Philebos 54c; correspondingly Aristotle says in De Partibus Animal-
ium, A 1, 640a18 ἡ γὰρ γένεσις ἕνεκα τῆς οὐσίας ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἕνεκα τῆς γενέσεως
“becoming is for the sake of being, bur not being for the sake of becoming”; the phrase in Philebos
26d γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν, “to grow into being,” is comparable with that of Aristotle in Physics B 1,
193b13 ἔτι δ’ ἡ φύσις ἡ λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὁδός ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν, “further, the nature which is
named <nature> in the sense of becoming is a way into nature.”
6 Timaios 27a, 29e.
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and about the for-the-sake-of-which are ambiguous, they have both a natural and a
purely analytical sense. It is plausible to see the questions, on one hand, as asking
after the rational reasons (Vernunftgrund) and, on the other, after the natural causes.
In the Timaeus as well as in the Met. Λ it is evident that Plato and Aristotle pursue
both directions respectively. However, Aristotle himself never went on to convert
the analytical results in teleology into cosmological and constructive principles, that
was the work of the reception.
If the question about the for-the-sake-of and that about the best is raised and if
an answer is given, even in a figurative manner (“Because he was good,” Timaeus,
29e), then the questionwhich Theophrastus asks, to which degree of detail we can go
into, is quite possible (9b2).7 The answer given for the whole cannot be transferred
directly to particulars, because these are subject to further conditions. Timaeus
says explicitly several times that the demiurge sets up all in its best form.8 Firstly,
because the demiurge himself was good, he has set up this world and, secondly, he
set it up as a good world. The cosmos as it now is is a reasonable and animate living
being (29e–30b). Aristotle does not frequently employ teleological considerations
in Met. Λ, but when he does, it is at systematically relevant positions, e. g. where
he says that the ‘unmoved moving’ moves “as a beloved being” and in the sense of
a for-the-sake-of (see below, Commentary on Λ 7.4 and 7.10).
By the first part of his lecture already (29 d–47e), where Timaeus presents the world
as a telelogically and reasonably ordered whole, the concept of telelology can easily
be replaced by the concept of functionality and still more, where he shows that
the foundation of the world by reason must accept restrictions and constraints in
its realization in the chora (see mind and body of man, 69a–90c). ‘Good’ means
‘functional’ and within the realms of functionality we look for optimization under
7 Cf. the same question is asked by Aristotle in De partibus animalium, A 1, 639b11ff., 640a7 οὐδ’
ἔστιν εἰς ἀίδιον συναρτῆσαι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀποδείξεως ἀνάγκην, “the necessity of this proof cannot
be traced back to eternity” (i. e. in infinitum). That is said in the context of the difference between the
hypothetical necessity as we see it when a particular thing grows up and the necessity of an apodeixis,
cf. Δ 2, 677a17.
8 Timaios 27a, 29e, 44c, 46c8, 48a3.
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given conditions. The term for these necessary conditions is ananke.9
Cosmology
Cosmology is considered the most evident common theme of Plato’s Timaeus and
Aristotle’s Met. Λ.10 As already noted, the impact of this dialogue in the reception
was extremely powerful. In Middle- and Neoplatonism the Timaeus was used as if
it was Plato’s physics and formed part of the Curriculum (Iamblichus, Proclus).11
During the first half of the Middle Ages the Timaeus, in the Latin translation by
Chalcidius, was the only Platonic dialogue known. Other dialogues were known
only by name and by the reports of antique authors like Cicero. For the longest
period of time it was regarded as Plato’s main work,12 and up to even in the 20th
century it has fascinated scholars in science (like W. Heisenberg) with its abstract
and geometrical outlook on nature. Plato makes Timaeus tell the story of the or-
ganization of the world. This narrative should end with the appearance of man, so
that afterwards it be possible to present the “moving state,” which was discussed
“yesterday”13 “at rest” (19b). The pair of concepts, movement and rest, is part of
9 ‘What is necessary’: Timaios 47e; Theophrastus,Met. 10a26, b19, 11a16, Aristoteles, Physics B 9.
10 P. Duhem, 1914–1959; G. Böhme, 1996; K. Gloy, 1996; M. von Perger, 1997; R. Ferber, 1997. On
the cosmology of the Timaeus see especially: A. E. Taylor, 1928; F.M. Cornford, 1937; H. Cherniss,
1944; F. Solmsen, 1960 (on the effects of the Timaeus on Aristotle’s Physics); J. Mittelstrass, 1962;
H. Blumenberg, 1966; G. Vlastos, 1975; W. Detel, 1979, 130–155; A. F. Ashbaugh, 1988; T. Ebert,
1991, 43–54; L. Brisson, 21994; L. Tarán, 1972–1983; K. Gloy, 1996; A. P. D. Mourelatos, 1981;
J. Dillon, 2003, 24: “It is indeed on the interpretation of the doctrines presented in the Timaeus that
much cosmological speculation within the Old Academy can be seen to be centred.”
11 Proclus, Theologia Platonica, 1, 28: Ὑμεῖς δὲ ἄρα ἐκ μὲν τοῦ Τιμαίου τὴν ὅλην περὶ τῆς φύσεως
θεωρίαν προάγειν δυνήσεσθε, “You can derive the whole theory about nature from the Timaeus.”
On the Curriculum cf. R. T. Wallis, 1995, 19. On the Timaeus in the Middle Ages cf. J. Mittelstrass,
1962; G. Vlastos, 1975; W. Detel, 1979. C. Ratkowitsch, 1995, has presented the direct influence of
the Timaeus on the Cosmographia of Bernardus Silvestris; M. Lemoine and C. Picard-Parra, 2004,
have presented a collection of texts (with introduction) of the School of Chartres, which have to do
with the Timaeus.
12 P. Friedländer, 1964–1975, III, 329. – The Timaeus was a point of reference for the School of
Chartres.
13 See the introducing part, 17b.
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the megista gene developed in the Sophist; the guest from Elea made it clear that
only both together can ever make up being (Sein). The static and merely ideal con-
ception of being in the manner of the “friends of the ideas” is equally as incomplete
as the idea that all beings are always in motion.
Timaeus introduces the subject of “all” in 27c, Aristotle uses the same subject to
set up his question in Met. Λ 1.2. The concept of “all” appears in different key
propositions, for example, in KP 8 and KP 10, but the sense of “all” does change.
While the Presocratics meant the universe, Aristotle means “all beings,” not as “all
particulars” (as did the Sophists) but as “all beings in principle.” This is due to
the shifting of the question concerning the universe and its elements to a question
about being as foundation of becoming. If we consider this shift of the concern,
then Aristotle’s theory about being is in some way the reformulation of a central
Presocratic question at a higher level. Aristotle, at any rate, saw it this way as is
evident from the way he integrates their thoughts into his doxographies.
The first and most important distinction of the proem is that between being and be-
coming, which is linked with the distinction between the noeton and the aistheton.
Only afterwards does the demiurge begin to give an order to the cosmos (29d). It
has been noted by some ever since that whatever he does, it is no creatio ex nihilo.
This becomes eminently clear in the discussion between Simplicius and Philoponus
the Christian about the eternity of the world.14 As Plato presents it, it is about
organizing or arranging pre-existing things, not about creating them. The chief is-
sues concern the model to which he adapts the as yet still not ordered fundamental
elements and movement. Timaeus says that the demiurge has ordered the world
according to a beautiful and unchanging model; that he has formed the cosmos as
a living being, which is an image of its model and that it contains all living beings.
The demiurge moulds the soul of this cosmic animal (35a). The order is visible in
14 See Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Θ 1, 251b28–252a4: Simplicius CAG X,
1169,10–1171,29; Philoponus: 1171,30–1182,39; Simplicius on creation: 1145,17–29: when god
creates something ἀμέσως (“immediate”) and ἀχρόνως (“without any time”), then that has nothing
to do with Aristotle’s subject; 1151, 32: creation implies change in god; 1120, 18 κοσμοποιεῖν;
on ‘creation’ cf. 1122, 24; 1142,22; 1151,17, 1173,1–1175,10. Nevertheless, many scholars, as J.
Rheins in his dissertation, 2010, call it creation without hesitation.
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the orbits of the planets, in their relations of distances, in time, which is a movable
reproduction of the immovable Aeon. That is what the demiurge did. Afterwards
he gave life to the gods and after having mixed a second kind of souls (41d), it fell
to the gods to do the rest in the development of the world.
If we compare this with Aristotle’s presentation it is clear that the same narrative fea-
tures cannot be found, because Aristotle does not use a figurative language. There
are, however, sufficient comparable elements, should we try to translate the myth
into conceptual language. Table 5.2 below, outlines some cosmological themes to
be found in the Timaeus, in Met. Λ and other early works of Aristotle.
A few remarks on this table. The 8th chapter of Met. Λ has an astronomic and cos-
mological subject. The question of how the cosmological theme can be integrated
into the theoretical considerations of the chapters 7 and 9 is very controversial. For
some scholars it clearly interrupts the line of thought, for others it is a necessary part
(see above p. 216). The movements of the planets are the subject of this chapter and
Aristotle does offer some proposals for how to understand the beginning of move-
ment in the astronomical sense. Beforehand, at Λ 5.5 and at Λ 7.1, he had named the
sun and the first sphere of the heavens as the first causes of natural movement. Fur-
ther themes inMet. Λ 8 are the number of the spheres, the relation between the first
cause, which sets in motion itself unmoved, and the second causes of movement, the
mediation of movement from the first physical cause of movement to other phys-
ical causes of movement (cf. Theophrastus, Met. § 1). The gods, created by the
demiurge, are identified by some interpreters with the 55 or 47 gods of the spheres.
31b–32b Timaeus speaks about the elements in the normal sense of the term, but
with the chora Plato has in mind something of a still more elementary character
than the Presocratics had looked for (48b, 46c). For the four visible and changable
elements cannot constitute the origin, that must be something absolutely unchange-
able and indefinite. As such he introduces the “receptacle of becoming” (49a). At
first, he names it hypodoche and “third genus” as something beside the being and
the becoming (48e–49a; 50cd; 51d; 52d). He tries, apparently, to make his meaning
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Plato, Timaeus: Aristotle:
the cosmos is a living organismwith
soul and nous
there are many unmoved movers, Λ
8
the cosmos is single, 31a Met. Λ 8.17-8.20, De Caelo A 8
there are elements, 31b-32b De Caelo 311b13-312a12
the corporeal world has three di-
mensions, 32a
De Caelo II 2, 284b21-22,
285a27ff., (Aristotle takes the
vector or orientation to be more
essential than the dimensions)
the form of the cosmos is the sphere,
33a
De Caelo B 4
circular movement, 34a Λ 6 (beginning), Λ 7 (beginning), Λ
7.12
the first movement is that of the self-
moving soul, 36a
Λ 6.20 (contra Plato)
time is the moved image of aion
(“eternity”), 37cd
the movement of the stars and plan-
ets is eternal, Met. Λ 8.3-8.5
ouranos and time have a beginning,
38bc
movement and time do not have a
coming to be and a passing away,
Met. Λ 6.2; 7.1; the cosmos is eter-
nal, Λ 7.16
number and courses of the planets,
38d
Met. Λ 8
gods of the stars, 40a Met. Λ 8
celestial movement of is transferred
to the mundane things, 58a
sun and ecliptic Met. Λ 5.5
Table 5.2.: Timaeus – Met. Λ, De Caelo
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clear with the use of different metaphors. After the comparison with the wet nurse
(49a4–5) comes the analogy with gold (50a4–b5; he means that the relationship
between hypodoche and things is comparable to gold, from which different things
can be made), then the mass (ekmageion), from which something can be formed
(50c2); then the substrate for unguents (50e6); after that the mother (51a5; and that
even though the same was named wet-nurse shortly before) and finally, he uses the
term chora, place (52a8).
Compared with the hypodoche or the chora the traditional elements are secondary.
In the first place Plato speaks about the elements in the context of the connection
between corporeal things and our senses (31b–33a). In the second he wants to show
the inadequacy of the traditional elements (49cd, prepared at 47e). They cannot be
primary because they change themselves. They serve as a foil for hypodoche and
chora. In the third place, which is about the elements, Plato tries to establish the
noetic order of the elements based on their geometrical structure, while at the same
time considering the conditions of ananke in order to explain in this way the effects
of the elements on our senses (61d).
The activities of the demiurge should serve to make clear in a poetical manner that
the changeable world, in which we live, is based on a noetic and unchangeable one.
If the world of the nous were not implemented in a natural world, there would be
no use of movement and the question of how movement is possible would be su-
perfluous. As we do, in fact, live in a natural world, we do have to ask the question
of why and how there is also a world of nature beside the noetic world. What good
could the world of change bring about? What is improved if beside the unsurpass-
able unchangeable world of being there is another transient one, in motion, with
things subject to becoming? Plato answers this question with a story (29d–30a),
saying that the demiurge took upon himself the task of arranging the things disor-
dered “because he was good and in no way jealous.” He has found the visible things
disordered and because order is better than disorder, he formed it as we see it is now.
The question is not whether and why the demiurge created the world, which Plato
explicitly denies he did (it is a Christian question). The question is, instead, why he
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has intervened in the disordered state.15 It is left unsaid why and whence the already
existing things had come to be. The question remains how the noetic order can be
transferred to things in the disordered state, and this question, in turn, requires an
answer as to how these things can be transferred in ordered movement. The answer
is: it is the result of the action of the demiurge.
Movement requires elements and their order. In the first place, mentioned above,
where Plato speaks about elements, he relates the characteristics of the elements to
the fact that they are corporeal and perceptible (31b). There cannot be visible things
without fire, no tactile things without solids (i. e. without earth). The elements are
the basis of our capacity for accessing mundane beings.16 The other two elements,
water and air, have the function to mediate between the first two elements. Further,
if the cosmos has a self-moving soul, then this soul will be the principle in the sense
of a rule of movement and in the sense of an origin of movement. The cosmos being
a body, fills space and has a shape. The movements which it can perform must be
in accord with its space and shape. Its shape is the sphere, its first movements,
therefore, are circular.
Aristotle concurs, De Caelo Γ 3: because there are simple movements, there must
be simple bodies too. The perceptible beings we have to do with cannot be made
up by either one single element or by an infinite number of them, since perceptible
beings can be destroyed and the process of destruction must come to an end.
The movement of the cosmos is circular (34a) and eternal (37d), Timaeus says.
Aristotle (Met. Λ 6, 1071b32) cites Platon (Timaeus 30a) on the eternity of the
eternal movement. Circularity of motion and the shape of the sphere are related
for Aristotle too, and in De Caelo B 3–4 he says that the reason why the ouranos
is eternal is that it is divine, which has as a consequence that it is spherical and its
movement circular.
15 It would be better not to employ phrases like “the divine creator of the world” and such like, which
are used for instance by J. Halfwassen, 2000, 39–62, and many others.
16 Aristotle speaks about the correlation between the senses and the elements inDe Sensu et Sensibilibus
2, where he sometimes refers on the Timaeus.
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That the ouranos is unique is a common theme too.17 Movement proceeds in time,
time must also be a theme. Plato says that time emerged with the ouranos Timaeus
(38bc). The aion is its paradigm, it has a variety of determinations, but these are not
successive as in the case of time, but all together. Timaeus calls time “the moving
image of aion.” In this way, becoming as such and not only the becoming of this or
that can be made the subject since becoming is realized in movement and movement
in time.18 When Timaeus speaks about ‘producing’ and ‘creating’ that is due to the
fact that he tells a story. This point is made explicitly when he presents the “making”
of the soul of the world. What he intends is a timeless structure, the story makes it
necessary to realize it in a vivid description.
Nous and noesis
The nous is another important common theme in both texts. Plato says in the
Timaeus that the demiurge arranges the disordered perceptible things by supplying
them with nous, but only a living being with soul can possess nous (30b), the func-
tion (nous) needs an organ (soul) thus the cosmos must have a soul. Plato hereby
meets the claims raised by Socrates, who blames Anaxagoras for promising to show
how the nous rules the world, but in fact remained at the level of corporeal causes
(see Phaedo 98–99). It is important that we keep in mind that the demiurge is not
the nous but that he gives the nous.
In speaking about the visual process, Plato distinguishes rather casually between
proper or first causes and causes incidental (46c–e). Afterwards, the crucial dis-
tinction between nous and ananke (47e–48d) is based exactly on this distinction;
both kinds of causes being necessary to attain knowledge of the beings around us
(68c–69a). All the rest of the dialogue (69a–92c) has to clarify that it is possible to
tie together both kinds of causes and, this is done with the aid of an example. This
17 See Tim. 31a, Aristotle Met. Λ 9 and De Caelo A 7–9, with good remarks by G. E. R. Lloyd, 2000,
266.
18 Aristoteles on becoming: Physik A, Met. A, Met. Z, 7–9.
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is the human being with its soul and body and this, “arriving at the nature of man”
was the initially declared terminus of the discourse (27a).
InMet. Λ the term nous appears when Aristotle prepares the speculative high points
and in these high points themselves (see KP 14–17 and Chapter 9). Aristotle also
uses the related concepts noeton und noesis, and it is the latter term that seems to
bear the decisive part of the argument, not the nous. Aristotle speaks about the nous
in 7.4 (KP 14) because he wants to illustrate what a kinoun akineton is. That which
the nous is aware of sets in motion the nous without itself being moved, only the
nous is moved (KP 15). In 7.19 (KP 17) Aristotle states that the nous is actual only
in the noesis (that is, when it performs its function), which is the “divine” in it. In
9.10 (KP 23) too, he uses the term noesis, in three senses: Every factual awareness
(= noesis3) realizes a world order (= noesis1) by means of that ability to be aware
(noesis2).
The standard interpretation identifies the nouswith god and the alleged ‘FirstMover,’
usually after some evasive preliminary remarks.19 The nous seems to be the link
between the demiurge and the cause which sets in motion itself unmoved. The way
Plato speaks about the nous, however, suggests that something in this construal is
wrong, because the nous seems to be the highest point in a system or the highest
being, but it is rather the demiurge that ought to hold this position. Finally, the
demiurge belongs to poetical language, the nous and still more the noeton and noe-
sis belong to technical terminology.
The Character of the Timaeus as Text
Plato himself reflects on the nature of his text, the Timaeus, and that right at the start,
in the proem. The last point he makes on the subject is that, of a solid and stable
thing we can speak using solid and stable language; but of any unstable thing, such
19 One example is that of J. Brunschwig, 2000, 276, who happily employs the terminology common “in
French Thomistic circles.” Could that fail to contaminate the contents of the argument? Of course,
it is quite possible that his text was intended for just such circles.
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as the cosmos, it is only in a figurative language that we can speak (eikos logos;
29cd).
The elements, the human body, the functions of the senses, the planets with their
spheres: these are described in great detail and in language now physical, now a
mathematical. The famous Platonic solids and the calculation of the distances of
the planets belong to this part of Timaeus’ lecture.20 By this precision one might
believe – and against Timaeus’ repeated affirmation, that all is said in the form of
an eikos logos – that we may take it face value. Some interpreters take the eikos
logos as a metaphorical manner of speaking, others a manner of speaking which is
adapted to the non-noetic content. G. Böhme proposed understanding the phrase not
as “plausible speech” but as “speaking about plausible things.”21 If that is correct,
what is said about the cosmos must be taken literally, the uncertainty inheres not in
the speech itself, but in the subject.
If we wish to examine the impact of the questions asked in the Timaeus on Met.
Λ we must bear in mind the specific and different characters of the texts. In the
case of Plato, we are reading a figurative myth, while Aristotle’s is a theoretical
study the aim of which is achieving clarity on some unanswered questions. With
the theoretical question about being and about the primary in becoming is taken up
the function of the demiurge. The question is treated within the frame of a set of
aitia. The ‘first moving’ forms part of a rather technical vocabulary and is never
intended as asserting something about a being or even to prove its existence, it is
simply the name for the first in one of the four causes.
In the Timaeus there is even more than just eikos logos. The introduction takes the
form of a dialogue, about 10 pages as against about 65 pages of lecture and inasmuch
differs clearly from all other dialogues. In the lecture itself, however, there are
different levels or kinds of text. The eikos logos does form the basis, something
like a basso continuo. On this basis, though, we do see a clear contrast between
conceptual and mythological passages. Furthermore, there are many digressions,
20 On these themes see the excellent presentation by L. Brisson, 1994.
21 G. Böhme, 1996, 29.
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which differ in subject and text style. The mathematical excursuses are famous (on
the Platonic solids, on the fundamental triangle), but there are also astronomical
(planetary orbits, the teleios eniautos, “the complete year”), physiological (form
and function of the body parts), and mythological excursuses. Finally, we must not
forget the invocations of the gods at two strategically important positions. What
follows from all this is that the Timaeus requires a special kind of translation, in
fact a modulated form of translation appropriate to the variation in the character of
this very special text.
We pay especial attention to two points repeatedly treated in the literature. Firstly,
again and again we encounter interpreters who transfer the chronology of the story
directly upon the chronology of the formation of the cosmos while the story has
only its narrative chronology qua story. Plato himself points out the fact (34e). The
sense of the account is the presentation of a system; Timaeus’ lecture in the form of
the eikos logos is a narrative in service to a system and its chronology corresponds to
the ontological hierarchy in the system. Secondly, wemust ask to what end the story
is told. It tells of the becoming of a cosmos in which the nature of the human being
may be conceivable. That is the declared aim from the start (27a) and is declared as
the achieved goal at the end (90c und 92c). It seems improbable that this figurative
representation of the becoming of the cosmos is to be directly transposed into the
literal, actual becoming of the cosmos in a quasi scientific sense.
We find about thirty uses of expressions like eikos logos or mythos eikos in the
seventy-five Stephanus-pages of the complete dialog. Plato makes clear, then, that
Timaeus’ lecture is not about something, which can be spoken of with the reliabil-
ity of noetic considerations. The subject requires empirical experience, the desired
knowledge cannot be derived from a priori premises. Natural beings do not hold
their determinations in a constant manner, they move and change and so does cor-
respondingly the knowledge about them. We cannot speak about the cosmos in the
same way as we do about the ideas. The lecture about the cosmos even in its purely
noetic form must be figurative. The first part, then, is under incidental conditions,
but Plato tries here already to introduce some systematic points of view, for exam-
ple, discussing the correlation between the elements and the functions of our senses
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or in speaking about the constitution of the corporeal world by geometrical forms.
It is plain that Plato presents the respective knowledge of his time with pleasure and
in great detail, nevertheless it should be kept in mind that all this remains subject
to a general reservatio mentalis. At any rate, Plato has seen that he must speak of
the world hic et nunc, even if in the form of the eikos logos, which is neither a mere
myth nor a form of conclusive argumentation. It is necessary to speak about that
world if we wish to understand the transition from the ideal world to the mundane
and if the ideas should have some function in this context.22
The Influence of the question in the Timaeus onMet. Λ
J. Dillon has engaged with the ‘legacy’ of Plato’s Timaeus. He draws a list of six
questions, which are left open by this dialogue,23 placing particular emphasis on
the cosmological part. He thinks that the main questions in the Timaeus concern
the demiurge and the “young gods”; then, the meaning of hypodoche; how it is
possible to produce the three-dimensional world from two-dimensional triangles;
and finally, how this construction of the world may be compatible with the theory
of ideas. I complement J. Dillon’s list with some further points, with which Plato
added to and enhanced the discussion about the cosmos, which had been led by the
Presocratics, see table 5.3.
There is an identifiable impact on Met. Λ from the Timaeus but it consists less in
the use of certain terms or in the discussion of specific themes than much more in
the fundamental orientation of the question. Right at the start of Met. Λ Aristotle
distinguishes between the singular of ousia, Sein, and the plural, the beings, Seien-
des. This corresponds to the double perspective under which he poses the question,
that is as a cosmological and a speculative one. This two-fold view is established in
the Timaeus and Aristotle subsequently considers the possibility of the mediation
of these views. This mediation between two distinctive perspectives corresponds
22 See some notes on the function of the ideas in the Timaeus by R. Ferber, 1997.
23 J. Dillon, 2003, 24.
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1. The elements of the Presocratics are replaced for being insufficiently
elementary; they do not have the character that the first being ought to
have.
2. The chora replaces the elements.
3. The nous takes on new value and function as cause; it conveys an a
priori-order to the world.
4. With the activities of the demiurge the ideas take on a function in the
becoming.
5. Finally, Plato is clearly aware of the issue that if being and becoming
are distinguished as is done in the proem, then the transition from being
to becoming remains to be explained.
Table 5.3.: Plato – Presocratics
.
to the question in the Timaeus of how the transition between the noetic and the
factual world may be understood and how it works. Under both perspectives is
the proton kinoun (‘which sets in motion firstly’) a leading term. In the specu-
lative line of thought the first setting in motion can be expressed by the formula
{ousia←noesis→energeia / Doxa}. Noesis in this formula corresponds to noesis1
in the phrase noesis3 noeseos1 noesis2 estin. Noesis2 is the point where the noetic
structure and the worldly realization are mediated, any particular realization is noe-
sis3. The protos ouranos is the ‘first moving’ in the cosmological line, and the sun
and the ecliptic perform the cosmological mediation. The combination of cosmo-
logical and speculative interest, then, can be designated as an effect of the Timaeus
on Met Λ.
Plato says that the transition from the noetic to the aesthetic or mundane world is
enabled by means of the hypodoche and chora. We do not find anything in Met.
Λ which parallels chora but certainly have elsewhere. When Aristotle wants to
speak about hyle or about the connection between hyle and necessity, he refers to
Plato’s chora or hypodoche. Aristotle identifies Plato’s chora with his prote hyle
in De Generatione et Corruptione B 1, 329a9ff., where he approvingly cites Plato’s
illustrations with gold and with the wet nurse in the Timaeus but limiting it to alloio-
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sis. He also cites the terms πανδεχές, pandeches, “that which takes up all things”
(De Caelo Γ 8, 306b16–19) and uses δεκτικός as characteristic of the hyle: hyle is
“physis, because taking up (: dektike) the beings, which have the principle of move-
ment in themselves” (Met. Δ 4, 1015a15–6.) He discusses the relation or similarity
that chora could possibly have with hyle and topos (Physics Δ 2, 209b1–17).24
Prote hyle and chora have in common that: both are a substrate and do not have a
coming-to-be and a passing-away; both are not perceptible; they are primary, some-
thing like a material out of which things are formed; they do not themselves have
any form; and they impose some necessity on the becoming beings.25 Of course,
there are differences too: hyle is that which undergoes the change of contrary deter-
minations and it is one of the four causes, which does not apply in the case of chora.
Moreover, hyle is pure potentiality and a concept of being (Seinsbegriff ). The dis-
tinction between potentiality and actuality plays no role in Plato’s dialogues and, as
hyle for something, it is always a relation (Physics B 2, 194b9). Aristotle empha-
sizes that hyle cannot be construed through planes, as Plato had said, because hyle
is not to be identified with the body (De Generatione et Corruptione B 1, 329a9ff.).
The elements, to be sure, are solid (stereos, spatial and corporeal), but Plato’s anal-
ysis goes as far as planes and it is impossible, that the “nurse” and the first hyle be
planes. “We say,” Aristotle continues a24, “that there is a hyle of perceptible bod-
ies, but that this hyle is not separated.” The elements are formed out of this hyle, it
is an arche, nothing for itself but appears always with its contrary. He reminds of
talking about it elsewhere and in more detail (sc. Physics A 6–7).
The decisive effect of the Timaios on Met. Λ may be this that it became urgent
to look for a speculative answer to the question about the being which can found
becoming.
24 Cf. M. Baltes, 1976 and 1978.
25 See also Physics B 9, 200 a14: ἐν ὕλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (“necessity is in the hyle”); cf. 200a30ff.;Met.
Δ 4, 1014b26–35; Met. Θ 7, 1049a24.
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Common Themes in the Sophistes and inMet. Λ
The Sophist is a second dialogue which had a significant influence on the question
asked in Met. Λ. In this dialogue Plato showed that the most important question
to ask is the question about being. Being is the most basic thought or concept, on
which all the others are based, it seems the easiest and most self-evident notion,
but when we attempt to articulate it we become compelled to confess that we too
entertain only contradictory opinions about it (Sophist 242b10). Aristotle takes up
this issue in his first speculative sketch,Met. Λ, then he will go on to do so again in
more detail in Met. ΖΗΘ.
If everyone does no more than assert their own opinions, there is the end to dis-
course. This is the sophist’s stance. Plato showed in the Sophist that we, indeed
not only the “earth-born” but the “friends of ideas” too, must therefore desist from
assertion. New assertions – about the sense of “to be”, say – are no more than the
next assertions and only sustain the old patterns of comportment in argumentation.
Even one who were to set a criterion favoring his own views on “to be” could not
do so without assertion. There is nothing for it but to analyze the existing opinions,
the opinions “we all” share. Such is the stance of the guest from Elea. Aristotle
adopted that stance and in the Topics developed a method to do just that. The “top-
ical attitude” (topische Einstellung) allows for the examination of opinions with-
out the making of new claims.26 Aristotle continues this ‘thinking without claims’
(unbehauptendes Denken, as I have called it), he again sets the same question about
being, in the topical attitude and with new tools (one of them being the ‘quotations,’
Anführungen, which too were preformed in the Sophist).
Aristotle’s results differ from Plato’s. While the result of Plato’s analysis of the
prevailing opinions about to bewere the ‘five highest genera’ Aristotle gives a spec-
ulative sketch in Met. Λ and a vision about being which can be summarized in the
formula {ousia←noesis→energeia / Doxa}. Later he repeats the question in Met.
ΖΗΘ. The content of the formula, that is, the use of to be, is extended more broadly
26 Cf. E. Sonderegger, 2012, I. 2 and I. 3.1.
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to the categories, the modalities, the distinction true/false. Met. Λ sets out a pro-
gram, which Aristotle tries all his life to carry out. The Sophist, then, is crucial to
Aristotle’s manner of asking the question about being.
Some Principle Phrases about Being and Becoming
In the following table I recapitulate the commonalities in content between some late
Platonic dialogues and Aristotle’s Met. Λ.
Places Met. Λ Themes Platonic dialogues
Met. Λ 1.7;
6.1
Being and becoming are different. Timaeus 27d, 29c3;
Sophistes 248a7
Met. Λ 7.6 Our approach to being and becoming is
different too, i. e. we refer differently to
things becoming things and to beings:
to the latter as noesis and episteme, to
the former by doxa, opinion,27 and ais-
thesis.
Sophist 248a10–12;
246b–c
Met. Λ 7.3;
7.7–10
Becoming is for the sake of being.
Metaphorically speaking one could say,
that things becoming ‘are striving for’
being.
Philebus 26d8;
54a628
Met. Λ 9.10 Knowledge of becoming presupposes
knowledge of being; without know-
ledge about being it is not possible to
know anything about becoming.
Sophist 242–243 (=
the middle of the di-
alogue)
27 Note that this everyday doxa must not be confused with the Doxa in the formula for to be, which
denotes a fundamental character of our speech and thought.
28 Philebus 26d8 Socrates: “…And now as to the third kind, I am reckoning all this progeny of our two
factors <sc. the kinds of Limit and Unlimited> as a unity, and you may take me to mean a coming
into being, resulting from those measures that are achieved with the aid of the Limit,” and 54a6:
Socrates: “…Now let us take another pair. …All Becoming on the one hand, and all Being on the
other. …Now which of these shall we say is for the sake of which? Becoming for the sake of Being,
or Being for the sake of Becoming?” (Transl. R. Hackforth, 1945.)
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Met. Λ 1.1,
6.8, 9.10,
10.30
Becoming rests on being, without be-
ing there is no becoming.29 Things that
emerge undergo this process in order to
be.
Timaeus 29–30
Met. Λ 10.31 Contra: The ideas are the being of the
beings.
Met. Λ 6.16,
10.26
The becoming of things that become is
possible because they participtate in be-
ings, in the ideas. In the first half of
Timaeus’ lecture the becoming is a be-
coming in thought; to get the real be-
coming we require additionally chora;
Timaeus 49a, 52a
chora mediates being and becoming. Timaeus 52d
Met. Λ 7.18, The world is preformed in the soul; Timaeus 36 e
9.10 the perceptible world is, so to speak,
construed in the soul. This alntic-
ipates the concept of being as {be-
ing←awareness→actuality / Doxa},
as exposed in Met. Λ. Structurally, this
corresponds to the Platonic idea that
knowledge is remembrance; Aristotle
agrees in a certain sense, but puts it in a
more technical language.
Table 5.4.: Principle phrases about being and becoming
This synopsis gives the most general thematic framework, common to some late
dialogues and Met. Λ; in the core of this framework is the question about being
and about the transition from noetic structures to worldly facts. We will see that
Theophrastus’ Metaphysics fits very well in this framework (cf. esp. § 2).
29 Cf. later in Met. Z, 1034a30–32, 1034b16–19; De partibus animalium A 1, 640a10.
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5.1.2. Theophrastus,Metaphysics
Date
It has been quite some time now that two fundamental assumptions concerning the
text of Theophrastus’ Met. have undergone important alterations: concerning its
date and its nature. The text was long dated to after Aristotle’s death, it seemed
to be the late revenge of a disappointed student on his master, and for some time
after the edition of W.D. Ross, one spoke of a Metaphysical Fragment. Now both
assumptions seem to be incorrect.
Theophrastus was born in Eresos (Lesbos) some years before Aristotle entered the
Academy (367/6). We have no information about the date of Theophrastus’ entry
into the Academy that is confirmed by external data. We have only reports about
his cooperation with Aristotle in Mytilene, after they left Athens (about 345, see
I. Düring, 1957, and W.W. Fortenbaugh, 1985). Theophrastus seems to have first
held the position of an assistant or a research associate at Aristotle’s institute. That
is all the more plausible if they were previously acquainted with each other. His
books testify to the fact that he is very familiar with the discussions and issues of
the Old Academy. If he had not been there himself, he would have had to obtain
any knowledge from reports (mainly from Aristotle himself) and out of books from
the members of the Academy. We must assume, in any case, that he knew these
texts. It is mere surmise that he was in the Academy a few years before Plato died
(347), but quite plausible. When they left Athens, Aristotle was between thirty-five
and forty years old, Theophrastus between twenty and twenty-five. For the date of
Theophrastus’ Met. there is no external data available. As a result, the attempts at
accurate dating vary greatly in their conclusions. They depend on the assumptions
made concerning the contents and function of the book. Some have tried to date it
on the basis of some particular statements it contains. W.D. Ross, M. van Raalte,
A. Laks and G.W. Most note several dozen places (see their footnotes) where terms
or content common between the texts can be discerned. It is, however, not possible
to claim certain priority for Aristotle’s text. Every claim for a given dating is based
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on decisions about the interpretations of the content.
W.D. Ross wrote in the introduction of his edition, for long an authoritative one,
that Theophrastus’Met. displays the spirit that obtained in the Lyceun after Aristo-
tle’s death.30 G. Reale, as many others, emphasizes the close connection between
Theophrastus’ Met. and Met. Λ, which he of course takes to be a late book, so that
Theophrastus’ work must also be late.31 In contrast to those scholars H. J. Krämer
mentions five points which testify to “früharistotelisches, ja voraristotelisches und
gemeinakademisches Gedankengut” in Theophrastus’Met. and this is an argument
for early dating.32 M. van Raalte offers an informative synopsis of different posi-
tions on the question of dating (1993, 23–24). She too prefers a late date for the
book (25, but see my arguments contra above, p. 215).
G.W.Most compares some statements concerning biological questions discussed in
both Theophrastus’Met. and in some biological works of Aristotle. It seems to him
more plausible that Aristotle is referring to Theophrastus’ work than the other way
round.33 By the reasoning of D. T. Devereux, based on the concept of the highest
form of philosophy, it follows that Met. Λ is earlier than the central books.34 Inci-
dentally, we have in his contribution a series of very convincing arguments against
the G. Reale’s arguments in favor of a late dating for Met. Λ.
One of the reasons offered for a late dating is that Andronicus of Rhodes (scholarch
about 70 B. C.) placed Theophrastus’ book as an introduction untitled at the begin-
ning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Nicolaus of Damascus (1st century ΒCE.) names
Theophrastus for the first time as the author of this text, which served as critical in-
30 W.D. Ross, F. H. Fobes (ed.), 1929, XXV; A. Laks, G.W. Most, edd., 1993, produced the leading
edition now.
31 G. Reale, 1994 (6. Aufl.), 296–317.
32 H. J. Krämer, 1973, 206–214:
1. the universal is divided in genera and species (8b20)
2. the use of analogy (4b12; 8a19)
3. knowledge of prota by means of negation (9a19)
4. science ‘comprehends the identical in the many’ (8b24)
5. the difference between theoretical, practical and poetical knowledge.
33 G.W. Most, 1988; cf. the edition by A. Laks, G.W. Most (edd), 77–79.
34 D. T. Devereux, 1988, 167–188.
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troduction to Aristotle’s Met. until the Middle Ages. The introduction would have
been less plausible, if the work had been the work of the young Theophrastus. On
the other hand, what would be the sense of an introduction criticizing in essential
points the work it introduces? Could it be that Andronicus has placed the two texts
together because he has become aware of the fact that both texts refer to roughly the
same context?
The transitional phrase in § 6 μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτων [...] , “hitherto [...] ,” to §
7 τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα [...] , “that afterwards [...] ,” takes on a different meaning
according to what one thinks about the text as a whole. If one wanted to read the
Theophrastean text as late and a pre-emptive criticism of the following Met., then
paragraphs 1–6 report the themes, in which Theophrastus agrees with Aristotle and
the rest is criticism. If, however, it is an early work, then the conformity is not only
between Theophrastus and Aristotle, but with the Old Academy too. The questions,
beginning with § 7, are questions to both, Theophrastus and Aristotle, issues that
resulted from the discussions in the Academy.
Many think that the close thematic connection is another reason for the late date
of Theophrastus’ Met., but this valid only if one accepts without further proof the
late date of Aristotle’s Met. Λ in combination with its supposedly evident theolog-
ical content. Beginning in the Middle Ages and up today many follow this line of
thinking: because Met. Λ contains an Aristotelian theology, it fulfills the task of
closing the last remaining lacuna in his metaphysical system. The highly compli-
cated considerations about the nous and the so-called ‘First Mover’ (as many still
obstinately put it35) can only have been possible in the latest stages of a philosophi-
cal career. The text is a late one and it tends to monotheism, which too is something
that develops in the end stages. This impression is confirmed by the fact that, until
Albertus Magnus, the Liber de Causis was taken to be an Aristotelian work. Used
for educational purposes, it had an impact on the interpretation of Met. Λ, because
it treats of incorporeal entities.
35 See e. g. the contributions of the Symposium Aristotelicum on Met. Λ (2000) or the New Essays
(2016) and the commentaries published 2019 by F. Baghdassarian and L. Judson.
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Some offer yet another reason for a late dating of Met. Λ (which, if true, would
corroborate the late date of Theophrastus’ work), namely the problem of the date
of Met. Λ 8, which seems to yield some external data. For in this chapter, Aristotle
using the imperfect tense, mentions (beside others) the theories of Eudoxus and Cal-
lippus concerning the movements of the heavenly bodies and their spheres. It seems
that Aristotle could hardly have met Callipus before 330 BCE, hence it follows that
the text is late (Aristotle died 322 BCE).
I will put forward some arguments against the assumption that the imperfect tense
is chronologically telling (on which see also I. Düring, 1968a) and that, if Aristotle
knew Callippus’ theory, he must not have been in Athens (for the discussion of the
dating of Met. Λ see also above, p. 216). Even if Λ 8 is late, there remain two possi-
bilities. EitherMet. Λ 8 is late and indelicately inserted in an earlier text (as e. g. W.
Jaeger, 1923, 366, or D. Frede, 1971, thought), or it fits very well into the context
of chapters 7 and 9 and the whole text is late, as, since P. Merlan, M. van Raalte
and certain contributors to the Symposium Aristotelicum (2000) believed. Again,
even if one finds that the arguments in favor of the earlier dating more convincing
(as I do), there are different possible explanations about the origin of the two texts.
Theophrastus’Met. could have been a close-following reaction to Aristoteles’s text,
encouraged, perhaps, by Aristotle himself; both could also have been written at the
same time, as a collection of the current topics of the Old Academy; finally, Aris-
totle’s text could have been a speculative complement to the more realistic text of
Theophrastus. We cannot resolve this uncertainty. The fact stands: both are early
texts, from shortly after Aristotle had left Athens, belonging chronologically close
to each other and to the Old Academy.
In his edition of Theophrastus’ so-called Metaphysics (2010, with arguments for
On First Principles as the real title) Dimitri Gutas examined the issue of dating in
great detail. He took into account the arguments in favor of the late date and offered
several in favor of an early one (say between 347 and 334; he prefers as date the
time Aristotle was in Assos). It seems that this conclusion can scarcely remain open
to doubt any longer and an early date for Met. Λ can also be established.
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Comments on some particular arguments
Both texts –Met. Λ and Theophrastus’Met. – have certain contents and expressions
in common, but there are no unambiguous quotations from the one or other (see the
footnotes of the mentioned editions). While Aristotle and Theophrastus cite other
contemporary philosophers, they do not each other. Whywould Theophrastus avoid
naming Aristotle, if he were going to criticize him? – When his book is dated early,
then it becomes unsurprising that there is no reference one to the other but only
to the Old Academy. Even if one of them seems to contradict the other, this may
be due to a different perception of the situation and symptomatic only of differing
views of the common tradition. There is a difference, at least, insofar as Aristotle
follows more a speculative line and Theophrastus more a realistic one. If the two
texts are contemporary and refer to the same set of issues, then there is no obvious
need for them to be citing each other.
Many questions Theophrastus asks are asked by Aristotle too. They cannot be ob-
jections, as, e. g., the question how far we can go in inquiring what something is
for. Even the question of whether “all things are at their best” and to what point
we can go in asking after a cause (§§ 15, 25: di’ aitiou theorein, 28) are common
to both. Aristotle asks in the first sentence of Met. Λ 10 how “the nature of the
whole contains the good and the best” and proposes an answer. The third book of
the Topics (also an early work) is a search for means and structures of argument,
which would allow for the obviating of the aporia concerning the question about
the good and the best. Finally, we must not overlook the hint in the Nicomachean
Ethics (A 3, 1094b11–27), where Aristotle suggests that not all questions have the
same accuracy (akribeia). This means that we cannot always state universal propo-
sitions with the same cogency. It should also be noted that, in such cases, Aristotle
often uses the expression hos epi to poly, “mostly.”
When Aristotle says in his De Partibus Animalium (A, 1, 641b12), “[...], because
nature does all things for the sake of something,” we must consider under which
aspect this point is being made. In Aristotle’s case it is the theoretical aspect, in
Theophrastus’ case it is instead the area of natural beings. The insight that the search
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after the archai is very different from that starting from principles (Theophrastus,
Met. §§ 13 und 25), is also made by Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, A 4, 1095a30–
b1), and Plato too had earlier led us to it (Cratylus 436d, Phaedo 101e, Politeia
511b).
In particular is the question following the report of the consensus (§ 7) – what is the
nature of ephesis – often understood as an objection to Aristotle, in fact is a genuine
Aristotelian question. Theophrastus asks this question in the context of the question
of how we can understand, that we see and experience many movements, but as-
sume, that there is only a single first cause of motion. That is just the same question
Aristotle poses inMet. Λ 6.23–6.25. It seems that this topic was current and belongs
to the question which, since the Timaeus, must necessarily be asked: namely, how
the transition from the noetic to the perceptible world is possible. Aristotle is very
careful in the scientific field, a sign of that is the fact that inMet. Λ 8 he reports sev-
eral theories of his contemporaries about the number of the heavenly spheres, before
he himself proposes a provisional solution to the problem. He does several times
note that all of this must be offered with considerable reservations. This cannot be
transformed into mere assertions, which they would be if Theophrastus’ statements
about them were objections. We can see particularly well the accordance, on one
hand, between Plato’s Timaeus and the questions of the Old Academy and, on the
other, with Theophrastus and Aristotle when we consider the question of how far we
can go in explaining what follows the archai.36 For this question, how the transition
from the world without chora into the world with chora may be understandable, is
raised with the Timaeus.
Theophrastus (§§ 8 and 27) and Aristotle agree on how they see the role and function
of the astronomy in knowledge. Astronomy has to do with the number of the spheres
etc. (see Met. Λ 8.6), but not at all with the question of being, as it is raised in the
first sentence of Met. Λ. It is nearly the same case with the position of mathematics
(see Theophrastus,Met., § 3), which has no means to explain the transition from the
36 Theophrastus,Met., § 11; in principle he already asks this question in §§ 1 and 2, where Theophrastus
asks whether the noeta have a connection with ta tes physeos or not, because the noeta are the
archai, the natural beings are consequences.
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noetic to the perceptible world. What Aristotle says (at Met. Λ 1.7, then 8.1–8.2,
and again 10.39–10.41) corresponds perfectly to what Theophrastus thinks.
One ought also to take into account that, as a late work, Theophrastus’ book would
be fairly uninteresting and obsolete, as far as it relates to Aristotle’s questions but as
an early one, it would be a rich resource in regard to the discourse of the Academy.
If one were to argue that Theophrastus’ Met. is really the late criticism of his mas-
ter by a disenchanted student, one would be forced to admit that Theophrastus ne-
glects essential distinctions, which Aristotle made in ΖΗΘ. If both texts, that of
Theophrastus and that of Aristotle, were written around roughly the middle of the
fourth century BCE then the Old Academy, itself marked by Plato’s late dialogues,
is their background. Furthermore, if Theophrastus’ Met. is not a late criticism and
if we are not obliged to read it as a response to any claims by Aristotle but as a text,
which like Met. Λ, lists and reflects the main problems of the Old Academy, then
it is one of the best sources for this background. Theophrastus is more interested in
realistic questions, Aristotle in speculative ones, but for both the question about the
transition from the noetic to the perceptible beings is central and the question about
the first and the principle is omnipresent in Theophrastus’ work as much as it is in
Aristotle’s (§§ 1, 6, 11, 13, 18, 25, 27, 34).
In summary, major reasons for an early dating of Theophrastus’ Met. are firstly,
the fact that we can see in it an objective in common with Met. Λ, oriented by the
discussions of the Old Academy; then, that many things in both texts become better
understandable, if the texts are written at about the same time; and that instead of an
obsolete criticism it is an intelligent summary of enduring issues (comparable with
Met. B).
The Structure of Theophrastus’Metaphysics
In order better to compare the content of Theophrastus’ Met. with Aristotle’s Met.
Λ we ought to consider the content and structure of Theophrastus’ work. Quan-
titatively, it divides into two very unequal parts. The first is the summary of the
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consensus (§§ 1–6), the second is the presentation of the remaining questions (§§
7–34). In this second part, the different questions overlap with one another so that,
for instance, the second problem is introduces whilst the first is as yet still open.
This is because the problems at stake are interlaced and themselves connected one
to another. It is not, then, possible to divide the text into clear-cut distinct units. This
shows that Theophrastus is well aware of the conceptual connection between the is-
sues. Questions about desire (ephesis) and origin (arche) are connected because the
desire aims at the origin. The question about the origin and the First cannot be asked
without reflection on the manner of posing question. The question of how far to go
in the inquiry into desire and the question about the limit of the for-the-sake-of,
these cannot be posed separately, one without the other.
In the first part, Theophrastus asks two main questions. First, he asks what the
method for a theory about the First could be; second, how the connection between
the noetic and the natural beings is possible (§ 1–2). He proposes contemporary an-
swers to these questions (§§ 3–4). It is consensus, he says, that the crucial question
is that concerning the First as a principle. So much is clear, that the First, which we
are looking for, is an unmoved cause of movement (§ 5). If we wish to speak about
the First, we have to understand its being and its actuality (§ 6). Theophrastus’ first
sentence37 does not criticize Aristotle’s first sentence,38 on the contrary, it confirms
the subject, namely “the First” and that theoria is the method to treat this subject.
In the same sense, Aristotle says that which he is searching for is being, ousia, as
the principle of beings, ousiai.
After the summary of the consensus in § 6 Theophrastus proposes in §§ 7–25 an
answer to the second question. He says, the connection between the first and the
second, i. e. between the noetic and the natural area, is that the second seeks for
the First (ephesis). There are several unanswered questions concerning this pro-
posal, Theophrastus says. How can “to seek for” represent a mediation between our
thoughts and our perceptions? Mathematics alone, at any rate, cannot perform this
37 “How and by which means have we to define the theory about the First?”
38 “The present theory concerns being <: ousia>; because it is beings <: ousiai>, whose principles and
causes are searched for.”
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mediation. Even astronomy is not the appropriate method for inquiring after the
First although it is concerned with primary things. Then, to what extent must the
caused effects be presented and explained? The range of application of the princi-
ples “All is for the best” and “All is for the sake of something” must be examined;
as too which method is apt to ask after the origin; and howwill be able to understand
that one and the same First has such different effects in nature as we see it.
The first part (§§ 7 until ca. 25) treats the ephesis, the desire or the ‘aiming at.’ “The
First” sets other beings in motion in the same way as the desired being moves the
desiring. In this context, he asks methodological questions in both directions: (§§
11–13): “How far should we go in inferring the particular beings from the princi-
ples?” and the other question: “How far should we go asking after the principles?”
Here (§ 13) Theophrastus states the methodological insight, which is also valid for
the question about being as Aristotle puts it, namely, that the question about the
principle is different from all other questions. All knowledge about other things
can take their principles as given and start with them, but the question about the First
cannot do exactly this take the principle as given and known. This corresponds with
what Aristotle says in agreement with Plato: “The way to the principles is not the
same as the way starting from the principles.”39 This is in accordance with the
manner in which Aristotle treats the problem in Met. Λ, what he says there is not
deduction but theoria, speculation.
The paragraphs 22–34 treat the knowledge of the First. Theophrastus dissolves the
general question into more specific, particular questions. While there are many
different ways (tropoi) of understanding, what is the difference between the theoria
as an eminent form of knowledge and the other forms? It seems we cannot get
knowledge about the First if we ask after the First in the same manner as we ask
after the cause of anything. The reason is that this second type of questions remains
within the range of beings but no particular being in the realm of all beings can
be the cause of all other beings. Therefore the question about the First requires a
different method, one which makes possible asking questions, so to speak, ‘outside’
39 Nicomachean Ethics, A 4, 1095a30–b1.
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the beings. It is the method, which Plato outlines in the Sophist and Aristotle inMet.
Λ and practizes in more detail in Met. ΖΗΘ. Questions about method must take in
problems like the following: With what does this question begin and what is its
principle? What does it refer to when it refers to the First? What is the nature of
the First? To what extent can the question about the cause be instigated if one starts
from the perceptible?
In the second part he picks up the question of the possible range of application of
the question about the for-the-sake-of (§ 25), which played a role already in the first
part (§ 15). This topic belongs to the first part because the First causes motion like
a for-the-sake-of, but it belongs to the second part too because we must clarify the
difference between the form of knowledge of the First and other forms of knowledge
(§ 23). Up to what point can our asking after the First proceed, if we ask after a cause
in the same way as we do when asking after the cause of this or that (cf. § 25)?40
If we read this text against the background of the issues of transition as treated in
the Timaeus, keeping in mind the issue of the question about being, while excluding
any mere asserting as treated in the Sophist, then we must admit that Theophrastus
has grasped the situation of his time very well. That the text had another effect in
the reception does not lie with Theophrastus.
Theophrastus’ Met. and Aristole’s Met. Λ share a common basic goal. Both steer
the interest to the question of a theory of the First. While in the question of the
connection between the First and the natural beings Theophrastus lays the emphasis
more on the realistic side, Aristotle does so more on the speculative side. The two
agree on the question about the ‘aiming at’ (ephesis), on the question of appropriate
method in the question about the first and the arche, on the question of the possi-
ble range in the question about the for-the-sake-of; and, finally, on the position of
astronomy in the hierarchy of knowledge.
40 Note that there is a parallel with the modern discussion about internal and external questions.
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What does Theophrastus’Metaphysics Contribute to UnderstandingMet. Λ?
We may ask what Theophrastus’ Metaphysics contributes to understanding Met.
Λ, assuming that: both texts were written early and chronologically very close to
each other; both were produced with the aim of recording the issues at stake in
the Old Academy shortly before Plato died; and to note the open questions. In
Theophrastus’ text the central problem of the transition receives a particularly clear
treatment in its cosmological aspect. It could scarcely be put more concisely than
Theophrastus did in his second paragraph:
The starting point is, whether [there is] some connection and something like a
mutual association between intelligibles and the [things] of nature or [there is]
none, but the two are, as it were, separated, though somehow both contributing
to [bring about] all of existence. (Transl. D. Gutas)
The questions raised by Aristotle and Theophrastus correspond to each other even
in the way they are asked (see table 5.5), but even more so when we look into
their meaning. Aristotle’s question concerns which being becoming is based on,
Theophrastus poses the same question but, as in the wording of the paragraph above,
does so from the point of view of the problem of transition. That can be formulated
as follows: “How can we conceive the transition from the archai to the natural and
perceptible nature?” If an understanding of the transition from the noetic to natural
beings is possible, at least one essential kind of becoming is understandable. Aris-
totle emphasizes the theoretical side of the question and starts from the colloquial
use of to be in order to ask after the meaning of to be in its first and fundamental
use. What he develops in Met. Λ 6 to 7 and 9 can be summarized in the formula
{ousia←noesis→energeia / Doxa}. Theophrastus on his side, singles out of his
tradition the more realistic thread.
In this concept of transition from noetic principles to perceptible beings the ephesis
(the desire or ‘aiming at’) has the function to realize the noetic structure in the natural
world. The transition takes place in such a way that nature aims at its origin, which
initially gave it the potential to move. In this context ephesis is evidently something
like a cosmic power or impulse, which should explain the movements in our factual
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world.41 Theophrastus’ questions refer to this sort of desire. He asks, how far we
can reasonably go in search of the for-the-sake-of and still expect an answer, when
the domain of our question is worldly reality. This question is justified because with
the desire something like a natural finality in general is assumed.
Theophrastus also asks the extent to which particular things can be deduced from
the principles. This question too is quite logical in a cosmological and therefore a
realistic approach. It is evidently the function of the principles to make possible the
deduction (cf. §§ 11–18). The question about the principles, nevertheless, remains
essential (§ 13). There should be mediating between the perceptible domain and
the supernatural. This realistic connection, formulated as early as by Theophrastus,
would be taken up by Christianity, because it serves very well to conceptualize the
idea of creation; this realistic link between the perceptible and the super-perceptible
is just at the core of just this idea. It is no wonder that this concept was transferred
to Aristotle, since at the time Theophrastus’ text was the introduction to Aristotle’s
Metaphysics. A further far-reaching question is the value of the principle “All is at
its best,” a question which preoccupies Aristotle too (see above, Part II, 2.4).
Some of Theophrastus statements can serve as a foil for Met. Λ. There, ephesis
is anything but a cosmic power. Primarily, it stands as a well-known example of
something that is itself an unmoved cause having the ability to set something else in
motion (see Met. Λ 7.4 and 10). In De Motu Animalium 6, Aristotle uses the same
examples for the first moving in order to explain how the soul can move the body,
in this text in the realistic sense, of course. In contrast to this, in Met. Λ the desire
and the aiming at are examples for the first moving in a theoretic line of thought,
which cannot terminate in worldly things.
The concept of the telos is realistic in themanner Theophrastus uses it too andwithin
the context of his questioning. Theophrastus sees in the telos a principle, by which
the world can be constructed, quite in contrast to Aristotle. The principles serve for
the deduction of the natural things, so how far we can or must go in the deduction
by telos must be defined. He says that the search for the telos must be limited in
41 An idea, which has fascinated vitalists.
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both directions: towards the archai (§§ 33–34) as well as towards the particular (§§
11ff.).
It is particularly interesting to note that Theophrastus, in consensuswith theAcademy,
remains attached to the question about the First. Of course, the question about the
First is the prime issue for philosophers in all contexts, but this question does not
mean the same in every world and even within one and the same world it can be
asked in different senses. Theophrastus emphasizes that this question requires a
methodology unto itself (§ 13). He explicitly excludes three methods, the astronom-
ical (§§ 8 and 27) and the mathematical method (§ 8), and especially the method
used in the other areas of knowledge namely, calling something knowledge merely
when one has been able to give the reasons for it (di’ aitiou theorein). This is
not possible in the case of the First. The method for this special search istheoria,
as stated in § 25 and at the prominent positions of the first and last paragraph, in
accordance with Met. Λ 1.1, see table 5.5.
Aristotle, Met. Λ 1.1 Theophrastus, Met. § 1
περὶ οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία· [...] ἡ
οὐσία πρῶτον μέρος·
πῶς ἀφορίσαι δεῖ καὶ ποίοις τὴν
ὑπὲρ τῶν πρώτων θεωρίαν;
The present theory concerns being;
…the proper being is the first part
<of the whole>, …;
How and with what sort of [things]
should one mark the boundaries of
the study of the first [things]? (D.
Gutas)
Table 5.5.: Aristotle, Met. Λ 1.1 and Theophrastus, Met. § 1
If we reconsider the points of the consensus reported by Theophrastus, that the pri-
mordial question is that about the First; that its method is theory; that we are search-
ing for being as primary in order to understand how becoming is grounded on being;
and which or what that being is, then we see that these points are precisely the sub-
jects which are also at the centre of Met. Λ.
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5.1.3. Aristotle’s Early Work
The Relevant Texts
We find references to the Academy in Plato’s late dialogues and in Theophrastus’
Met., but no less in Aristotle’s early work, and all of this can help to shed light
on the background of Met. Λ.42 We shall look through Aristotle’s early work in
thematic not chronological order, because for the moment we are interested only
in its function as background to Met. Λ, not in tracing the development of Aristo-
tle’s thinking. These texts are particularly closely connected to the subjects of the
ideas (and in addition to this, the numbers and the ideal numbers), movement, be-
ing (ousia), and methodological reflection. The theme most treated ist that of the
ideas and their criticism (De ideis, De philosophia,Met. A 6 and 9, M–N, insofar as
there are early passages). The theme of ‘movement’ is very intricate, because what
tradition has received as cosmology, theology and teleology is very closely linked
with movement. We, thus, shall encounter many things which have been important
in the traditional reception of the book.
At the outset we ought to explain what is meant by the term ‘early work.’43 The first
works listed by Diogenes Laertios’ in Aristotles’ Vita can be classes as early.44 To
be sure, this is not a strictly chronological list although the chronological criterion
is predominant. Like Plato’s work, that of Aristotle is divided in two parts, the
esoteric and the exoteric texts. What we have to read are Plato’s exoteric works,
intended for the general public, the dialogues. If there were, as is plausible, esoteric
scripts, those are lost. We do know something about one of them, the lecture On
the Good. In Aristotle’s case, it is the other way around. Cicero was able to read
Aristotle’s dialogues and make a positive judgement of their style. Afterwards they
were lost but the scripts for use in school were preserved, the so-called pragmaties.
42 For literature on Aristotle’s early work see H. I. Düring, G. E. L. Owen (Hrsg.), 1960; E. Berti, 1962;
P. Moraux, 1975; B. Dumoulin, 1981; id., 1986; J. Wiesner, P. Moraux, (Hrsg.), 1983; H. Schmitz,
1985; J. Wiesner, 1985 und 1987; A. Preus, 1992; J. Barnes (Hrsg.), 1995, 305–307 (bibliography);
Flashar 2006.
43 Cf. P. Moraux, 1975.
44 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum V 22–27.
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The dialogues seem to be early works, but they are not the only ones in this group,
texts like De Ideis are also among them.
“To study the work of Aristotle” does not always mean the same thing. In the early
Peripatos it referred to stying the texts having content of particular interest at that
time; in Cicero’s time it meant the dialogues; in Late Antiquity the pragmatieswere
much commented; in the Middle Ages only parts of the Organon were known, the
logica vetus.45 It was not before the 12th century that his work became known to the
extent we do today, the early work forming a part of this and some of these became
known only from reconstruction.46
The notion of ‘early work’ typically refers chronologically to a phase of life.47 Aris-
totle’s philosophical life divides into three. The first phase, after earliest youth
(384–367), is that of his stay in the Academy (367–347); then follows the epoch of
travels (347–335: Atarneus, Assos, Mytilene, Stagira, Mieza), and finally, a second
period at Athens (335–322). By this division, the texts written during the first stay
at Athens and those during his travels can be called early work. In this case, we
are obliged to concede that works produced when Aristotle was already over forty
years old belong to the early phase.
It seems that Aristotle had already drafted some of his later pragmaties before and
during his travels. Attempts were, of course, made to distinguish the layers (as
was done in the case of Homer and with the same methodological weaknesses).
The first and most famous example is that of W. Jaeger’s attempt, who tried to
distinguish the different layers in the text and reconstruct the development of the
Metaphysics. Afterwards, many others followed his example.48 – For our project
not only the dialogues belong to the early work, but we include also the texts which
45 The Logica vetus is, in short, Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione in the translation of
Marius Victorinus und Boethius together with Boethius’ commentaries; in addition Porphyry’s Isa-
goge with commentary. Sometimes included were also Boethius’ logical treatises and an unfinished
commentary on Cicero’s Topics.
46 As examples: theProtreptikos, I. Düring, 1961; D. S. Hutckinson andM.R. Johnson, 2017, at philpa-
pers.org; De Ideis: G. Fine, 1993.
47 I. Düring, 1957.
48 See Flashar, 2004, and the begin of the article by M.-L. Gill, 2005; a relatively late example is e. g.
B. Dumoulin, 1986.
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in all likelihood were written not long after he left Athens. With respect to Met. Λ
the works that are most relevant are those listed in table 5.6.49
De ideis, De philosophia,
Categories, De Interpretatione,
Topics, Metaphysics Λ,
Physics H 1, Physics Θ,
De Caelo, De generatione et corruptione,
Metaphysics A 6 and 9, and ev.
MetaphysicsM 10 and N.
Table 5.6.: Aristotle’s early work
Judging from Aristotle’s reactions and the number of references, it seems that three
Platonic dialogues above all preoccupied him: the Parmenides, the Timaeus and the
Sophist. While he cites by name the first two, he never mentions the third by name.
He did, however, himself write a dialogue by that name. In the Topics, the Meta-
physics and other works he treats problems arising from the Sophist.50 Objectively
the Sophist exercised the most significant influence on Aristotle. That he took the
question about being and not that about the good to be the crucial question and that
he made a new outline of this question in Met. Λ iterated in Met. ΖΗΘ, this can all
49 I follow the ordering of I. Düring, 1968a, Sp. 332f. – A useful list of places in the Met. where
Aristotle refers to other works is given by G. Reale, 1993, vol. I, Indice XI, 363f.; in addition, Indice
X, where references within theMet. are listed. W.D. Ross, 1929, and L. Elders, 1972, give parallels
to the Met. in other works ad loc. – S. Fazzo, 2014, emphasizes the importance of the Academic
tradition. With respect to later works we have to compare in particular the Physics withMet. Λ 1–5,
Met. Z 7–9; and the parallels of Met. Λ 6–10 with Physics ΗΘ. – The edition of the fragments is that
of O. Gigon, 1987. For particular works see the separate editions (see bibliography).
50 As an example, in the first book of the Topics: A 1, 100b24 – Soph. 226a, ἐριστικοὶ λόγοι,
“sophisms”; A 5 and 7 on identity and difference, ταὐτόν and θάτερον; A 17 – Soph. 231a, ὀμοιότης,
“resemblance.” – Examples from other parts of the Corpus Aristotelicum: Soph. 236a2–3 μεστὰ
ἀπορίας ἀεί, “ever full of aporia” – Met. Z 1, 1028b2–4; 240e εἶναι πὼς τὰ μὴ ὄντα, “that the
non-being is somehow”; Met. Γ 7, 1011b26; Soph. 242 doxography: Physics A, Met. A; Soph.
251 ἄνθρωπος / ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθός, “man / good man”;Met. Z 6; and τρέχει, βαδίζει, “he runs, he
walks,” as examples; Soph. 254b9–11 τοῖς πᾶσι κεκοινωνέναις, “which is common to all beings”:
Top. Δ 6, 127a26 τὸ πᾶσι ἀκολουθοῦν, “that which follows all things”; Soph. 258 ὡς ἐστιν –
εἶδος : τὸ ὅτι, τὸ τί ἐστιν; Soph. 261–2 δηλώματα τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, “which makes man-
ifest by voice something about the ousia”: De interpretatione 1; also φωνή – λόγος, ὄνομα – ῥῆμα;
Soph. 263 σύνθεσις: De Interpretatione, 1, 16a12; Soph. 263 λόγος is true/false: De Interpretatione
1–6; μὴ ὄν: Met. N 2 1098a2–6.
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only be the effect of that dialogue. He was inspired by the Sophist too to create a
new kind of concepts: the quotations.51 Finally, throughout the Organon he exam-
ines in detail the logos, a task that was set as a the necessary programme by Plato in
the Sophist (259–260).
If G. R. Ledger is right in his dating of the Timaeus, then it is the latest complete
dialogue, only the fragmentary Critias follows. It is consensus that the Timaeus
belongs to the late works. Aristotle often refers to it by name (see Bonitz, Index),
more often still to its content, mainly when that is about movement or about the
hyle. This is the case not only in De Caelo but also in Physics H 1 and Θ, in De
Generatione et Corruptione, in De motu animalium. Apart from Met. Λ he speaks
about that which can set in motion itself unmoved in De Philosophia, De Caelo and
Physics Θ.
The De Ideis as well as Met. A 6 and 9 (also M–N) are relevant to understand
Aristotle’s criticism of the ideas and the reference that this criticism has to Plato
criticism of the ideas in the Parmenides,52 the De Philosophia too should be noted
in this regard. De ideis “belongs to the time in the Academy,” G. Fine argued (1993).
According to A.H. Chroust it was written “about the time of Plato’s death” as W.
Jaeger had already maintained. He took it as a programmatic text produced on the
death of Plato.53 W. Jaeger regards M 10 und N as early texts; J. Annas provides
arguments in turn against that thesis (1974). In M–N we find many paralleles to
Met. Λ, but the consensus is that A 6 and 9 came before M–N and that they belong
to the early period. H. Schmitz (1985, 511) places A 9 even before the Timaeus. The
early dating of the De Caelo is testified by the fact that Aristotle took the Timaeus
into account there; further, that he makes use of arguments first developed in De
51 See E. Sonderegger, 2012, I. 2.3.
52 Cf. I. Düring, 1975, 180f.; then newer studies on Plato by H. C. Günther, 1998; J. A. Palmer, 1999;
K. Wood, 2005; very instructive are two smaller texts on the Parmenides by A. Graeser, 1999 and
2003.
53 W. Jaeger, 1923, 23, 125ff, 133ff.; edition by H.D. Saffrey, 1971; B. Effe, 1970, says that becauseDe
Philosophia is very close to thePhilebus and the Timaeus, it must have beenwritten after the Timaeus;
edition by M. Untersteiner, 1962 (Hrsg.); E. Berti, 1962, 336ff. discusses different approaches to
dating of the dialogue.
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Philosophia; and the fact that dynamis and energeia do not appear here.54 Finally,
the Topics with its numerous examples issuing from the Academy, are certainly
of an early date.55 Fortunately for our purpose the exact chronology of the texts
does not matter. It will suffice, that we have at our disposal real texts which are
chronologically near to Met. Λ, and not only fragments and reconstructions.
The Subjects
It seems that the criticism of the Platonic ideas took up a large amount of space in
Aristotle’s first texts. In the extensive research about this criticism the questions
discussed are how conclusive it is and to which phase of the theory of the ideas
it refers. As Aristotle speaks in his criticism of subjects quite other than those we
find in the dialogues, the question arises what the content of the so-called Theory
of Principles and of the Unwritten Doctrine really is. The research on this is based
on presuppositions about method and content, which are even more than usually
controversial. It is, therefore, not a sound basis for us.
Let us take another approach and no longer ask whether Aristotles’s criticism is
correct or not; not least because such could only be judged with respect to theories,
which have yet to be reconstructed; instead, we shall ask after the objectives of
this criticism. To what end and in what respects did Aristotle criticize the ideas?
We may well ask this, because Aristotle did not reject the ideas as a whole, they
continued to play a role in his arguments. He even retained the term eidos, though
it be in a modified sense. He has analyzed the particular thing of everyday thinking
in eidos and hyle and, as regards its function, the eidos is now one of the four ways
‘we’ (the Greeks of his time) use the term ‘cause’ and it is the ‘second ousia.’ As
the textual basis for our questions about the aim of the criticism of the ideas, we
shall rely on De ideis and Met. A 6 und 9.
It is typical for the way Aristotle proceeds, that he reconstructs the target of his crit-
icism in a way we do not find in Plato’s text. It is not only today that we ourselves
have to reconstruct the theory of ideas and the arguments pro and contra, this already
54 As argued by J. Krämer, 1983, 265–266.
55 I. Düring, 1968b, 202–229.
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applies to Aristotle because Plato did not develop and organize any such over-all-
theory in his dialogues. Every critical reflection must proceed in this way. Aristotle
follows the method, developed in the Topics, of regarding all theses and claims from
the topical point of view. He, therefore, transforms the free Platonic formulations
into propositions and theses in his own terminology in order to stabilize them better
for quotation (: protaseis labein). It is only in relation to such quotable statements
that is it possible to formulate objections, and, as the text shows, it is not necessary
that the objections be definitive, they can be tentative. They belong to the consid-
erations pro and contra and it is possible to develop Aristotelian arguments against
the latter.
Only in such Aristotelian (and modern) reconstructions and by no means in the Pla-
tonic dialogues themselves there are proofs that ideas exist. Ideas are certainly the
proper beings in the dialogues, but ‘to exist’ is not at all the primary meaning of
einai, to be. What to bemeans remains still to be discovered (see the central section
of the Sophist). In the dialogues the ideas are neither an assertion nor something to
prove, they turn out rather to be an experiment to showwhat the necessary condition
for giving a proof would be, they are preconditions for the asserting and proving of
anything. Nevertheless, what Plato tries to show in his dialogues is that it is possible
to lead someone to an understanding of what they are, that they can be revealed as
fix points for our thinking. For some remarks on the origins of the Platonic idea see
below, p. 315 ff.
De Ideis
In the De Ideis we find five arguments against the ideas.56 The first argument takes
56 The main part of the text comes from the commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias (ca. 200 A.D.);
most of the text is printed in CAG I, M. Hayduck, 1891; further texts in the edition by Gigon). This
commentary is transmitted in two recensions, the recensio vulgata, which is a little bit more detailed
than the recensio altera. Editions of De Ideis: see the complete edition by V. Rose, 1896 (repr.
Stuttgart 1966); then W.D. Ross, 1955; D. Harlfinger, 1975, 15–39, this last edition is today the au-
thoritative edition for both recensions; O. Gigon, 1987, 372–384 (he prints both recensions following
the edition by M. Hayduck); G. Fine, 1993, both recensions following the Harlfinger edition, with
English translation and an in-dephth-comment; A. Graeser, 3, 1998, 121–143, gives a reading text
following M. Hayduck with a German translation.
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the idea as that which is the object of knowledge, since knowledge refers to some-
thing other than perceiving. Knowledge refers to what is stable, identical with itself,
something beside the perceptible particular things. – The argument against this take
on the idea is: not every object of knowledge “other than the perceptible” need to
be an idea, it could be simply a universal. Following this conception of the idea,
we would have too to accept ideas of things, which craftsman-like know-how deals
with. The defenders of the ideas would deny that.
According to the second argument, the idea is “the one above the many,” not one
of the many things but different from them. Against this one may reply, that this
concept of the idea can be applied to negations and negative statements too. In this
case we would have to accept ideas of non-beings. Even in that case “the one above
the many” could be no more than an universal. – This objection is especially inter-
esting. Aristotle himself has excluded negative terms inDe Interpretatione because
they are not determined: terms like ‘not-house’ ought not be used in arguments.
Aristotle is therefore well aware that the argument against the ideas, which uses
negation, itself has a counterargument.
The third is called the argument “from the nous.” It runs as follows: that which is
in our mind (nous), i. e. that which we are aware of and which we think of, refers
not to a particular, perishable thing but to a being. The thought remains even if the
thing vanishes, and this “remaining beyond the thing” is the idea. – The argument
against is that there are consequently ideas of vanishing things and of particulars too,
because in the nous are such things too. – This argument too can be rejected with
reference to the fact that “to be in the nous” is expressed in many ways (pollachos
legetai). The particular is not “in the nous” the same way that the idea is. The
particular as such cannot be “in the nous” in any case. We cannot define particulars
and there are no conceptions of them. We can think of particulars, but these thoughts
are again universal. It is not plausible that Aristotle was not aware of this at the time.
Even if we are to replace the conception with the description to arrive at a concept
of an individual, it is clear that there is a difference between the description and the
idea. In addition, the description includes other elements which are universal.
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The fourth is named the argument “from the pros ti” and runs as follows: that which
we can say unequivocally and in truth of a number of things, refers to the proper be-
ing, precisely to the idea. Statements about particulars are not absolutely the same
in different cases, only statements about the idea are absolutely identical. One can
say, for example, that Plato and Aristotle are both men, but in a slightly different
manner. Neither realizes man-ness in pure form, the concrete categorical determi-
nations of each differ slightly. One of the arguments against is, that in this case there
would be ideas of the pros ti as well, when there should only be ideas of ousiai. –
This argument too can be refuted by Aristotelian means. Socrates, of course, is a
man in a slightly different manner than Plato, and insofar the statements ‘Socrates
is a man’ and ‘Plato is a man’ are not identical. But in ‘Socrates is a man’ the pred-
icate does not mean the particular Socrates, but the man in general, and that is the
same for Plato and Socrates.
The fifth argument is that of the ‘Third Man.’57 When something is said with truth
of a number of things, without being one of them but remaining distinct: this is an
idea. – The argument against: if ‘man’ is said as an idea, which is something itself,
separated from the particular man, then ‘man’ must be said of this idea as well as
of the particulars and this is the ‘Third Man.’ This model is iterable and so the idea
vanishes in infinite deferral.
All of these argue in common, in view of our everyday experience, against the log-
ical consistency of the idea. They are not arguments against the idea as such.
Met. A 6 and 9
From an overview of the first book of theMet. we see the relation between chapters 6
and 9. It is easy to divideMet. A because Aristotle provides some structuring notes.
The main division is: introduction (chapters 1 and 2); two main parts (chapters 3–7
and 8–9); and final chapter (chapter 10). In the introduction Aristotle tries to make
57 The article by G. Vlastos, “The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides,” in: Philosophical Review
63 (1954) 319–349, (now in: Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, R. E. Allen (Hrsg.) London 1965,
231–263), produced an incredible amount of reactions; for literature see now new editions and com-
mentaries of the Parmenides.
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clear the general objectives of knowledge. He divides knowledge by the criterion
of purpose: one form of knowledge concerns our acting, another our producing,
the last is the knowledge, which is sought for its own sake. With respect to this
variety in forms of knowledge, Aristotle asks whether there is a primary form of
knowledge, what and how it would be. As criterion he uses the prevailing opinions
about the wise man. The result is that theoretical knowledge, the knowledge which
is for its own sake, is the most free and therefore primary.
In the first main part, divided by three summaries (984a16–18; 985a10–18; 987a2–
27), Aristotle presents what had up to then been believed to be this primary kind
of knowledge. Because he takes knowledge to be not only as ‘knowledge that,’ but
also ‘knowledge why’ (knowledge of causes), he analyzes the opinions on causes
too. The first summary says that at first only the cause in the sense of hyle was
recognized. Considering what Thales, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Hesiod and Empe-
docles have said, we can say, that two kinds of causes were found: the hyle and the
hothen he kinesis (“where the movement comes from”). Anaxagoras considered
the nous to be the origin of movement; Hesiod the Eros; Empedocles philia and
neikos (love and strife). Chapter 5 deals with the school of Pythagoras and takes
up Parmenides again (including Melissus and Xenophanes), and, finally, Chapter 6
with Plato. –
In the second main part Aristotle discusses the problems of the endoxa presented.
He begins with a summary of these endoxa. It is in this context that he treats the
Platonic ideas. In Chapter 6, then, Aristotle presents the afterwards so-called ‘theory
of the ideas’ (and related subjects) in the form of endoxa and in Chapter 9 shows the
problems inherent in this ‘theory.’ The goal of the study is to find the “knowledge
sought after” and to define its content. He seeks a primary theoretical knowledge
which can explain, why the phainomena are such as we experience them. The four
aitia are the means to examine this, their function is to yield a set of questions. At
the end of Chapter 10 Aristotle can state that, beyond his four causes, no others have
been identified.
In the sixth chapter we find a complex presentation of the theory of ideas. This is
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linked with thoughts we do not find in the dialogues, nevertheless the content can be
displayed in general form. Aristotle begins with the fundamental determinations of
the idea and their origins. He says that the ideas are inspired by Cratylus, Heraclitus
and Socrates. The ideas are the point of reference of the definition: they are peculiar,
standing beside perceptible things, the proper beings, which alone can be said to be
in strict sense; and only the ideas are knowable. Apart from this, there are some
remarks about numbers, which although being numbers are not so in the normal
sense and other remarks about principles. The latter should be causes or principles
on a higher level than the ideas. Plato is said to have stated, that as the ideas are the
causes of things, so the numbers are causes to the ideas. The expression eidetikoi
arithmoi, “eidetic numbers,” appears occasionally in Aristotle’s text and more often
in the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias and in Syrianus. Aristotle subsumes
the one under ousia, the “large-small” and the indefinite dyad under hyle;58 these
are the last elements and causes in the Aristotelian sense.
Aristotle obviously also speaks in his report of the Platonic philosophy about themes
other than the well-known subjects, themes which are not treated in the dialogues.
This gave rise to the inference of an ‘Unwritten Doctrine.’ Because we do not have
much material for this doctrine, scholars relied on places in the dialogues where
Socrates said that there remained more to say on the given subject. The Tübingen
School named such instances “Aussparungsstellen.”
To the mind of the present author and to some other too it is true that there remain
passages in the dialogues which cannot be understood (while the Tübingen School
argue that everything was understandable, by their reading at least). I find, for
example, in the literature no reasonable and convincing explanation of what is meant
by the idea of the good. Some drift off into theology and make the idea of the good
god or even something above the gods. Plato himself as well as Aristotle have made
the idea a subject of discussion. We can surmise, that in his late dialogues Plato tried
to circumvent some of the weaknesses and aporia of the idea. A sign of this may
be the discussion of the weakness of writing and text in the Phaedrus and in the
58 The “great and small” is identified with chora, which itself is understood as topos.
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7th Letter. Evidently, we must not understand the text of the dialogues literally,
nevertheless we ought to take them at their word. It seems, then, that there was
something like an internal philosophical discourse at the Academy, about which we
do not know very much.
Meanwhile, exceptionally sophisticated books and articles about the purported Un-
written Doctrine have been written, but unfortunately with little support from the
texts and of only limited philosophical interest. Many interpreters have wanted by
all means that the Platonic philosophy has had its last mysteries. They also wanted
to know them and write books about that, about which Plato said it was impossible
to write.59 So much is clear is that Plato had spoken about things other than ideas,
things connected to numbers and the pair of principles, the one and the indefinite
dyad. That their function was to serve as a basic structure for deduction as H. J.
Krämer meant, is not in the texts themselves, it is no more than a surmised recon-
struction. It is possible that the first generation of students made this systematization
and reification (Vergegenständlichung), I would not attribute it to Plato. In Met. A
9 Aristotle shows that the ideas are a useless duplicaton of the world.60
If there are as many ideas as beings then the ideas lose the character of principles.
The proofs in favor of the ideas are not conclusive partly on logical grounds, partly
because ideas appear where they are not required. This shows that the concept is
not restricted and narrow enough according to Topics Z 3.
Aristotle asks whether the ideas can be ground of the perceptible things, be they
eternal or perishable (Met. A, 991a8–b1). His analysis shows that ideas cannot be
causes either in the sense of movement or the out-of-which and to say that they are
‘models’ (paradeigmata), is simply metaphorical talk. It is another question how
and in which sense the ideas can be separately. Can an idea, as the ousia of a being,
be separately from that being? Aristotle also examines the approach of taking ideas
as numbers (or as geometrical entities as point, line, surface, solid). The test is
59 I forego to give examples, this is all familiar enough.
60 This motive was used in the positive sense by G.W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der
Philosophie, Werkausgabe 18, 40; Wissenschaft der Logik, 6, 27; 18, 39; Wissenschaft der Logik, §
21 and 22.
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restricted to the question, whether ideas can be grounds of perceptible things, the
result is negative.
Aristotle and others seek out the grounds of the evident (see 992a24f., ton phaneron
to aition, in combination with 990b1). The phrase “the ideas are causes of the
evident” is often understood in a realistic sense, as if ideas were causae efficientes.
That is hardly what Aristotle had in mind nor is that the sense of his question, of
which being becoming is grounded on. This is a question he comes on through
Plato and which he accepts, along with the question of how we can think of the
transition from the noetic to the aestetic world. He neither wants to prove that there
are no ideas nor that Plato’s intentions are meaningless. His criticism leads to the
conclusion that the ideas cannot serve the desired purpose.
Aristdotle’s criticism has received different interpretations.61 First, it is controver-
sial which points in the dialogues or in other sources his criticism is directed at.
Some want to find essential parts of the theory of principles already present in the
dialogues, such as the Philebus.62 It is, furthermore, unclear what the content of
these other sources would be. Some say that Aristotle means that Plato took the
ideas as causae efficientes (which is incorrect), others that Aristotle criticizes Plato
for having had no interest in causes at all (G. Fine); finally, some maintain that
the criticism concerns the ideas even when they are understood as causae formales,
even so they are not determined sufficiently and correctly. Many say that Aristotle
simply did not understand Plato or that he had distorted the sense of his theories
deliberately (e. g. H. Cherniss, H. J. Krämer). In this regard, I agree with J. Dillon
and C. Shields,63 who argued that it is more plausible to assume that Aristotle did
understand Plato better than we, because he lived in the same world as Plato, was
with him for twenty years and was a kind of assistant to him in the Academy for a
61 Some examples: H. Cherniss, 1945; P. Wilpert, 1949; G. E. L. Owen, 1957, 103–111 (M. C. Nuss-
baum (Hrsg.), 1986, 165–179); E. Berti, 1962; G. E. L. Owen, 1965; J. Annas, 1974, 257–283; W.
Leszl, 1975; J. Annas, 1977, 146–160; S. Mansion, 1984; G. Fine, 1987, 69–112; A. Graeser (Hrsg.),
1987; G. Reale, 1993, 253ff.; G. Fine, 1993.
62 K.M. Sayre, 1983.
63 J. Dillon, 2003, 17; Chr. Shields, “Plato and Aristotle in the Academy,” in: G. Fine (ed.), Oxford
Handbook of Plato, Oxford 2008, 505.
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couple of years. We live about 2400 years later, inhabiting a completely different
world and we have our knowledge from texts alone. It is highly likely that in his
days Plato has “helped” his dialogues with oral explanations.
It seems that in the Old Academy competing solutions were developed for problems
that persisted after the Timaeus (and other subjects too, of course). This dialogue
was treated on its cosmological and theological side, while for Theophrastus and
Aristotle the question about the relation between “the first and the second” and about
the transition from the noetic to the aesthetic world was in the foreground, since the
concept of methexis could not serve to mediate those. This was also one of the
problems in which Speusippus was interested.64
Unlike as in other efforts to discover to which phase of the theory of the ideas Aris-
totle’s criticism referred or to reconstruct the theory of principles from his allusions
here we ask: to what ends were the ideas and a possible theory of principles devel-
oped and why could both not answer the questions they were meant to. Our main
question is not what the ideas really are or what their determinations are and so on.65
Rather, we would like to have answers to questions of the following kinds: What are
there ideas for? What do they do? In which areas do they have a function and what
is their function? It seems that in his criticism Aristotle was guided by questions of
this kind.
Before we can criticize Plato’s ideas or Aristotle’s criticism of the ideas, we first
must ask for what purpose Plato has ‘invented’ the ideas, what problems were to
64 A. Graeser, 1999.
65 The following text of G.W. F. Hegel, could provide the starting point of a modern interpretation of
the ideas (see Theorie Werkausgabe, 1971, Bd. 19, 40):
Die Idee ist nichts anderes als das Allgemeine, und dass dies Allgemeine
nicht als das formell Allgemeine genommen wird, wie die Dinge nur teil
daran haben oder (wie wir es ausdrücken) nur Eigenschaften der Dinge
sind, sondern indem dies Allgemeine als das an und für sich selbst Seiende,
als dasWesen genommen wird, als dasjenige, was nur ist, was nurWahrheit
hat; und 41: …sie sind allein das Sein.
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be formulated or solved by them. – It is clear that questions of this type can be
answered in various ways, depending on the context in which the function of the
ideas is being asked after. The answer which I propose can be compatible with
other ones, we need only make explicit the different contexts, such as semantics,
ontology or others.
In my view the ideas are an intuitive insight with comparable functions in different
areas. We have to bear in mind that Plato’s purpose in using the ideas can differ
from Aristotle’s perception of their function in Plato’s dialogues. It may just be
that the question “What does Plato use the ideas for?” is not the most appropriate,
because the ideas are only one part of the distinction between the noeta and the
aistheta, which is combined with the distinction between being and becoming. We
cannot reasonably speak about ideas in isolation, because they are what they are in
relation and in distinction to something else, which is not an idea. It would be better
to ask after the sense of this difference. What does the distinction between the being
and the becoming, between the conceptual and the perceptible, by which the ideas
are the being and the conceptual, serve? In which problem area did this difference
become necessary and helpful? To which questions the ideas are an answer?
It seems to me that the ideas are Plato’s response to the discussion of some of the
central problems of his time. In the concept of the idea he manages to integrate three
insights suggested by the tradition. I give an account of these suggestions in the
chronological order of the dialogues, in which they appear. First, I mention the im-
pulse lent by Socrates (the early dialogues); next that of Parmenides (Parmenides);
and finally, that of the Presocratics (Timaeus). The chronology is not otherwise
decisive, this is a systematic consideration.
Plato received a first impulse from Socrates. Aristotle tells us that the ideas have
their origin in the Socratic question of how we shall be able to form a basis for
our acts (Met. A 6; cf. Plato, Euthyphron 7b–c). What is the reason we seem to
have safe knowledge, capable of becoming ethically normative? Why and how is
it that we have a solid knowledge of what is good, when that is evidently neither
a perceptible thing nor a mathematical or suchlike entity? How is it possible that
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normative predicates can be used constantly and reliably?66 The ideas are answers
to such questions.
It seems that ethical issues led Socrates to definitions, that what definitions refer to
are ideas. Reflection on the conditions of this kind of knowledge leads to dialectic.
Plato and perhaps Plato only (that means not Socrates), then tried to test the possible
use of the ethically proven method elsewhere. What is certain is that Plato examines
whether the stability found in ethical noeta holds also for noeta in general.
In our everyday experience we see that our knowledge about changeable things is
suitable and sufficient enough to the situations in which it is required. This knowl-
edge is not irrefutable, but it would be wrong to say that we do not know anything.
On what is this knowledge founded? We have always to ask for the origin of our
knowledge. On what knowledge, prior to experience, is experience based? It is
urgent to ask after the referents of our thoughts because the general thoughts can-
not possibly relate directly to the individual things. Nevertheless, we believe that
our thoughts about them are true. With reference to what, our statements are true?
We distinguish in our everyday life between the perceptible things and our thoughts
about them. We distinguish between the particular things and their nature and our
knowledge about them. In knowledge too, we distinguish between basic presup-
positions and the knowledge based on these. It seems to have been the intuition
of Socrates and Plato, that these distinctions cannot be made and comprehended
without ideas.
Socrates has shown that our ethical knowledge must be based on some knowledge
prior to experience and he discerned this basis in the general and unconditional
ethical norms especially. Plato, perhaps, generalized this into ideas which consti-
tute knowledge about stable beings independent of or prior to experience. He said,
metaphorically, that we ‘remember’ those when we have a corresponding experi-
ence. This line of thought leads to the culmination in the Politeia where the idea
of the good is presented as the highest and first idea. Ideas are the being (Sein) on
which becoming and knowledge about becoming is based.
66 Cf. W. Wieland, 1982, 127.
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A second impulse came from Parmenides. Plato realized that the programme of
the absolute separation between being and not-being is not feasible. In the Sophist,
therefore, the question about being arose and asking this question, the guest from
Elea discovered the Doxa and ‘the sophist in myself.’67 The Doxa marks a posi-
tion in the discourse. First many people contend something, side by side, without
any connection. Plato related them to each other through Socrates, who is the point
of reference for all opinions, thus do the participants in the dialogue become aware
of their opinions. Finally, Plato has confronted himself with his own opinion, show-
ing that the position of the sophist is the position of everyone in the discourse, who
is contending an underlying conviction about being, that is, it applies to the ‘friends
of the ideas’ too. This is what I intended to say by the discovery of the ‘sophist in
myself.’ We all, not only the known sophists, must abandon this position in order
to escape the crisis of discourse and free ourselves from merely asserting claims.
Aristotle has reflected this situation in the discourse, organized by Plato in the di-
alogues; all of Plato’s dialogue participants are referred to Socrates. Drawing on
the situations in the Platonic dialogs Aristotle has replaced this personal reference
in the Topics with rules on how to deal with opinions and claims. Finally, since
the Academy is a school there arises a new situation of discourse. In schools it is
necessary again to contend something.
This line leads to the five highest genera in the Sophist. Reflecting on the various
opinions about being (one of them is the conviction that the ideas are the being),
Plato sees that the discourse can only be saved by acknowledging one’s ownDoxa.
The result of his analysis of theDoxa are the five highest genera. This is one of his
attempts to clarify the question of where the pre-empirical knowledge stems from.
In contrast to the first impulse, which aims at an understanding of norms which
are not at our disposal, here, in the Sophist the second impulse has as its aim to
arrive at an understanding of being, after some shocks and aporia and this ought to
provide a new starting point for thinking. Plato’s basic distinction between being
and becoming, the considerations about the idea (the idea is the being, Sein, the
idea is the only thing that can be said as itself), the highest genera (the being as
67 See E. Sonderegger, 2012, 85.
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that which is asked after, movement and rest as concepts describing to be, identity
and difference as concepts of reflection, Reflexionsbegriffe) – all these insights, are
that not steps on the way to the question about being? Plato’s final conclusion on
this path was in the discovery of the Doxa about being and its articulation as the
highest genera.
Plato received a third impulse from the Presocratics, who asked what the principles
of becoming are. They concluded, that the elements are these principles. This line
leads to the Timaeus. Plato shows that the elements (earth, water, air, fire) are
insufficient as principles, because they are no more than a special kind of things
within the set of all things. As present things, they cannot be principles, they are
not sufficiently elementary.
Plato develops the concept of transition in the Timaeus (picked up by Theophrastus
in the first paragraph of his Met.) by presenting the world in two versions, one
noetic, the other as world in the chora. By combining ideas and chora the world
of movement and becoming should become comprehensible and that is what the
dialogue aims at. How the demiurge formed the world, seeing the ideas as models,
this is not only a metaphor for our knowledge of the world, but also an illustration
of the fact that the world is and of how it is (Dasein, Sosein).
The ideas came about, then, from intuitions in three areas. The intuition, in fact,
is always the same one, any difference issues from the difference of the fields in
which it applies: values and acting; experience and knowledge; or becoming and
being. The fields do not overlap, so the intuition cannot be exactly formulated as
a consistent over-all theory; what the ideas do as fixed points of reference in the
different fields being different. In the range of human acting, the idea is a supra-
personal basis, in the range of experience it represents the noetic world prior to the
factual world, in the range of becoming the being is model.
Against this background Aristotle’s criticism of the ideas is a criticism concerning
more the method than the goal, because Aristotle does not abandon the issues and
problems which the ideas were conceived to resolve. Both Plato and Aristotle, have
the same horizon of problems, which Theophrastus shares too. How we are to think
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of the transition from a not-perceptible principle to the perceptible things?68 How
things become beings,that is, how things can be? Which being grounds becoming?
Whence comes the ‘desire’ to be, the drive of things that become and how is it that
we know anything about that?
The question persists and Aristotle, therefore, says at Met. Λ 1.1: “The theory is
about the being (Sein).”
It is not at all Aristotle’s intention to say that Plato’s statements are false, he wants to
ascertain the validity of his thoughts bymeans of the criticism inDe ideis and inMet.
A 6 and 9. Any criticism is situated in larger context of a comprehensive report of
possible and factual opinions about the question of how being may be the ground
of becoming. Plato says that the ideas are the being (Sein), in De Ideis Aristotle
reveals some logical inconsistencies in this concept. In Met. A 9 he shows that the
ideas are not able to satisfy the intended function and that the question remains.
Neither a theory of ideas nor a theory of principles could resolve the problems be-
cause by the time they entered in a new field of problems. Examining the ideas to
their consistency and explanatory power, Aristotle prepares the ground for his own
question about being. It remains to be seen whether the considerations in Met. Λ
will answer better the remaining questions: whether the ‘vision’ presented in it will
give a better answer to the question about the being which grounds becoming than
the ideas and whether it can explain the transition from noesis to nature better than
Plato in the Timaeus did.
Cosmology, movement, transition
Whoever might wish to give an answer to the question about the First in the context
of the questioning about the transition from the First to the Second, has some fur-
ther topics to discuss. To the cosmological question conveyed by the Presocratics
via Plato’s Timaeus belongs the question of the movement. Aristotle takes up this
question first in De Philosophia, De Caelo and in Physics H and Θ.
68 See also J. Stenzel, 1959 (3. ed.), 109ff.; K. von Fritz, 1978, 162.
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In De Motu Animalium, De Partibus Animalium, Met. A and B, De Anima and, of
course, in the Physics he further developed the question of movement. When this
question is asked not only as a question about the nature and the conceptual elements
of movement but as a question about the cause of movement in the factual world,
and when the question must be asked as the question about the first moving (to avoid
the progress, Physics Η 1, Θ 5), then this question can easily drift to theology.
In his early dialogues Plato tried to explain his vision of the idea and its function,
and why it is necessary to accept it; in the Timaeus he asks how the noetic and
the perceptible, separated at first, might have to do with each other. By asking so
it becomes evident, that the ideas, which were, within the frame of the Socratic
situation of discourse, a good basis to understand our acting, are no longer adequate
in the new context of the question of how the perceptible can be grounded in noetic
beings. It is the new set of problems, brought about by Plato himself, in which his
old tools, the ideas (and, if he really had one, the theory of principles), will no longer
serve.
What the ground of being may be remains open what. It is very plausible to distin-
guish the areas of being from becoming, but then the mediation is missing. We are
capable of thought, we have a world of thought, indeed we live in a world of thought
with structures in place prior to experience, structures that lay down the basis for
experience and provide us with an a priori order (kosmos noetos). We live in a
sensual world too, however, which we perceive. This duality makes it unavoidable
to take heed of the transition from one world to the other. If being and becoming are
not to be two absolutely separated worlds – a position for which the guest from Elea
in the Sophist militates – then we must ask after their relation, mediation or connec-
tion. We must inquire not only after our knowledge (“How being makes knowing
something about becoming possible?”) but just as much after what it means for a
thing becoming to be.
For answers to questions of exactly this kind did Plato seek in the Timaeus and
the answer he found was chora. Aristotle followed Plato on this path and went
further. He affirmed that we certainly cannot say anything about movement and the
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perceptible world without something like chora, but understood that neither ideas
nor the chora itself is capable of causing movement. How is it possible that aistheta
and noeta “co-operate in a certain sense” Theophrastus asked in Met. § 2. How
is it possible that we know something about what we have perceived through the
senses? Is there an isomorphy between aistheta and noeta, or an analogy? Or are
the one images of the others? – Such questions show that the established instrument
for yielding answers – the methexis – has become problematic. It seems that the
question of transition was at the centre of interest in the Old Academy, at least as far
as we can tell from the reports of Aristotle and Theophrastus. Whatever the content
of the theory of the ideal-numbers and the principles may have been, it seems that
they were developed to meet objections brought against the older version of the
concecption of the ideas.69
In addition, these contents played a role in the process of transition from the noeta
to the aistheta. Alexander of Aphrodisias, for example, in his In Aristotelis Meta-
physicam (117, 25f.), introduces the principles with the following quotation from
the De Philosophia:
ἐκτίθεται δὲ τὸ ἀρέσκον αὐτοῖς, ὃ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ φιλοσοφίας εἴρηκε·
βουλόμενοι γὰρ τὰ ὄντα (ἀεὶ γὰρ οὐσίας τὰ ὄντα λέγει), ταῦτα δὴ τὰ ὄντα
βουλόμενοι ἀνάγειν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἃς ὑπέθεντο (ἦσαν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀρχαὶ τῶν
ὄντων τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, ἣν ἔλεγον ἀόριστον δυάδα), εἰς δὴ ταύτην
θέλοντες πάντα ἀναγαγεῖν [...]
He reports what seems correct to them, which he had also said inDePhilosophia:
They <: the members of the Academy> state that the beings (he always calls
the beings ousiai), they state to trace these beings back to the principles, which
they have posited (principles for the beings were for them the great and the
small, which they called ‘indefinite dyad’), on that <principle> they wanted to
refer everything [...]
It is quite possible that not Plato and Aristotle did think of a deduction of all things
from the first principle (that would only be creation in a secular form) but that other
members did think along those lines, as modern defenders of the Unwritten Doctrine
69 That the theory of principles should remedy some errors in the theory of the ideas is also E. Berti’s
view, 1962, 323.
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suppose, when they say that the beings are deduced from the one and the indefinite
dyad. Eudemus, Speusippus, Xenocrates may have considered such possibilities.
One and the same question can be asked in different ways, even in one and the
same world. Depending on how one sets out and what one sets as goal, the same
question can turn out to be cosmological, theological or theoretical, and the answers
can differ respectively. Such is the context of Aristotle’s early work.
Questions such as: How the cosmos came about? What is its origin, its structure,
which are its principles? Why there is life? – such questions can lead to theoretical
and epistemological questioning about how becoming is to be understood, how be-
ing and becoming are related to each other, on which being becoming is founded.
This is the ground common to the Timaeus, Theophrastus’Metaphysics andMet. Λ.
It seems that Aristotle first treated the question about movement in De Philosophia
and in a very instructive manner in fact. Yet, many ‘fragments’ are only reports,
the exact reading being uncertain. It is rare that we can definitely allocate a given
text to a certain book, nevertheless some attempts have been made to reconstruct
the book (see above fn. 53). We may, however, dispense with the reconstruction of
the book, simply compiling texts treating of the same theme. Then we end up with
blocks of quotations and reports that describe the way to philosophize. It may have
somewhat resembled the doxographies in Physics A or Met. A. One first block
concerns sophia, the genuine philosophical knowledge, which is arrived at across
different levels. The term theoria may or may not have appeared in this doxogra-
phy, but we do find the term in the Protrepticus. It denotes the characteristics which
distinguish philosophical from other forms of knowledge. A second block consists
of the criticism of the ideas70 and a third block with movement. This last question
must have been associated with the gods, because one of the reasons to presume the
existence of gods are the meteora (see De Philos. frg. 12a). The movement of the
heavens belong to these and its unchanging order (fr. 18 and 19a) and the gods are
considered to be their authors.
In De philosophia the questions about the the First and the knowledge about it are
70 E. Berti assumes that De ideis is prior to De Philosophia, so that Aristotle canprevious have used his
anterior text.
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characteristically connected. In this context Aristotle also assesses the explanatory
power of the ideas. The conclusion is that the knowledge about the ideas cannot be
the knowledge being sought and, finally, there is a discussion about the origin of
movement, which had been initiated in the Timaeus but had not received a satisfac-
tory solution in that dialogue.
De Caelo begins with the following statement:
The knowledge about nature <deals> almost entirely with bodies and magni-
tudes further with their affections and their movements and, finally, also with
the principles which belong to this kind of being.
The kind of movement is contingent on the kind of body that is moving. Simple bod-
ies have simple movements, compound bodies compound movements. An instance
of such simple movements in nature that we can see are the circular movements of
the stars. These movements are – “as is known so far” as Aristotle emphasizes –
without a temporal beginning or end and without any other alteration. There must,
therefore, be a body able to bring about such a movement. This body can be neither
light nor heavy, because such bodies move either to the middle or away from the
middle. It must be the “the first natural body” which differs from the elements earth,
water, air and fire: Aristotle named it aether.
The subject of De Caelo is only one area of physics, but within this area Aristotle
wants to ask after the First in such a way that the movements of all other natural
bodies become explicable. With this aim De Caelo is on the cosmological side of
the question about the transition, Met. Λ on the theoretical. In the leading question
about the First and the transition to the second they agree not only with each other,
but also with Theophrastus’ Met. Aristotle provides his cosmological report with
strong reservations (DeCaeloA, 270b3, more extensively in 270b12–25). DeCaelo
B begins with clear indications that the opinion that the heavens did not become and
that they therefore are divine, is conventional (283b26–284a6). Insofar we cannot
speak of scientific statements in De Caelo and all the less in Met. Λ.
The first sentence of Physics Θ runs as follows:
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Has movement ever had a beginning without having been before and does it
perish again, so that <then> nothing moves <anymore>, or has it neither come
about, nor does it perish <ever>, but was it always already and ever will be,
and is that <: to be in motion> an immortal and never ending characteristic of
the beings, like a life for all natural beings?
Aristotle then lists some of the endoxa concerning this question (250b15–251a5).
All who have spoken about the origin of the cosmos and who have dealt with
coming-to-be and passing-away in general must assume that there is movement.
He concludes the introduction (251a5–8) with a comment on the usefulness of this
question. It is not only valuable ‘for the knowledge about nature’ (peri physeos
theoria), but also for thinking about the prote arche, the ‘first beginning.’
This text in the Physics evidently corresponds with Theophrastus’ Met., not only
in the general line of thought but also in part quite literally and it is consistent also
with De Caelo, De Philosophia and with Met. Λ. In the first sentence of Physics Θ
the Parmenidean vocabulary is striking. We will meet it again at the end of Met.
Λ 7. The word apaustos (“never-ending”) belongs to an elevated poetic high style.
Parmenides uses it; next Aeschylus and Euripides in lyric sections of their tragedies;
Plato is the first to use it in prose; then we find it in Physics Θ 1, and Theophrastus,
Met. § 5.71 Aristotle develops this question further into considerations about an
unmoved arche, which maintains the eternal movement of the heavenly bodies.
The logic of the regressus demands that if there are moved things, there must be
‘something’ which can set in motion, itself unmoved. That has as consequence that,
should the movement should be “continuous” (syneches), then there must be a first
moved thing, moved by the first that sets in motion itself unmoved. This first moved
thing must be eternal too and from its movement derive all other movements. The
71 Physics Θ 1, 250b13–14 (in the introductory sentence: καὶ τουτ’ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄπαυστον ὑπαρχει
τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ζωή τις οὖσα…“that belongs to the beings as something immortal and never ending,
like a life…,” Parmenides, frg. 8, 27 ἄπαυστος, as attribute to ἐόν; Aeschylus, Supp., 574 (in a lyric
part: αἰὼν ἄπαυστος; Euripides, Supplices, 82 (lyr.); Pl., Tim. 36e4 attribute to βίος, “life”; Crat.
417c5 ἄπαυστος καὶ ἀθάνατος ‹φορά›, “never ending and immortal <movement>”; ἄπαυστος not
found in Homer, or in Herodot. To this sentence see E. Sonderegger, “Aristotle’s Theory of Nature
from the Point of View of our Hermeneutical Situation,” in: Aristotle on Logic and Nature, ed. by
Jan-Ivar Lindén, Peeters, Leuven, 2019, 281–284.
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last are the movements of all things we see around us, which are sometimes in mo-
tion, sometimes at rest, now one way, now another. The first tier of moved beings,
those moved by the unmoved being, provide the answer to the question about the
transition, posed in the Timaeus. We should keep in mind that the statement about
the first being that sets in motion and the first moved being is made in hypothetical
form.
The statement in Physics Θ that the world is eternal seems to contradict the one
in Met. Λ, that the movement begins with a ‘First Mover.’ R. Sorabji thinks that
Philoponus first discovered this contradiction in the context of the eternity of the
world.72 Philoponus said, that it is not possible that there be an infinite number of
things and that a process with infinite steps could not be carried out. If the world
were eternal, as Aristotle says, then there would be an infinite number of periods
of time. – The contradiction pointed out by R. Sorabji, presupposes a realistic un-
derstanding of eternity which stands in contrast to the Christian understanding of
creation, based on a creator who sets in motion at a certain moment. Eternity in a
realistic sense contradicts a temporal beginning of the world.
In reply to this, we may say that Aristotle himself saw very well the antinomy be-
tween the eternity and the finitude of the world. He has tried to maintain both pos-
sibilities and to allocate them to different contexts, while Philoponus, on the other
hand, rather dogmatically fixed the antinomy. According to Aristotle, it is not pos-
sible to speak about a beginning of time, as regards the notion of time. We cannot
assume a beginning for time, if time is defined by the difference of before and af-
ter: a first period of time would become an phase within time, while a first point of
time having no point of time which it succeeded, could not be a point of time. That
is the conceptual context, but in the natural context it seems necessary to assume
a first producing movement, which itself is not caused and not moved, otherwise
the reason for the actual movements we experience hic et nunc disappear in the in-
finite regression. – It is this difference which determines the discussion between
Simplicius and Philoponus. Simplicius cannot understand what Philoponus means
72 R. Sorabji, 1987, 6, Chapter 9: “[...] Philoponus’ great achievement [...].”
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by creation as a philosophical term, Philoponus (and R. Sorabji) cannot see that
Aristotle speaks about natural becoming in one context and, in the other, about the
abstract concept.
Many see another contradiction between the concept of ousia in the Categories,
in Met. ΖΗΘ and Met. Λ some alleging that it is only as a result of Aristotle’s
philosophical development. For the standard interpretation prote ousia in the Cat.
is the concrete particular “just this horse,” while in Met. ΖΗΘ it is the eidos and
in the presumed late text Met. Λ it is, finally, God. E. D. Harter, (1975) tried to
resolve the apparent contradiction, saying that between the Cat. and the Met. there
is no difference in the conception of the ousia, the difference is in the eidos. While
in the Categories Aristotle understands the “universal species” as eidos, the eidos
in theMet. is the “particular form of a concrete individual.” The “substantial form”
as combination of causa formalis and causa finalis is the primary reality and it is
neither universal nor individual but “individuated.”73
To this we can reply that prote ousia is always the heading to a question. It is useful
in different respects, which D. Fonfara has persuasively shown. But the starting
point is always the same: the question of what the hen is in the pros hen legesthai
of to be; even the methodological means, namely the topical means, are always the
same. If Met. Λ is an early work, then Aristotle, saying that ousia is noesis, departs
with a speculative climax at the outset. Aristotle distinguishes in the Cat. prote
ousia and deuterai ousiai. The First is the primary and one with respect to which,
we use to be in various ways. It is the hen in pros hen legesthai. We are looking
for it, but it cannot be articulated. The second is the humanly possible substitute for
that; the ti en einai cannot be articulated, but we can designate genus and species
of a thing.74
Reflection on Method
73 Harter, 1975, 15; for further remarks on this theme see below Part II, 2.1.2; D. Fonfara, 2003, inge-
niously tried to unravel the apparent contradiction between theCategories andMet. Z by a distinction
of different views, namely ontology and epistemology.
74 Cf. E. Sonderegger, 2012, III. 8.
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Every philosophical consideration must include some reflection on the method to
be followed. By means of such reflection, Plato showed through the figure of the
guest from Elea in the Sophist, that new assertions about being would not further the
cause. After the discourse about being that had been conducted by the Presocratics
and Sophists and the difficulties to which that discourse was by then (at Plato’s time)
subject, any mere assertion about being had to come to an end. Any new assertion
would be nomore than a new opinion to be proven true, there was no egress from the
world of opinions. The only way to break out of this circle is to reflect on existing
claims and opinions. This insight cannot be set aside. It is implausible that Plato
and Aristotle would later have forgotten or excluded it.
Evidently, assertions are not equally problematic in all areas. What has been said
above is valid primarily in the theoretical area and for abstract reflection. In our
everyday life and in empirical knowledge, realism and assertions are quite normal
and well justified, while in the theoretical domain of the question, however, one
ought to go through one’s tradition in order to become clear about one’s place within
the discourse. One of Aristotle’s strongest means to achieve this is the quotations
(Anführungen); in theCategories,De Interpretatione, and especially in the Topics75
he has developed other means. Plato and Aristotle made it clear, what thinking
without claims is and its power, Plato with the highest kinds in the Sophist and
Aristotle with the theory in Met. Λ.
These are all conclusions, preceded by much reflection. There is reflecting on the
difference between the methods of the physicist, the mathematician and the philoso-
pher (Physics B 2, Met. Γ 2–3, Ε 1); on what astronomy has or has not to do with
the question about the First (Met. Λ 8, Theophrast, Met. § 27); another concerning
the question of how it is possible to ask after the First (cf. Nicomachean Ethics, A 1,
1095a38–b1 with a reference to Plato); on how the knowledge about the First differs
from knowledge about other topics; and, finally, how the transition from the First to
the Second ought to be conceived. – All these themes are common within the Old
Academy76 they exercised their effects on Theophrastus’Met. and Aristotle’s early
75 See “topical approach” (topische Einstellung) in E. Sonderegger, 2012, III. 3.1.
76 Very plausibly in the sense as it was reported by K. Gaiser, 1963, or by H. J. Krämer, 1983.
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work. It is likely that the Academywas developing a suite of potential modifications
to the theory in reply to the outstanding questions just mentioned. Aristotle opposed
such attempts, the mere rebuilding or updating of the idea being insufficient. That
is at the core of his criticism of the ideas. It is not his aim to modify the hypothesis
of the ideas, even if he retains idea as one of the four causes and maintains that eidos
is that which, together with hyle, constitutes the particular.
The question itself requires reorientation. Socrates started from with the question of
what the origin and basis of a solid knowledge in the domain of our actions would
be. Plato, alone perhaps, expanded the question to knowledge itself in general. The
proper being (“that which is beside the perceptible”) could qualify as basis for sure
knowledge. In this case we have to explain how it is possible that we actually live
in a world of perceptible things, which are not proper beings and at the same time
can know something of them on the basis of the proper being. It was never up
for discussion of deriving the perceptible particulars from the principles or proper
beings.77
This reorientation is already associated with a further change of the question in the
Platonic dialogues. The proper being founds our knowledge of ethical norms and of
perceptible things (early and middle dialogues). The good is the basis of knowledge
and of being as well (Politeia). In the Timaeus the conclusion is drawn: if the good
is the basis of being and of knowledge, then we ought to be able to reconstruct
the intellectual contingency of the particular from the first principle (this not to
be confused with a realistic causal inference or producing). We must arrive at an
understanding of how the perceptible world is connected to the noetic such that
the perceptible is and somehow becomes understandable. Theophrastus pursues the
question in its realistic sense, when he asks how far we can go in asking after the for-
the-sake-of-something and in the search for its grounds. Along with other questions
not related to our present subject, the question about the difference between being
and becoming, and about the difference between aistheta and noeta and how and
why being arises from opposites are the guiding questions in Aristotole’s early work
77 This would be a projection of a false understanding of Neoplatonistic considerations onto Plato.
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as well as in Theophrastus’Met. In summary, it can be said that Aristotle has seen in
the hypothesis of the ideas and what is related to it (such as the theory of principles,
the hen, unity, the aoristos dyas, the indefinite duality), an attempt to determine the
primary knowledge (prote philosophia, as zetoumene episteme, “knowledge we
are looking for”) of the first being (prote ousia). The foundations laid by Plato do
not suffice, but the aim of arriving at a primary knowledge of the first being is not
called into question. Quite the contrary, this objective should only be pursued by
better means. Aristotle will try throughout his life to realize the speculative sketch
presented in Met. Λ.
5.2. The First Sentence inMet. Λ
5.2.1. The Kind of Phrase that KP 1 is
The understanding of the whole book depends on how we understand its first phrase
and it depends even more on the type of sentence than on its content. For a long time
it was understood as programatic.78 It designates what is asked after, being (Sein);
and next, the method of the question to be followed, the theoria. The following
sentence says that the beings should be studied with respect to which is the first for
them (and very significantly not of them!).
Is that, however, really good reason to anticipate a metaphysics of substance? Is
ousia something about which either we or Aristotle can contend anything because
knowing what it is? Is it clear enough in its main features, at least, what ousia is and
we have only to ask which of the ‘candidates’ is to be selected as substance?79 Even
78 W. Jaeger, 1912, 122; M. Frede, 2000, 55, characterizes it very well as “referring to an already
ongoing enterprise,” unfortunately he thinks of this enterprise as a metaphysics of substance. S.
Fazzo, 2009, has emphasized the extraordinary importance of this phrase, which, as she says, is much
more than an incipit. In her book (2014, 116) she treats the connection of this phrase with Plato’s
Sophist, 244a4f., but nevertheless sticks with ousia as substance, with the thesis that Aristotle wants
to found the primacy of the substance in Met. Λ.
79 Many are used to think of theMetaphysics that way, amongst others M. Frede and G. Patzig in their
Commentary on Met. Z. But, from time to time we read that the instances in Z 3 are not candidates
for the substance, but material to find the criteria for substance, see e. g. M. L. Gill, 1989, M.V.
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if it were already clear that substance translates ousia (although that is obviously
not the correct translation, authors in late antiquity were much more cautious than
modern ones), we would still have to ask what substance means. If ousiawas clearly
substance, the question would not be as open as it remained after Plato’s Sophist and
as Aristotle has retained it. However, even after Met. Λ and ΖΗΘ, the theoria peri
ousias remains an unfinished project, something yet to resolve.
If we leave aside the standard interpretation and we read Met. Λ 1.1 as not having
the closure that had been imagined, as open as it in fact is – as also M. Frede wanted
to do (2000, 55) – we can see that Aristotle’s position is very similar to that of Plato
expressed in his Sophistes 243de. There, in the middle of the dialogue, reaching
the aporia confronting one who questions how to ask after the first and the origin
of all and of all knowledge (242b), it is to be (τὸ εἶναι, 243e2), which takes this
first place and it is only apparently the most clear and simple of concepts, in fact
it obscure and inducing of aporia, something we only thought we were clear about,
but we of which we too, the friends of the ideas and not only the somatikoi must
admit to having no better than opinions, no stable knowledge.80 This is reason to
raise once more and anew the question about the First and with new methods.
The first sentence of Met. Λ 1.1 is very close to the sentences in the middle of the
Sophist but apart from that we must take into account how close it is to the other
Aristotelian sentence: “The term ‘being’ is used in manifold ways.” Both Aris-
totelian sentences have two things in common, they summarize a tradition and his
reflections with respect to the fundamental opinions. KP 1 says that the philosoph-
ical discourse which had taken place up to then showed that the study about to be
is necessary in this intellectual situation. Plato has said the same in his Sophist.
Secondly, like the phrase in the Sophist Aristotle’s phrase “the term ‘being’ is used
in manifold ways” cannot be surpassed; it stands against all argument and riposte.
Even one who attempted to contradict it is in fact accepting it, for any contradiction
affirms it, all contradictions being no more than further opinions the phrase invites
Wedin, 2000, M. Burnyeat, 2001, S.M. Cohen, 2009, 201.
80 Cf. Met. Z 1: it is and remains doubtful in Aristotle’s view, what ousia does mean; see E. Sondereg-
ger, 2012, I. 2.
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reflection on them.
The first sentence in Met. Λ is, then, a sentence opening up the question about
being, like its counterpart in the Sophist, but as the conclusion to a long tradition. It
condenses a long and ramified discourse on being, only in the spirit of the topical
approach protaseis labein, in order to concentrate and to continue the discourse on
a new, that is on the theoretic level. It is like a work instruction “we have to do our
work now.” The task is to ask after the sense of to be, because it became unclear
what to be is, what is clear is only the heading of the issue, ousia. The theoria
peri ousias is a task that remains to be accomplished. The sentence expresses a
disposition to the problem: “Now we have to ask in theoretical attitude what we
have ever understood by ousia, the basis of all our speaking and meaning,” thus, it
matches the main concern of the Sophist. That is confirmed by the fact that here
as well as in the Sophist 238a, 242b and 243d, it is a question of origin, the origin
is not given it must be attained.81
The sentence is a beginning, but also the culmination of a tradition of discourse. We
are no longer obliged to read Aristotle’s texts as products of a thinking outside of
history or as an absolute thinking in any way. Sadly, admirers and critics too often
do this; some, because they think an absolute knowledge about an independent truth
is possible; others, because they get a good opponent that way. Instead, we might
try to establish the situation of the discourse in which they were written. Aristotle
has focussed the tradition on the question about being.
In the second sentence he gives the reason why it is right to do so: it is because
ousia is the first whichever way we turn the question. We have to begin with the
theoria about being, and for this reason we had to clarify what this sentence referred
to, what other sentence it contradicts, to which question it is an answer.
81 Roughly in the middle of the dialogue (Sophistes 242b6ff.) the guest says: “Say please, with which
beginning we could start that dangerous discourse? It seems, dear child, that we have to go this
way absolutely.” Theaetetus: “Which way?” Guest: “We have to study first which seemed to be
clear all the way …” Then, he adds the question about being as that which seemed to be absolutely
clear; 243d1f. the guest: “…now we have to consider what is most important and that which leads
primarily.” Theaetetus says that the guest means that which everyone understands by ‘being’.
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It has not been necessary to include all the themes of the foregoing discourse, it had
been sufficient to discuss the relations and connections with Met. Λ. That would
to some extent have been easier, because we have not had to reconstruct the situ-
ation of the discourse ‘as it really was’ (which in any case were impossible), but
we could limit ourselves to Aristotle’s reception of it, and how we find it in his
texts. To that end, we have studied some parts of Plato’s Sophist and Timaeus and
of Theophrastus’Met. and Aristotle’s early work. On this ground it should be pos-
sible to understand what is at issue inMet. Λ. The tradition in its broader sense and
the context of the discussion in which the question of this text has a sense should
now have become apparent.82
5.2.2. KP 1, in brief
Let us try to summarize the results of the above. The first sentence of Met. Λ runs
as follows:
Περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία· τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦνται.
The present theory concerns being <: ousia, Sein>; for it is the beings <: ousiai,
Seiendes> whose principles and causes are sought.
It presents three distinctions: the first is that between the ousia and the theoria; the
second between ousia and ousiai; and the third between the ousiai and their archai
kai ta aitia. The first distinguishes the subject and the method: the subject is the
ousia, the method the theoria. It is Aristotle who focuses the discourse on being,
but that is not from misunderstanding or ill will as H. Cherniss wished to show. On
the contrary, Aristotle excels in this way some of the efforts of the tradition and of
his present day and renders the question once more the rank it had had in the works
of Parmenides’ and Plato.
Theory differs from other forms of research. It consists in returning to first princi-
ples, to the fundamental, in contrast to moving from the principles to further find-
ings. Aristotle, like other philosophers, uses the term in other contexts too, there is
82 See E. Sonderegger, 2012, I. 2.
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no establishment of definitive terminology. In this first sentence the word does have
programmatic importance, an importance underscored by its repetition in Chapter 7
at another prominent place, further by its use in the early work and its appearance in
Theophrastus’ Met. § 1. Theory, then, is conceived as the appropriate method for
the question about the First, but in what does this peculiar method of going to the
principles consist? In the Topics we can see what the young Aristotle thinks con-
cerning the knowledge of the First. The main point amongst others is that the given
must be analyzed for its simple preconditions that make up it. We must look into
which elements a proposition can be broken down to, to which simpler features a
concept can be terminally reduced. The method to do this is the “topical attitude.”83
When this is done, the presuppositions we have found must not again be asserted as
a truth, but represented as the prerequisites of endoxa.
There are indeed different lines of research within the Old Academy, according to
which on the one side is Aristotle, on the other all the rest. There is a division of
topics; some members of the Academy – quite in the spirit of H. J. Krämer and oth-
ers – work towards the establishment of a ‘pyramid of being,’ whereas Aristotle, in
contrast, looks to some extent for facts, even reported ones, while never forgetting
theoretical questions. Above all, it is a matter of methodological division, inas-
much as Aristotle never forgets the lesson, he has drawn from the Sophist, namely:
other than the areas in which assertion is legitimate and even necessary, the core of
philosophy is non-assertive.
Secondly, Aristotle distinguishes ousia in the singular from ousiai in the plural.
The singular is the leading term of the topic, the primary that is sought for and
ousia corresponds to the on in Plato’s megista gene in its function. The singular
term shows the continuity of the problem between Plato and Aristotle. The plural
designates the area where the research begins, the area of beings to be questioned,
it designates the given, the things, the beings in the endoxa. Everybody knows
since ever what ousia is in his tradition, everybody has a firm opinion about what
ousia is. Everyone lives, speaks and acts in the line of his tradition. The difference
83 See E. Sonderegger, 2012, I. 3.1.
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between the singular and the plural is the difference between being (Sein) and beings
(Seiendes) and at the same time, the difference between the first and the second (in
Theophrastus’ view the noeta, noetic beings, and ta tes physeos, natural beings),
which makes necessary the question about transition.
If we ask after the principles and causes of the many ousiai, then we must ask too
after the causes of becoming and movement. Aristotle and Theophrastus designate
desire or ‘aiming at,’ ephesis, as the cause of becoming of the things that become;
things that become aim at or desire to be.
The question of transition is the result of a development. Parmenides, perhaps, had
already appreciated the problem of the transition but found no solution, it became
the decisive question only with Plato’s Timaeus.84 If we take into account what
Theophrastus said it seems that the question of transition was among the main ques-
tions in the Academy.85 As said above, the theory of principles, the ideal numbers,
the criticism of the ideas were already connected with this question. Met. Λ is an
alternative speculative sketch for the same. Following Plato in this point Aristotle
denoted the arche by the singular ousia. It is the principle in all beings (but not in
a causal or constructive sense). Through a certain acquaintance with this singular,
humans come to understand the many and particular ousiai.
The method for asking after this singular is theoria. The archai kai ta aitia had
been established as the leading respects in the inquiry for the tradition, especially
for many of the Presocratics. Even for someone who might think that Aristotle
misunderstood the Presocratics focussing on archai kai aitiamust agree that this was
his particular reception of them. Some Presocratics understood the question about
the origin of becoming in the sense of the material origin of the things, in Plato’s
and Aristotle’s view, at least. They named elements as that origin, therefore. The
elements are no more than a realist and material foundation for the being of things.
Plato completely changes the sense of the question of becoming: with him it became
a question about the transition from the noetic to the aesthetic world wich means that
84 For how Eudoxus saw this connection, see K. von Fritz, 1978, 162.
85 See J. Stenzel, 1959 (3. ed.), 109ff., on transition.
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now a fundamentally different answer is required. He sets the ideas as this answer.
The ideas are the being of the beings (Sein des Seienden). By means of the ideas
can we understand things that change, the transient, phenomenal things on a ground
of stable being.
Plato later became aware of the aporia entailed by his finding. Thus he wrote in the
Sophist that the ‘friends of ideas’ have only opinions about being like everyone else
which is why in that dialogue the examiner, the guest from Elea, is himself subjected
to examination. The consequence is that he sees that we do not need new answers
is for old questions but to review and reflect on existing opinions. The result of this
reflection in the Sophist the megista gene.
There is no consensus about the temporal relationship between the Sophist and
Timaeus,86 but for our purposes this is not decisive, the connection of thoughts
can remain the same with different chronologies. A “true chronology” would not
change the thought but would only tell us when Plato was thinking what. Only
the relationship between the contents of these two dialogues matters to us. If the
Timaeus was written after the Sophist, and if we can assume that its aim is to recon-
struct the factual world by mathematical and geometrical means, then we must ask
why Plato now finds it worth talking about factual things (which are by no means
proper beings) after having asked the unsurpassable question about being in the
Sophist. What other philosophical question is worth being asked when the question
about being is the highest and ultimate question? In the Sophist this highest and last
question arises because Plato realized that his proposal, that the idea is the being, is
nothing more than an opinion, even if conceptually it goes beyond the tradition.
It is not possible to ask a theoretical question of any higher degree, but it is possible
to integrate into it another question. If the opinions about being are analyzed and if
their ground is found, it is possible to ask the manner in which the actual, phenome-
86 G. E. L. Owen, 1953: Timaeus soon after Politeia, in any case before Parmenides and Theaitetus,
Sophist, Politicus; H. Thesleff, 1982: Timaeus after Parmenides, about 355a; K.M. Sayre, 1983:
Timaeus before Parmenides or at the same time with Parmenides, 2. part; further Lit. R. Ferber,
1997, 6ff., and M. Erler, 2007, 262–263 …wohl im letzten Lebensjahrzehnt (257…347)…; R.M.
Dancy, 2004, 7, fn. 26: Theaitetus between Parmenides and Sophist.
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nal, pseudo-beings (the things that become, das Werdende) are related to the proper
beings. How can the connection between being and becoming be conceived? Plato
raises what the Presocratics had in mind to a higher level. He makes clear that it is
not enough to take some of the set of things – earth, water, air, fire – as the element
of things. The question about the archai kai ta aitiamust aim at the truly elemental
character of the elements. This he calls chora. The connection between being and
becoming is established by chora, through which things that become can seek to
be.
The question about being is complex and difficult and encumbered with many pos-
sible misunderstandings. A first misunderstanding could be to take being (ousia,
Sein) as the ground of becoming in the sense of the causa efficiens of things coming
to be (there are those who attribute this role to God). On the contrary, the insight is
that all becoming is based on being but that is not enough. We need the second in-
sight, that the becoming has, metaphorically, something like a drive towards being,
that being is the object and the for-the-sake-of becoming.
Plato had focused the Presocratic question on being, the Academic discourse took
up the proposal; thereafter, Aristotle was inspired by the Sophist to ask the question
about being, now in his theoretic manner, of course and by his conceptual means.
Admittedly, who can be said to represent the Old Academy and what was really
ever said, is controversial. I thought, therefore, methodologically correct to prefer
existent texts to reconstructions. If one accepts this and if one takes Theophrastus’
Met. together with Met. Λ to be of early date, one can include Aristotle’s early
work as representative of the Academic discourse within limits, of course, but on
the ground of valuable texts. It is not necessary to demonstrate any unity in this
discourse, it is quite plausible that the Academy was a ‘polyphonic’ organization.
On several occasions Aristotles referred to the background of his theoretical ap-
proach, in the doxographies, for example. The first sentence of Met. Λ is one of
these references. Aristotle wants to revitalize the old question by presenting a the-
oretical alternative to the tradition.
We can summarize that sentence as follows: considering the previous discourse and
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summarizing the discourse from the Presocratics up to Plato’s Sophist and Timaeus,
it is clear that the question about being is at issue because being has proven to be
the origin and basis of becoming. Merely offering a new answer about that is of
no use, it would only be a new statement on the same level, which would have to
be examined in the same as the older ones. No, the question must be built up in
the approach of a thinking without claims (topische Einstellung); as a basis of the
research serve the endoxa, the prevailing opinions.87
87 Cf. the paraphrase of this first sentence by L. Judson, 2019, 50, who translates the singular ousia
with the plural ‘substances’; it is noteworthy that he says in his Prologue to the Commentary, that
substance “is a rather misleading translation…” but keeps that translation nevertheless, sure, after
some remarks on ousia in the Categories.
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InMet. Λ Aristotle asks after the being (Sein) that makes becoming possible. In the
first five chapters he limits the research to the ousia aisthete and uses as his starting
point the endoxa about it.
6.1. Met. Λ 1.2–1.8, with KP 2
If we wish to understand becoming, we must understand being, ousia, before (see
Part III, Chapter 5). Yet, ousia is a word used in many ways in ordinary language
as well as in the philosophical tradition. It can mean ‘thing,’ ‘property,’ ‘the par-
ticular,’ ‘proper being,’ but also the nature of a thing and being (Sein) in general.
In the Categories ousia is used in three ways terminologically, first as prote ousia,
secondly and thirdly as the deuterai ousiai, i. e. as genus and as species. Ousia is
the subject of Met. Λ, as elsewhere movement, time, nature or soul are the principle
subjects. The use of ousia is neither simply univocal nor equivocal, its unity is that
of the pros-hen-unity thus we are searching for the hen in the pros-hen-structure. In
asking after ousia we wish to know what the first and one is, with respect to which
the diversity of uses of ousia has its unity.
In the last Chapter I have tried to show the traditions in whichMet. Λ 1.1 (KP 1) is
rooted. The Greek listener of reader of this sentence was clear about this tradition.
They themselves lived in it, Aristotle did not have to say very much about it, it
was enough simply to have it in mind. In the following sentences he gives three
further reasons justifying ousia as his subject. To begin with, ousia is the first,
irrespective of whether the totality of beings has the form of an organized whole or
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of an aggregation of unconnected things. In both cases further determinations are
only possible after the ousia has been identified.
The second sentence, a19, καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὡς ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν […]· καὶ εἰ τῷ ἐφεξῆς
[…]1 lacks a verb, as often in Greek in general and even more so in the Corpus
Aristotelicum. The most natural supplement would be ἔστιν or λέγεται (‘is’ or
‘is said’). Depending on the verb we supply, the sentence will read either “If it is
like a whole [...]” or “If it is said to be a whole [...]”2 Because Aristotle always
treats ‘to be’ according to the structure of the logos, this difference may be two
faces of the same coin, rahter than two alternatives. Further questions in the second
sentence concern the sense of the difference “as a whole” and “successively”3 and
the reason why ousia is primary in both cases. This difference seems to be the same
as that between a holistic and a serial view of the world. W.D. Ross thinks that
it is the opposition between “the universe as a genuine unity” and “as forming a
loosely connected series.” – Next we should like to know the significance of to
pan.4 Some have thought that it means synholon, the particular thing as the unity
of form and matter in contrast to the particular thing with its different categorical
determinations.5 In the tradition of the Presocratics we could understand to pan
as the universe, the whole world. K. Oehler saw in 1.2 the contrast between the
substance and the accidens,6 for if the substance vanishes the accidens vanishes
too. There is, however, an eternal accidens: movement.7 H. Seidl, on the other
hand, argued that Aristotle had in mind the difference between the first, immaterial
and unmoved substance and the second, material and moved substance.8 –
1 (1.2) “For, if the whole is like a total, the proper being <: ousia> is <its> first part, as well as if it is
<a being> part-by-part, in this way too the proper being <: ousia> is primary, …”
2 W.D. Ross, 1924, translates: “[...] may be regarded.” T. A. Szlezák, 2003, supplements <betrachtet
wird>.
3 Concerning ἐφεξῆς, “successively,” see Physics E 3, 226b34 and Met. Γ 2, 1005a11; ἐ. means
a series of several things under the condition that they follow the first thing and are of the same
position or kind (examples are line, unity, house). This would be a very loose kind of unity.
4 F. Baghdassarian, l-univers: L. Judson, “totality of things.”
5 So H. Bonitz ad loc., but cf. W.D. Ross, 1924, II, 349.
6 K. Oehler, 1984, 41.
7 id., 47.
8 H. Seidl, 1995, 66f.
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Aristotle continues, explaining that in both cases ousia is the proton meros, the
first part. ‘Part’ does probably not mean ‘real component,’ so that ousia would be
the first portion of a thing. Kata meros legein means “to speak about something
part by part,” in this case ousia would be the first to be mentioned when speaking
of something. If we take into account what Aristotle says in Met. Z 9–10, then
mere, parts, are characteristics and requisites which make up the eidos. It seems
to me that this makes the best sense. Indeed ousia is the first noetic determination
we must state (explicitly or more often implicitly) when speaking about anything.
The other categorial determinations denote beings in a restricted sense (1.3), they are
only qualities or changes of the proper being, i. e. variable determinations of ousia as
opposed to the stable determinations which constitute ousia. Another sense of ‘first’
in this context, should be added, namely that it signifies the world as a structure in
contrast to the world as the sum of all the things therein.
choriston A second reason that ousia is the first is that only ousia is choriston, ‘sep-
arable,’ while the other categorical beings are not (1.4). A being is separable if its
concept can be formed independently of other determinations that the being may ad-
ditionally have. A being is not separable if its concept cannot be formed without that
from which it is not separable.9 Ousia must underly all categorical determinations,
no other categorical determination can be said to stand for itself, but be only a de-
termination of ousia. The term complementary to not-separable is “that which can
be said as itself.” In accordance with this, in Cat. 5 two characteristics distinguish
ousia from the rest, namely μήτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινος λέγεσθαι, “to be said
neither of an underlying …” (meaning roughly the same as καθ’ αὑτὸ λέγεσθαι,
“to be said in respect of itself”) and μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινι εἶναι, “…nor being
in an underlying” (meaning roughly the same as choriston).
Aristotle justifies this in 1.3 pointing to the fact that if we accept e. g. poion ti as
a being without that of which it is a determination, we should have also to accept
not-beings as beings (e. g. ‘not-white,’ or ‘not-straight’ are examples of poion ti). It
9 Choriston does not mean transzendent, as H. Seidl says in his Commentary on Met. Λ 1.4, 1980,
547. – I avoid the translation with ‘independent’ or ‘autonomous,’ because that would involve the
notion of subsistence and lead to substance.
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is important to see, that the rejection is not definitive but only relative, under certain
conditions a non-being can very well be called a ‘being.’
We can summarize the sentences 1.2 to 1.4 as follows. When speaking about any
given thing, we first have to state its ousia, whether the unity of all beings be holistic
or serial (for it amounts the same to say that the beings are a unity because inter-
related to each other or that they are independent and their unity only an external
one). In both cases we have first to designate the ousia of a thing (systematically,
not temporally) and then the further designations.10 He adds that the further desig-
nations are beings only in a restricted or improper sense because being separable is
an essential feature only of ousia.
The third reason that ousia is prior to the other determinations is given in a doxo-
graphic remark (1.5–1.6). The forerunners had, in fact, always searched for prin-
ciples, elements, causes of ousia. They found them in particular things (like fire
or earth). Philosophers of the time, Plato and the Academy, preferred universals.
Hence ousia in its variety must be studied above all, because it is primary, cate-
gorically as well as with respect to separability and even following the prevailing
opinions. We are prepared, then, for the second key proposition:
KP 2 Met. Λ 1.7 (1069a30) οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν αἰσθηθή, ἧς ἡ μὲν φθαρτή,
ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἡ δὲ ἀΐδιος, ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ
στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πολλά· ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ταύτην φασί τινες
εἶναι χωριστήν, οἱ μὲν εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες, οἱ δὲ εἰς μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ
εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, οἱ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων.
<There are> three ways of being <: ousiai, Seinsweisen>: one <of them> is
perceptible, and of this <kind> one is perishable, on which all agree, e. g. plants
and animals, and the other eternal; of this, <i.e. the perceptible kind of beings in
general,> it is necessary to search for the elements, whether there is one or many;
another <kind> is immovable, and of this some say that it is separable, some
dividing <the immovable and separable kind> in two <types>, others putting
the ideas and the mathematicals in one nature, and others <accepting> only the
mathematicals <as separable>.
As examples for the three ways of being Aristotle names the natural beings on the
10 ‘Red’ is not the same when it is said about the sky or about an apple.
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earth, the natural beings in the sky and beings such as mathematics deals with.11 –
Whence does this classification stem and what is its purpose? The content of the
classification is simply an endoxon, because all share it (the phrase …ἣν πάντες
ὁμολογοῦσιν directly refers only to the perishable way of being, but the consensus
exists also about eternal things). The content of the classification is not a specific
Aristotelian finding,12 only the compilation is Aristotle’s work. Even today natural
beings divide into those that show their changes, their coming to be and passing
away and others for which this is not observable in our lifetime or by visual inspec-
tion.
When modern science says for example, that the fixed stars and the galaxies do in
fact move we must not conclude, that the statements from antiquity that they are
immovable are falsely made. Firstly, Aristotle always marked his reservations and
made clear that he was referring to endnoxa; secondly, revisions on the basis of
new observations were envisaged; and finally, still today it is impossible to detect
the movement of a fixed star other that the circular one with the naked eye. Vi-
sual inspection is the basis of Aristotle’s statements (we remember that οἶδα means
‘I have seen’). Today our astronomical ‘knowledge’ is based on instruments that
very few of us could handle and calculations that would overwhelm most of us.
We believe, certainly with good reason, in the consensus of the experts. – Beside
the natural beings, the text continues, some groups of scholars separate ideas and
mathematicals others combine them as one kind of being, others accept only math-
ematicals as an unmovable kind of being. Admittedly, it is unclear what they mean
when they say that such things are. At any rate, these statements are nothing more
than endoxa, even if in this case of professional scientists.
Aristotle arrives at his classification by combining the characteristica ‘perceptible’
and ‘perishable’ and their negations, so that four forms of being result (see above,
table 4.1, page 241). One field is empty, that of perishable and not perceptible
beings, so that there remain three. By this taxonomy Aristotle tried to establish out
11 Cf. P. Merlan, 1953,134: “classes” or “level of being;” T. A. Szlezák, 2003, Substanzen gibt es aber
drei [,..]; I prefer ‘ways of being’ to ‘kinds of beings.’
12 Berti, 2016, 75, agrees.
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the way of being, which was the least disputed in order to ask the question about
being with reference to the consensus-group. This would be the way of being of the
perceptible beings around us, the ousia aisthete. The main feature of these is their
being changeable, this point is made in the third key proposition: “The perceptible
way of being is changeable.”
6.2. Met. Λ 1.9–2.8 with KP 3
Having outlined his question about being in 1.1–1.8 and selected one of the ways
of being as the basis of his research, which he captured terminologically in 1.9 by
its main characteristic: metabole, change, he goes on explaining in 1.9–2.2 the
notion of change. The next group of sentences, 2.3–2.8, contains reflections on
these remarks. Chapter 3 introduces the question of what it is that becomes itself in
the process of becoming and what does not. First, Aristotle discusses eidos and hyle
because these concepts are included in the notion ofmetabole. Neither of them has a
coming-to-be. In 3.2 he takes the use of ‘becoming’ in ordinary language as a fresh
starting point for the same question. Later in the text, he replaces the division in
four ways of being with an analysis of being starting from the endoxa about ousia.
‘We’ (his Greek-speaking contemporaries) call ousia the hyle, the physis and the
from-these-both. In the fourth chapter, he asks whether or not all categories, i. e.
ousia and the rest of the categories, have the same causes and principles. Aristotle
develops three answers to this question, first a negative one, then an answer in the
sense of “partly yes – partly no” and finally, in chapter five, a positive one.
Met. Λ 1.9–2.2
In 1.9 to 2.2 the perceptible being is terminologically fixed to serve as basis for the
research because it is the least controversial being. New contentions about being
would serve no purpose, we would continue in the old manner of merely setting
our opinions against one another, which had been the very cause of the crisis of the
discourse described in the Sophist. We must leave it at the old assertions and reflect
on those. When the endoxa form the field of investigation, then it is right to take
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the most plausible, as the stock of that which must be investigated. Aristotle, then,
begins the analysis of becoming by capturing the perceptible being terminologically.
In the third key proposition he says that the ability to change is at the core of the
perceptible being:
KP 3 Met. Λ 1.9 (1069b3) ἡ δ’ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή.
The perceptible being is changeable.
The singular “The perceptible being” generally applies for all perceptible beings
(generalizing function of the article), so that changeability is their main feature,
thus, in fact, it means their way of being.
The concept of metabole is applicable in four categories (2.2), namely with respect
to that which something is, how it is conditioned, how big it is and, where it is. In
every case the metabole is a change between two extremes (opposites) which do
not themselves change during the process of becoming, so that a third being, which
bears the change, is required; Aristotle calls it hyle (2.1). Even hyle is a word used in
ordinary language, converted by Aristotle into a term with the meaning ‘possibility
to …,’ or as M. Heidegger translated it ‘suitability for …’
With respect to a clear pair of opposites, we can speak of a ‘turn,’ in other cases we
speak rather of a ‘change’; though this kind of change must be distinguished from
qualitative change. Cat. 10 lists four kinds of opposites (antikeimenon). Something
stands is opposition to another thing:
1. as relatives,
2. as contraries (“good – bad”),
3. as steresis – hexis, i. e. the not-being present of a determination
in contrast to its presence,
4. and, finally, as affirmation and negation.
Table 6.1.: Kinds of opposites
The opposition which is relevant here is number 3. Themetabole is a change “from
something to something,” comparable to kinesis, movement. It includes all four
ways of becoming: becoming absolutely, quantitative and qualitative change and
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local motion.
6.2.1. Met. Λ 2.3–2.8
The main characteristic of the perceptible being is metabole as Aristotle states in
1.9. The following sentences make clear that ‘becoming’ of natural beings means
‘to change’ or ‘to alter.’ By this he designates the change between opposite deter-
minations, actually the transition from steresis to eidos or vice versa, which must
take place in a third being, the hyle. The opposite determinations are not present at
the same time, one of them is actual the other potential. So, the sentences 2.3–2.8
reflect on the elements implied in the concept of metabole and in its various kinds.
On certain questions, when Aristotle refers to the Presocratics he does so to assess
the conclusions arrived at. The hyle can change because it can have both positive
and negative determinations (2.3). The concept of metabole thus implies the differ-
ence between actuality and potentiality. Because to be can denote an actual as well
as a potential state of a being, it is possible to say that “all beings come about of not-
being,” one has only to add that this is meant as incidental becoming. Just as well,
or even better still, we may say “all beings become out of a being, more precisely
out of a potential being” (2.3). That is what Anaxagoras meant by the ‘one,’ says
Aristotle, and that was better said than what Empedocles, Anaximander and Dem-
ocritus have said about the same. Anaxagoras’ statement too should be improved
in the following way: “All is everywhere, but potentially only not actually.”
It is not quite clear whether the transmitted text must be understood in the way it has
just been reported, combining Empedocles, Anaximander and Democritus (see the
commentary byW.D. Ross). It is, furthermore, not clear what Aristotle meant when
he spoke of Anaxagoras’ ‘One.’ Fortunately, these questions are not of very great
importance for our purposes. It only matters that Aristotle uses some statements
made by certain Presocratics as evidence that it was their intention to take hyle as
the changing being and that this can be expressed through his distinction of actuality
and potentiality.
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Who says that something comes about from a not-being, actually means that it
comes about of a potential being (2.5). The not-being is not an absolute not-being
but a potential being; but even if it is only potentially, it has the positive possibility
to become that which in fact afterwards it becomes. It is, therefore, not possible
that “everything becomes everything from everything” that would be a becoming
by chance; that contradicts our experience, we see that the things come about out of
suitable predispositions.
If we accept the nous as the determining principle as Anaxagoras did, and the hyle as
that which is determined and if both are unique, then we cannot explain the plurality
and variety of the things. A unique determining principle and a unique determined
thing can only end in a unique result (2.7). Aristotle concludes with a summary
(2.8): thus far we have seen three principles of becoming or, in other words, if we
want to understand and explain becoming, we must speak about at least three things,
about eidos, steresis and hyle. The result of the reflection leads to a specification
of the term metabole, which was used before in a more general way. Now we can
say that metabole, change, is a turning from possibility to actuality, and that this
transition from steresis to eidos will take place on a third, the hyle.
We should not forget either that Aristotle takes the endoxa as a launching point
for reflection, but does not talk about becoming in the ordinary sense of the word.
He refers to endoxa but translates them and the questions about them into his own
terminology, so he can speak about becoming in a precise and terminological way:
Becoming is the transition from steresis as potentiality to eidos as actuality. This
transition must not be understood once more as a natural process of natural beings
or things. Steresis and eidos are thoughts or mental concepts, the transition happens
in noesis, in pure thought, so that the transition is a noetic one. With these terms the
foundations of the opinions about becoming in Aristotle’s tradition are expressed
terminologically. The question about becoming leads us to other questions: Where
does the impetus for this transition come from? Why this transition from steresis
to eidos does set off? Later on we shall find that the transition is initiated through
something that does not itself begin, through an Ungewordenes, “something that
has not become,” in short, through ousia, being, Sein.
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6.2.2. Met. Λ 3.1–3.11: KP 4, KP 5 and KP 6
In chapters 1 to 5 the perceptible beings are the field of research for treating the
question of the being which underlies becoming because they are the least disputed.
In a first analysis of becoming Aristotle uses the concept of metabole (1.9–2.8), in
a second analysis, which begins with 3.1, he states that in the process of becoming
hyle and eidos do not become. This, not itself becoming, is a necessary feature
of the being we are looking for. In his analysis he uses the way ‘we’ speak about
becoming in ordinary language and presents a new classification of ousia (3.7) and
a new kind of cause (3.9). Sentence 3.1, the fourth key proposition, sums up the
foregoing section and makes a statement which will be substantiated in 3.2–3.4.
KP 4 Met. Λ 3.1 (1069b35) Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος,
λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα.
1069b35(1) After that <we must say> that neither the hyle nor the eidos come
into being – I mean the last ones.
In the first analysis it became clear that hyle and eidos play an essential role in
becoming. Now Aristotle adds that both do not become.13 Hence the question
about that which becomes in the process of becoming remains as yet unanswered.
By process of elimination he can identify which ousia on the given list does have a
becoming: it is, obviously, the ek touton.
What is the meaning of the specifications “I mean the last ones [sc. hyle and eidos]”
in 3.1 and, accordingly, of the “first” which sets in motion in 3.2? Sometimes Aris-
totle names the prima materia “ultimate hyle,” but it is unlikely that he meant that
in this sentence. It seems that we can fill in concrete examples which show that in
both cases the directly involved cause is meant. If something changes in the process
of becoming, then neither the hyle nor the eidos has a becoming in this process, both
are already present. The timber is in the stock, the form of the bed is in the mind of
the carpenter when he begins to make the bed, but the bed itself comes to be.
13 For the same theme see Met. Z 7–9.
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To give reasons for his statement in 3.1 Aristotle analyzes the process of metabole.
He does not draw on scientific means or the like, but on an analysis of how ‘we’
speak about change and about coming to be. If we take as an example “a table comes
about out of timber through a carpenter,” thenmetabole can be analyzed into: from
what it becomes; through what it becomes; and into what it turns to be. So, Aristotle
sorts out the basic concepts required by analyzing the formal structure of the ordi-
nary language of his time about becoming. Whenever we say “something comes to
be” or “something changes” or “something turns into something” we mean in fact
“a thing becomes something through something from something.”14 The analysis of
speaking aboutmetabole shows that we presuppose some thing or ground on which
becoming takes place (hyle), another through which it becomes (to proton kinoun)
and finally one into which its coming to be ends (eidos).
Hyle and eidos evidently do not have any beginning. They are necessary causes
of becoming, insofar they belong to the being, Sein, that grounds becoming. But
they are not sufficient causes, neither of them can initiate becoming. The reason
for this is that hyle is only potential and insofar does not have any effect (see Met.
Λ 6.5–6.8). Eidos for its part cannot set in motion anything, because its relation to
the things, the methexis, only allows things to partake in the eidos. Just this was
the deficiency in Plato’s ideas and the main theme of Aristotle’s criticism of them.
If hyle and eidos had a becoming through a particular process of becoming then a
regressus ad infinitum would be entailed (3.3). The question of which being is able
to initiate movement and becoming, without having itself movement and becoming,
then, remains. We have to concentrate on the other causes, on to proton kinoun and
to telos, which have not as yet been considered.
Before he does this, Aristotle mentions another condition of becoming:15
14 See correspondent analysis in Met. Z 7, H 6, Physics B and A 7.
15 For the use of ἐκ συνωνύμου compare: Met. Z 9, 1034a21–26, where the wording is ἐξ ὁμωνύμου,
but the sense is the same as here.
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Met. Λ 3.4,
1070a4f
Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι ἑκάστη ἐκ συνωνύμου γίγνεται οὐσία (τὰ γὰρ φύσει οὐσίαι
καὶ τἆλλα),
After that <we must say> that everything <: hekaste …ousia> comes into being
from some univocal <being> (for <what is> by nature as well as the others are
beings <and this rule applies for all beings>).
That means that becoming proceeds along the lines of being. This is valid not only
for natural becoming, but also for things that result from artificial, accidental or
spontaneous processes.16 That may seem to be obvious of natural becoming and
Aristotle alludes to the fact with the sentence “A man1 begets a man2.” The reason
that a particular animal, plant etc. (= natural being2) comes to be and has such and
such features is that another actual animal, plant etc. (= natural being1) of the same
kind implants its own nature in the natural being2. It is less obvious that the same
happens with products of culture: the carpenter and his table are in no way univocal
beings. In the last sentence of the third chapter we find the reasoning to account
for why the sentence is valid for cultural processes too. Medical art and knowledge
contain in some way the notion of health. This notion of health will bring about
health for a man in the same way that the eidos of a man will bring about the being
of another man. In 3.8 Aristotle reasons in the same way. In Met. Z 9.5 (1034a24)
too he uses techne in the function of eidos. Techne and eidos differ only in that the
natural being has the cause of movement in itself, whereas the cause of movement
for a cultural product is external to itself, it is in the producer. It is this point which
Aristotle emphasizes in 3.6.
The many beings and the different ways of being are the starting point of the re-
search. To find the being that can found becoming Aristotle first explores hyle and
eidos because they have no becoming in a particular process of becoming – they
are already. Indeed, they are indispensable for becoming, but they cannot initiate
movement or becoming. The question has not yet found a suitable solution, so Aris-
totle chooses a new point of view for further investigation. He no longer looks at the
many things and their classifications as he did in 1.7, where he had organized them
by the characteristics ‘perishable’ and ‘perceptible’ and by their negations. Now he
16 For different ways of becoming see Met. Z 7 (at the beginning), H 6 and Physics B.
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considers the possible answers when someone is aking what this thing is. If some-
body asks, “What is this?,” depending on the situation the answer may be “Clearly,
that is timber!” or “Clearly, that is a bed!” One would, then, have designated the
hyle or eidos of the thing or the actual thing in question. Essential moments of ousia
can, thereby, be identified. Now, in the fifth key proposition, Aristotle formulates
the new point of view to consider ousia. The question is no longer about classes
or kinds of beings but about the essential moments of being, which will be found
through the possible answers to the question of what things properly are.
KP 5 Met. Λ 3.7 (1070a9–13) Οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἡ μὲν ὕλη τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι
(ὅσα γὰρ ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει, ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον), ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι
εἰς ἥν, καὶ ἕξις τις· ἔτι τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἡ καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷον Σωκράτης ἢ
Καλλίας.
neu 1070a9 KP 5 (7) There are three ways of being <: ousiai>:First the hyle,
which is a some-this by appearing concretely (for, what is by contact <: by exter-
nal connection only> and not by growing together <: not by natural and essential
connection>, is hyle and hypokeimenon), then the nature, which is a principally
determined being into which <the growing up evolves> and some state <: ἕξις
τις>, further a third, the from-them <: i. e. the being realizing the previous ways
of being>, namely the <being an> individual, e. g. Socrates or Kallias.
If ‘being’ is considered in itself, then the three distinctions between hyle, physis
(elsewhere called eidos) and to ek touton are more essential than the classification
of an amount of beings in kinds.17 Aristotle adds an explanation with every deter-
mination. In respect to hyle, he says that it is “a principally determined being τῷ
φαίνεσθαι.” Now, hyle is certainly not a τόδε τι, a principally determined being.18
That Aristotle makes hyle a tode ti must have its reason in the additional dative
τῷ φαίνεσθαι. This addition can be understood negatively as it was by Pseudo-
Alexander (κατὰ φαντασίαν), H. Bonitz (imaginationi tantum est τόδε τι) orW.D.
Ross (“which is a ‘this’ in appearance”), the dative means ‘only seemingly,’ then.
We could also take it as instrumental in which case it takes on a positive meaning:
“If it appears, by appearing concretely, it becomes a concrete thing.” Hyle, being
17 For this distinction see Z 3, 1029a2–7 and Z 8.
18 For τόδε τι in 1070a10, 11 and 13 see the commentary ad loc., and the glossary; cf. E. Sonderegger,
2012, 171–174; Meinong called this unvollständige Gegenstände. – Cf. H. Bonitz, 1849, 476, who
points to H 1, 1042a27, Z 3, 1029a20 and 27, De Anima B 1, 412a7.
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no more than appropriateness to something, becomes a certain particular in a given
case ‘by appearing’ in an eidos. Hyle by itself is the potentiality, say to be a bed.
The planks in the stock are not yet a bed; but when the carpenter forms a bed with
the planks, then the bed ‘appears,’ the hyle becomes a principally determined being,
not the hyle in itself but insofar as it contributes to construe a particular bed.
The parenthesis in 3.7 concerns the opposite case. If something has an external
connection, it is hyle only and that which underlies (example: bricks lying side by
side); but, if something has a symphysis, if it is grown together into a new nature
(if it has a natural conjunction, for example: bricks forming a house), then it is a
tode ti, a certain particular. In Physics Δ 5 (at the end) and in E 3 Aristotle says
that symphysis forms an actual unity, that means that the being is grown together
into a nature, whereas by contrast haphe is that which has the potentiality for such.
Here, we can apply this too: hyle in itself, as potentiality and appropriateness for
…, is in opposition to the hylewhich is grown together with the eidos into the actual
concrete particular.
Aristotle explains physis, nature, in two directions: as tode ti eis hen and as hexis
tis; so that tode ti too can be physis but the eidos (in the text ‘physis’) is a tode
ti just as little as hyle is. Eidos is universal, tode ti particular, more exactly it is
the blank space for a particular (and therefore only a principally determined being).
Aristotle specifies two meanings of ousia in Met. Δ 8. The first use of ousia is
hypokeimenon eschaton, that which cannot be said of another being; the second is
the tode ti and choriston, the shape and the eidos of something. It seems that tode
ti has not its technical use here, but one that is founded in ordinary language and
rarely used by Aristotle. We may translate it with ‘something specific’ or ‘definite-
ness’ (Bestimmtheit). He uses tode ti or only tode again in 3.7 (1070a11) and 3.8
(1070a13) with the meaning ‘to be determined as such and such’ that is in some way
the same as eidos.19 Besides the hyle, which is as yet not what it has the potential to
be, there is the form “into which” the actual particular “grows.” If that happens then
the third-named ousia, the concrete particular, is present. This too is considered as
19 Cf. W.D. Ross, II 358: refers on Δ 8, 1017b25 (note).
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ousia in everyday, common-sense thinking. We have to bear in mind that all this
is said in the form of technically articulated opinions, endoxa. We have, then, to
speak now about the ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἡ καθ’ ἕκαστα <οὐσία> (1070a12), “the concrete
actual particular,” because just this and this only has a coming to be. Afterwards,
we have to look for the cause which sets it in motion, mentioned in 3.2.20 Both
hyle and eidos can be called ousia, if certainly in a different sense. Both, separately
and together as the ousia that consists of them both, point to the further way for the
question about being. The new classification in 3.7 replaces that in 1.7.
3.8 is a corollary to 3.6–3.7, it treats the question of whether the just mentioned
tode as definiteness is independent from the to ek touton, the particular, with its
composite form of being. That is not possible in some cases, the eidos of a house
for example, is not separate from the actual house; the health is not apart from the
healthy animal, and so with all things belonging to culture – unless we consider the
producing knowledge (e. g. medical science, architecture) as the eidos, which could
be separable from the particular.21 Perhaps, in the case of natural beings, we may
speak of separate eide as Plato did.
The end of 3.8 can be easily misunderstood: “…to the proper being in the strongest
sense belongs the last <hyle, which together with the eidos makes up the individual
being>.” This does not mean that hyle in itself is the proper being in the strongest
sense, the expression must be understood in the context of the present classification
in 3.7 and it means, therefore, that the last hyle belongs to the compound particu-
lar. The sentence specifies only which hyle is relevant for the compound particular,
evidently the last, which means the hyle that directly makes up the particular. The
same is true of the purpose of the series of examples fire – flesh – head, in which
the respective previous example is the hyle of what follows.
The analysis of howwe speak about the becoming and changing of things (metabole)
reveals three ‘parts’ of becoming, the opposites steresis and eidos and the underly-
ing hyle. The provisional result is that becoming is the transition from a potential
20 Cf. for this also the two citations of the sentence “A man begets a man” in 3.6 and 3.12.
21 With (3.8) εἰ μὴ ἡ τέχνη, compare techne as eidos in Z 9, 1034a24: ἡ γὰρ τέχνη τὸ εἶδος.
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being in the state of steresis to an actual being in the state of eidos and that this takes
place on the ground of a third, the hyle. Neither hyle nor eidos, however, can give
the impulse to start the transition in this process, so this question of that which can
provide the initial impetus remains. If we put this together with the other two causes,
we find a new classification. Hyle and eidos are internal causes, they are necessary
parts of the being, present together with the particular, while the moving cause is
external and temporally prior. This is the subject of the sixth key proposition.
KP 6 Met. Λ 3.9 (1070a21–23) Τὰ μὲν οὖν κινοῦντα αἴτια ὡς προγεγενημένα ὄντα,
τὰ δ’ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἅμα.
The moving causes are beings <: onta> that are beforehand, while other
<causes>, such as the notion <: logos>, are at the same time.
The particular, to ek touton, consisting of hyle und eidos, is that with respect to
which the moving cause is “prior.” The causes of movement, which we encounter
in everyday life, are all becoming themselves. That is obvious in the case of natural
beings and things belonging to culture; the question now, however, is not how this
or that thing comes to be but about becoming itself and in general. Thus we must
ask after the first moving cause, which is capable of setting in motion becoming, in
itself and in general, as a transition from steresis to eidos (cf. 4.13–4.17 and 5.5).
The moving cause will play a major role in chapter Λ 6. The term “<causes> such
as the notion” means here the same as eidos. Sentence 3.10 gives examples for the
principle referred to in 3.9. The particular and its eidos are always together. It is
impossible that a particular could be present without its eidos. We find a noteworthy
variation in the expression for the eidetic nature: in 3.7 it reads tode ti, physis and
hexis; in 3.8 tode and logos. It seems that Aristotle wants to avoid a technical
terminological definition or that he considers it unimportant.
The questions in parentheses in 3.10 do not concern the main question about being.
The question whether a part of the eidetic nature of a being for example of the soul
or the intellect, remains after its passing away can, thus, be left open without dam-
age. The question arises because the second classification of causes had a temporal
criterion, moving causes are prior to emerging being, while hyle and eidos are si-
354
6.2. Met. Λ 1.9–2.8 with KP 3
multaneous with it. And, hyle and eidos have no becoming in a particular process,
so that we can ask whether they have an end or not.
In 3.11 the question of whether the ideas are necessary or useful is denied. Pla-
tonic ideas must be distinguished from the Aristotelian eidos, which is necessary
for becoming. Aristotle wishes to apply what he said previously about the Platonic
ideas. To understand becoming we must understand being. But being cannot be
something like the Platonic ideas, because they cannot initiate movement and the
three mentioned causes as eidos, hyle, kinoun, are sufficient to make understand-
able becoming. That is evident not only in the case of natural beings as Aristotle
indicates with the repeated phrase that the actual man conveys through his nature
his eidos to a becoming man. The same is the case in cultural producing, where the
relevant knowledge (not the producing artisan), is the eidos, because “the medical
science is the notion of health.”
6.2.3. Met. Λ 4.1–4.2, with KP 7
Hyle, eidos and to ek touton have been hitherto considered with respect to what they
contribute to ousia, in which sense they are ousia and whether they have a becoming
or not. Amongst these three only the last has a becoming. This ousia, the concrete
particular, has many categorical determinations. Aristotle seeks to clarify whether
all categorical determinations have the same cause or not. Right at the start he states
a general principle, in some sense it is the anticipated result: The causes of different
categories are different and, although with some restrictions, they are “in some way
different, and in another way not,” he says (4.1). If we speak “analogically” then
we can say that different categories have the same cause. Aristotle uses the proper
being, ousia, and the pros ti (4.2) as a model to formulate his question, whether the
proper being and the other categories have the same causes or not. In 4.3–4.9 he
develops two possible but contradictory answers, two further answers follow in the
fifth chapter. While developing the answers he introduces some new distinctions
which specify the sense of “analogically.” In 4.13–4.17 it is the distinction between
internal and external causes, in 5.4–5.5 the distinction between actual and potential
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causes, in 5.6 the distinction that causes can be universal or not and, finally, in 5.7
(see 4.17 already) the distinction between the first actual and potential principles.
The answers rely on these distinctions. The question remains the same until the end
of chapter five. The first answer is exposed in 4.3–4.9, the second in 4.10–4.17, the
third in 5.1–5.3 and the fourth in 5.4–5.11.
Whether the being proper and its categorical determinations have the same causes
or not has far-reaching consequences. Only if all categories have the same cause can
the question about the causes be restricted to this one cause, which determines all
categories; otherwise, if each category has its own cause, then the cause of each cat-
egory must be considered separately. In the seventh key proposition, Λ 4.1 (together
with 4.2), the leading question is extended in this sense.
KP 7 Met. Λ 4.1 (1070a31–33) Τὰ δ’ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι
δ’ ὥς, ἂν καθόλου λέγῃ τις καὶ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ταὐτὰ πάντων.
In some sense, the causes and principles of some beings are these, of other beings
they are others, in another sense, if you speak generally and by analogy, they are
the same for all.
6.2.4. Met. Λ 4.3–4.9
In 4.3–4.9 we receive a first answer to the question posed in 4.2. Aristotle gives two
reasons for the thesis that it is not possible that all categories have the same cause.
The first in 4.3–4.5 runs as follows: If the pros ti and ousia had the same cause, this
cause would have to be something that both had in common and therefore stood
above the categories. There is nothing beyond the categories, however, categories
are the highest general determinations of the beings. The categories can be reduced
neither to one common genus nor to each other.22 If one category should be prior to
another the second should be an element of the first, but that is impossible in the case
of the categories. Aristotle uses the being proper and the pros ti as an example, but
the reasoning is valid for all categories. The question of how the proper being could
be an element of the with-reference-to-something or the converse of this (4.4–4.5),
22 H. Bonitz, 1849, cites Met. Δ 28, 1024b15, K 9, 1065b8, Physics Γ 1, 100b34, Analytica posteriora
Α 22, 83b15; it is enough to point to the fact that ‘to be’ is no genus.
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is only a rhetorical question. The categories are a list of different uses of ‘to be’ to
avoid confusions arising from its usage. The proper being and the with-reference-
to-something are categorical determinations of one and the same being, but different
from each other and not reducible to each other.
In the sentences 4.6–4.9 there is a second argument. First, Aristotle repeats the lead-
ing question (4.6): How can the same elements be elements of all beings? Then he
transforms this into the question of whether or not an element can be the same as
the compound thing of which it is an element. This evidently cannot be (4.7), but,
is that really the same question as asked in 4.6? Of which “all” ought the elements
to be the same? Taking into account what is said hitherto and the conclusion con-
cerning the categories in 4.8, “all” means “all categories.” Then the question in 4.6
asks whether the different categories can have the same elements. Provided that
the categories are the highest genera, the most universal determinations of beings
and of our discourse as well, that is impossible. Common elements of categories
could be nothing other than higher and more universal determinations. Both, the el-
ements and the composite, of which they are elements, would be the same, namely
categories.
This, evidently, is absurd. If we wanted to change the presupposition by assuming
that there are elements which are common for all categories but without themselves
being categories then none of these elements could be the proper being or, for in-
stance, a with-reference-to-something (as an example for the other categories), If
categories are the highest genera, however, that should be.
Aristotle’s reasoning has the form of indirect evidence. If ousia and the other cat-
egories had the same elements, then ousia and the other categories could not be
elements themselves; but they are inescapably elements, because they are reducible
neither to something else nor to each other. Thus, there are no common elements
for all categories.
4.7 gives an important supplement. What has been said so far referred to the percep-
tible beings. Now Aristotle adds that there is no such thing even in the noetic realm,
neither ‘being’ nor ‘unity’ are such elements. Compound and as much as simple
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beings are and both are in their respective forms of unity. In the Topics Aristotle
has shown that being and unity “follow all beings.”
6.2.5. Met. Λ 4.10–4.17, with KP 8
In 4.10–4.17 Aristotle gives a second answer in his typical locution ἔστι μὲν ὡς
[...], ἔστι δ’ ὡς οὔ, “Or, as we say, in some sense there are <the same elements
of all beings> in another sense not.” The second and positive answer concerns the
perceptible bodies.23 The sentence is divided into three parts (1070b10–13; b13–4;
b14–16); but, probably they do not present three kinds of substance as W.D. Ross
suggests, the subject is the same in all three parts. The first part shows that it is
possible to say that all beings have the same causes and elements. This is the case
if we assume that the warm is the eidos as one of the causes of the perceptible body,
and that the cold is the steresis and then the hyle is that which is potentially both.
The second part aggregates this as things or beings (ousiai); the just stated eidos,
steresis and hyle, taken together are the ousiai, the particular beings, in terms ta ek
touton. The third part, introduced with ἤ, does not speak about a new subject, but
specifies only that which was said in the second part.24 Ta ek touton is, strictly
speaking, the unit of warm as eidos and cold as steresis in an appropriate hyle, as
an actual thing, say flesh or bones. In such cases the elements are the same, but the
things themselves differ from the elements (see end of 4.10).
Can we transfer this to “all” in 4.11? Speaking now about “all <beings>” Aristotle
revokes the limitation to the perceptible things in 4.10, and includes the other cat-
egories, in accordance with the leading question in chapter 4, whether the proper
being and the other categories have the same causes or not. The answer is that “all”
cannot have the same elements and principles except by analogy.25 That had already
23 H. Bonitz, 1849, 480f.; he cites Alexander, 651, 16, and C.A. Brandis, 1836, 24, who thinks that
Aristotle’s discussion about the elements refers to B 4, 1000a5 and K 2, 1060a27; H. Bonitz gives
some arguments against this view, 1849, Prooemium, 24f.
24 For further examples of this use of ἤ see Kühner-Gerth, Griechische Grammatik, II 2, § 538,3.
25 “By analogy” means that there is the same relation between different things whereas the pros-hen-
relation means that different things have a different relation to the same.
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been said in the parentheses in sentence 4.11, but in 4.12 it is said again explicitly
and with examples. If we say that the causes of all are the same, be it directly or by
analogy, then we must take into account that in a particular case only their function
is the same, whereas the elements actually involved can be different. Aristotle says
that when something becomes coloured, the eidos is white, the steresis black, and
the surface is the hyle: or, when day and night come to be, then the light is the eidos,
the dark the steresis and the air is the hyle, thanks to the air both, eidos and steresis,
can become day and night.
We are still looking for those causes, which have no coming into being but are
necessary for coming into being and can initiate movement. The moving cause was
mentioned before in 4.1 and 4.9, but only with 4.13 is it the subject. The moving
cause is external to the caused being (in contrast to eidos, steresis and hyle); it
cannot be an element but is nevertheless a cause and a principle (4.13). That which
sets in motion is an arche and an ousia. Thus there are three elements, which by
analogy are the same for all beings; and, if we add the moving cause there are four
causes and principles. We must not forget, Aristotle repeats and adds at the end,
that the direct internal and external causes in each particular case are different.
In 4.14 and 4.15 Aristotle gives two examples. Health and illness stand for eidos and
steresis, the moving cause is the knowledge of the physician (4.14); or, the shape of
the house is the eidos, the not yet organized construction material the steresis and
the knowledge of the architect is the moving cause. In 4.16 he reflects on the types
of moving causes, because they are not the same in the case of natural beings and
things belonging to culture. If a man begets a man, then the moving cause is the
eidos in the actual man, in the case of beings belonging to culture the moving cause
is the eidos in the thought of the craftsman. There are, thus, three causes, in a sense
four, depending on whether or not we count eidos once or twice. Aristotle sums it
all up in 4.17: the art and knowledge of the physician (as moving cause and as eidos)
is in some way health (as eidos); the art and knowledge of the architect is in some
way the eidos of the house; and the eidos in the actual man is the moving cause for
the man that becomes. No moving cause has its becoming in the respective process,
in which it is involved, the moving cause must be anterior. But every moving cause
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has a coming to be in another antecedent process. All causes so far considered are
already. Even within this restricted frame (and without any speculative intention) it
is right to say that becoming is based on being.
The chapter seems to end very abruptly with KP 8. I shall try to make this sentence
comprehensible by recapitulating the line of thought. The perceptible ousia has been
selected as the area of research into the causes. In this area Aristotle searched for
the first and for that which has no coming to be through a process of becoming. We
have seen that hyle and eidos do not have a becoming but that they cannot initiate
movement and becoming. We have seen, furthermore, that the moving cause has no
becoming in a respective process, but otherwise all moving causes that we know of
have a coming to be. Thus we have still to ask after the first unmoved but moving
cause which is the cause of all beings.
KP 8 Met. Λ 4.17 (1070b35)…· ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα ὡς τὸ πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν πάντα.
…; yet <there is a principle> beside those <just listed; namely a principle> as the
first of all moving all.
We have always to ask for the primary and that in the case of the moving cause too,
of course. What is this first cause of being (Seinsgrund) that has not any becoming?
This question does not ask after a cause of something actually present, but after
something systematically primary, beyond time, that is to say the first and one,
which is the hen for the rest in the sense of the pros-hen-relation.
6.2.6. Met. Λ 5.1–5.11, with KP 9 and KP 10
In chapter five Aristotle first gives reasons that – in contrast to what is said in chapter
four – it is right to limit the question to ousia, because without the proper being no
other category can be. This is the fourth answer to the question, whether ousia
and the other categories have the same causes (or the third, if one takes the first
two parts of chapter 5 as only expositions of the aporia and not as answers). It
is affirmative, because ousia is the necessary ground for all other categories. In
this chapter Aristotle distinguishes the different ways, in which ousia and the other
categories can have the same aitia and archai. Ousia is the common cause for all,
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because:
(i) ousia has categorical priority (5.1–5.3);
(ii) ousia has modal priority (5.4–5.5); and
(iii) ousia is prior when we take into account that something can be a
cause in the universal or in the singular sense (5.6).
Table 6.2.: Priority of ousia
Aristotle gives one example for each of the three cases. I discuss them next. The
ninth and tenth key propositions stem from this section of the text.
ad (i)
Ousia is the one and same cause for all, because it alone is separable. This is to
say that without ousia we cannot speak about any other category, without ousia no
other category can be. Of ousia, independent of any other category, however, we
can speak. Ousia can be independent of any other category (not as a particular being,
of course). Aristotle does not use the term ‘category’ but pathe and kineseis (5.2)
but if we wish to describe what a being can experience or how it can change, that
must be done in categorical terms. By limiting the area of possible accidents, ousia
indirectly becomes cause for all of them.
As examples for such common causes Aristotle names “soul and body, or more
precisely intellect, impulse and body” (5.3).26 Such are the causes for that which
can happen to a particular, concrete man. Many conclude, incorrectly to my mind,
that Aristotle supports essentialism by saying that ousia limits the area of possible
accidents. Firstly, Aristotle provides his statement with some restrictive conditions
(see the following sentences); secondly, the thesis does not concern everyday things
but is a result derived from the analysis of opinions about ousia and belongs to the
speculative area whereas essentialism has in its focus the essence of real things.
ad (ii)
26 ἤ as above, 1070b14, not as alternative choice but introducing a specification. For the connection
of nous and orexis see De Anima Γ 10, Nicomachean Ethics Z 2, 1139a18, De motu animalium 6,
700b19 and 20, Politica A 5, 1254b5 and Γ 16, 1287a32.
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KP 9 Met. Λ 5.4 (1071a4ff) ἔτι δ’ ἄλλον τρόπον τῷ ἀνάλογον ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί, οἷον
ἐνέργεια καὶ δύναμις· ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλως.
Yet <also> in another way, analogically, the principles are the same, namely as
actuality and potentiality; but these too are <principles> for one thing this way
for another that way and in any case differently.
In another way too, the principles of the proper being and the other categories can
be analogically the same, namely when we consider whether the cause is cause
actually or potentially. Themodalities, actuality and potentiality, are not themselves
causes, the issue is the difference in whether the causes are actual or potential. In
the individual cases the causes may be different actually but the same analogically.
This means we have to take into account, whether whatever is a cause is actual
or potential, because the being-a-cause is different in each case. In addition the
actuality of an actual cause and the potentiality of a potential cause can differ in
different cases.
Aristotle distinguishes two cases in which themodality of a cause can vary. In 5.5(a)
(1071a6–11), he considers the case that the same being, depending on its relation,
is an actual or a potential cause, taking as examples wine, flesh and man. In 5.5(b)
(1071a11–17), he deals with the difference between potential and actual in the case
of causes which have neither the same hyle nor the same eidos as the caused being,
taking as example the man with its hyle and its eidos and for moving causes the
father and the sun.
We begin with 5.5(a). Wine, flesh, man are examples for causes, which are potential
or actual depending upon their relation. Wine is in itself an actual being, having its
categorical determinations. It can be an actual cause for, say, festive atmosphere or
for wine stains on the tablecloth, but it is at the same time a potential cause, namely
as hyle for the body (flesh) which for its part is a potential cause for the drinkingman.
Each of these is something for itself and when it is cause actually for something it
is cause in a different way than when it is cause potentially (the wine which has
the potential to build up the flesh and the wine which is already integrated in the
flesh). Aristotle says, therefore, that all causes of this kind fall within the already
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mentioned causes, namely eidos, steresis and to ex amphoin, but that they differ
when they are cause actually or potentially. Wine is a to ek touton, it is composed
of grapes, the hyle of the wine; and wine has its own eidos, as well as the grapes
taken for themselves. Wine as potential vinegar is steresis and hyle of the vinegar.
The vinegar has its own eidos and it is a to ek touton, a particular thing; in another
relation, if it is used to prepare salad dressing, vinegar is again steresis and hyle.
We find a textual problem at 1071a9. Should we place a punctuation mark between
the words [...] ἀμφοῖν στέρησις [...], as W. Jaeger and S. Fazzo do, or not, as W.D.
Ross proposes? W.D. Ross renders the text as follows (II, 359): “[...]; the form
(if it is separable) and that which includes both elements but is a privation exist ac-
tually, the matter potentially.” With a punctuation mark the sense changes totally.
The being determined by the eidos and the from-both are actually (actuality does
not mean ‘to exist’ but ‘to have the necessary determinations’), but the being de-
termined by steresis is just as well (to be determined by eidos or by steresis means
to have or not a certain determination or only in restricted manner). Hyle is poten-
tiality in both cases, because ‘it can become both’ (see at the end of 5.5(a)), i. e.
it is that which can be determined in the sense of eidos or of steresis. H. Bonitz,
1849, 484, connects the foregoing classification of causes in eidos, steresis and hyle
and the present classification in actuality and potentiality as follows: forma rei, res
concreta, privatio belong to actuality, materia to potentiality.
H. Bonitz says that the part 5.5(b) of the sentence is opaque. He accepts, therefore,
the emendation of Trendelenburg ἄλλως δ’ ἤ (485). With this reading the text is
concerned with the kinds of causes and with the sun as a first moving cause (men-
tioned before in 4.17). The sun has a status of its own vis-à-vis the four causes and
vis-à-vis the distinction between actuality and potentiality. As a primummovens the
sun must be distinguished from the type of cause, which it most resembles, namely
to a particular thing as causa movens.
What is the result for our understanding of 5.5(b)? In 5.5(a) it was stated that if the
cause and the caused thing have the same hyle, potentiality and actuality are used
in the modal sense. In the process of becoming the modality of the hyle changes.
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The hyle is only a potentiality but thanks to the eidos, hyle comes to be part of an
actual ‘from-both.’ Now, in 5.5(b) Aristotle adds that if the cause and the caused
thing have neither the same hyle nor the same eidos, actuality and potentiality differ
from the sense in 5.5(a), i. e. that their sense is other than the modal sense. To make
this clear he uses man as example. Its remote hyletic causes are the elements, as
fire and earth, but a man does not consist of them unmediated, his immediate hyle
is the nutrition or flesh, blood, bones, made up by that, so the remoted hyle of man
differs from its immediate hyle. The hyle which, together with the eidos, makes up
the from-both, the actual man, is the same in any case. The man’s eidos does not
have a hyle, but the moving cause does. The father has the same kind of hyle as the
son, but not, of course, the same particular portion. Further, if we ask after the first
moving cause in nature, we find the sun and the ecliptic. The sun has neither the
same hyle nor the same eidos as the man, which is caused.
Now, what is the difference between actuality and potentiality in (a) and (b)? In
5.5(a) we see the hyle-eidos-sequences, where the hyle-phase is a phase of poten-
tiality for the next eidos-phase, as a phase of actuality. If we include the remote hyle
in a less strict sense we can say “all things have the same hyle,” because all natural
beings are formed out of the same elements and the same first hyle. If, however, we
only consider the next hyle as cause, then the hyle of different beings is different.
In this case the difference between actuality and potentiality is a modal distinction.
In 5.5(b) the issue is about the difference between actuality and potentiality, when
the caused and the cause do not have the same hyle. To ex hou is the hyle; the eidos
and the hou heneka do not have any hyle but to kinesan or arche kineseos do. This
hyle can be the same in the cause and in the caused. That is the case with the natural
growing out of plants and animals where we consider the hyle which makes up the
plant or the animal together with the eidos. But when we consider the pasture as the
hyle of the cow, then the hyle is different from that of the causes. In the artisanal
production the hyle and the eidos of the moving cause and of the caused being is
different, in any case (carpenter – table).
Considering the first cause, which is capable of setting in motion in the field of nat-
ural becoming, i. e. the sun and the ecliptic, we see that the sun as cause has a hyle
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different from that of the caused. This means that not only does “the same arise[s]
out of the same” (which is the case if the notion of the produced thing and the pro-
ductive knowledge is taken as the eidos of the produced thing, as has been shown)
but different beings also arise out of different beings. J. Tricot refers in his footnote
to the text to Met. Θ 1. This is helpful for the understanding of 5.5. It seems that
Aristotle wants to point out two kinds of difference between actuality and poten-
tiality. On the one hand we have the technical modal use of the concepts (dynamis
– energeia), on the other hand there is the sense of dynamis in its colloquial use,
where dynamis is “the principle of movement and change in another being or inso-
far as it is another being” (cf. Θ 1, 1046a4–11). With this sense of force or power is
connected the resistance and the capacity for suffering. We must understand the sun
as dynamis in this sense because it is the principle of movement in another being. If
the caused beings and the causes have the same hyle, then potentiality has the modal
meaning, hyle is this potentiality; if they have a different hyle, then it has the sense
of arche kineseos.
It may come as a surprise that Aristotle mentions the sun. But it is remarkable that
Aristotle never forgets his leading question, even if he makes lengthy digressions.
The leading question lies in the first sentence of the book: Περὶ οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία,
“The present theory concerns being.” To be able to carry out this theory we first
have to identify and to define the field of investigation. Following the line begun in
the Sophist, it is clear that this area is that of the prevailing opinions about being. In
this area the opinions about natural beings are the least controversial. With regard
to them, we ask after the being and the primary, which makes becoming possible
and which being involved in this process has a becoming and which not. We have,
then, to ask after that which is capable of initiating movement, because just this
question has not yet been answered. The Platonic ideas cannot be the being we
are searching for, because the ideas cannot found movement, they cannot cause or
move anything, even if they do have that other necessary feature, immovability.27
They are insufficient to answer the questions raised in the Timaeus and picked up
27 Certainly Soph., 248e–249a, is not taken into account here; but what Aristotle names τὸ παντελῶς
ὄν, is not the idea in the sense of the “friends of the ideas.”
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by Theophrastus at the beginning of his Metaphysics.
We are satisfied, then, with a partial response as given in 5.5. The father as moving
cause is a good example, but inadequate as an answer to the leading question which
being can ground becoming. The sun seems a much better candidate. The sun, in
any case, does belong to the set of eternal beings. It is a moving cause, even the
cause of life on earth. According to the state of knowledge at the time, it is the
first cause capable of initiating becoming in the area of natural beings. The ecliptic
belongs to the same astronomical area and is responsible for the variation in the sun’s
manner of being a cause. The discussion about the difference between actuality and
potentiality in 5.4–5.5 must serve as a preparation for the considerations in 5.6–5.9.
This last part must be understood in connection with the foregoing.
ad (iii)
Aristotle begins with the distinction that some terms can be said universally, others
not (5.6), then he states a thesis concerning the first principles:
KP 10 Met. Λ 5.7 (1071a18f) πάντων δὴ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ πρῶτον τοδὶ καὶ
ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει.
Thus, the first principles of all <beings> are the first actual this and another <prin-
ciple> which is potential.
The ‘actual this’ (meaning the full-determined particular) and the potential hyle be-
long to the first principles of all beings. After the foregoing considerations about
potentiality we must make a differentiation in the notion of potentiality. In some
cases it is modal, as potentiality in contrast to actuality (in the sense that the being
is determined in its eidos), in other cases it means the power to set something in
motion, in contrast to actuality (in the sense of realization or performance of the
movement).
The sentences 5.6 and 5.7 form a unit, 5.8 and 5.9 explain them. The “general
causes” refer to genera, the other to particulars. Aristotle cites man as a cause,
but ‘man’ is not the same as genus and as particular, so the causes of both must
be different too (and both of those are themselves causes, in different ways). The
366
6.2. Met. Λ 1.9–2.8 with KP 3
genus is a being only in a secondary sense (deuterai ousiai), while the particular is
“more being.” Let us consider these differences in the meaning using as example
the phrase “A man begets a man.”
1. As a singular sentence it means: “Peleus begets Achilles.”
2. As a universal sentence it means: “Something with the eidosman begets
a man and not, say, a tree.”
3. In a mixed manner: “The eidos ‘man’ in the begetting man, insofar it is
its nature and therefore its principle of movement, is the cause that the
single, begotten being is again a man.”
4. The statement “The particular is the first and essential cause of a partic-
ular” is in turn universal. Only the actual cause in a given case is dif-
ferent from an other actual cause of the same kind in another case, but
both have in common the determinations to be a ‘this’ and to be ‘actual’
(they do not differ in their eidos). 5.8 explains this with the example of
the father.
Table 6.3.: “A man begets a man”
It is not clear to which the word ἐκεῖνα in 1071a19 refers. W.D. Ross thought that it
refers to a17 andmeans the Platonic ideas. In a similar way, T. A. Szlezák translates:
Jene allgemeinen <Prinzipien> [...] With H. Bonitz, it seems more plausible to me
that it refers to “this” in 5.7.
5.9 takes up the assumption that causes and elements of the beings differ from each
other. If that is true, then there are no general causes, neither in the categories in
general, nor in each category separately, but even here it remains true that by anal-
ogy all beings can have the same cause. In the case of the particulars the three causes
– the actual hyle, the eidos of the particular and the moving cause – do differ.
5.10 gives a long summary. If we ask with regard to the principles and elements
of the beings and of every single category, whether there is a universal cause for
all beings (and categories) or whether every particular has its own cause, then we
must first be clear about the underlying presuppositions that we accept in the frame
of the above mentioned distinctions. The answer will differ, contingent on this. If
we ask generally, the answer will be affirmative, with the limitation that it is valid
367
6. From KP 2 until KP 10: Met. Λ 1–5
only analogically. If we ask taking into account the distinctions made above, we
can answer more discriminatingly and name as causes the eidos, the privation and
the moving cause. We can, moreover, designate a single cause for all beings insofar
as all beings, which are not ousia, depend on it. As a cause ousia determines to a
certain degree all other categories.
With καὶ πάντων we again encounter a textual problem (1071a33, in 5.10). In W.
Jaeger’s edition this is the beginning of a sentence (: [...] πλὴν ὡδί. καὶ πάντων ὡδὶ
μὲν [...]); W.D. Ross puts the comma after the phrase ( [...] πλὴν ὡδί καὶ πάντων,
ὡδὶ μὲν [...]). W. Jaeger punctuates as Moerbeke did, T. A. Szlezák, L. Judson
follow him. The reading of W.D. Ross seems to me to make sense, but I think that
the two ὡδί, a33 and a34, display only the first ὡδί in1071a33. Paraphrasing the
sentence we get: only in a certain way are there the same principles for all beings :
a) insofar as hyle, eidos, steresis and the moving cause are the same causes for all
beings by analogy; b) insofar as the ousia is the cause for every other categorical
determination.
In the second half of the sentence 5.10, 1071a35, Aristotle reminds us again of the
first universal principle of all, namely the actual particular. This too is a general
principle for all beings. In contrast to this, the factual first and direct causes for
something are different if they are opposites, which cannot be combined in a supe-
rior genus and which are not said in many ways. Finally, the directly involved hyle
of a certain being too is a different principle.
We can summarize as follows: Corresponding to the diversity of our ways of speak-
ing (Met. Λ 5.10) the aitia and archai of the ousia and the symbebekota are different;
when we take into account the distinctions made in (i), (ii) und (iii), then the ousia
and the symbebekota have the same aitia and archai.
5.11 is the final sentence in the usual form. Presented here in the form of a list are
the results of the distinctions made in Met. Λ 4–5:
1. By analogy and in general the cause for all beings is the same; if we consider
the causes in detail, if we ask what the cause for this and that is, then the
368
6.2. Met. Λ 1.9–2.8 with KP 3
causes are different.
2. By analogy and in general the cause for all beings is the same, be it actual or
be it potential. The respective first causes for something must be an actual
any-this. This is valid for natural beings as well as for beings in the cultural
area.
3. We cannot explain and understand the transition from steresis to eidos with
hyle and eidos alone. We have, therefore, to examine the other causes in the
list, the moving cause and the telos.
4. Due to the variety of our manners of speaking, the causes for all beings are
different unless we explicitly take this variety into account and we pay atten-
tion the the pros-hen-relation.
At the start, we asked in a more general way the question which being is the basis of
becoming. That question now has a more precise meaning. We ask after the first,
which is prior to becoming, having no coming-to-be itself and which is in some
sense the cause of becoming. This is all asked within the frame of the given dis-
tinctions in our language. What on the whole can initiate movement is asked, we
do not ask after the cause of the existence of this or that. The Platonic idea fulfills
the condition of having no coming-to-be, but it cannot initiate any movement, be-
ing only something in which things can participate and even the Aristotelian eidos
cannot move anything. The same is true for the hyle: as pure possibility it cannot
initiate any movement. The being we are searching for is not yet found, the inves-
tigation made so far will not suffice. There is something we have seen that can set
in motion and which has no coming-to-be: the sun, but the sun is not unmoved in
the manner we seek (5.5). Not even the sun can make becoming understandable.
The investigation made thus far has revealed necessary but not sufficient causes.
Theophrastus intends the same when he remarks (Met., § 25):
Up to a point, then, we are able to conduct studies bymeans of a cause by taking
starting points from sense-perceptions; but when we move on to “the first and
highest” [things] themselves, we are no longer able to, …(Transl. Gutas)
Eidos and hyle do not have all the features to be required the first causes. We must
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continue our investigation into the first unmoved moving cause and the first telos.
The series of the finite moved causes cannot end in an infinite regression. This
result, that our inquiry is incomplete, once again confirms that that which is asked
after is nothing other than being, Sein.
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7. KP 11 and KP 12: The First Speculative HighPoint,Met. Λ 6
InMet. Λ 6, Aristotle makes a new beginning, by referring back toMet. Λ 1.7. This
new start leads to two speculative high points. Although the next chapters stand
in contrast to the previous ones, they are based upon them, therefore I shall briefly
recapitulate the turns the question about being has taken in Met. Λ 1–5. Next, the
plan of the chapters 6 and 7 will prepare us to locate the speculative high points in
their context. The further sections of this chapter discuss KP 11 (Met. Λ 6.1) and
KP 12 (Met. Λ 6.8), together with subsequent reflections on that sentence inMet. Λ
6.9–6.29. The exposition of the second speculative high point in Met. Λ 7 is given
in the next chapter, which treats key propositions 13 until 18.
7.1. Recapitulation of Content and Results of Met. Λ 1–5
The first sentence of Met. Λ denotes the subject of the inquiry, the method and the
point of view fromwhich the question about being is to be asked. With this sentence
Aristotle refers to a long tradition of philosophical discourse that includes Presocrat-
ics, Plato and the Old Academy. It is a fact that he concentrates the discourse on the
question about being; it is not relevant for our question whether he was right or not
to focus his tradition in that way. His method of the inquiry is theoria and the point
of view from which the question is asked is the question of what being (Sein) can
found becoming. That he asks the question about being together with the question
about becoming seems to be a result of the foregoing discourse that had shown that
becoming cannot ground itself, but needs being as its ground. The first five chapters
have clarified the sense of this question.
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Aristotle does not search for an answer by means of experience or by exploring
beings present in the world, precisely because these things, experience and being
that are present, need to be founded; instead, his method is theoria, speculation
practized in topical attitude. Since, then, the leading question is after that being
which is the basis of becoming we ask – within the given distinctions, which are
distinctions made by the language – for the first which precedes becoming having
itself no becoming. It is, nevertheless, a cause of becoming, it ‘causes’ becoming.
The quotation marks should remind us that being does not ground becoming in the
sense of a causa efficiens.
In the following section – from Met. Λ 1.2 up to 1.8 – Aristotle lists some modes
of being from which three types of being result. It is something like an overview
of prevailing opinions about being: ‘we’ speak about perceptible beings, of which
some are finite, others not and about not-perceptible beings. On the basis of this
overview Aristotle chooses the perceptible being, ousia aisthete, in 1.9, as the sub-
ject of first investigation because this is the being least disputed, the opinions about
it popular and stable. He translates these opinions into his own terminology in order
to have in place a valid basis for the question about being. He does this in sentences
1.9–2.2 employing the termmetabole. These sentences contain the first analysis of
the being of the ousia aisthete.
We can divide the text from 2.3 to 5.11 into two sections. Up to the end of chapter
3 there are reflections on the elements of the concept of metabole and a second
analysis of becoming, oriented towards the way we use the term ‘to become’ in
our discourses: “All becoming things become something out of something through
something” (so 3.2; as an example: “A table becomes out of timber by a carpenter.”)
Thus, we have as causes the eidos, the hyle and the moving cause.
In chapters 4 and 5 Aristotle asks in what sense all beings can be said to have the
same aitia kai archai and in which sense they cannot. If we wish to know what the
first cause is, then we must ask after those within the range of the four causes, which
do not themselves have a becoming. For we seek for a being without becoming,
but one which can found becoming. Within the set of beings that do not have a
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becoming, we must select that which can initiate movement.
Both hyle – which was the Presocratic answer to the question about the first being
– and eidos – Plato’s answer – do not have becoming. Hyle cannot be the being we
are searching for as the basis of becoming, because it is mere indeterminateness and
potentiality.1 The eidos is not suitable, because it cannot initiate movement. From
the list of the causes there, therefore, remain telos and the moving cause. With
respect to a present process of becoming, the moving causes have no becoming,
they already are. Considered, however, in another respect they do have themselves
a becoming.
Any philosophical questioning is ultimately directed at what is primary in its field,
so Aristotle has asked whether hyle or eidos have the necessary features to stand as
the first causes of being. After answering that in the negative he now asks whether
the moving cause could stand as that primary. One reason for this choice is that the
moving cause is one in the list of causes, but another even stronger is that Aristotle
was searching for an answer to the question of how movement can first begin. The
primary that sets in motion must be something without itself any form of motion. As
such, nothing in our world is suitable, not even the sun, which – to the knowledge of
the time – it was considered an eternal being, was thought subject to the conditions
of a specific form of movement and to have a hyle.
If there is one and the same cause for all categories (for instance, the same is the
cause for something being an apple and being green) then all we have to do is to
investigate this one cause. If, however, each category has a different cause (one
thing is the cause for it being an apple and something else cause that the apple is
green) then the procedure becomes much more complicated. In the second part, in
chapters 4 and 5, Aristotle investigates in which sense the same can be cause for
different categories and in which sense it cannot (the question whether the entire
spectrum of the use of to be shares a common center or not belongs to the same
complex of questions.) The answer is positive when being in general is under con-
1 Note, that with this shift of the concept Aristotle has transformed hyle into a Seinsbegriff, a concept
characterizing being.
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sideration. Insofar as ousia and eidos define the framework of possible realizations
in the different categories we see one and the same cause for all categories. The
answer is negative, when we consider only the causes of a particular, of a tode ti
(5.10).
7.2. Disposition and Line of Thought inMet. Λ 6 and 7
InMet. Λ 6.1 Aristotle refers to the distinguishing of beings into three groups, made
in 1.7: one of them being the group of perceptible beings, some of these eternal
others perishable and the third that of not-perceptible beings. On the basis of these
distinctions, the conclusion is “that there is also an eternal and unmoved being.”
Even this conclusion is drawn on the basis of opinions. Aristotle does not anticipate
the speculative result that comes only later with 6.8. This sentence does not claim
the existence of anything either, it is no more than the logical consequence of given
endoxa.
Through the first eight sentences of the sixth chapter Aristotle arrives by the shortest
way at the highest speculation. Throughout the rest of Met. Λ, Aristotle is only
developing and explaining this result, so to speak. In sentences 9 to 12 Aristotle
considers the state of hyle in this context, then the problem of whether actuality
or potentiality is prior. The rest of the chapter is devoted to considerations of the
consequences of other assumptions about the question. Consequently, we see no
other being than that with the characteristics mentioned in 6.8, which could make
being (ousia) understandable as a reason for becoming. The text concludes with an
analysis of the question of how irregular movements could be the effect of a cause
that is working constantly, in the same regular way.
The first three sentences of chapter 7 introduce the unmoved moving. The phrase
…καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως…in sentence 7.1 signifies, that if we did not accept the result of
6.8, i. e. if the origin of movement was not conceived as {being–actuality}, then we
should have to return to the solutions just rejected in 6.13–6.22. The combination
of the determinations ‘moved’ and ‘moving’ and their negations result in a table,
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wherein the ‘unmoved moving’ has a position.
W. D. Ross saw a textual corruption in 7.3, W. Jaeger a lacuna. S. Fazzo has re-
cently come up with a solution, which at once is sensible in itself and accepts the
manuscript reading (2012, and 2016, 203). Against the transmission, at 1072a25
she prefers the dative ἐνεργείᾳ, to get the sense “Unmoved Mover in act” instead
of “unmoved mover as act” (2016, 181–205). She argues that Aristotle mainly uses
the pair with dative δυνάμει – ἐνεργείᾳ, and that the notion of an “ἐνέργεια [as]
an absolute concept” (183) is not an Aristotelian but a Neoplatonic one and that
furthermore, the Iota adscriptum often drops out in capital writing. In 1071b20 she
retains the nominative ἐνέργεια, because ousia with a genitive depends on it (196);
her paraphrase of 6.8 runs: “…those beings which eternally act [i. e. the heavens]
are such that acting is the very essence of them.” It seems to me that we can arrive
at the same meaning with the nominative or the dative. Even if the original text
did have the nominative, after 6.8 the meaning would be ‘being – in the mode of
actuality’ which had had no prior possibility and had never a coming to be.
7.3 (1072a24–26) ἐπεὶ δὲ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν καὶ μέσον, τοὶνον ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ
κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα
Since <there is a> moved, a setting in motion, and an intermediate <type of be-
ing>,
LS 13 there then is also some <type> that sets in motion without being moved,
which is eternal, being <: ousia> and actuality.
In a longer section (7.4–7.15) Aristotle shows that a cause that sets in motion, it-
self unmoved, is possible, understandable and even necessary. To explain this he
takes up everyday experience. Everybody is familiar with causes that set in motion,
themselves unmoved, namely the things which one desires, thinks of, loves (7.4).
Starting out from such experiences, it becomes easier to understand the being, Sein,
for which we are searching as a being which sets in motion, itself unmoved. Aris-
totle has raised the question to a new level.
Subsequently (7.10ff.) he explains that a desired object or person can initiate motion
without being moved itself because it is a cause in the sense of a goal. Insofar as
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something is moved in another respect, it has some potentiality and it can become
otherwise than it is just now. This means it does not meet the condition stated in
6.8. At first, it may seem that the heavens or nature is the principle and origin we
are searching for. but that would be mistaken in the same way that it was to take the
sun for the principle (5.5). Even the heavens and nature depend on the arche we are
looking for (7.15).
In the sentences from 7.16 to 7.23 Aristotle reaches the second speculative high
point. This begins abruptly with a statement about the “way of life” (diagoge, 7.16,
1072b14):
And we have a way of life, such that it is the best, for a short time, for that
<origin> is this way forever, and indeed <that> is impossible for us.
How does this fit in the line of thought? – In 6.8 Aristotle said that the being we are
searching for, the principle and origin of becoming, must be actuality. What being
(Seiendes) does fulfill this condition? The sun and the fixed stars are first in our
natural world to initiate motion, but all the same they do not fulfill the necessary
condition. The question remains what actuality will mean in the case of the first
moving cause, if it should set in motion without itself beingmoved like a telos. With
the diagoge, way of life, Aristotle redirects the attention from the realm of beings
(Seiendes) to being (Sein), another example the manner in which the philosopher
can shift a question to a higher level. In doing so he is following suggestions made
by Plato in Sophist 248e: ousia, being, cannot be purely static, it must include life,
soul, thought. How ought we to understand the actuality of being, which as the
sought out cause of becoming in the sense of a telos, sets in motion without being
moved itself? Aristotle responds in 7.16–7.19 that noesis, actual awareness, is the
cause we are searching for.
In 7.24–7.25 Aristotle discusses dissenting opinions. There are anticipated possible
objections to his thesis that the complete and perfect is the beginning. Pythagoreans
and Speusippus think that the most beautiful and the best cannot be the beginning,
but that they are the end, as we find in observing plants and animals. Aristotle
responds that this objection has its basis of factual things that become, but that even
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here actuality and the perfect state must precede. It is not the seed which is the
beginning, but that from which the seed comes. Now, this example from the realm
of everyday life must be translated in into the speculative frame.2
Sentences 7.26 and 7.27 conclude the chapter referring primarily to 6.1 (not to 7.17–
7.20). 7.26 is a very typical closing sentence beginning with ὅτι μὲν οὖν (Thus,
that there is some being <: ousia, Sein>, eternal, unmoved, and separate from the
perceptible <beings> is clear from what has been said; …). The vocabulary used
in this sentence points to the origins of the question in the Parmenidean thinking.
At this point we must consider a specific difficulty of the text. Normally, we rightly
assume that a word is used in a text in a consistent way, i. e. that it retains the same
meaning throughout the text. Aristotle himself establishes this as a rule because
equivocations destroy an argument or render it invalid. Here, the word ousia should
have the same sense at every occurrence. According to this rule one could sum up
the different determinations given about ousia and all of these together would ex-
press what ousia is. It would be possible to state a result of all these determinations,
god, for example and say that this is the first substance we are searching for. The
rule, however seems to be seriously violated inMet. Λ. The reader must be aware of
the diversity of meanings of ousia and make his choice without any helpful indica-
tion from the text. The different determinations of ousia cannot, then, be summed
up. They refer to different things.
We find a good example of how Aristotle shifts from one use of ousia to another in
sentences 6.1 to 6.8. Here Aristotle leads us on the shortest route from the things
and beings around us to the highest point of speculation about being. In 6.1 ousia
means groups of beings, because it refers to 1.7; in 6.2 it means the particular; in 6.8
it means being (Sein), as it does inMet. Λ 1.1. Aristotle is switching between ‘ousia
absolutely’ (Seiendes) and ‘ousia of something,’ but he is aware of the difference.
‘Ousia absolutely’ stems from the area of endoxa and is the starting point for the
2 This is comparable to the chicken-and-egg problem. If the question is asked in the natural area, there
is no possible solution. There is no chicken without an egg and no egg without a chicken. But if the
question is asked in the eidetic area, that means, if we want to know where the eidetic determinations
primarily lie, then the answer is that the chicken has the priority.
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reflection, the ‘ousia of something’ corresponds to the ti estin;
But besides this twofold use of ousia, we find in Met. Λ 1.1 and in the speculative
sentences a third use, which could be confused with ‘ousia absolutely.’ This third
use is the peculiar goal of all the theoretical considerations: being, Sein. If we
accept these distinctions for our reading then we see that Aristotle, by different
approaches, leads his readers from the endoxa to the deepest basis of their opinions,
i. e. to theirs opinion about to be. Sometimes the meaning of ousia in questions
and answers can change in quick succession. What is said later about ousia is not
necessarily thought to be added to that which had been earlier said, there could be a
totally new approach. Things can be said in a new respect and on a level of question
which in the meantime has shifted.
In addition to this we have to take into account the possibility of a twofold interest at
play, and this in every sentence of every chapter but most especially in chapters six
to ten. For, Aristotle pursues an astronomical-cosmological interest and a theoreti-
cal interest as well. This duality is founded on the way the question must be asked
in the tradition of the Timaeus. The contribution of this dialogue was to show that
for the question about being (Sein) the theoretical method is prior to the physical
method. Theophrastus takes this up in his first paragraph:
How and with what sort of [things] should one mark the boundaries of the study
of the first [things]? For surely the [study] of nature is more multifarious and,
at least as some actually say, more lacking in order, involving as it does all
sorts of changes; but the [study] of the first [things] is bounded and always the
same, for which reason, indeed, they even place it among the intelligibles but
not the sensibles, on the ground that the [intelligibles] are unmovable and un-
changeable, and on the whole consider it more venerable and more important.
(Transl. Gutas)
The theoretical method alone can provide an answer to the question of the first be-
ginning. If we do not want simply to restate new opinions against old opinions then
we cannot do otherwise than reflect on our own opinions and seek out their funda-
mentals. That, however, does not prevent Aristotle from returning to the astronom-
ical side of the question. The objective is not to decide whether the speculative part
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in chapter 6 and 7 or the astronomical part in chapter 8 is the last word. In the think-
ing without contention, there is, in any case, no last word but also no first word.3
The comments on both issues are to be considered within their respective frame, the
one in the theoretical the other in the frame of an actual cosmological discussion.
What astronomy cannot provide for the question about the first is clear: astronomy
has nothing to do with the theoretical first.
The overall direction ought not to be along the line of asking “We have a subject,
the substance, and nowwe wish to knowwhat we can know about it.” Better instead
were: “We have opinions about the beings, now we want to ask for the necessary
fundamentals of these opinions, for their very horizon.”
The two lines of inquiry intersect, following different types of questions about the
first and the origin. The theoretical question asks “How and in which sense being
is cause and origin of becoming?” the physical “Which are the first causes of this
natural being?” We find the same duality of questioning in Plato’s Timaeus and in
the difference of questions asked by Kant in theMetaphysische Anfangsgründe der
Naturwissenschaft and in the Opus postumum.
7.3. KP 11 (Met. Λ 6.1): The First Speculative High Point
KP 11 Met. Λ 6.1 (1071b3–5) Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαὶ μία
δ’ ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀΐδιόν τινα οὐσίαν
ἀκίνητον.
Since there are, as has been stated <in Λ 1.7>, three kinds of being <: ousiai>,
two natural but one immovable, one must say about the last, that it is necessary
that there is some eternal immovable ousia.
Aristotle begins his reflections in Met. Λ 6 referring to the divided opinions about
beings reported in Met. Λ 1.7 with the thesis, “that it is necessary that there is
some eternal immovable ousia.” In 6.2 to 6.4 he gives some reasons supporting this
thesis; in 6.5–6.7 he adds considerations about the actuality and potentiality of the
3 Quite contrary to what Th. Nagel, argues in his The Last Word, New York 1997.
379
7. KP 11 and KP 12: The First Speculative High Point, Met. Λ 6
moving cause, and immediately draws the speculative conclusion 6.8: Therefore
there must be a principle such that its being <: ousia, Sein> is actuality. The
remaining sentences of the chapter are corollaries (about the hyle, about which of
the pair, actuality and potentiality is prior to the other, 6.9–6.10) and reflections on
the conclusion in 6.8 (6.11–6.12). Finally, 6.22–6.28, Aristotle deals with arising
objections to his own result.
6.1 refers to the list of opinions reported in 1.7. From the three groups of beings the
perceptible and moved beings have already been discussed. Now the other group,
the unmoved beings are to be examined. As regards the content, sentence 6.1 is con-
nected even more strongly with 1.1 than with 1.7. The theory of being, announced
in 1.1, is taken up now in a closer circle than before; the starting point, namely the
opinions about the being of natural beings is outlined inMet. Λ 1–5, the theory itself
as reflection on the fundamentals of our opinions, can now begin. In the following
chapters 6–7, Aristotle gives a speculative answer to the question of what the being,
Sein, is, that fulfills the necessary and the sufficient conditions, which the first mov-
ing cause must meet, with respect to the world in motion, as we see and experience
it.
Neither Parmenides nor Plato, could put the question concerning the primary in this
form, they did not possess the intention or the tools for such. Parmenides had to de-
clare an epiphany, Plato wished to present the opinions in order to have them tested
by Socrates. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Aristotle’s question is in the tradition of
Parmenides since he employs Parmenidean expressions to describe being, Sein; and
he is also located in the tradition of Plato, for – beside the many references to the
Sophist and beside the common main theme, the question about being – Aristotle
uses the new type of terms established by Plato, the quotations.4
Contrary to the standard argument it seems that the essential goal in Met. Λ 6–10
is not to trace the first cause creating of the world’s creatioin but to find that being
which can found becoming. The first cause that is capable of setting in motion is
just one of several points to explain in what prevailing opinions claim about natural
4 For quotations, Anführungen, as a type of term see E. Sonderegger, 2012, 3.2.
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becoming.
This becomes very clear in 6.5–6.8. In the question “How does movement come
about?” the notion ‘movement’ is to be understood in a double respect. With respect
to the content, movement is the transition from a not-thus-determined being to a
thus-determined being, that is, from steresis to eidos. In modal respect it is the
transition from potentiality to actuality. Determination is always a determination of
a being to be determined, so that the transition requires something on which it can
take place. This can never be the steresis-itself or the eidos-itself, but it is that which
Aristotle named hyle. Obviously hyle has no becoming in a particular process but
is necessarily involved in this process. The eidetically determined hyle becomes a
from-both (Met. Λ 1–2).
A first heuristic means asking the question about the being which founds becoming
was the examination of the way we speak about changes; a second was the dis-
tinction between internal and external causes. The causes which were discussed
hitherto, namely steresis, eidos, hyle, can be put together as internal causes, they
make up the being which becomes. External causes are the moving causes (Met. Λ
3–4); but, in the area of natural and beings in the cultural area, it turns out that they
themselves have a becoming. We must distinguish between the causes which have
a becoming and those which do not and only the latter ones are now of interest.
7.4. KP 12 : Met. Λ 6.8, The First Speculative High Point
KP 12 Met. Λ 6.8 (1071b19–20) δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια.
Therefore there must be an origin such that its being <: ousia, Sein> is actuality.
The reflections in Λ 1–5 did not succeed in tracking down the being which is capable
of founding becoming, that only comes with Met. Λ 6.8. Here Aristotle designates
the sufficient condition: it must be an origin whose being is actuality.5 In the short
5 S. Fazzo, 2012, 184 translates: “Bisogno dunque che esista un principio tale, che la sua sostanza
381
7. KP 11 and KP 12: The First Speculative High Point, Met. Λ 6
passage from 6.1 to 6.8 Aristotle turns our attention from the causes of becoming of
natural beings to the cause of becoming itself, to being, Sein. I shall now attempt to
integrate 6.8 with a paraphrase of the text, where the sentence is the fitting culmina-
tion. We cannot define a first point of movement and time, so if the natural beings
are in motion in a time without beginning and without end, then the being that sets
them in motion cannot be limited in time (6.2–6.4), we must surmise that this being
is eternal. Therefore, an eternal being, capable of setting in motion something else,
is sought in chapter six. Unlike with the ideas, which indeed are beyond time but
can do no more than to allow to be partaken in, this first moving being must be able
to initiate the transition from steresis to eidos; and, what is more, it will not suffice
to be able to do that, its actual performance must not be based on a prior potentiality
to set in motion that which is now being realized (Met. Λ 6.5–6.6), because such a
transition would again require another moving cause, in which case we would find
ourselves in a regressus ad infinitum (Met. Λ 6.7). To initiate the transition from
steresis to eidos must be the being, Sein, of this origin. If, then, the natural move-
ment without a beginning must be founded and maintained “there must be an origin
such that its being is actuality.” With this we have reached the first speculative high
point in Met. Λ 6.8.
That is my paraphrased rendering of the text. This alone will not suffice. We shall
endeavor another approach in regarding the consequences of that sentence placing
it within the historical chain of thoughts that lead up to it. Aristotle has concentrated
the previous philosophical discourse on the question about being inMet. Λ 1.1; what
is the role and the place of 6.8 in this question? – In the sentences leading up to 6.8
‘beginning’ has meant the beginning of natural movements and of natural coming to
be. We need to understand which natural being is the ground of natural becoming.
That is a direct reference toMet. Λ 1.1, because becoming is the traditional problem
and the value of any new effort to understand being will be assessed on its power
sia atto;” in 2014, 293, “la sua sostanza” is replaced by “la sua essenza.” She wants to distinguish
between “the essence of a being in actuality” and “it is actuality.” She confirms the modification
2016, 196, saying that the eternal substance according to its essence must be active, especially in
the context of Met. Λ 6 where the eternal movements of the heavens are the subject, not the ‘First
Mover.’ S. Fazzo thinks that it is essential to leave ἐνέργεια in the nominative in KP 12 while the
word is in the dative in KP 13, 1072a25.
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to explain becoming. If we take on the question about becoming, that is if we –
“like the ancient thinkers” – wish to be able to explain what becoming is, how it is
possible and if we wish to avoid both the Parmenidean aporia about being and the
sophistical aporia about non-being then we must understand what has a coming-to-
be in the process of becoming and what not. We have, thus, to find an answer to the
question about the beginning of becoming.
The transition in the process of becoming has two sides:
1. With respect to the natural becoming of a particular being, it is a question of
physics.
2. With respect to the transition from steresis to eidos it is a question of specu-
lative theory.
The expression ‘beginning of becoming’ is ambiguous. In our parlance it means
the natural becoming of a particular being. At the beginning of its coming to be
there is another particular being. A being of the same type as the caused beings
cannot, however, initiate the first movement and becoming as the first in a sequence,
because then there must be a beginning of movement and time, which, as we have
seen, is not conceivable so.
The being initiating becoming in toto cannot be the first in a sequence, we must
adjust the sense of the question. That is the reason why Aristotle tries in Met. Λ to
shift the horizon of the question. In both cases there must be an impulse given by a
proton kinoun. That which, in the speculative case, first sets in motion transforms
the indefiniteness of a possible being in eidetic definiteness: this is what is meant
by actuality. Actuality is what is aimed at in the process of becoming. Actuality
signifies that something has attained its telos in a stable form. This form is the for-
the-sake of becoming and therefore the good of becoming and in this way it is the
first moving cause. To be actual is the goal of things that become, the becoming-
thing ‘strives’ to be, so to speak.
In the complete being the eidos becomes evident. This ‘it becomes evident because
it has attained the respective determination’ is the being (Sein) of the thing, for the
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sake of which something begins to become and this being sets in motion unmoved
as a goal. This being is the unmoved moving cause.
Themain result of the sentencesMet. Λ 6.1–6.8 is a shift of the horizonwithin which
the question must be asked. We have to move from the question about the causes
of beings around us, to that of being as ground. The origin of becoming is being.
This origin is neither a first in a sequence nor a temporal primary. It is the being
‘striven for’ by that which comes to be. It ‘causes’ the transition steresis to eidos
and it is the cause of this transition. The following sentences 6.9–6.27 confirm that
actuality is the crucial point. In this section Aristotle is not concerned with anything
else more than this.
7.5. Met. Λ 6.9–6.29: Reflections on 6.8
In the sentences 6.9–6.29 we find reflections on the result presented in 6.8. There
it was said that only a non-contingent actual being can be cause and principle of
the natural becoming without beginning. This form of actuality is a special form
because it is not based on potentiality.
The reflections divide into four sections. In 6.9 to 6.10 Aristotle says that the ousia
mentioned in 6.8 cannot have hyle. In 6.11 and 6.12 he deals with an aporia con-
cerning the energeia already mentioned in 6.8. In 6.13–6.22 he treats other views
on the subject. Sentences 6.23–6.29 deal with the problem that it is not evident how
something that is itself in an eternal and completely uniform motion can produce
the irregular movements we see in fact.
In 6.9 we encounter a conspicuous change in the number of ousia. After the singular
in 6.8 we now find it in the plural form. Nevertheless, Aristotle cannot be speaking
about a wholly new issue in 6.9, since there is a reference back with the demon-
strative pronoun: “Still further, such beings <: ousiai> must be without hyle; for
they must be eternal, if anything else is eternal.” W.D. Ross (II, 369) identifies the
singular in 6.8 with god, the plural is an anticipation of the many unmoved movers
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of the spheres (cf. E. Berti, 2000, 192). We note the same change from singular to
plural inMet. Λ 1.1. There the singular stands for the heading of the question about
being absolute before any distinctions, while the plural stands for the many beings
around us. The singular in 6.8 has the same sense as in 1.1 and the plural in 6.9 can
too be explained by the plural in that sentence. The first thing to ascertain for each
being is the group to which it belongs: is it an eternal or a perishable being, is it a
natural being or a number etc.? Now, there are many such groups which explaines
the plural in 6.9.
I shall next attempt to make this view plausible by paraphrasing the sentences 6.8–
6.10. The being (Sein) of the arche we are searching for, the origin of all changes
(metabole) from steresis to eidos, must be non-contingent and actual. If there are
such ways of being – no matter how many, it is not about their number now – they
cannot have any hyle, because hyle necessarily includes possibility, change and
finiteness. That which is eternally setting in motion cannot be of this kind. This
confirms the result in 6.8 that the being we are searching for must be non-contingent
and actual.6
There is, however, another possible understanding of the plural. What is said as a
general rule in 6.8 must be true in every single case of becoming too. In this case,
the plural will refer to the many particular cases of factual becoming. Being (Sein)
with its actuality is always the origin of becoming.
Against this background the question about the priority of possibility and actuality
arises (6.10). One could argue that possibility is prior to actuality because all actual
beings must be possible, but not all possible beings beed be actual. The extension
of possible beings is broader than that of actual ones. Actuality, then, seems to
presuppose possibility which therefore has priority. The argument that the extension
of the notion A is broader than that of B works in the frames of genus and species.
The compared beings must have certain determinations in common, but it would be
6 I think that all variants of ‘actuality’ in 6.10, 1071b22, are compatible with this sense; a) ἐνεργείᾳ in
the dative means “in the acctual mode”; b) if we accept the nom. sg., then the sentence refers directly
to the singular in 6.8; c) the nom. pl. refers to the plural in 6.9. – S. Fazzo, 2016, 195, as in her
edition 2012, retains the singular in 1071b20, but prefers the dative in b22 which also makes sense.
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false to combine actuality and possibility as genus and species. The argument, thus,
is inconclusive.
It remains that in the context of natural becoming the actuality is prior, because
something only possible requires an actual moving cause in order to be realized.
From this point, Aristotle presents other views on the beginning of becoming and
discusses their problems. He proposes that factual, natural movement can be under-
stood neither through the claims of the theologians about the first moving cause,7
nor in the way the physicists have expounded (6.13); the ‘Night’ of the former and
the homou panta of the latter are only possibilities. They constitute, perhaps, the
primitive material of becoming, but are not a cause for becoming.
Here as in the other cases, the criterion for the origin of movement is the concept
of actuality. Because the hyle, which the physicists designated as a principle, can-
not set in motion anything (6.15), Aristotle says in 6.16 that Leucippus and Plato
assumed the eternal energeia. After raising an objection to Plato’s thesis that self-
movement could take over this function (Timaeus 30a), Aristotle cites Anaxagoras,
Empedocles and Leucippus (6.22), all of whom argued that actuality is prior.
In the sentences 6.13–6.22 Aristotle refers to considerations coming from the tradi-
tion. In discussing them he confirms the priority of actuality vis-à-vis potentiality
stated in 6.8 and he can solve the aporia mentioned in 6.11.
He closes the chapter raising an anticipated objection to his own thesis.8 In Physics
Θ 3–6 (cf. the aporia in Θ 3, 253a24–30) and De Caelo B 12 we find similar con-
siderations. – If the origin of things moved and things becoming is the {actuality–
being} mentioned in 6.8, then we cannot establish and understand how different
movements are possible. The {actuality–being} has no hyle and no possibility. If it
7 W.D. Ross says that ‘theologians’ refers toMet. A 983b29; the term includes the early cosmologists;
see alsoMet. Β 4, 1000a9, Λ 6, 1071b27, Λ 10, 1075b26 and Ν 4, 1091a34, plusMeteorologica B 1,
353a35.
8 W.D. Ross says that 1072a9–17 (6.23–6.29) refers to the difference between the sphere of the fixed
stars with a motion that is “ever the same” and the ecliptic with different movements (cf. 1071a15
and De Generatione et Corruptione B 10, 336b15).
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is operative it has always the same effect.9 In fact, however, we see and experience
many and different movements. To all appearances, the movement of the fixed stars
is always the same. The planets show a zigzag movement, although analyzable in
the circular movements of different spheres. We see further rather more irregular
movements in the sublunar dimension: clouds, elements, animals and other phe-
nomena. Nevertheless, the claim that even these irregular movements depend on
the first moving cause should not be given up.
Following Aristotle, the difference between “with respect to itself” or “as far as it
is up to it” and “with respect to something else” allows to differentiate movements.
The {actuality–being}, left independently unto itself, would always produce the
same effects but with respect to the fact that it is the for-the-sake of becoming of
this or of that, its effect is different depending on this or that.
Which movement will effectively result depends on for what the {actuality–being}
is the cause of the change from steresis to eidos.
9 L. Elders, 1972, 156, says that this is the ‘Unmoved Mover,’ E. Berti, 2000, 298, and others say that
this is the sphere of the fixed stars.
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8.1. KP 13 : Met. Λ 7.3
KP 13 Met. Λ 7.3 (1072a25–27) [...] τοίνυν ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ
οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα.
[...] then there is also some <way of being> that sets in motion without being
moved, which is eternal, being <: ousia> and actuality.
The first three sentences of chapter seven state that there is a type of being which
can set in motion something without itself being moved. Sentences 7.4 until 7.15
clarify in a general way how something can set inmotionwithout itself beingmoved.
7.16–7.23 ask in what sense the word ‘actuality’ (energeia) is used in 6.8. Aristotle
includes a discussion of other views (7.24–7.25) and concludes both chapters, six
and seven, with two final sentences (7.26–7.27).
In the first section (7.1–7.3), we encounter some linguistic or textual problems:
– To what οὕτω [...], 7.1, 1072a19, does refer?
– Should we break up the first sentence in two, the second beginning with καὶ ἔστι
τι [...], a21?
– Which question is resolved with 7.1?
– Must we read energeia in 1072a25 in the nominative with the manuscripts or in
the dative heeding the conjecture of S. Fazzo?
– How to repair the corruption at 7.3?
The word οὕτω in 7.1 may refer to the immediately preceding text. Certainly, in
389
8. KP 13 – KP 18: Second Speculative High Point, Chapter 7
6.23–6.29 is only dealing with the part of the question of how we can explain the
different natural movements which we see in our world, if the first cause is setting
in motion in an eternal and constant way. The foregoing chapter had ended with the
rhetorical question (6.29): “So why must one search for other principles?” Aristotle
is here rejecting the solutions offered in his time – be it the answers given in the
Academy or those which he will go on to cite immediately next – and preparing us
for his own answer given in 6.8. “Since it is possible <to explain becoming> this
way, …” then refers to 6.8 and siginifies that the issue of the first moving cause as
explanation of natural becoming will be resolved in 6.8.
A. Laks (2000, 208 and 213) punctuates in 7.1 differently from W.D. Ross and
W. Jaeger, placing a period instead of a comma after λύοιτ’ ἂν ταῦτα. He thinks
that οὕτω in 7.1 refers to 1072a9, i. e. to the priority of the actuality over poten-
tiality (211–213). He argues that the eternity of movement (this is the content of
the sentence beginning with καὶ ἔστι τι, 1072a21) can be deduced from the priority
of the actuality (this is the content of the sentence beginning with ἐπεί, 7.1). – It
is improbable, however, that οὕτω refers to the argument that actuality is prior to
potentiality because that is only an appendix to the thesis that the being of the origin
we are searching for is actuality but not potentiality (with which A. Laks is in agree-
ment). Nevertheless, it is thinkable – irrespective of punctuation – that the sentence
beginning with καὶ ἔστι τι (1072a21) is a new sentence, because if it were merely
consecutive to the sentence λύοιτ’ ἂν ταῦτα, it would be in the optative rather than
in the indicative mood.
If the origin we are searching for is that mentioned in 6.8 then the theoria peri ousias
announced in Met. Λ 1.1 is achieved and that would be the sense expressed by of
λύοιτ’ ἂν ταῦτα. Thus, finally οὕτω in 7.1 is referring to 6.8 and to the solution of
the issue formulated in Λ 1.1.
If this solution is refused (καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως 7.1), i. e. if the origin is not conceived
as an origin whose being is actuality, then we are thrown back on the alternatives,
which had been refuted in the preceding chapter, 6.13–6.21. Then we must say as
the ancient have that becoming is to be explained in terms of Night, of non-being
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(6.13, cf. 2.3–2.4), of some “all together,” and we return to the assertion of opinions.
If, however, we may rightly conceive of the origin in the sense of 6.8 and if, in fact
(ἔργῳ), we observe the sun and the sky as exercising an eternal motion, namely
in a circle, then the sphere of the fixed stars is eternal, it causes as beginning of
all movement the eternal movement of the natural becoming. The fixed stars with
their eternal, circular movement can be seen as the actual cosmological cause of
natural movement (if the aporia in 6.23–6.29 has been resolved). The mingling of
the theoretical and the cosmological view is very striking in this sentence. Οὕτω
reminds us of the theoretical side of the question, but the continuation deals with
the cosmological side.
The sense of 7.1 could be that the origin conceptually defined in {ousia–energeia} in
6.8 will suffice as the non-temporal origin of becoming which has neither beginning
nor end. It will not suffice, however, as the origin of that becoming which drives the
humors in the bodies or the clouds in the sky, but of that becoming which consists
in the transition from steresis to the actual eidos. Again, the next sentence, 7.2, is
an unanticipated cosmological notice: “Hence there is also something that moves
<the first heavens>.” Aristotle concludes from the factually observable, eternal and
perfect circular motion of the heavens that there is certainly a moving cause behind
this circular motion. There is something other than the fixed stars themselves to
which we may attribute their movement. With regard to this statement we must not
neglect the provisos in respect of the astronomical observations as well as the fact
that this is all inferred from empirical data, about which Aristotle says explicitly
that they are restricted and open to correction.
If that which can set in motion and maintain the eternal movement of the fixed stars
(7.2) can only be an unmoved moving cause, this concept must be reflected on. It
is problematic insofar as nowhere in nature do we observe such a thing. Everything
that sets something in motion is itself also moved. The concept of an ‘unmoved
moving cause’ seems to be contradictory in the area of nature, because movement
is an indispensable character of natural beings.
Aristotle deals with this concept in 7.3. S. Fazzo alone thinks that the text is not
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corrupt, her attempt to preserve the text’s reading is noteworthy.1 She maintains
that Aristotle in this context is speaking about nothing other than the movements of
the celestial bodies. In contrast, it seems to me that Aristotle is here introducing the
speculative concept and the possibility of an unmoved moving cause. As far as the
reading of the text goes, I follow S. Fazzo. But even if the text were corrupt, it would
without doubt be clear what would have to be correspondingly added. Aristotle
combines the positive and negative instances in the distinction of beings that set in
motion and beings that are moved; this results in four groupings, one of which is
the unmoved moving being, see table 8.1.
1. 2. 3. 4.
sets in motion + + - -
is moved + - + -
Table 8.1.: Beings setting in motion and being moved
Beings in the first group are active natural beings. The second group is the set
of those which we are searching for. Group three are inactive natural beings and
examples of the fourth group are ideas and numbers.
7.2 seems to be an existential proposition: “Hence there is also something that
moves <the first heavens>,” but in 7.3 the claim about the existence of something
is only in the background.2 The sentence states only that in the list there is also
a place for an unmoved moving ‘thing,’ which precisely speaking is something to
ask after, its existence is neither stated nor claimed nor proved by the scheme. This
proposition, that there is an unmoved moving ‘thing,’ must be understood in con-
nection with the leading question of Met. Λ: What is that being, Sein, which is able
to found becoming? A first part to the answer has been given in 6.8; now we can
add that the arche mentioned there sets in motion being itself unmoved.
1 See see above, p. 375, and S. Fazzo, 2012, 58; eadem, 2016, 203 and 181–205.
2 In contrast to this A. Laks, 2000, 215, for example, triumphantly declares about 1072a23–26: “This
section is short, but it contains the only argument in favour of the existence of an unchangeable mover
which one can find in the whole of Λ 6 and 7.” – Even the term “mover” remains.
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With respect to the being which is the origin and cause of becoming and of mundane
being – and that is what it is about in 7.3 – an existential proposition is senseless.
Existential propositions declare something about things in a world, now the issue is
the world itself. Further, existence is not a Greek problem and can only be asserted
about a thing in a world, but not of that which is the subject here. Even a sentence
like “This world exists” is senseless, because this sentence can have a sense only in
an other world, where ‘to exist’ stated about a world has a sense (this is comparable
with the external question rightly criticized by R. Carnap).
At the end of 7.3, Aristotle recapitulates the characteristics of the First, which sets
in motion, see table 8.2.
The first moving is:
οὐσία justified in Λ 1
ἀΐδιον justified in 6.1–6.4
ἐνέργεια justified in 6.5–6.8
οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ justified in Met. Λ 7.3
Table 8.2.: Determinations of the first moving
Now we must ask how the {being–actuality} can effect the transition from steresis
to eidos. Explaining precisely this is the goal of the theoria announced inMet. Λ 1.1.
In the next two sections, 7.4–7.15 and 7.16–7.27, the speculative attempt reaches
its second point of culmination.
Based on the above, we can summarize the first section, 7.1–7.3, as follows: Since
the being, which founds becoming is comprehensible in the way stated in 6.8, the
leading question as exposed in Met. Λ 1.1 (the question about being) is hereby
solved in its theoretical form. One not accepting this answer would have to return
to those other answers: the ground of becoming is Night; or the “All together”; or
the non-being.
There does actually exist something we see that is in an eternal circular motion, so
that the first heavens can be called eternal. In that case there must be something
else which sets this heaven in motion. If we combine the possibilities of ‘to set in
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motion’ and ‘to be moved,’ it does transpire that there is a position for an unmoved
moving. This is exactly the {being–actuality} named in 6.8 which assumes this
position. We can say about it that:
(i) it sets in motion other beings being unmoved itself;
(ii) it is without a temporal beginning or end;
(iii) its being is actuality.
8.2. KP 14 : Met. Λ 7.4, and KP 15 : Met. Λ 7.7
KP 14 Met. Λ 7.4 (1072a26–27) κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν· κινεῖ οὐ
κινούμενα.
But what is longed for and what is thought about move in this way; they move
unmoved.
How can an unmoved being cause motion? The astronomical point of view must
be replaced by the speculative point of view. For it is clear that there is no being
in our natural world, even if the sun and the sphere of the fixed stars play a special
and prior role which had that necessary character of the origin we are searching for,
namely to be all together unmoved, If we are asking after the being that moves,
being totally unmoved itself, then the sun is not the answer.
What does ‘set in motion, being unmoved itself’ mean at all? In fact, that one
thing can set another in motion without itself being moved is far from being a mys-
tery. Here at 7.4, as in De Motu Animalium, 6, 700b23–24, Aristotle easily points
out situations that everybody is aware of. In everyday life, when we act, such un-
moved things play an important role: pursuing a target, striving for something, lov-
ing someone, we are moved while our target is not moved; thinking about something
our thoughts are moved by the thing we think about, but the thing itself remains un-
moved. The objects of desire and of thought set in motion our desire and thinking
while being unmoved themselves.
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We find the same also inDe Anima, Γ 10, 433b11–13: “The first <producing move-
ment> of all is the object of desire (for this produces movement without being
moved, by being thought of or imagined)” (Transl. D.W. Hamlyn). Aristotle speaks
about that which is desired and that which is thought of or about that which can be
desired or can be thought of.
It has often been thought that the sentence 7.5 “The first of both <i. e. of that which
can be longed for or be thought of> is the same” was enigmatic.3 As I see it, the
phrase points to the end of 7.6: ἀρχή γὰρ ἡ νόησις, “for awareness <: noesis> is
the origin.” The origin for both, for desire and for knowledge, is being aware of the
respective goal.4 What Aristotle says inDeMotu Animalium 6–8 about the question
λοιπόν ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα (“Now we have to consider how
the soul sets in motion the body”) confirms this interpretation.
Being aware of the good sets in motions our action: the good is our goal, we allow
ourselves to be moved by it. In 7.6 it is clear that Aristotle is speaking about us
humans, not about gods. What he says is intended to illustrate what is meant by
speculation. Because 7.6 stands in immediate connection with 7.4 and 7.5, these
sentences too give examples of that for which we are searching, the unmoved mov-
ing cause. ‘To be the object of desire or of thought’ is by no means a definitive
determination of the unmoved moving being sought, i. e. of the being which is the
origin of natural becoming. That is not of any interest at this moment. Here we
need only to understand how an unmoved being, capable of setting something in
motion, is possible. Of course, the first unmoved moving is an object of desire and
of thought, but is so not with respect to itself but incidentally.
The examples have highlighted that the defining character of the first unmovedmov-
ing is to be a cause in the sense of a goal. The content of this goal we infer from
sentence 6.8: its being is actuality (not existence). In saying this, Aristotle is in no
3 Thomas Aquinas, 1926, Nr. 2522, says that that first desired and thought of is the good; H. Bonitz,
1849, 496, says that the first of the desired and thought of is τὸ καλόν (“the beautiful”), according
to 1072a27–b1.
4 1072a30 (at the end of 7.6): H.-G. Gadamer translates: “Denn der Ursprung ist das Denken”; J.
Tricot: “Le principe c’est la pensée”; H. Bonitz: “Prinzip ist das Denken.” Maybe Aristotle wants
to describe what W. Schneider, 2001, names the fusion of being and eudaimonia in the actuality.
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way being revolutionary. Being had long before been said to be the for-the-sake-of
becoming, so Plato, Philebus, 54a5, who said that becoming is for the sake of being
and not at all the other way round. Things which become do so in order to be.
This ‘in order to be’ is the first which sets in motion, it must be such that its being
is actuality (Met. Λ 6.8) and it sets in motion like an unmoved goal.
The actuality that is striven for in every process of becoming is the first movingcause; this is the speculative main result of Met. Λ.
“Becoming” here means neither the development of a natural being out of its un-
developed nature according to natural laws, nor even its coming into existence, be
it according to a Big Bang theory or according to a Creation story. The term ‘be-
coming’ signifies the change from indeterminateness to determinateness. A thing
which becomes is not simply an absolute thing with no connection to any world.
Instead, it is ‘this particular here’ or ‘this particular here as something.’ A thing
can be ‘something as something’ (etwas als etwas) only by entering into a world
and there is no world without a noetic structure. Aristotle calls this structure noesis,
awareness. In this area of awareness the becoming thing becomes an ‘any-this.’5
This means that the leap from becoming into being takes place in the noesis. This
first “being”6 is the result of a process in which something is aware of something
as something or perceives something as something; the being aware is perceived
itself, because both the perceiving and the perceived are potential knots in the net
of the same noesis, the same world. To be this way is the telos, that which is aimed
at in the process of becoming. It is the for-the-sake-of becoming, comparable to the
unmoved goal in the case of actions and thoughts.
If we further divide that which belongs to desire and thinking into that which moves
and what is moved, the noeton belongs on the side of what sets in motion. The end
and fulfillment of motion and of coming-to-be is the first, simple and actual ousia
and precisely this is what sets becoming in motion. Both, the movement caused by
5 It bears repeating at every possible opportunity: this is not the awareness of a human or divine subject
or of a human or divine consciousness.
6 ‘First’ not in the temporal but in the systematic sense; ‘to be’ here does not mean ‘to exist’ or ‘to be
present-at-hand.’
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desire or of thought, begin with being aware of the desired and the thought of it (:
ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις). This leads to a pair of columns (7.7, systoichia): The nous
faces that which it can think of, the orexis that which it can desire; the first, simple
and actual being faces the nous. Examples for that which can be desired are the
beautiful and that which is to be chosen for itself (7.8).
There is some discussion about what systoichia refers to. W.D. Ross, ad loc., thinks
that it refers to a definte series of contraries.7 It does seem, however, that the term
ought to be understood in a more general way, as the result of distinguishing pairs
following a rule. In the present case it concerns the distinction between nous and
noeton. In this case, Met. Λ 7.7 has the sense: If we distinguish between nous and
noeton, nous is aligned with thought, knowledge, recognition: while the noeton
with that which is recognized and the ousia.8 We can further complete the rows: If
on the one side we place thought, knowledge, desire then on the other side are being,
the recognizable and the desirable. The nous is not an unmoved moving cause. The
nous is moved if it recognizes or thinks something, as Plato at Sophist, 248e–249a,
said. In this way, it is not easy to understand why the nous has been identified with
god by Aristotle’s interpreters. The nous does not, in any case, stand on the side of
unmoved things, even if it thinks itself. If one should wish to avoid this they would
necessarily have to must resort to mystical formulation.
If being (ousia, Sein) should be the unmoved moving as the for-the-sake of becom-
ing, then the the for-the-sake-of must be applicable to the unmoved moving cause
(Met. Λ 7.9).9 Aristotle uses the notion of the for-the-sake-of in two ways. The
good could be taken as the content of the for-the-sake-of; insofar it is unchangeable
since what is good in itself is and remains good. But if ‘good’ means ‘good for
someone’ then it is variable, for what is good for one person can be bad for another;
7 See also H. Happ, 1971, 264f.; H. J. Krämer, 1964, 154f.
8 T.A. Szlezák, 1979, 147, has argued against a strong fixation on the content of the systoichia by
W.D. Ross, 1924.
9 The for-the-sake-of belongs to the the unmoved beings: H. Bonitz, 1849, 499f., says that this is a
reference to De philosophia; cf. also Physics B 2, 194a35: “the for-the-sake-of is double”; see also
De anima B 2 415b2, De Generatione Animalium B 6, 742a22. – Themistius gives an example: the
for-the-sake-of medicine is health; health is eternal and unchanging; but health is in favour of the
patient, which is changeable. S. Fazzo’s reading reflects this very well.
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or even what was used to be good for a person can be bad later (7.9). Further, the
motion is transitive and can continue; what is moved by the unmoved moving cause
can itself set in motion other things (7.10).
The fixed stars are not completely immobile, they execute the first movement in
circular form. This movement is eternal, certainly, but nonetheless changeable and
insofar has some potentiality, at least concerning place or position (the fixed star
touches one point of the circle after the other), if not being. The being of the sun
is the same as the morning sun and the evening sun, but is at first in the East, then
in the West (cf. Met. Λ 7.11). Mobile beings can change the way they behave,
this is true even for the eternally moving heavenly beings, but not for the unmoved
moving cause. The moving cause, immobile in every respect, is more fundamental
than the sphere of the fixed stars, which, in the spatial sense at least, is mobile.
8.3. KP 16: Met. Λ 7.15
KP 16 Met. Λ 7.15 (1072b13–14) ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ
φύσις.
Thus <even> the heavens and the physis depend on this kind of principle.
We can understand the expression τοιαύτη ἀρχή, “this kind of principle,” in two
ways. It could refer to the sphere of fixed stars which was mentioned immediately
before and which has its aspect eternal and actual although mixed with some po-
tentiality. By that reading, the text would mean that the rest of the heavens and
nature around us depend on this first sphere.10 Alternatively, the expression refers
to 6.8 and to the leading question about being, as οὕτω in 7.1 did. In this case it
asks which being, Sein, makes possible natural becoming as we see that around us.
For the Presocratics it was the elements that do this; for Plato the ideas and chora;
for others, as Aristotle reports, it is the sun or the still more constant sphere of the
fixed stars that do so.
10 Aristoteles uses the same verb ἤρτηται also in De motu animalium, 4, 700a6.
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One might suppose that this sphere is the first and absolutely independent moving
cause, by inference from its eternal circular motion. From this movement should
be inferred in a mediated manner the other natural movements, among the first of
them the movement of the sun. From this movement depends the natural becoming
on Earth as Plato had indicated by means of the simile of the sun, but the move-
ment of the fixed stars cannot be the origin Aristotle is searching for. Aristotle says
in 7.15, therefore, that we must seek another origin, even for the heavens and the
nature in general. He points to the origin named in 6.8, the arche which is {being–
actuality}.
7.15 closes the cosmological considerations that began with 7.11. It does not open
new ones,11 as the dash made by W.D. Ross and W. Jaeger would suggest. With
this sentence the astronomical perspective is changed to the speculative one. The
presupposition to 7.15, that the eternal motion of the heavens is the first or last
moving cause and a suitable answer to the question about being (Sein) as posed in
Met. Λ 1.1, turns out to be only one step along the way. Speculation alone reaches
the final end.
8.4. The Second Speculative High Point, KP 17 : Met. Λ7.17–7.19
8.4.1. Text and Translation
Given the great importance of this sentence, I add here 7.16 to the text and the
translation of Met. Λ 7.17–7.19, which form KP 17.
KP 17 Met. Λ 7.16–7.19 (1072b14–24) (16) διαγωγὴ δ’ ἐστὶν οἵα ἀρίστη μικρὸν
χρόνον ἡμῖν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο · ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ
ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες
δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα).
(17) ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ’ αὑτὴν τοῦ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ
μάλιστα.
11 So says also A. Laks, 2000, 230: “The sentence presents itself as a conclusion.”
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(18) αὑτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται
θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν.
(19) τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων, ὥστ’
ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον
καὶ ἄριστον.
b14 (16) We have a way of life, such as it is the best, for a short time,12 for
that <origin> is this way forever, and indeed <that> is impossible for us, for its
<: the origin’s> actuality (Wirklichkeit) is also a pleasure (and therefore being
awake, perceiving, and being aware are the most pleasant <states>, while hopes
and memories <are pleasant> on account of them).
1072b18 KP 17 (17) Awareness in itself is of what is best in itself, and <aware-
ness> in the highest degree is of <that in> the highest degree.
1072b19 (18) The nous is aware of itself, at the same time partaking in that of
which it is aware; for <the nous> becomes an object of awareness by touching
and being aware <of itself>, so that the nous and that of which it is aware are
the same.
1072b22 (19) For that which can receive the noetically perceptible and the being
(: ousia) is nous: <which> is actual by having <the noetically perceptible>;
therefore it seems that nous is divine more from the latter <: its actuality> than
the former <: its receptivity>, and theoria is the most pleasant and best.
With just this passage (more precisely with sentences 7.15–7.24) and without any
additional comment doesG.W. F. Hegel conclude hisEncyclopaedie der philosophis-
chen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Heidelberg 31830. Elsewhere, in the chapter
dealing with Aristotle in the Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, he
comments on Met. Λ 7, 9 and 10 at length (with longer translations).13
In 7.16–7.19 and 7.20–7.23 Aristotle is considering the first origin, which, being a
cause beyond the natural causes of movement, initiates the transition from steresis
to eidos and enables the becoming of natural beings.14 Now we are at the heart of
12 Variant: <The origin’s> way of life is such as it is the best for us for a short time. / Ross: And it is a
life such as the best which we injoy, and enjoy for but a short time…
13 For some remarks on this passage see N. Hartmann, 1955– 58, II, 214–252; W. Wieland, 1970, 35,
fn. 18. For Hegel’s remarks on the text see Theorie Werkausgabe, Bd. 19, Frankfurt am Main 1971,
160–168.
14 Stephan Herzberg, 2012, has dealt with 1072b14–30 in a study with the title Menschliche und göt-
400
8.4. The Second Speculative High Point, KP 17 : Met. Λ 7.17–7.19
the speculation in Met. Λ. We have already understood that the origin of becom-
ing that causes the change from indeterminateness to determinateness must produce
its effect in the manner of the longed for or the thought of, as the for-the-sake-of
becoming and that the being (Sein) of this origin must be actuality (not existence).
Becoming ‘aims at’ reaching this actuality (metaphorically speaking). This holds
for everything. Each single being seeks to reach its perfection in actuality and de-
terminateness in its own {being–actuality}.
Aristotle tries to explain what the actuality of this origin means. In order to do
this, he links being and actuality with noesis, awareness. As has been repeated, he
is not speaking about a human or divine mental state. Noesis, awareness, means
something like the noetic structure of the world. The question about being is not a
logical, physical, cosmological or ethical one. The answer becomes a speculative
or, as Aristotle puts it, a theoretical one. It is not possible to prove the ‘viewing
of the First,’ because any proof can be made only on the basis of ‘having seen the
First.’ This First is the structure of a world. We cannot see, understand, experience
something beyond our world. In this way, the question about being is a unique and
singular one.
Even so, it is no mystical experience or divine revelation. Aristotle can lead us to
this view with comparisons or conceptual means which cannot completely satisfy,
perhaps, but there is no better way to stir to speculative insight. Above all, the text
is allegory (in its literal sense). In this main section especially, where we should be
reaching for the end of theory and speculation, we must be aware of the necessity
to use the language of metaphor and comparison, language which says one thing
and means another. As a speculative text, it represents the attempt to initiate a turn
from attending to the things around us and away from particular beings towards
tliche Kontemplation. It is the result of his studies at the Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät of the
Eberhard Karls Universität in Tübingen. For him it is self-evident right from the start that Aristotle
presents a theology inMet. Λ (without any justification; but he is far from being alone doing so), the
main question in his view is the relation between human and divine thinking. He chooses the variant
that it is the relation of analogy. Also he reverses the explicandum and the example and says that
human knowledge is the example and the starting point to find something about divine knowledge.
He does not mention Hegel.
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being and actuality itself, just as τῆς ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ, “the reversion of the soul,”
had been the aim of Plato’s philosophy (cf. Politeia 518cd, 521c). This turn or
reversion, however, can only begin with that with which we are acquainted. The
text often has to travel to and fro between comparison or example and that which in
fact is meant, but difficult of expression in simple words. What, in fact, is meant is
the answer to the leading question about being and this in the speculative way. The
method for thinking about being is theory, because being itself is, finally, noesis.
Being must not be understood abstractly or for itself, but in the sense of {being ←
noesis → actuality}. So much for the speculative answer. It seems that Plotinus
has understood very well this point in Met. Λ. He set it down in Enneades III 8
formulating it in his own Neoplatonic language.
8.4.2. What does “Way of Life” Mean?
In 7.16 Aristotle introduces the word diagoge, “way of life.” This is mostly un-
derstood in a personal sense, as if Aristotle would wish to speak about god.15 In
contrast to this, we shall try to understand the word as a figurative means towards
speculation and not as a technical terminological component of argument. We may
well ask how the word does align with the course of the leading question so far and
what it contributes to the speculative insight.
We shall recall that in 5.5 Aristotle dealt with the claim that the sun, and later, in
6.1–6.4 and 7.1–7.2, the sphere of the fixed stars is the first moving cause. Both
have a singular kind of actuality and both are origins, but both too undergo local
changes and are not primary in the sense required. The leading question must be
asked in a new way. We pose the question of what the primary as a goal and end of
becoming may be, setting in motion while being unmoved itself, being the cause of
the change from undetermined possibility to determined actuality. In 6.8, with a first
step starting from the opinions about being, we have seen that {being–actuality} is
15 See for example, A. Laks, 2000, 231–237, gets into some difficulty making consistent sense of the
text with this presupposition. He says that the argument does not convince; which evidently is the
case, because Aristotle’s aim is different.
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the for-the-sake-of the natural motion without temporal beginning. From this it
follows that beings of the type of the sun and quite generally of the type of being,
Seiendes, cannot stand as the origin we are searching for.
Which are the characteristics of the actuality of being (Wirklichkeit des Seins),
which while it remains unmoved itself, are capable of causing becoming in the sense
of a goal? Comparing being with a “way of life” Aristotle directs our regard from
the area of beings (Seiendes) to the area of being (Sein) as actuality. Everybody
knows what diagoge, “way of life,” means and everybody since Homer has an idea
of the way of life of humans and gods. Even by our ordinary understanding the
“way of life” is not a being (Seiendes), as we ourselves who lead this life are, it is
the way to be human.
If we take into account that with the question about being Aristotle, he too employ-
ing the metaphor of life, is repeating the question that was first asked in the Sophist,
where Plato tries to clarify the sense of to be (248e–249a), then the phrase “way
of life” seems to be an appropriate metaphor for {being–actuality}. If god is the
point of comparison then the suggestion of what is meant is even more powerful:
the {being–actuality} is in a higher degree than the divine way of life, just as the
divine way of life exceeds our human way of life.
8.4.3. What is the Meaning of “We have a way of life, such as it is the best, fora short time, for that <origin> is this way forever, and indeed <that> isimpossible for us”? (7.16)
Next we examine the text 1072b15–16:
We have a way of life, such as it is the best, for a short time, for that <origin> is this way forever, and
indeed <that> is impossible for us.16
Later, in 7.20, Aristotle speaks about the difference between gods and us humans
16 Alternatively: “<The origin’s> way of life is such as it is the best for us for a short time.” Ross
translates: “And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is
ever in this state, which we cannot be).
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with respect to the perfect way of life. Many think that god, mentioned in 7.20, is al-
ready being referred to with with ekeino in 7.16. But it seems much more plausible,
that ekeino refers to ek toiautes arches in 7.15, which refers to {being–energeia} in
6.8. The best state, the theoria, is estimated to be only possible to humans within
temporal limits, whereas there are no such temporal restrictions for “this” (7.16) or
for god (7.20).
At first glance, the opposition between the brief and the eternal duration of the best
way of life “for this” and “for us” seems to correspond to the opposition between
the possibility of the evanescent human intellectual recognition of luck and the eter-
nal knowledge that belongs to god. This interpretation seems to be backed by the
Platonic distinction between god, who knows and man, who strives to know (cf.
Symposium 203e–204a). Thus, the opposition would mean that we humans have
only brief opportunity in a few special moments to be happy in the highest knowl-
edge whilst God does forever.
I do not wish to question this reading, but would like to make another use of it. The
sentence does not provide information about god, it just cites a common opinion
in order to lead us to the theory. Whoever should prefer the direct, god-oriented
interpretation must take into account, that god is not named in 7.16–7.17; in 7.19
only the word to theion appears and in 7.20 we have the first occurence in Met. Λ
of the word ho theos. As to the period during which someone is in the state of the
lucky actuality of noesis and theoria, it remains to say that even if it were about
the difference between men an gods we still must admit that the expression “for a
short time only” could mean any greater part of human life, even whole the lifetime.
Compared with the life of immortal gods any human period of time is short. Con-
sidering the ‘eternal’ duration of an eventual divine theoria, it is irrelevant how long
a man is in the state of theoria, which in any case would be “short in time.” What
Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics K 7, when dealing with eudaimonia, which
consists in theoria, corresponds very well with this interpretation. Eudaimonia is
said to be “something divine” (1177b28) and Aristotle invites us not to be too hum-
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ble “but when possible to emulate the immortal gods.”17 In Met. A 2, 982b24ff.
Aristotle is speaking of a form of knowledge which is for the sake of itself. It is the
most free and therefore the most divine knowledge. Simonides seems to say that it
is impossible for us humans to acquire this knowledge18 but Aristotle, for whom it is
possible to aim at this knowledge and to whom the gods are not jealous, contradicts
this. If it were the superiority of the gods being demonstrated in sentence 7.16 that
would be an irrelevancy to the Greek reader.
The difference between gods anmen had been well established and recognized since
at least the time of Homer’s Iliad and up to Plato’s Sophist (see the opening scene).19
There is no need to prove the existence and the superiority of the gods, it is part
of the endoxa. In comparison to the speculative consideration about being it is
of secondary interest if there are gods or not. They too are no more than beings
(Seiendes) and do not belong to the class of {being–actuality}. What then is the
purpose of the opposition? The opposition between the short and the long length
of time with respect to men and gods is no more than an endoxon. That our life is
short is a topos of the late archaic lyric.20
It is no more than a common opinion that makes this distinction, but now we shall
have to transfer it to the question of origin, that is about being. It is the consensus
and I agree, that the “this” in 7.17 refers to the unmoved moving. I wish here to
underline that “this” does not refer to god but to {being–actuality}, which is the
unmoved moving end of all becoming. Whoever should wish to take “this” to refer
directly to god must do so as a simile. In the manner that the way of life of gods
surpasses that of humans, so the unmoved moving {being–actuality} surpasses all
factual being (Sein), even that of the gods. As it does throughout the text, speculative
17 1177b33 ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἀθανατίζειν.
18 Met. A 2, 982b30a, cf. Plato, Protagoras, 339a–346d; D. Page, Poetae Melici Graeci, Simonides,
frg. 37,14.
19 Aristotle refers to this common opinion in 1074b13 citing the πάτριος δόξα, “belief of our fathers.”
See also the texts collected by A. Laks and G.W. Most, Les débuts de la philosophie, Fayard, Paris
2016, Chapitre 3. Les dieux et les hommes.
20 See Mimnermus, frg. 2D, Pindar, Pythia, 8, 95; Aristotle himself cited in the Eudemus the story
about Silenus and King Midas (Ross, Eudemus, frg. 6), in content in accordance with Sophocles,
Oedipus Colonus, 1211ff; there are similar statements by many other poets in late archaic lyric.
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and cosmological interests alternate, so the {being–actuality} can be represented as
the actuality of the world. In being awake, thinking, in perceiving and not only at
some selected moments of insight we, in fact, perform this {being–actuality}. All
beings (Seiendes) aim at this end.
8.4.4. “…for its actuality is also a pleasure” (7.16)
What does ‘pleasure’ contribute to the understanding of ‘actuality,’ and for what or
for whom is actuality a pleasure? In modern times being and actuality (Wirklichkeit)
are, to a large extent, reduced to existence, the present-at-hand or presence in space
and time. The Aristotelian insight that to be is expressed in many ways has the
potential to enhance the modern understanding. Even modern thinkers would not
dispute that there is a manyfold use of to be, but disagree that multiple use has
something to do with each other or have a common focus.
I think that at least the manifold use of which Aristotle speaks, at least (being in
its categorial, modal, veritative use), are oriented towards some hen, which we are
seeking. In this case too, however, if the different ways to use to be have something
in common, the characteristics of their relations must be clarified. For, the different
use refers differently to the hen, and as we with our more extensive historical expe-
rience than was available to Aristotle must not neglect to add this hen can change
over time. It is the center of a cluster of common opinions at given moments in
time.
Using the expression “way of life” in connection with the gods, Aristotle prepares
us to conceive that the difference between the actuality of {being–actuality} and
that of a particular being is comparable to the difference between the divine and
human way of life. Actuality, at any rate, is not static existence or reality, it is,
rather, something like the life of the being and yet not simple activity. In a similar
way, Aristotle designated sight (das Sehen) the actuality of the eye and the soul the
actuality of an organic body.21
21 Here again we see a typical issue of speculative expression. When we try to articulate a specula-
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The expression “its actuality is also a pleasure” (1072b16), justifies both the preced-
ing part of the sentence (diagoge d’) and the following part (b17), which begins with
kai dia touto; it is not necessary to parenthesize this as did W.D. Ross. Relating to
the earlier part it reasons that this way of life is the best and from there it follows
that being awake and so on is most enjoyable for us. The text argues systematically,
that to be actual is also a pleasure for “this” <: for the origin> and therefore being
awake and in conscious states is the most enjoyable “for us.” Hermeneutically we
can turn the argument around: We are able to experience that being awake, think-
ing, perceiving are outstanding ways of being actual, we can use this to come to
understand the actuality of {being–actuality}.
It has become established practice to supply ‘god’ or ‘nous’ to the expression “its
actuality” as that which experiences pleasure. When, however, this expression is
employed in order to lead us to the insight of the theory, then what we have here
too is only a comparison, a metaphor and not a plain text. If we take into account
the whole line of thought it seems to be obvious that “of that,” at 1072b16, has the
same referent as “this,” at b15, namely the unmoved moving cause. “Its actuality”
is, then, the actuality of {being–actuality}, which is the origin, that which, in the
sense of a goal, first sets in motion while itself unmoved.
The first unmoved moving is being (Sein) in the mode of actuality as the for-the-sake of becoming.
It is a ‘pleasure’ for all beings to reach their goal, to be actual, but in a further and
special way for us humans, who are capable of appreciating the being of the beings,
when we ourselves are actualized having reached at our goal. At the level of the
beings (Seiendes) the actual world represents the {being–actuality}. To paraphrase
once again the passage “Its actuality is also a pleasure”: In the cosmological sense
the actuality of {being–actuality} is the actuality of the world we live in, in the
theological sense it is the actuality of god, in the theoretical sense it is being, Sein.
tive insight by means of language, we conjure only a thought, but the expression does not properly
correspond to the content of that thought. It would not be correct to use the simile ‘life’ to interpret
energeia as activity or action.
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In fact, it is much more important that all things which undergo the process of be-
coming, reach at a certain time their unmoved goal. That end has set them in motion
and arriving here is a pleasure for each being, for each after its own fashion, for hu-
mans but no less for flowers, worms, stones etc. Things which become become
beings when they reach their goal or telos, their appropriate actuality. In the spec-
ulative sense they reach their actuality in the noesis.
In some sense, the human and divine actuality in the noesis is something special but
that does not in any way mean that the other beings would not exist if they were
not perceived in some way by humans or gods, there is no question of empirical
idealism. Primarily each being is in its respective noesis1. It is just a secondary and
empirical statement to say that a being is in the human noesis. When we ask under
what conditions things are something (etwas), we have to answer that whatever they
may be, they can only be in one world, that is, in a noesis1, which is the structure
of that world. Such is the speculative view.
Up to this point, I have been translating noesis with ‘thinking,’ as it is customary
to do. Now we must replace this translation with the more appropriate ‘perceive’
or ‘being aware’ (for passive forms forms of perceive are required). Permit a bold
comparison: the process of measuring in quantum physics and being in the noesis
are in some ways comparable. As in quantum physics there is no definable state
without measurement, so without noesis is there no definite being. When we are
aware of something in our everyday life (noesis3), that is the counterpart of mea-
surement, but the net which makes it possible to place something at a certain point,
that is noesis1 as the structure of the world.
Imagine an absolute and abstract being – how would it be possible to say something
about that? How could we speak of something that had no relations, something
without or beyond a world? We dare not employ other words and things in order to
explain the ‘absolute thing.’ There is no explanation at all. – None of this will do.
No thing is absolutely, without any relation, strictly ‘in and for itself.’ Anything is
within a world and it cannot be in a world without being in a noesis. ‘Something
without or beyond a world’ is only ever a figurative expression or a contradictio in
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se. Nothing can be said about an absolute and detached thing. The thinkable before
the thought, the thing in itself, that is – comparable to the non-being in Sophist,
238c10, – ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον, it is “incon-
ceivable, ineffable and unutterable, it is senseless.” Everything we are talking and
thinking about, everything we experience and refer to, will necessarily be some-
thing, etwas als etwas, and thus it will be in our world. It is neither possible nor
sensible to speak or to think of something that is not in a world.
It is not necessary that this world, in which things are, be the world of humans or
gods. This means that there are different forms of noesis, different ways of ‘per-
ceiving’ or ‘being aware.’ Even without any humans and gods there is a world,
and therefore a noesis. If noesis means perceiving or being aware, what kind of
perceiving or being aware could be meant other than that of a human conscious-
ness? Aristotle gives noesis a speculative turn. Of course, our perceiving or being
aware of something as humans is also noesis, but that is only secondarily. Primar-
ily, noesis1 is what makes it possible for us to perceive and to be aware, this is the
basic noesis as structure of the respective world. Only by entering in this noesis1
things become actual and real. But that noesis1 is not the consciousness of a subject
in the modern sense and the things are not the so-called mind-independent things,
conceived as things before or beyond any world. The structure of the respective
world is decisive for the being of things, through this structure they become a thing
in a world. Entering into this structure things pass from possibility to actuality. We
must take into account that the speculative intention can only be expressed through
simile, at best by well known opinions about of humans or gods.
Human discursive thinking requires both, the perceiving nous and that which is
perceptible to nous: the noeton. This distinction does not yet exist in the noesis1
which is {being–actuality}. Aristotle discusses this in the sentences immediately
following.
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8.4.5. Why Does Aristotle Introduce Noesis in 7.17?
The being (Sein) that is the cause of becoming because it is the for-the-sake of
becoming is comparable to a way of life. It is pleasant to be. For human beings
some excellent performances of to be would be being awake or perceiving by the
senses or thinking (7.16–7.17). We realize our {being–actuality} at any given time
simply by living and being but, in being aware, we do so to a higher degree. That is
the most beautiful and the best for us humans, even if it is only realizable for us for a
short time in comparison with the timeless noesis (and even if this ‘short time’ were
for the whole life span, it would be fleeting). God is believed to be permanently in
that state, all the happier must we consider him.
Noesis, being-aware, is a new element in the enquiry. It is the last and conclusive
speculative moment discerned by the theory about being. Noesis says conceptu-
ally what diagoge does figuratively, it is this primal first out of which being and
actuality evolve. I choose to translate noesis with ‘being-aware’ or ‘perceiving’ as
relatively neutral words which in this context are not yet terminologically overladen.
Ordinarily it is translated with ‘thinking,’ but that seems excessively limited. The
disadvantage of my translation is that, without a subject, it would seem that there
could not be awareness.
With respect to this new element there are some questions: What does noesis mean
in this context? In what sense does noesis complement being (Sein), which must be
taken now as {ousia← noesis →energeia}? Will it not lead to an extreme subjec-
tivism if we give awareness this position? Finally, we must supplement the formula
withDoxa: {οὐσία← νόησις→ἐνέργεια /Doxa}, because this first being (Sein)
is based on prevailing opinions in a particular world; whoever would contest this,
would confirm this principle doing so.
The true and first actuality of being, Sein, is noesis, thus noesis is the firstunmoved moving. The for-the-sake-of becoming of all things is to be actual inthat way, that is to say: to arrive at this noesis and to be in that noesis is thefirst unmoved moving cause.
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One could compare the way bodies seek to settle in their natural position with the
drive by which beings are moved to find their ‘natural place’ in the noesis. This be-
ing (Sein) provokes that becoming as the for-the-sake of becoming. This causation
is not temporal, because it belongs to the area of noesis, but the mundane realiza-
tion of that takes place over and over again, it has, does and ever will.22 Causation
does not equate with production, or to be causa efficiens or such things. It signifies
to bring something from undetermined potentiality into determined actuality. The
causing {ousia← noesis→energeia} is not temporally prior to that which is caused
in a temporal sense, because it is not at all temporal. In the realization it is the end
at which becoming aims.
The pure actuality of being – which does not mean the existence of the material
world as such, but the actuality of the material world in the noesis – has at its pre-
condition the fact that “the nous is aware of itself,” otherwise there ist neither being
nor actuality of whatever. In a particular case of awareness in a particular world,
that which is aware of a thing or perceives something, can do so only because it
is ever aware of the world as a structure before this single case. ‘Pure actuality of
being in noesis’ means the basic pattern which makes possible all thinking and per-
ceiving in their world, be it to gods or to men (and to any other beings). In KP 18,
therefore, this {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια /Doxa} is described in Parmenidean
terms, because it is about being (Sein) and not about beings (Seiendes). Such would
be possible if one understood this actuality as the thinking of a personal god, but
that would represent a reification for the sake of everyday life.
It is common opinion that the act or a state of mind of awareness requires a sub-
ject, a being capable of being aware of something. In addition, awareness requires
an object, because ‘being aware’ is intentional: it can only mean ‘being aware of
something.’ It is, however, in no way evident that being, Sein, also requires aware-
ness.
Just this point, that there is no being without awareness, noesis, is that which Aris-
22 The for-the-sake-of is a further criterion (necessary but not sufficient) of being in addition to the
criteria examined in Met. Z, namely separability with respect to itself.
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totle wishes to demonstrate in the theory of Met. Λ. We must see that, beyondMet.
Λ 6.8, the final ground and the first origin is not the pure {being–actuality}, but that
{being–actuality} results, instead, from noesis. Without awareness, the {being–
actuality} is incomplete, it is not actual in that way, in which the first unmoved
moving must be. The formal concept of being we have now arrived at is the struc-
ture {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια} whose content is given by a respective Doxa.
Noesis is placed in the middle because the external terms, ousia and energeia, are
something like an expression, evolved outcome or consequence of noesis.
It is comparable to Parmenides’ theorem “to be aware and to be are the same.”23
The intention of this sentence is not to put together or to identify two different
entities separately existing beforehand, it means, rather, that there is an original
unity, a “same” out of which to be and to be aware develop.
Aristotle picks up the formula in 7.18: the nous becomes noetos and so both are the
same. The everyday distinctions of the systoichia collapses. They are the same in
the noesis and, here too, noesis is a unity which precedes all realization (as ousia
and energeia, as nous and noetos; which makes it comparable with the theoria in
Plotinus’ text, see the last Part in this book).
“Way of life” is a metaphorical expression of {being–actuality} in 6.8. Now, at
7.17, noesis replaces this metaphor and is said to be the pleasant actuality of {being–
actuality}. Awareness has steps, levels and modes, the highest mode is directed at
highest things, the lesser at lesser things and so on. Every way of being takes its
own form of awareness, the human takes a human form, gods a divine form, a stone
a stony form. Noesis designates the pure {being–actuality}, which had been sought
sinceMet. Λ 1.1, its mundane realizations are very different. In everyday life basic
noesis is present in any form of awareness.
What does it mean that noesis is the “actuality of the nous” (7.19)? Noesis is the pri-
mal unity, nous, ousia and noeton are systematical (not temporal) developments out
of it. The results can be ordered in a row of connected pairs (systoichia). The nous
23 Parmenides, 28 B 3: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστιν τε καὶ εἶναι.
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can grasp ousia and noeton, it can “assimilate” it (dektikon, in sich aufnehmen) and
so it is the core of every particular process of acquiring knowledge. Insofar as think-
ing is the process in a present situation it is transitive, objectivating, dianoetic.
The nous can act this way in a particular case only provided that the noeton is iden-
tical with it (: with the nous) in advance. The noeton is not prior to a particular
act of awareness in the form of a particular thing, but as a node provided in a net.
The structuring order or nexus are captured and described by the basic opinions of
a world. Aristotle says inMet. Λ and in the Nicomachean Ethics that theoria, spec-
ulation, is the purest performance of noesis. Thanks to the basic noesis, a particular
noesis in our everyday life becomes possible.
Now, we should like to understand what the pure actuality of this noesismay be. In
the standard interpretation the actuality often has been understood as gods existence
and the actuality (Wirklichkeit) of the noesis as actus purus translated as pure activ-
ity (Tätigkeit). Let us, instead, try to reach an alternative understanding starting, as
Aristotle did, from everyday experience. Firstly, actuality is not a determination of
things, as little as to be is a predicate of a thing. Instead, as Aristotle already said, it
is something like a way of life. Being awake, perceiving and thinking, therefore, are
eminently ways of being a human. Those correspondences and comparisons from
our ordinary experience serve to bring us to insight into what noesis is. As another
possible comparison he has talked about the gods, because to the gods, it seems, we
must assign ‘pure actuality’ in the highest degree.
In the first five chapters of Met. Λ Aristotle asks after the first and the origin, start-
ing from opinions about to be, as Plato in the Sophist, 246–248, had done taking as
starting point for the question about being the opinions of the “aborigines” and those
of the “friends of the ideas.” These chapters had no definitive result. Only later, in
6.8, is such an origin discerned as {being–actuality}, where actuality does not mean
existence but completion of the eidetic determinations of a being. Taken wholly
unto itself, a being having its eidetic determinations (say a horse) would be just an
abstraction and would not have as yet any emplacement in a world. The actual be-
ing is an involvement of the total set of possible relations, in short: it is in a world.
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Mere eidetic determinations outside of a world cannot constitute an actual being, the
particular is actual and real only within a whole. That whole is the respective world
constituted by fundamental opinions and distinctions. For an absolute being there is
nothing else external to itself, not even its cause. Without connection and emplace-
ment within situational potentiality there is no ‘this.’ We can say, positively, that
the eidos is the aspect that a being A presents for another being B, which in its turn
presents its aspect to A. Both, the being that is perceived and the perceiving being,
are aware of each other and thereby they are, maybe in a common world, maybe
each in its own world. Each ‘performance’ of being aware (noesis3) brings about
the change from a potential to an actual being. What, however, is the first unmoved
awareness (beyond time and prior to particular awareness) which can set something
in motion? – It is ‘absolute’ or ‘pure’ awareness (Bemerktheit schlechthin), noe-
sis1.24 Only this noesis can yield the relations, which constitute the structure, which
is to say the world in which a particular thing can be what it is.
{Oὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια} as the goal and end of becoming is the unmoved
moving cause; it brings into being the thing which becomes. What are the condi-
tions under which a becoming thing comes to be a being? An absolutely isolated
thing could not become a being, that is possible only within the context of a world.
Getting its eidetic determinations is to move from potentiality into actuality and this
takes place through entering in a world. That world is formed by basic concepts,
distinctions and values, in short, by Doxa. It would make no sense to speak that
is to use to be beyond a world. Any utterance refers to or is related to its respective
world which means to a total of opinions, whether this done consciously or not.
In the original noesis1, both the perceiving and the perceptible form an undivided
unity whereby the perceptible is not the ‘real’ thing but a noetic potentiality. So
the world as noesis1 can provide an openness, in which potentialities can change
into actualities and where any particular finds its place, where it can fit in and be
determined and be that way.
The statement ‘all things aim to be’ means that all things aim at getting at the node
24 See commentary on 9.10.
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in a local nexus where they can be. When we are aware of something, we fix a being
as such. That is the worldly realization in parallele to the way in which the unmoved
moving cause systematically sets in motion something by causing the change from
steresis to eidos. So, through noesis as the world of beings, the becoming things
attain their being (Sein).
This first and primordial noesis has no subject. Only as the noesis of gods or men
does noesis take on the character of subjectivity.25 The basic noesis predefines the
whole in which relations of beings and things can be realized. As such, the basic
noesis is not the awareness of a subject but the condition of that awareness. The
relation between the one and the other, the perceiving and the perceived, does, of
course, have an effect, in different ways, certainly, physically but also quite other-
wise. That the A experiences the B has an impact on A itself. The B experiences the
A equally (in manifold ways). That impact is based either on their common noesis
or Doxa or world, or on common features of their respective worlds. All things
that are, have this mutual perceiving and experiencing impact upon each other. That
which cannot enter into the whole of aDoxa is not in a world and therefore simply
is not. That perceiving is not restricted to human or divine awareness but that just
as much the plant perceives the soil in which it roots as the moon perceives the sun
etc. is very well observed and explained by Plotinus in Enn. III.8.
As has been said several times before noesis has yet another meaning. Besides
that of perceiving and being aware in the everyday sense, noesis has yet another
meaning, that of the structure of a world. We can distinguish between worldI and
worldII ; whereby worldII means the world of our factual existence and of present
things and worldI the ‘world before that world.’ Aristotle brings into play the vi-
sion of a relation-structure, which ‘is’ already prior to any concrete thing. Concrete
things do nothing other than realize a point of this structure in a particular case.
The structure is already the true actuality before any realization of it, it is the con-
dition of possibility for all the rest, for the worldly actuality. The structure of an
opinion-based world does not just begin with the particular beings, which realize
25 C.O. Schrag, 1969, finds some comparable ideas in W. James and A.N. Whitehead.
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the structure. It is not an idea of god, for gods too are only elements in the structure.
The particular being carries out its own being only in the noesis. Only by virtue of
noesis1 does it stand within an order, within a world.
If a being arrives at its worldly actuality in an act of awareness of another being
(noesis3), the factual structure is that of a peculiar worldII and insofar it is only
secondary, but this worldII is based on noesis1. The structure represented by noe-
sis1 seems to be a mere potentiality, but, in fact, this structure is that “origin whose
being is actuality” mentioned in 6.8. The being and the actuality of this structure can
be described in Parmenidean terms but we must not hypostasize it anew as an objec-
tive fact in our phenomenal world, it is and remains a structure of an opinion-based
world.
8.4.6. The Cancellation of the Difference Between that which Perceives andthe Perceived
In 7.7 Aristotle says that that which sets in motion and that set in motion is different
(νοῦς ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται, “that which is aware is moved by that which it is
aware of”). Such pairs form a systoichia, a double row. On the one side is that
of which one is aware, the noeton and the ousia as that which sets in motion, and
on the other side is the moved, like that which is aware and that which thinks (the
nous). From this arise many questions. What exactly happens in the process of
being aware? What is going on when a particular being is aware of something and
how is it possible that a particular can be aware of another particular, which is only
by virtue of being noticed?
7.18 gives an answer to these questions. That which is aware of something can do
so only on the condition that it be aware of itself priorly. ‘Of itself’ means that
the being aware of something is priorly in a structure in which the thing noticed
can appear. Through this process the being which is noticed becomes a noeton, it
enters into a world and becomes an actual and fully definite being (es wird etwas als
etwas). That which another being is aware of (das Bemerkte, A) is for its own part a
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being aware (das Bemerkende, B, for any thing is a being aware of and has noesis)
so that in the process of noesis the being aware (das Bemerkende, B) becomes that
which something else is aware of (A), it becomes a noeton.
For us humans this world-structure is not private, it is common to a community. The
one (say A) can appear in the structure of the other (say B) and the other (say B) can
respectively give a place to the one (say A) inasmuch as both are within a common
structure (: within a worldI or noesis1) which has enough common features so that
each can be aware of the other.26 In this noesis1 the being aware and that which it is
aware of are not separated, only together they are. In the speculative view, noesis1
as structure of an opinion-based world is the actuality, while the other, noesis3 is
the worldly realization of that structure at a certain point. In the case of our actual
world, that means that the being aware presents its structure as a potentiality to that
which it is aware of and that the latter becomes an actual being in the world of the
being aware. In the mutual, common noesis there is no difference between the being
which sets in motion and the being set in motion, valid in 7.7. This is the reason why
we cannot say that an absolute, actual being could be grasped by an equally absolute
or independent thinking. Our opinion-based whole has systematically determined
that which the being aware can perceive as a particular thing.
Some may now argue that this speculative interpretation of Met. Λ is a secondary
import, but it is, in fact, the result of the cancellation of the distinction made in
7.18 between the perceiving and perceived. Even opponents of this interpretation
must somehow appreciate the meaning of this statement. The cancellation is no
mystical event or an experience reserved for a single philosopher, it is valid for
everyone and for the simplest actions, it results from the fact that we are and live as
parts of an opinion-based whole. This {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια / Doxa} we
are searching after, is the world in which each thing performs its being (Sein) be it
active or passive.
It is the special characteristic of Aristotelian speculation that {οὐσία← νόησις
26 I forgo here to explain the relations regulating the mutual perceiving, say of a human being and a
stone.
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→ἐνέργεια /Doxa} is attributed no personal subject be it human or divine. Noesis
and integration in {οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια / Doxa} is what simply happens,
it requires no inventing and commanding subject, no human, no institution. no god
has invented or created noesis, it is prior to all of those.
That which is aware of something is primarily aware of itself, in being so it is capable
also to be aware of the object, see 7.18. This sentence is not a statement about
a particular being (say god), but says something about the fundamental structure
of being (Sein) of all beings. This structure is prior to any particular perception
and that pertains for all beings, men, gods, stones. In some cases, in the case of
human beings, for example, it is possible that this implicit structure becomes explicit
through reflection. That which is aware of something can, thus, also be aware of
the fundamental structure of the world in which what is perceptible has been ever
perceived.
When a being aware stands before an actual perceptible thing, then the respective
position of this thing in the structure becomes activated. This process has been
discussed under various headings. Plato called it anamnesis; elsewhere it is the a
priori; in physics the principle “Pressure generates counter-pressure” is an appli-
cation of that notion. If a being aware is aware of another being, then both are
actualized through their mutual awareness (7.19). All our interpersonal activities
have this character of mutuality. The Greek language has the middle voice to ex-
press this. The nous perceives the perceptible and the being (Sein). In doing so it
becomes actual itself; its divine character consists in being able to do so and this
is theoria and the most beautiful (7.19). It follows from this description that all
beings are beings only thanks to noesis and in noesis and that a being aware can
perceive something else only if the structure of the world is effective in itself. That
is the condition for perceiving anything (7.18). The nous can recognize what it has
perceived, that is its ousia, and on this basis, that it is aware of itself, the nous “is
actual” (ἐνεργεῖ δέ). To be in noesis, to be in its world, is something that works
without the underlying structure needing to be explicitly known. Comparable with
this is the case of language and grammar: anyone can speak their own language
even without having an explicit knowledge of its grammar.
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Next, I shall attempt to summarize the speculative content of 7.16–7.19.
7.16: The being (Sein) we are searching for is something like a way of life. The
actuality of that being (Sein) is beautiful, pleasant and when we are awake or being
aware we are in a comparable state. The possibility of being like this is limited in
time for us humans, while the being itself (Sein) and the noesis in itself are always
in the best state.
7.17–7.18: In the narrow sense {being–actuality} is actual only in noesis. The nous
can be aware of something on the basis of being aware of itself. In being so the
nous becomes its own object. Awareness in itself is awareness of the best, that is in
fact the noesis itself as the world-structure. A lower noesis refers to lower beings, a
higher to higher ones. In the noesis as the opinion-based world-structure the being
aware and that which it is aware of are not yet discrete or distinguished.
7.19: It is the same process in which the nous recognizes itself and its object, but
by different functions: one is transitive, the other reflexive. Through reflection
one can make the noesis explicit. In our everyday life, enacting a noesis always
requires a subject which is aware of something (noesis always has an agent), but the
noesis itself does not need a subject. Being aware is directed towards its object (it
is intentional) but the precondition for doing so is the underlying world-structure,
detectable by a reflexive turn, being in place. The being aware and what it is aware
of are actual only in the awareness. There are levels and ways of being aware,
the highest for men is theoria. To be actual by being aware of something is a more
divine feature in the nous than merely being able to pick up that of which it is aware.
At the centre of the Aristotelian theory are insights of the kind which are listed in
table 8.4.
It follows from all these considerations that the positivist opinion that truth and
reality subsist in our world absolute and objective, that there is an absolute givenness
and we have only to discover the beings, is not wrong but is nothing other than
a further concrete version of noesis1, in a specific world amongst other possible
realizations in other potential worlds.
419
8. KP 13 – KP 18: Second Speculative High Point, Chapter 7
– There is no becoming without being–actuality, no being–
actuality} without noesis.
– Noesis is the actuality of the nous.
– The being aware is actual through giving the perceived a place
in its world and the perceived becomes actual by entering into a
world which means into noesis1.
– ‘Being-aware’ alone and ‘being’ alone are abstractions and sec-
ondary forms of actuality (like existence).
– The prime actuality is awareness (Gewahren). ‘Being actual’
means ‘to be aware of something and to be perceived.’
– Noesis is realized in different ways; each has its respective form
of actuality, characteristic for a definite opinion-based world.
Table 8.4.: Examples of speculative insights
This view which connects our experience with the fact of being in a certain world
is neither a form of aporetic thinking nor a form of relativism, because in any world
we can attain truth and reality when guided by noesis. It negates only that there is
truth and realty beyond a world.
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8.4.7. The Meaning of the References to God in 7.20–7.23
Because of the importance of this passage I reproduce here the translation:
7.19
(1072b22)
For that which can receive the noetically perceptible and the being (: ousia) is
nous: <which> is actual by having <the noetically perceptible>; therefore it
seems that nous is divine more from the latter <: its actuality> than the former
<: its receptivity>, and theoria is the most pleasant and best.
7.20 (b24) If, therefore, god is always well in such a way, as we <are> sometimes, that is
wondrous; if even more <so>, it is even more wondrous.
7.21 (b26) But he behaves this way.
7.22 (b26) And indeed life belongs <to the nous>; for the actuality of nous is life, and
actuality is just this; and its actuality, in itself, is the best life and eternal.
7.23 (b28) Of course we say that god is a living being, eternal and best, so that life and age,
unbroken and eternal, belong to god; and precisely this is <what we mean by>
god.
In this section (at 1072b25 to be exact) Aristotle mentions god for the first time
in Met. Λ. Many scholars have felt legitimized by this in taking the whole text as
theology. My own view about this claim is set out in Part II, 2.2. When seeking
to understand the reason why Aristotle does mention god in 7.20–7.24 we ought to
recall the context. In Met. Λ Aristotle is searching for the origin of natural move-
ment. Aristotle asks his question in two forms, as a natural and as a speculative one,
exploring the latter being his primary objective. He has developed the leading ques-
tion about being and transformed it into the question of what the first moving cause
may be, given that natural movement has neither beginning nor end. This question
too is treated as both a physical and as a speculative one. The answer to the physical
question is that the sun, the sphere of the fixed stars (πρῶτος οὐρανός), and, in De
Caelo, the aether as the first body, execute the first movement in space. The theo-
retical question about the origin of movement was transformed into the question of
what can cause the change from steresis to eidos and from possibility to actuality.
Part of the answer is given in 6.8: {being–actuality} is the origin. The answer is
completed in 7.17–7.18 where it is stated that {being–actuality} takes place in the
noesis. This, to be in that noesis, is that which first sets in motion as a goal. All
becoming things are moving towards this goal, the goal of being actual in the noesis,
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which means in the structure of a world (not in a personal consciousness). This is
the being (Sein) for the sake of which all becoming happens.
The formula for the same is {οὐσία← νόησις→ἐνέργεια} and, because all this can
happen only in an opinion-based world the complete formula for to be is {οὐσία←
νόησις →ἐνέργεια / Doxa}. Doxa below the line indicates where the content of
{οὐσία← νόησις →ἐνέργεια} does come from. To be that way is the for-the-sake-
of becoming.
The question remains what the philosopher’s mentioning of god may add in this
context. It is plain right from the start in Greek culture, from the Iliad up until to
Plato and on to Epicurus, that gods are different from humans. It would have crossed
no one’s mind to doubt this or to try to prove their existence.
InMet. Λ the immortal gods are obviously compared with humans in some respects,
but in which? Firstly, it must be held that the divine noesis is at a level much more
perfect than our human noesis and more eminently actual than we are. This may be
the main content of any opinion about gods in other cultures and worlds too. The
same is valid for the longevity of achievements, that is why they are called immor-
tals, but we mortals. The gods must, after all then, be supposed nearer to the origin,
that is to the noesis. The divine represents a purer being (Sein) than we humans do,
as in line with our opinions. The original and first noesis, which underlies all being,
is realized in different ways. Gods must succeed in their realization much better
than we. They can be said, thus, to live in a more proper sense than we mortals do.
If any life is, then it is the life of the gods that is actuality and noesis as the actuality
of the nous. Such beliefs about gods give ground to well justified comparisons be-
tween gods and men, so our beliefs about gods can help us to understand the quite
different noesis which – beyond any question of men and gods – gives space to the
actuality of being.
Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes his reliance on opinions about gods. In 1072b23
he says: ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, “what the nous seems to have as a divine
characteristic […],” b 28: φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι [...] , “we say that god is [so
and so],” and finally see Met. Λ 8, 1074a38–b14. The remarks in De Caelo A 3,
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270b1ff. and A 9, 279a22ff. point in the same direction.
It also becomes clear that noesis as awareness does not share the everyday sense
of it. The question of whether we humans see or understand anything in a special
way is not posed. Our whole life, indeed, the being of nature and natural beings,
the being of cultural beings, the being (not existence) of quite simply all things is in
this noesis and there can be nothing beyond noesis. All beings and, perhaps, human
beings especially, enact all what they are performing this awareness, realizing in
every case what is already laid down in the noesis. Plotinus will understand the
very same in Enneades III 8 under the heading theoria.
In the noesis of the nous all is thought, perceived and united beforehand in a non-
temporal sense. Only under this condition can things be, retracing what is defined
by the noesis1. By this process all things become actual. The concept of noesis is
now very far from its everday use, it does not mean the thinking of a subjective,
particular and personal mind. Here it is awareness as a process without subject.
In it there is no difference between nous and noeton, that distinction is secondary.
Perhaps noesis is something like the cogito of Descartes if would be formulated
impersonally as cogitatur.
8.4.8. Met. Λ 7.24–7.25: Aristotle Confronts Other Opinions with His Results
In 7.24–7.25, Aristotle gives different opinions on what the firstmay be. Pythagore-
ans and Speusippus have said that “the most beautiful and the best” cannot stand at
the beginning but must be a result at the end. An example to this rule is the develop-
ment of animals. At first there is only the semen, the complete animal comes only
at the end. This objection has natural becoming as its grounds and it refers to the
course of time.
Aristotle mentions one of two possible counterarguments. Certainly, the semen is
less complete than the mature animal, but the semen is not the beginning even in the
natural process but a product, the fruit of an actual and complete animal (see Met.
N 5,1092a17, where the statement “a human begets a human” gives the reason for
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that). Aristotle knows and distinguishes different ways of ‘beginning.’ In Met. Δ
2 he definitely mentions the semen as first because it can set something in motion.
Nevertheless, the semen is subordinated in the hierarchy of causes because it is for
the sake of another, namely of the ousia. In Physics Θ 7 too, Aristotle distinguishes
between different senses of ‘the first,’ most notably between the senses of first in
time and first in being (Sein). Here (261a13ff.) we find the speculative sentence
that declares that the incomplete being in the process of becoming is going towards
its origin in order to become complete (in accordance with Physics B 1, 193b13,
“nature in the sense of becoming is the path into nature.”)
Aristotle does not speak of the difference between the physical and the theoretical
view in 7.24, because with the objection, the theoretical level has been abandoned.
In the speculative area arguments involving beings (Seiendes) are irrelevant. The
counterargument mentioned in 7.24 is valid on the basis of the distinction between
the first concerning the factual becoming of a particular thing and the first in being
(dem Sein nach); in the case of the particular the semen is antecedent to the complete
animal, in the latter ousia is prior.
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8.4.9. KP 18 : Met. Λ 7.26
KP 18 Met. Λ 7.26 (1073a3–12) ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος
καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· δέδεικται δὲ
καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ’ ἀμερὴς καὶ
ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν (κινεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δ’ ἔχει δύναμιν
ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον· ἐπεὶ δε πᾶν μέγεθος ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πεπερασμένον,
πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι μέγεθος)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀπαθὲς
καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι κινήσεις ὕστεραι τῆς κατὰ τόπον.
Thus, that there is some being <: ousia, Sein>, eternal, unmoved, and apart from
the perceptible <beings> is clear from what has been said; it has also been shown
that this ousia cannot have any magnitude, but that it is without parts and indivis-
ible, for it sets in motion <other beings> for an infinite time but nothing finite has
an infinite power; and, since every magnitude is either infinite or finite, on this
account it would not have a finite magnitude, nor an infinite one, because there
is no utterly infinite magnitude; but surely <it has also been shown> also that it
<: ousia, Sein> is unaffected and unalterable for all other motions are secondary
with respect to change in place.
By the standard interpretation, 7.26–7.27 summarizes the characteristics of the ‘Un-
moved Mover.’ It is obvious and uncontroversial that 7.26 is a summary and it is
beyond dispute that the summary covers chapters 6 and 7. B. Manuwald says that
there is a close connection between this section and Physics Θ 10 and he thinks that
the content is more proper to the Physics than to Met. Λ, because Aristotle “argues
in a surprisingly physical manner” (65).27
We do well to scrutinize that more closely. In 7.26 the Parmenidean vocabulary is
striking. Following the order inMet. Λ the determinations are: eternal (Parmenides,
frg. 8, 27); without becoming (frg. 8, 3); unmoved (frg. 8, 26); separated from sen-
sible things (frg. 2, frg. 7); without magnitude; and therefore without parts (frg. 8,
22); unaffected and immutable (frg. 8, 3–4). There is, thus, ‘something’ with the
determinations which Parmenides gave to being (to eon; Sein). The obvious refer-
ence to Parmenides should make clear that this is not about beings but about being,
27 B. Manuwald, 1989, 61–66.
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Sein.28 The becoming, which we must acknowledge as on pollachos legomenon,
is not possible without being, without prote ousia. One of the determinations of
that being is to be the first moving in the sense of a goal (τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ὡς
τὸ τέλος). In Met. ΖΗΘ the following criteria of prote ousia are mentioned: kath’
hauto legomenon, choriston, energeia, aletheia, and, only with certain reservations
tode ti. It is the way of being that satisfies these criteria which every becoming
strives after. The text makes clear, in any case, that neither the nous nor god are
that ousia, which initiates becoming as its telos. What Aristotle says in Met. Λ
7.19–7.24 and 27 are in no way descriptions of god because even god recognizes
only what is described here (Met. Λ 7.20–7.21).
Since noesis is the actuality of the nous there is an ousia having Parmenidean deter-
minations, because just this is its actuality. This ousia is not any being (Seiendes),
it is the being (Sein) we are searching after as the for-the-sake of becoming. It is the
good, that being, which has its actuality in the noesis.
28 I follow the line of interpretation that Parmenides’ subject was being, Sein.
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While the structure of Met. Λ 8 is uncontroversial1 there are some other difficult
problems and questions about this chapter. Here, Aristotle treats astronomical the-
ories in concrete form as nowhere else in his Met. There are issues of chronology,
since he mentions the astronomical theories of Callippus.2 The third and most diffi-
cult problem is how the eighth chapter with its astronomical content is to fit into the
line of thought of Met. Λ 5–10. If we leave the chapter in its place in the traditional
order, we must identify the meaning of these cosmological considerations within
the whole larger work. If we opt, rather, for a break in the sequence we then face
the question of its dating.
9.1. Outline of Chapter Eight
I present a short outline of the chapter. First Aristotle lays out the question to be
treated: whether or not “the ousia of this kind” is singular (8.1–8.2, 1073a14–22).
He says that the ideas cannot explain any movement in the world and that assuming
the ideas does not bring sufficient clarity with respect to the question of the num-
ber of the “ousia of this kind.” Sometimes it is said that the ideas are numbers, but
here and there that the numbers are an infinite quantity and elsewhwere again only
a decade. In Met. Λ 8.3–8.7 (1073a23–b17) we find the fundamental principles
and distinctions on the basis of which Aristotle wants the question decided. There
is also a remark about the competence of astronomy and mathematics with respect
1 The division which I propose is, in its main features at least, in accordance with that of G. E. R.
Lloyd, 2000, 252. G. E. R. Lloyd emphasizes Aristotle’s poor expertise in astronomy, which is less
important here.
2 See Part II, 3.3.
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to the present question and strong reservations are expressed as to whether the as-
tronomical observations of his time are reliable and complete enough. When new
observations came along, the question would have to be asked anew, he says.
In the next section, which is the longest in this chapter (8.8–8.11; 1073b17–1074a14),
Aristotle first presents two astronomical systems, that of Eudoxus and of Callippus,
then he proposes his view about the number of the spheres. Sentences 8.12–8.16
(1074a14–31) are an appendix. From the 55 moving spheres, 47 of which eternally
moving, we can deduce the number of the ousiai and archai akinetoi, so that the
number of the unmoved moving principles is defined.
The next section (8.17–8.20; 1074a31–38) treats the question of the uniqueness
of the ouranos as does De Caelo A 7–9. Unfortunately, it is not quite clear what
Aristotle has in mind by ouranos, the argument is somewhat cryptic: “because the
first ti en einai is without hyle, for it is entelecheia.”
The chapter closes with a reference to the traditional connection between the ob-
serving of the heavens and the inferring of gods (8.21–8.23; 1074a38–b14). This
connection is discussed in De Philosophia and De Caelo A 3 too.
9.2. Astronomy inMet. Λ 8
With regard to astronomy, the most prominent subject in Λ 8, it is essential to see
that it is more relevant that Aristotle treats this subject than what he says about it.
His statements about astronomy are naturally contingent on the state of knowledge
in his time and Aristotle is well aware of that. Here and in De Caelo he repeatedly
expresses serious reservations about the contemporary state of observations. The
text shows very clearly that Aristotle would have appreciated the telescope and,
quite in contrast to Simplicio in Galilei’s Discorsi, he would have reconsidered the
case had he the benefits of its powers.
G. E. R. Lloyd (2000) has convincingly shown that in many places and on many
topics it is not entirely clear, which astronomical theories Aristotle really follows.
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He also explained how limited Aristotle’s competence in astronomy was, a point
that had already been made by W.D. Ross ad loc. We may, therefore, pass over
this topic and turn to the question of why it is that Aristotle includes astronomical
considerations in his project and what their function may be in the sequence of
reasoning of Met. Λ.
We have already dealt with this kind of background to Met. Λ in Part II, 3.3 and in
connection with the Timaeus in Part III, 5.1.1 under the heading ‘Cosmology.’ For
reasons which had become established as traditional, astronomymust be included in
the question of which being could be the basis of becoming, for Plato had presented
the world in two versions in the Timaeus: a pure noetic one and a realistic one,
taking into account chora. The question is posed within the framework of the Older
Academy.
For systematic reasons too, Aristotle had to take this question into account because
the question about being as ground of becoming has both a speculative dimension
and a realistic-physical one. Theophrastus explicitly emphasized this point in the in-
troduction of hisMetaphysics. As we, asking the question about being, are ourselves
physical bodies, we dare not neglect reflecting on the nature of the transition (the
Übergang to use Kant’s expression in the Opus Postumum) between the noetic and
the physical view. We have already seen that under the speculative view the being
we are searching after is captured through the formula {οὐσία←νόησις→ἐνέργεια
/ Doxa}. It remains, then, to seek out the physical side because the foregoing ref-
erences to the sun and the sphere of the fixed stars were too scattered.
Once we have understood the process of “becoming into being”3 as a transition
from steresis to eidos in noesis, which is to say in the sense of the transition from
non-determinated to determinated in awareness (noesis1), the physical considera-
tion remains. For this the natural growth of animals will serve as model.
3 See Plato, Philebus 26d7, γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν, “becoming into being”; Plato, Definitiones, 411a5
γένεσις κίνησις εἰς οὐσίαν, “becoming is movement into being”; Aristotle,Met. Γ 2, 1003b7, ὁδὸς
εἰς οὐσίαν, “way into being”; or possibly the most explicit reference Physics B 1, 193b12–13 ἔτι
δ’ ἡ φύσις ἡ λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὁδός ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν, “furthermore: the so-called nature in the
sense of becoming is a way into nature.”
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Aristotle coined the expression “nature in the sense of becoming is a way into na-
ture” (Physics B 1, 193b13). It is the goal of the process of becoming that the thing
becoming attains into its definitive form. The question now is not about the noetic
beginning and origin of becoming, but remains within the natural frame. The answer
will depend on the world in which the question is asked, on the available knowledge
about natural things, but especially on what kind of knowledge of nature one looks
to cultivate in this world.
The Big Bang, which is the first impulse of all movement is such an originary mo-
ment for us today. Scientists are attempting to formulate a Great Unified Theory
capable of including all moving forces in one single and comprehensive theory (in
the modern sense). Aristotle located the first moving force in the sphere of fixed
stars, the first heaven. Through ever more complex sets of circumstances, the ini-
tially very simple movement is transferred to the things of the world around us with
their manifold movements.
9.3. HowMet. Λ 8 fits together withMet. Λ 5–10
W. Jaeger says that the eighth chapter interrupts the line of thought and for this rea-
son thinks that it is a late interpolation, while the rest of Λ is an early text. In the
view of L. Elders the eighth chapter contradicts the alleged monotheistic system of
the book.4 He goes so far as to maintain thatMet. Λ 8 is not authentic. For D. T. De-
vereux, on the other hand, the eighth chapter fits in perfectly with the rest because
in both Aristotle was operating with the same metaphysical conception. In his intro-
duction to the Symposium Aristotelicum (edited with D. Charles) M. Frede tries to
demonstratey a certain plausible unity to the sequence of ten chapters, in that they
all are about “unchangeable substances” and not about god. L. Judson also thinks
that the chapter can be easily arranged. Neither J. Brunschwig nor A. Kosman who
4 Apart from W. Jaeger and W.D. Ross, with M. Burnyeat and with the coeditor M. Frede, L. Elders
is the most often quoted author in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda of the Symposium Aristotelicum,
2000.
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both treat chapter nine, discuss the problem of continuity.5 Both L. Judson and F.
Baghdassarian treat the issue at greater length; they rather try to integrate the chap-
ter in the whole of Met. Λ and giving less importance to questions of chronology.
In the context of the discourse following the Timaeus, Met. Λ 8 fulfills the expec-
tation raised after that dialogue, that the problem of transition be dealt with. The
development of the notion of a noetic world represents an important advance, for
previously the answer to the question of origin and first principles was sought only
within the common, phenomenal world and that is insufficient. The speculative an-
swer to that question calls for an answer to the connection between the speculation
and the empirical experience.
In the noesis the becoming being finally becomes actual (mind you, not ‘existent’)
and all that is becoming strives to enter into this actuality for it strives to be. The
answer to the question about the natural beginning of this process of realization and
of the transition from possibility to actuality is that the first movement originates
from the outermost sphere. To this question with its two aspects the answer ‘ousia’
has a double aspect. In the speculative line it is the heading to the question about
being, in the physical line to the natural beings.
In the next chapter I explain how, to mymind, the eighth chapter fits in its context.
5 In their contributions there is no German language literature cited, not K. Oehler, K. von Fritz, and
not H.-G. Gadamer, H. J. Krämer, T. A. Szlezák et al.
431
9. From KP 19 to KP 21 in Met. Λ 8
9.4. KP 19 : Met. Λ 8.1
KP 19 Met. Λ 8.1 (1073a14–17) Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ
πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων
ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι περὶ πλήθους οὐθὲν εἰρήκασιν ὅ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν.
It must not escape our notice whether we have to assume one singular ousia
of this kind or many, and how many <they are>; but we must also mention the
statements of the others, that they did say nothing about the quantity, which could
be said quite clearly.
After these preliminary remarks we consider KP 19 (Met. Λ 8.1), where Aristotle
asks whether  “the ousia of this kind” is unique or not. With “such” or “of this kind”
Aristotle refers to the theoretical ousia which was treated in Λ 7. Now it is taken
from the perspective of how this ousia can be the cause of natural becoming. The
question is pursued of whether there is one being or many beings in nature, which
could be the origin of natural becoming.
As usual in such cases the answer is that the ousia is unique in a certain way, namely
as the sphere of the fixed stars, in another way there are many such ousiai, namely
as the mediating spheres and the sphere of the moon. We must take into account,
that in Aristotle’s time it was not observable that the heavens are temporally finite
and changeable (as, for example, concerning the movement of a single star in a
constellation). Although certain phenomena, such as the irregular surface of the
moon were easily observable to the naked eye,6 the moon has now become the last
element in a series of unchangeable spheres, so that it might be plausible that it have
some irregularities, but also that the planets and the stars have different colors, and
that the changing stars may have been evident. Other irregularities, such as comets,
were placed below the moon.
With τοιαύτη οὐσία in KP 19Aristotle is asking after the function of the speculative
ousia in the natural context. Many interpreters, however, wonder why Aristotle
wishes to ascertain the number of those beings when other astronomical questions
6 See G. E. R. Lloyd, 2000, 249.
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were of much greater relevance such as the questions concerning the periodicity of
the planets, their velocity, the inclination towards the ecliptic and others.7 Certainly
one of the reasons may be Aristotle’s insufficient knowledge of astronomy, which is
why he could not distinguish the essential questions from inessential ones.8 Another
reason is the leading question, which pertains to the origin of natural movement. As
to this question, it is important to know whether that origin is unique or not. We
must make sure, in any case, that there is not an infinite number of principles. That
would contradict the idea of a principle and would make impossible any knowledge
at all in this area. Investigating the number of something is also part of the standard
questioning procedure in Aristotle’s inquiries.9
InMet. Λ 8.3–8.7 Aristotle presents his fundamentals and the distinctions by which
he wishes the question decided. There are two main points: in Met. Λ 8.3–8.5
he presents the content-related aspect (with 8.3 as KP 20 ); in Met. Λ 8.6–8.7 the
methodological point (with 8.6 as KP 21).
9.5. KP 20: Met. Λ 8.3
KP 20 Met. Λ 8.3 (1073a23–25) ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον
καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν
κίνησιν·
<The basis for our reasoning is as follows:> The origin and the first in the area
of the beings is unmoved, both in itself as well as accidentally, it sets in motion
the first eternal and single movement; …
According to KP 20, the first origin is unmoved in itself as well as accidentally
and it is the initiator of the first eternal movement. In fact, we observe also other
eternal movements beside the simple movements of the sphere of the fixed stars. If
7 G. E. R. Lloyd, 2000, 252.
8 L. Judson tries to rehabilitate Aristotle to some degree, 263–5, 269–70.
9 See πόσα in TLG; examples: Topics A 2: For how many things and why is this inquiry useful? Met.
A: how many αἴτια and ἀρχαί are there? Met. Z 2–3: how many ousiai are there? In a general
manner the question of quantity is put with the formula posachos legetai.
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any eternal movement must have an eternal unmoved moving cause, then we must
suppose an eternal unmoved moving ousia for each such movement. It follows
from this that there must be as many eternal unmoved moving ousiai as there are
eternal movements. With respect to this First we have two questions to ask, they
are not easily answered. What, firstly, is meant by “origin and first of beings” and
why, secondly, does each eternal movement require a separate individual moving
cause?10
G. E. R. Lloyd thought that the different movements could be explained by the dif-
ferent axes, periodicities and positions that the spheres take in the whole. Indeed
Aristotle does, indeed, use the term taxis in 8.6 and 8.8–8.9 and mentions the differ-
ent inclination of the spheres in relation to the zodiac. One has, perhaps, to accept
the principle as an axiom. The antique idea, that the physical body itself should
determine its own motion stands, at any rate, in rather sharp contrast to the view of
classical physics that a physical force (or a field) acts upon it. In the Aristotelian
context the body is an ousia, which seeks to occupy its natural place. In the case
of the heavenly bodies that place is above and their motion is circular. Anyway, in
Met. Λ 8 Aristotle leaves behind the theoretical level and enters the physical.
Ousia in 8.1 is still referring to the ousia of chapter seven, but only because its
function of being an unmoved moving cause must find a counterpart in the physical
area. The expression “origin and first of the being” in 8.3 (1073a23) must refer to
the first moving in this sense, to the sphere of the fixed stars. It is certainly not the
noesis in 7.17 that is meant because here the subject is real and visible (1073a28). It
does, however, have the same function, namely as cause of the change from steresis
to eidos, from indeterminate to determinate.
10 1073a28 τὴν μίαν ὑφ’ ἑνός, “the one by one”; cf. G. E. R. Lloyd, 2000, 254 ad loc.; it might be that
the first transmits its movement to different things in different ways.
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9.6. KP 21 : Met. Λ 8.6
KP 21 Met. Λ 8.6 (1073b3–6) …· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης
φιλοσοφίᾳ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας·
αὕτη γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν ἀϊδίου δὲ ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, αἱ δὲ
ἄλλαι περὶ οὐδεμίας οὐσίας, οἷον ἥ τε περὶ ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν.
…; but we must learn the quantity of the movements from the mathematical
knowledge whose nature is nearest to philosophy, namely from astrology; it is
this <knowledge> which considers the being <: ousia>, which is perceptible but
eternal; the others <in the range of the mathematical knowledge> do not deal with
ousia at all, e. g. that which <deals> with numbers and geometry.
The considerations presented can be summarized in three points and from these
a question arises, which is answered by KP 21: (i) There is a certain number of
eternal unmoved ousiai; (ii) they are organized hierarchically; (iii) that hierarchy is
determined by the different ways in which the fixed stars, the planets, the sun and
the moon are moving. These three points give rise to the question which form of
knowledge is competent to determine that number.
That is, obviously neither a theoretical question because it refers to perceptible be-
ings, nor a mathematical or geometrical question, because these forms of knowledge
are always expressed in abstracto (cf. Physics B 2). “Astrology” remains, then, to
serve as the knowledge required. We see that Aristotle’s evaluation of astronomy
is not in contrast to that of Theophrastus. In the physical domain and especially
with regard to the question of the number of the principles required, astronomy is
competent, but this form of knowledge has nothing to do with theoretical questions
about the first.
Aristotle, furthermore, expresses major reservations here and elsewhere about what
we know with certainity in astronomy (Met. Λ 8.7; see also Met. Λ 8.12, but as
well De Caelo A 3, 270b11–25, De Partibus Animalium, A 5, 644b22–645a6). He
presents the theories or opinions of other philosophers and does this only ἐννοίας
χάριν (1073b12), in order to have something concrete to say about how it could be.
He reports the celestial mechanics following Eudoxus and Callippus, to which he
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adds his own solution (8.8–8.11). G. E. R. Lloyd (2000), has given a good account
of the remaining problems, of what remains unclear or what is not well founded
in that proposal. Remarks in 8.12–8.16 are intended to definitively establish the
number of spheres, but even here we find a reservation expressed, which can hardly
be ironic, as J. Tricot, II 695, thought. That number, too, remains hypothetical.
Aristotle wishes to convey that the number is complete under certain conditions,
one of which is the astronomical system one chooses to rely on, the other are the
observations presently possible. He confirms this in the second part of 8.12. If
every movement in the celestial area contributes to the movement of a star, i. e. if
the movements of the spheres are entangled with one another and if the best state
of everything must be its telos (to reach its telos meaning to realize the eidetical
determinations and to become actual), then the number of the ousiai we have found
has reached its telos and there is no need of more ousiai (8.12).
Aristotle adds two further principles: (i) everything which sets in motion and every
motion is for the sake of the moved thing (there is no motion purely for the sake of
itself or for the sake of another motion, for that would terminate in something like a
free-flying movement), (ii) even if a movement were for the sake of another move-
ment this other movement must have its telos, unless we are to end in a regressus
in infinitum. Every astronomical movement must culminate in the movement of a
“divine body in the sky” (8.16).
The next, penultimate, section (8.17–8.20) treats the uniqueness of the heavens.
The thesis itself is less interesting than the type of argumentation employed. In the
thesis that there is only one heaven (8.17) and that this heaven is the origin of all
natural movement, by ‘heaven’ Aristotle probably means the first of the three senses
mentioned in De Caelo A 9, 278b10–21; i. e. he refers to heaven as the outermost
sphere of the universe, respectively to the corresponding natural bodies. Now he
argues that if there were many ouranoi as, for example, there are many humans, then
there would be eidetically one principle for every heaven, but quantitatively many
principles. The quantitatively many things have hyle, but to have hyle is impossible
for the heaven, “because the first ti en einai has no hyle because it is entelecheia”
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(1074a35–36). This is the difficult point in the argument. Unfortunately G. E. R.
Lloyd, 2000, says nothing on the matter. Bonitz (513), thinks that the text is corrupt,
Ross ad loc. that what is meant is the “Prime Mover,” F. Baghdassarian (317) and
L. Judson agree.
It is easy to understand that the many has hyle because the many is made up of
singulars and each singular (to kath’ hekaston) is a synholon, that is a composite
of form and hyle. Socrates is the example offered for that in the text. Conversely,
we can say that the eidetically unique can become many thanks only to hyle. The
eidetic one remains one as long as it is not realized in hyle and it is not said about
an underlying thing (hypokeimenon).
The remarks on hyle and ti en einai are more difficult. Hyle is a term to describe
being (a Seinsbegriff ). Its usual translation as ‘matter’ is as misleading as could
be. M. Heidegger grasped the sense much better with his translation Geeignetheit
zu …, ‘appropriateness’ or ‘suitability for …’ Hyle stands, then, in the domain of
possibilities. The statement “the first ti en einai has no hyle” does not primarily
mean that the ti en einai has no material parts (which would be trivial) but that it
has no unrealized potentialities. The subsequent remark that the first ti en einai
is entelecheia is self-evident, but this first ti en einai does not need to be god or
the (inexisting) ‘Prime Mover,’ it is the ti en einai of anything. The reason for
that comes from 6.8 where it was said that the answer to the question about the
speculative origin of movement is given with {being–actuality}.
Only something which is actual neither occasionally nor only de facto can be the
origin. What is established theoretically must be valid, mutatis mutandis, in the nat-
ural domain too. The natural equivalent of this origin is the first unmoved heaven,
which is eternally in motion and suffers no interruption.
The expression “the first ti en einai” remains to be reconsidered.11 Considering the
various ways in which the term is used12 we see that no ti en einai has hyle in any
11 On the linguistic background of the term to ti en einai see my papers 1982, 1992, and 2000, as well
as the remarks made of H. Schmitz, 1985, and H. Weidemann, 1996.
12 Met. Z, chapters 4, 6 and 11, but also De Caelo A 9, 278a3: It does not belong to the determinations
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case. On the other hand, hyle is part of every any-this (tode ti). The sky is unique
but not an any-this. Thus, it is trivial to say that the first ti en einai in the sense of the
‘ti en einai of the first,’ namely of the sky, has no hyle, but it is not trivial that this
is so on the basis of {being–actuality}. As in 6.8 we must take {being–actuality}
not as god, as if what were intended was a hidden proof of the existence of god. It
is, instead, about the position of the first in the distinction between possibility and
actuality, a distinction developed by Aristotle himself.
As to the principle of becoming on the theoretical side, i. e. to {οὐσία← νόησις
→ἐνέργεια / Doxa} as the being which is the for-the-sake of becoming (taking
place as ‘becoming determined’ in awareness, noesis1), so does the first sphere and
the aether as the physical cause of natural movement on the physical side corre-
spond. This first movement initiates the movement of the other spheres, in combi-
nation with further secondary causes of movement (which also depend on the first)
continuing down to the next and familiar natural movements.
G. E. R. Lloyd recounts the last section (8.21–8.23) as if Aristotle would support his
own statements, with his references to traditional opinions. It would, however, be
a questionable logic first to give arguments and then to end with the vindication of
an opinion poll. G. E. R. Lloyd tries, therefore, to lend great plausibility to the tra-
ditional belief in the stars. We should not imagine, however, that such suggestions
render more plausible the argument. Firstly, the remark that the starry skymotivated
people to belief in gods has always been taken to refer to De Philosophia, secondly
it is uncontroversial that the text here is reporting prevailing opinions. The question
is just what the function of these endoxa is.
They do not support the plausibility of the foregoing considerations, quite the con-
trary, they only underline the reservations. Previously it was a matter of the stars
connected with gods (not only in 8.16), now Aristotle says that this must not be
taken at face value. It was spoken only en mythou schemati and it is patrios doxa,
the “belief of our fathers.” That is a clear indication that in theoretical and physical
considerations theological arguments have no place. The drift to theology is a re-
of a sphere whether it is made out of ore or not.
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lapsing into the endoxa, which are always a necessary starting point of the inquiry
but never to be taken as a result or something to be contended.
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Since the main features of the speculative outline are already fixed in Met. Λ 7,
perhaps it is of only secondary importance to know how well chapters seven and
nine cohere with each other. The three last chapters contain only addenda, speci-
fications, explanations or further questions. Nevertheless, both the eighth chapter
dealing with cosmological questions and the ninth chapter returning to speculation,
have enjoyed considerable attention because these addenda were essential. J. Brun-
schwig thinks that the subject of the ninth chapter is still the divine thinking while,
rather subtly, he places greater emphasis on the fact that the subject is not god him-
self but noetic aspects of god. It is taken for granted by many that also in chapter
9 God is the topic, L. Judson for example simply adds ‘divine’ to nous without
further remark (304), see also his Epilogue to chapter 9 “1. What is the Divine
Thinking about?” (326–329) and F. Baghdassarian speaks of a intellect divin and
a pensée divine (329 and elsewhere). For the sake of precision, we should mention
that Aristotle never uses the word ‘god’ or ‘divine thinking’ in the Met. Λ 9 which
is observed by a minority of interpreters, see below p. 446. Theology in chapter 9
is the importation of the reception. Aristotle uses the superlative ‘most divine,’ at
1074b16, as a characteristic of human nous and does so in order to characterize our
nous as the most divine thing on earth (“within the range of phainomena”),1 and at
1074b26, where it characterizes the object of thinking.
I adduce some quotations which manifest the special language that has been used
when speaking of the divine thinking.
H.-G. Gadamer (1961), says the “the very speculative identity of subjective and
1 See Blyth, “The Role of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12.9,” in: Methexis 2016, 76–92, esp. 79ff., who
stresses the fact that it is simply an endoxon, that our human nous is the “most divine.”
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objective” is “the culmination point of his metaphysics [...];”2 and that that Aris-
totle like G.W. F. Hegel has in mind the transcending of the dimension of self-
consciousness by absolute reflection getting (1966). H. J. Krämer (1967, 317), de-
nies that Aristotle could have had an idea of “a pure thinking without any object”;
and 319: “God primarily thinks the series of the essences in Himself,” that is “pure
thinking of objects.”3 – K. Oehler (1973, 50) writes:
Concerning how Aristotle defines God’s noetic way of being – namely that it
is a thinking of Himself – it is essential to see that this self-thinking does not
need another object to be aware of itself as we do in our finite human thinking
but that He has nothing other than Himself as object4
and 55:
Aristotle defines the being of the first mover as thinking of thinking.5
K. Gloy (1983, 519) calls the noesis noeseos the “point where ontology and espis-
temology coincide.”6 H. Seidl argues in his Commentary on the Metaphysics, II,
579, that the noesis noeseos cannot be understood as a reflexive self-knowledge:
The expression noesis noeseos means that the divine rational being is at the
same time the highest activity and the highest object of knowledge.7
Further, 1987, 158, H. Seidl says:
Because the divine intellect is a ‘pure act of being’ and so the first cause of all
2 Gadamer: …die wahrhaft spekulative Identität des Subjektiven und Objektiven, ist die höchste Spitze
seiner Metaphysik.
3 Krämer: …reines, von aller Gegenständlichkeit isoliertes Denken; Der Gott denkt offenbar primär
die Reihe der in ihm einwohnenden Wesenheiten, reines Objektdenken
4 Was nun die aristotelische Bestimmung der noetischen Seinsweise des Gottes betrifft, dass sie ein
Denken seiner selbst sei, so ist für dieses Sichselbstdenken des Gottes wesentlich, dass es nicht erst,
wie das Sichselbstdenken des endlichen, menschlichen Denkens, über einen anderen Denkgegen-
stand zu sich selbst kommt, sondern überhaupt nur sich selbst zum Gegenstand hat,
5 Aristoteles bestimmt hier das Sein des höchsten Bewegers als das Denken des Denkens: noesis
noeseos.
6 Koinzidenzpunkt von Ontologie und Epistemologie.
7 Der Ausdruck noesis noeseos besagt also, dass das göttliche Vernunftwesen als reine vollendete
Wirklichkeit zugleich Erkenntnistätigkeit und höchstes Erkenntnisobjekt ist.
442
beings, [...] he recognizes that he is the first cause of being for all things.8
and little later, 164:
InMet. Λ 7 and 9 noesismeans the actual intuitive knowledge, which in the di-
vine intellect, i. e. in the first principle of being, at the same time pure actuality
of being.9
F. Inciarte (1994, 21), comments on ‘actuality’:
Aristotle’s God cannot change. Otherwise he should be something which acts
in one way or another, a substance which finds itself in changing states. That
is, however, just what he is not, instead he is pure activity, so to speak, pure
action, which bears itself. The fact that he is not a substance in action but the
self-bearing pure action or activity does not imply that he ought to be conceived
as process.10
and, shortly after:
Aristotle’s metaphysics begins as ontology and attains its perfection as theory,
where, indeed, it does not have to cease as at the end of a process, as theology. It
is throughout, from its opening (principle) and its completion, always a doctrine
about substance (Ousia) as the being as such. Only that the substances . . . are
subjects of predicate qualities, while the first substance of all is its own subject,
an activity bearing itself, which required no other subject.”11
A. Kosman approaches my own position more closely arguing that when Aristotle
8 Da die göttliche Vernunft als ,reiner Seinsakt’ erste Ursache für alles Seiende ist, [...] erkennt sie
von sich selbst, wie sie erste Seinsurache von allem ist;
9 InMet. Λ 7 und 9 hat die noesis die Bedeutung intuitiver Erkenntnisaktualität, die in der göttlichen
Vernunft, dem ersten Seinsprinzip, zugleich reine Seinsaktualität ist.
10 Der AristotelischeGott kann sich nicht verändern. Dazumüsste er etwas sein, was so oder so handelt,
eine Substanz, die sich in wechselnden Zuständen befindet. Gerade dies ist er aber nicht, sondern
er ist reine Aktivität, reine, wenn man so will, Handlung, die sich selbst trägt. Dass er nicht eine
Substanz ist, die handelt, sondern sich selbst tragende reine Handlung oder Aktivität, bedeutet aber
ebensowenig, dass er als Prozess aufgefasst werden kann;
11 Die Aristotelische Metaphysik beginnt somit als Ontologie und erreicht ihre Vollendung, bei der
sie allerdings nicht wie beim Ende eines Prozesses aufhören muss, als Theologie. Sie ist aber von
ihrem Anfang (Prinzip) und ihrer Vollendung her durchgehend Lehre von der Substanz (Ousia) als
dem Seienden als einem solchen. Nur dass die Substanzen [...] Subjekte von Eigenschaften sind,
während die allererste Substanz sich selbst Subjekt ist, eine sich selbst tragende Aktivität, die keines
anderen Subjektes bedarf.
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calls the thought ‘divine’ he means to characterize the intellect as god-like and not
a god’s intellect (311). M. Bordt also takes a less traditional position of Λ 9 (141f.),
saying that the theme of the chapter is the question of why the human intellect is the
most divine of the phenomena.
For some interpreters the noesis noeseos is a narcissistic activity (J. Brunschwig,
2000, 305; cf. E. Zeller; W.D. Ross), for others it is a self-reflection without object
(K. Oehler, K. Gloy, H.-G. Gadamer). Others think that the concept of a thinking
without an object was impossible for antiquity (H. J. Krämer), while still others
place at the centre the function of living (J. G. De Filippo). For T. De Koninck
(1991, 150), noesis noeseos is neither a self-reflection nor a mere logical relation
but an activity in highest perfection, but that activity does not bring plurality or
motion into God. F. Baghdassarian sees in the pure auto-comtemplation du Premier
Moteur the causalité seulement finale (21), she interprets noesis noeseos as parfait
retournement de la pensée divine sur elle-même (339).
An old and venerable view is that God’s self-knowledge prepares the knowledge
of the world, as Thomas Aquinas said intelligendo se intelligit omnia “by thinking
himself, he thinks all things”12 an idea later picked up by F. A. Trendelenburg, and
F. Brentano. A. Kosman (2000) explained in his contribution that all knowledge
on the one side is necessarily intentional but on the other side must include an ele-
ment of self-consciousness too. Indeed, Aristotle develops this idea in Λ 9.11–9.15,
but takes care not to fall into the duality-trap, pointing out that under the specula-
tive view nous and noeton are not separated and therefore there is no intentional
relation.
So much for some points in the reception. Next, we move to the structure of the
chapter. It can be divided into four sections.13 In the first sentence Aristotle says
that he wants to discuss some aporia concerning the nous (9.1), which seems to be
the most divine thing we know of, but it is unclear how and why it is so. In the
five sentences 9.2–9.7 he explores this question, in 9.8–9.10 he offers an answer:
12 Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis Metaphysicam XII, lect. 11, Nr. 1614.
13 The division of the chapter is not controversial, F. Baghdassarian and L. Judson present the same
division.
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the nous thinks itself and “thinking is thinking of thinking.” There follow some
objections against this proposal: ordinarily knowledge is thought of as knowledge
of something other than of itself (9.11–9.15). The last two sentences introduce a
new aporia: what of the composite things we know of?
Next we shall attempt to follow the speculative sentence 9.10.
The first sentence mentions the theme, the aporia concerning the nous.
KP 22 Met. Λ 9.1 (1074b15) Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας·
In Hinsicht auf den nous bestehen gewisse Aporien; [...]
Concerning the nous there are certain aporias; it seems to be the most divine
<being> in the range of the appearing <beings>, but the conditions under which
it is such <: πῶς ἔχων>, has with it some problems.
The theme announced here obviously refers to chapter 7 passing overMet. Λ 8. This
means that after the cosmological, the speculative intention is once again leading.
After the remarks on astronomy some questions concerning the given speculative
answer to the question about being need to be raised. The origin of movement
must be a non-contingent actuality, as had been said in 6.8. Afterwards, 7.17–7.19,
Aristotle added that this non-contingent actuality is nothing other than noesis. This
means that noesis forms an opinion-based world which enables something to notice
something and being noticed by this. Here to be means {ousia← noesis→energeia
/ Doxa}. That is our state of knowledge so far. The nous and what it is aware of
are divided into two ranks according with our everyday understanding: one setting
in motion the other being moved itself.
It became clear, however, that this division is not valid for the original noesis. Noe-
sis is prior to nous. In this ‘primary’ noesis, nous and noeton are not separable
because each disappears when its counterpart disappears. Only when both are to-
gether, in an original unity, are they actual and real. The distinguishing of noesis
into nous and noeton, as into two separate beings is valid in our everyday acting,
living and thinking, it is the basis of our normal realism.
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It is not surprising, then, that Aristotle wants to revisit this unity, peculiar and dif-
ficult as it is to understand. It is not general considerations that are the reason for
the revisiting, but special grounds, namely the question of why the nous seems to
be what is most divine on earth for it is not clear why and in which way it is so.
By the standard interpretation, this question proves the chapter is about the divine
intellect. According to this view, the aporia is how and what God thinks.
S. Broadie, A. Kosman, B. Botter and, on this point at least also M. Bordt too, have
already made arguments challenging this traditional view. Here I offer my own
contribution to that effort to challenge that view. Anyone who reads the text in
Greek taking care not to allow for the distorting effects of the secondary literature,
will observe that the word ‘god’ simply does not appear in Met. Λ 9. This is in
marked contrast to the host of reports on the matter (one of the latest examples
being C. Horn, 2016, but also the new commentaries made by F. Baghdassarian and
L. Judson, 2019). We do find the superlative theiotaton, “most divine,” occurring
twice. In neither case is the word related to god (1074b16; b26): “As it seems the
nous is the most divine <being> in the range of the appearing <beings>, but the
conditions under which it is such <: πῶς ἔχων>, has some problems.” In the first
case it is the human nous that is being called “most divine”; in the second it refers
to the object of thought. Here, as in the other places, Aristotle involves the gods
in order to have a point of comparison. By pointing to traditional views about the
divine he makes more readily comprehensible to his contemporaries what he means
here by noesis. They are brought to mind of what they already take to be true in
thinking and knowledge of the gods. These opinions about the gods are examples
and points of comparison, here as well as in Met. Λ 7, which are meant to aid
understanding of what is actually intended.
Developing the sense of his question in 9.2–9.7, Aristotle raises the issue which
represents the problem common to any theological interpretation of Met. Λ. If the
nous is identified with god, we must explain why god comes to stand on the wrong
side of the systoichia, on the side of moved beings: if god is identified with the nous
he cannot be the unmoved moving cause. The theoretical considerations in 7.17–
7.19 have shown that the problem does not arise because neither the nous nor the
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noeton are the unmoved moving being, but {ousia← noesis→ energeia / Doxa}.
Otherwise, the nous would be a hypokeimenon for something, so to speak, it would
be the subject of an activity. But the noesis in the formula is without subject, because
it is a system of basic opinions. Only the factual realization of noesis has a subject,
but this question is not at issue here.
We might ask what it is that the nous is aware of. Of course it is extremely improb-
able that it is aware of nothing. If the nous is only potentially aware of something
this means that it has the faculty to be aware of something so it would be in a lower
degree than the {actuality – being}. The nous is thinking actually only when there
is something to be apprehended but then that which it is aware of ranks before itself
(9.2). The apprehended being could be the nous itself or it could be something else.
In either case the answer must exclude that the nous be changing. Concerning the
noesis, we may ask after its content. Aristotle leaves open for the moment whether
the question concerns nous or noesis (9.3). In fact, the further sentences 9.8–9.10
deal with noesis. Perhaps, he leaves open that alternative due to the use of nous and
noesis in common language. In any case, he says in his terminology that noesis is
the actuality of the nous (as seeing is the actuality of the eye). That the origin we
are searching for must be in the modus of the non-contingent actuality is explained
in 6.8.
At the beginning of chapter nine Aristotle develops some distinctions. The nous is
aware of nothing or of something; if it is aware of something, that must be itself
or something else; if something else, it is either always the same or in each case
different; the nous must be aware of that which is most divine and most honorable,
but, without itself changing.
Based on these distinctions and due to the absolute priority of the noesis, which
since 7.17–7.19 is made clear, it follows in KP 23 (= 9.10, 1074b33), that the nous
can be aware only of itself. The second half of the sentence explains the meaning
of the first part: “So then it <: the nous> is aware of itself if indeed it is the most
excellent, that means awareness3 is awareness2 of awareness1.”
This phrase is a further culmination point in Aristotle’s theoria. In it noesis is men-
447
10. From KP 22 to KP 24 in Met. Λ 9
tioned three times. The traditional comments identify two of them, the most com-
mon citation of the phrase is therefore “noesis noeseos” or “thinking of thinking,”
dispensing with the first nominative.
We must keep in mind the context of this phrase. In Met. Λ the subject is the
awareness of human beings. To introduce the awareness of animals or of gods will
lead only to anthropomorphism. We cannot speak reasonably about how gods think
or how they realize, but we can reflect very well on our own opinions about divine
awareness, which we take to be the best and purest form of such. From those we
can infer what our best human potentialities may be. By this point, we have arrived
at the speculative approach of 6.8 (KP 12) and 7.17–7.19 (KP 17) once again.
All these considerations must have to do with the leading question: on which being
is becoming based? At this point it is no longer left open whether we have nous
or noesis to speak of, because to be means – in short – noesis. It is necessary to
take into account that noesis is used three times in this attempt to give a speculative
answer to the question about being as the ground of becoming.
KP 23 Met. Λ 9.10 (1074b33–35) αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν
ἡ νόησις3 νοησεως1 νόησις2.
So then it <: the nous> is aware of itself if indeed it is the most excellent, that
means the awareness3 is awareness2 of awareness1.
Perhaps the following paraphrase will help to clarify the meaning of the phrase.
When we, humans, are aware of something or realize something in our everyday
life (= noesis3), then some node in a nexus of fundamental conceptions, distinctions
and values (noesis1) is actualized because we have the capacity to do so (noesis2).
– The nexus is the structure of our world, it is ‘the world before the world.’ This
is rightly called the best and the most divine, because it enables us to make partic-
ular experiences, providing a space, an openness to be aware of particular things
(noesis3), in so doing we are and we are actual, wirklich.
We recognize a particular thing because we have recognized it in advance as an
element, as a potentiality within a structure. In a factual state of awareness (noesis3)
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we recognize that thing as a point in the world, in noesis1. Doing so that point
becomes actual as a being, as do we ourselves as being aware of something. The
prerequisite for this process to take place is {ousia← noesis →energeia / Doxa}.
Noesis in this formula for to be is primarily noesis1 as the world-order in the whole,
but it is also noesis3, our factual realizing of that order at a certain point, where we
are aware of something.
De Anima Γ 4–6 (and especially De Anima Γ 4, 429a22–24) can help to understand
the phrase noesis noeseos noesis:
ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς [...] οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων
πρὶν νοεῖν,
the so-called nous in the soul [...] is nothing in the realm of beings actually
before it is aware <of something>
It is just that which all becoming things are striving after. The impetus which drives
the becoming thing on its path to becoming a being, ceases only when the becoming
has reached its eidos, its definite form. Reaching that is only possible through taking
its place in awareness1 and being there is the for-the-sake of all becoming, at the
end it is.
We are capable of understanding something (which is the meaning of noesis3) be-
cause we always have been in noesis1. This noesis1 has two aspects. On the one
hand noesis1 is the world which guides our life, our actions, our thoughts and deter-
mines what is false and what true, good and bad. In this way it is the non-worldly,
noetic actuality which is prior to our factual phenomenal lives. This world is the
origin and basis of our lives. We acquire it through growing into it. We act and
live along its lines, it is as if we ‘perform’ the world. This is accomplished even
if that structure is not explicitly known. This gives some plausibility to the em-
pirical approach, which says that that world is actual prior to our perceiving and
activating. The actuality of the world as structure is not, however, identical with its
corresponding worldly realization, it has so to speak a higher actuality, which was
never a potentiality.
On the other hand, this noesis is the ultimate in our factual recognizing. We know of
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it only by reflecting on and analyzing the whole set of our opinions. What is primary
in everyday life and what is primary in speculation are not the same. We begin
with noesis3, with our factual and particular awareness of something. In contrast
with this, noesis1 makes particular knowledge and acting possible antecedent to all
that.14
Aristotle raises an objection with respect to this point, that awareness is primary in
being and becoming. The objection is not a speculative one, but stems from ev-
eryday thinking. Knowledge, awareness, opinions and thoughts all have referents,
they do not refer to nothing (cf. Platon, Sophist, 237d, 262e). That which knowl-
edge, thinking etc. refer to is not the knowledge or thinking itself, but something
else. We are, to be sure, aware of our knowing, thinking, seeing. We are aware
that we know, we are aware that we see, but only incidentally, en parergo, only in
a secondary manner. Thinking, seeing, awareness are primarily intentional, object-
oriented.
Aristotle introduces a second problem (9.12–13): if the being of thinking and the
being of that which is thought of are not the same, we may ask which is prior.15 This
question is asked from the point of view adopted in 7.7, where nous and noetonwere
divided into two ranks.
We have agreed that nous is the best and the most precious we can think of. If the
nous is aware of something it is at the same time both active and passive (noein,
noesis versus noeisthai, nooumenon), it is perceiving something and is in turn af-
fected by that which it perceives. We ask, therefore, whether it is its active or its
passive side that makes it the best. Is nous the best through its being aware of some-
thing or through its being affected? The answer will show that this very distinction
cannot be made in theory. The reason for this is not that there a false conception of
nous is operative, but that nous is taken in one instance as the speculative nous in
the other as the everyday nous.
14 Cf. De Anima Γ 4, 429a10–29.
15 Οn the expressions in the dative τὸ εἶναι νοήσει, τὸ εἶναι νοουμένῳ see E. Sonderegger, 2012,
186–190.
450
Aristotle answers the question in 9.14–9.15. He says that in some cases the knowl-
edge itself is thematter, so that the distinction implied in the question is inapplicable.
That the knowledge is itself the matter can be seen in the case of craft-knowledge:
the table without hyle is at the same time its ti en einai as well as the knowledge of
it. Thus, here too Aristotle uses our everyday experience to show what he means
speculatively, just as he did earlier in the case of the orekton, as example of the
unmoved moving cause or with the gods, as examples of a singular way of life.
Now we ought to apply this in the theoretical domain. Here, the logos, the notion is
the matter as well as the knowledge of the matter. Thus, in the theoretical domain
we cannot distinguish what in everyday life we must, as has been clear since 7.17.
In noesis1 the distinction between model and application does not pertain (9.15).
Aristotle still mentions a further aporia (9.16).
How must be understood the unity of nous and nooumenon, the unity of awareness
and the matter, the unity of the three ways of noesis, if that which we are aware of is
composite? Every composition entails change, even in the case of knowledge, the
parts of a composite object of knowledge are subject to change. We know something
by going through its characteristics (hence we call it dia-noia). Could it be that all
beings without hyle are indivisible and the aporia dissolves? Within the theoretical
domain we refer to things without hyle. In this case, we may say that the noesis
mentioned in 9.10 is very readily understandable from everyday situations too.
If the nous (not the dianoia) is aware of a composite object, say of a horse, we can
say that the nous can synthesize all particular characteristics of that uno intuitu, into
one single ‘picture.’ Perhaps it would be better to say that this original, synthetic
unity that the nous provides is what enables us to experience particular composite
things.
Every being is one, otherwise there is no insight possible. Nevertheless, the being
must not be elementary, it is enough that is be synthesized. The exceptional (“di-
vine”) feature of the nous is just this synthesizing capacity. It is performing this for
us all the time and at every moment, it brings into unity anything we may encounter
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and sets it in the totality of a world, by which it becomes understandable. In this
way it continuously realizes to being-aware3 of awareness1 at all times.
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The tenth chapter, too, contains supplements.1 Aristotle returns to some as yet unre-
solved problems. It is a chapter that looks a little like the well-known doxographies,
where Aristotle develops aporias out of the existing contentions and theses. The aim
of the method is partly to formulate the issue at stake in the proper manner, partly it
is to ensure the completeness of his own presentation. The end of a book is scarcely
the right place for such aims, however. This passage must have another meaning.
Either way, Aristotle is here showing points, in which his speculation about the
question concerning the being which can be the basis of becoming, is superior to
the solutions traditionally offered on both the natural as well as the speculative side.
On the basis of his speculation there are possible answers where the others fail. Aris-
totle confronts only by implication his answer to the leading question with those of
others. He only gives his answer explicitly in a few limited cases, otherwise it has
to be found in the preceding text.
There is some consensus on the division of the chapter’s opening (sentences 1–6
= 1075a11–25). The rest of the text has been more subject to despute. D. Sedley
(2000, 336ff.) divides the following text into the section B (1075a25–b34) and C
(1075b34–1076a4). In his section B he traces criticism of other contentions con-
1 In contrast to this the editor of New Essays, 2016, 269–293, finds the chapter to have a special
objective, namely to prove that the world receives its order and unity in the sense of divine-design
from a deity, which is in the center of the universe: “The order goes back, according to Aristotle, to
a divine entity which is in the center…” This is being alleged of a text, no less, in which there is no
occurrence of the word for ‘god.’ He adds: “This deity is compared with the general of an army…”
– nowhere in the chapter does any such comparison appear. Where could it lead, when we ourselves
are taking license to make up the text we wish to comment on? – L. Judson tries to demonstrate a
tighter unit of the chapter “Aristotle endorses the view that the world contains…a unitary teleological
structure” depending on the goodness of the ‘PrimeMover.’ Also F. Baghdassarian emphasizes more
the unity of the chapter.
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cerning the first principle. Other philosophers have not succeeded in drafting a
distinct account of the function of the good in the cosmos. Section C shows that
they fail to make an account of the unity of the cosmos. – After a short introduc-
tion (1075a25–28) H. Carvallo (1966) discerned the criticism of a false conception
of material and goal (1075a28–1075b16). Thereafter, he wrote, Aristotle criticizes
others that they did not offer any explanation of how coming to be took place.2
It seems, in this way, that it is not very easy to arrange Aristotle’s disparate notes
into any semblance of perfectly defensible order. L. Judson and F. Baghdassarian
have tried to show this at some points very plausibly but both supposing as a matter
of course a ‘Prime Mover’ in their arguments which is never mentioned in the text.
At the beginning (10.1–10.5) we do read how the “nature of the whole” contains
the good, the rest is clearly intended as a criticism of those who take it “otherwise.”
We must, first of all, clarify the meaning of the thesis and formulate it in plain
language, because Aristotle is speaking here only in the form of rhetorical questions,
figuratively and through comparisons. Next, we must ask what the precise sense of
“otherwise” in 10.8 may be, and to what it refers. Finally, we need to get at the
meaning of the different sets of criticism and appreciate how the criticisms do not
affect Aristotle’s theoria in its speculative and its cosmological aspect.
Let us begin from the least disputed opening point. The introductory question seems
to be clear:
KP 25 Met. Λ 10.1–10.2 (1075a11–13) Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου
φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ’
αὑτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν. ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα;
KP 25 (1) We have to consider also in which of the two ways the physis of the
whole has the good and the best, whether as something separated and <as a being>
itself by itself or as the order <of its parts>.
(2) Or in both ways like an army?
It seems that Aristotle tends towards the second interpretation: the whole contains
the good in the way that the army has its order due to the good leader. This is main-
2 The division in: H. Carvallo, E. Grassi (ed.), 1966, is made by H. Carvallo.
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tained on the basis of the principle that “all is ordered towards one goal” (10.5). That
principle is explained by the simile of the household, where all things are ordered
towards one goal too. It is by this simile that we ought to understand the principle.
To what the introductory question refers and how we ought to understand the phrase
“the good and the best,” are questions that need attending to. Both, W.D. Ross
(1924), and D. Sedley (2000), L. Judson (2019), F. Baghdassarian (2019, 350, with
slight qualification: ne sésigne pas uniquement le Premier Moteur) unhesitatingly
relate the expression to God.3 In their view the introductory question asks how God
can be the source of all the good in the world. – In this form the question is close to
a Platonic statement. In the Republic Plato had declared the good to be the ground
of being and knowledge through the series of similes of the sun, the line and the
cave.
It is astonishing that Aristotle should pose the question of the good, for the idea of
the good has no special priority amongst his topics. He took up the question about
being in the Sophist but did not the question of the good from the Politeia or from
the so-called Unwritten Doctrine. He mentions Plato’s famous lecture On the good,
but makes no use of it in his argument. Here, in Met. Λ 10.1, we however discover
that question concerning the good. In Topics Γ he did also discuss the question of
how we are able to decide to choose the better.
Plato said the idea of the good is epekeina tes ousias, “beyond being.” Its counter-
part inMet. Λ as ground of being and knowledge is the {οὐσία← noesis→ἐνέργεια
/ Doxa}. What sets in motion and sustains motion is the striving to be and to be-
come actual (: to attain Seins-Wirklichkeit) in the noesis, in perceiving and being
perceived. The particular being becomes actual in a noesis3 due to our noesis2
guided by the noesis1. But this noesis1 is already actual before the particular noe-
sis3, like a ‘world before the world.’ The for-the-sake of becoming is to be and that
is the good for the thing becoming but the being of a particular thing becomes inte-
grated in a whole (9.17 at the end), in a world, which is in fact noesis1. Every single
3 F. Baghdassian, 350: …ne désigne pas uniquement le Promier Moteur; L. Judson, 340, sees as the
main theme in chapter 10 “The Priority of The Prime Mover and the Unity of the Cosmos.”
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thing is oriented towards this noesis1 (10.5), in this consists the unity of everything
(ἓν τὸ ὄν) and inasmuch the good.
Besides other possible connections, the introductory question does certainly stand
in clear relation to the final sentence of the preceding chapter. There it was said that
the First, being without hyle, cannot be divided. Even for the human intellect it is
not the concrete particular which is its good and best, but the whole, more so even
than the system as such, noesis1 (1075a10). If the question in 10.1 is linked with
9.17 then it is asking how the system can be realized in the “nature of the whole.”
This question must be understood in the same sense as the question about transition
from the noetic to the material world.
H. Bonitz (1849, 518), thought that the section 1074a11–25 is to be read in close
connection with chapter 9, the nature of the first principle and its relation to the
world being their common subject. Aristotle offers two answers. The good is in the
world as it is in the army, so it follows from the principle “all things are oriented
toward one goal.” This principle is exemplified by the household. Every thing
stands in relation to every other thing (10.4). That is clear if being as noesis1 means
the order of the world, that is a totality of relations. The order of the world is not
a random relation of things or groups of things, no, all things, as has already been
said, are ordered towards one goal just as in a household all persons are.
In this sentence, 10.5 at the end, there are some difficulties as concerns the grammar
and the content of the expression “their nature is such a principle.” D. Sedley (2000,
330), translates: “For that is how (universal) nature works as a principle for each
thing in the cosmos.” He takes “nature” to be the nature of theworld on thewhole, H.
Bonitz thought that “nature” refers to the particulars (ipsarum rerum singularum).
In the interpretation of D. Sedley (2000, 333), the example of the household shows
that one unique nature orders all things at different levels of freedom according to
their different contribution towards one goal, while for H. Bonitz the nature of the
particulars is such as to contribute to the whole. Grammar and syntax support of
H. Bonitz’ view, sense that of D. Sedley. In summary we may say that Aristotle
here calls the arche ‘the good,’ as he had already done in 9.17 and that thereby
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he is referring to the {being–actuality} in 6.8 and, according to 7.17–7.19, to the
expanded form {ousia← noesis →energeia} which is the formula for the overall
order providing and ensuring the pros-hen-structure.
The pros hen tetaktai is the predecessor of the later to on pollachos legetai – alla
pros hen. This hen, called prote ousia inMet. Z and elsewhere, has now reached its
speculative interpretation because it was said that to be only becomes actual in noe-
sis. By this alone does an undetermined thing enter in the noesis, i. e. into the nexus
of a world, which is the order and the ‘structure of a totality of a set of opinions’
(Struktur eines Meinungsganzen) and this gives the thing its determinations.
In 10.7 Aristotle mentions the problems that philosophers, who wish to explain that
“otherwise” encounter. To what is the word “otherwise” referring? Does it mean
“otherwise than explained in 10.1–10.6” while referring to the “good in nature” (as
D. Sedley thinks), or does it mean “otherwise than the theoretical result of Met.
Λ”? The latter would imply that to be would have to be captured otherwise than by
the formula {ousia← noesis→energeia / Doxa}. Perhaps, alternatively these two
possibilities coincide, so that the explanations in 10.1–10.6 are only another formu-
lation of the theoretical result? Perhaps again, it could mean “otherwise than the
cosmological result of Met. Λ.” Such are some possibilities for understanding the
“otherwise” with respect to that which precedes it. In whichever case, the sequence
of the text shows that Aristotle has in mind to speak of the fundamental structure of
becoming.
Aristotle deals with the same issue in other texts too, e. g. inMet. A or in Physics A
and in Met. Z. Finally, it bears comparison with the issue discussed in Met. Λ 1–3
and that may be decisive. If the beginning of the book had correctly established the
context, then Aristotle asks at the end of the book, what has been the outcome of the
whole speculation (cf. above, Part III, 5.2.2). Indeed, the sentence relates to Met.
Λ 1–3, insofar as it deals with the question about the becoming of natural beings.
Further, while he mentions the good, he demonstrates that he wants to give account
not only in the natural domain but in the speculative as well.
Aristotle briefly outlines his concept of becoming (10.7–10.12). He takes as starting
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point the consensus that becoming takes place in oppositions (10.8). Against other
thinkers he argues that it is not right to make the hyle into one of the opposites
(10.11), in fact the hyle is a third factor with the pair of opposites (10.10). The
pair of opposites cannot initiate becoming, because neither can set something in
motion and they do not change themselves, the warm does not become cold by
itself and so on. Next (10.13–10.14), he describes the problems which would arise
if his concept of becoming is rejected. In the following two sentences Aristotle
asks certain questions in reference to the exposition in 10.1–10.6, the consensus
mentioned and to the leading question in 10.7–10.12. It seems that these questions
only form a series without any further connection. As he changes his point of view
without providing reasons – some problems are theoretical, others are put from the
natural point of view – the impression is made that the different points are made
only pro memoria.
The following sentences, from 10.13 until 10.23 (or until 10.25), seem to refer di-
rectly to the question in 10.1, they deal with the question of the good. If all things
come to be out of opposites without the hyle as the third then all (except the one)
partake of the bad, because the bad is on the one side of the row of opposites (10.13).
That Aristotle points to the one suggests that he may have in mind the Academic
theory of principles, by which the one and the undetermined duality are principles.
In that case his remark is a criticism, but if the opposition between good and bad
were the same as that between eidos and steresis then Aristotle himself must agree
on that negative consequence since all things partake in steresis.
That Aristotle accepts as self-evident the principle “in all <beings> primarily the
good is principle” (10.14) is surprising since it is of Platonic origin. Aristotle uses
it to criticize those who accept neither the good nor the bad as principles. We must,
consequently, assume that he agrees with this principle. I do not know of other
places where Aristotle makes use of this principle, though two applications of its
basic premise are discernible. One of them is in the Nicomachean Ethics A, where
the point at issue is why we act and what we are striving for. All striving is oriented
towards the good, therefore we are ultimately striving for that which is good in itself,
quite in contrast to all other goals after which we strive, which are for for the sake
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of something else.
In the concept of telos and of the for-the-sake-of, we trace a second argumentative
application of the good. If B is why we are doing A, then B is the telos and the good.
InMet. Λ Aristotle has shown that to be in the sense of {ousia← noesis→energeia
/ Doxa} is the unmoved moving cause, the for-the-sake of becoming and as such
the good. The remarks about the deficiencies of the thesis of the opposition between
the good and the bad (10.13–10.23) thus may be referred to the theoretical result in
Met. Λ.
How and why, however, does the theoretical result inMet. Λ depend on the correct
understanding of becoming defined by two opposites and hyle as third? To be clear,
Aristotle has achieved the speculative result by asking after the first and after that
being which is the basis for becoming. The analysis of becoming in Met. Λ 1–5
provides the basis for the speculation. The distinction of two modes of becoming
is at the core of that analysis. The becoming of concrete things is quite different
from the transition from the noetic to the concrete being. Becoming is, in any case,
the change from steresis to eidos which takes place upon an underlying hyle. If this
basis is withdrawn the speculation cannot attain its goal.
Platonists agree with the sentence that “in all <beings> primarly the good is prin-
ciple” but they fail to say how or in which sense the good is principle. The Pla-
tonic idea of the good will scarcely be a cause in the sense of causa materialis,
formalis, finalis or efficiens. Instead, Plato’s idea of the good is rather something
like Aristotle’s τὸ πρῶτον ὅθεν ἔστι, γίγνεται καὶ γιγνώσκεται, “the first from
where something is, comes to be and can be recognized.”
When Aristotle criticizes Empedocles or Anaxagoras, he has in mind the inconsi-
tencies or incompleteness of their concept of cause, but not their general aim.
KP 26 Met. Λ 10.24 (1075b13) καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ’ ἄφθαρτα οὐδεὶς λέγει·
[...]
and no one says why some are perishable but others not; [...]
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Sentences 10.24 and 10.25 can be assigned differently. When Aristotle says ‘no
one says’ is he referring only to Empedocles and Anaxagoras or also to the pantes
of sentence 10.23? The historical perspective is of no importance for us at this
moment. The sentence refers to those who declare that the causes are the same for
the becoming of all things, with the result that they can offer no reasons why some
beings are perishable while others imperishable. Others too, who say that the being
comes to be out of non-being and others that all is the same, find themselves on the
wrong side. That may constitute part of the foregoing criticism, which refers to the
fact that they name only two archai (1075b14), but it may also form the opening of
his treatment of the topic he will deal with in 10.26, namely ‘becoming.’ That is
said in the sentences 10.26 and 10.28 as the next key propositions:
KP 27 Met. Λ 10.26 (1075b16–17) ἔτι διὰ τί ἀεὶ ἔσται γένεσις, καὶ τί αἴτιον
γενέσεως, οὐδεὶς λέγει.
Further, no one says, why there always will be becoming and which is the cause
of becoming.
KP 28 Met. Λ 10.28 (1075b20–21) καὶ τοῖς μεν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῆ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ
τιμιωτάτῃ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναί τι εναντίον, ἡμῖν δ’οὔ.
While for others there is necessarily something that is the opposite of wisdom
and of the most valuable knowledge, there need not for us.
If we take 10.1–10.7 as introduction (“In what way is the good in the world?”) and
10.8–10.12 as report of the established consensus (“All beings come to be out of op-
posites”), combined with the criticism of its inadequacy (the third which underlies
the opposites is missing), then 10.13–10.23 may be the report of the insufficiency of
the opposite-claim with respect to the understanding of the good, and 10.24–10.27
the report of the insufficiency of the opposite-claim with respect to the understand-
ing of becoming. Finally, sentences 10.28–10.29 deal with the consequences of the
opposite-claim for knowledge.
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KP 29 Met. Λ 10.30 (1075b24–25) ἔτι εἰ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἴσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται
ἀρχή καὶ τάξις καὶ γένεσις καὶ τὰ οὐράνια, ἀλλ’ αἐὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, ὥσπερ
τοῖς θεολόγοις καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πᾶσιν.
Further, if there was nothing beside the perceptible <beings>, then there would
be neither a principle nor an order nor a becoming nor the heavenly beings, but
<there would be> always a principle of a principle, as <in fact> all theologians
and natural scientists <must assume>.
With 10.30–10.38 Aristotle opens a new theme. He is asking after the consequences
when there is nothing other than the perceptible beings. This question corresponds
to the fourth aporia in Met. B (995b14ff. and 997a34ff.), which is one of the most
fundamental questions in the whole ofMet. The chapter concludes with the question
of the cause for unity (10.39–10.41).
KP 30 Met. Λ 10.39 (1075b34–36) ἔτι τίνι οἱ ἀριθμοι ἓν ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ
ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲν λέγει οὐδείς· οὐδ’ ἐνδέχεται εἰπεῖν, ἐὰν
μὴ ὡς ἡμεῖς εἴπῃ, ὡς τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖ.
Further, whereby numbers <are> a unity, or the soul and the body, and generally
the eidos and the thing, no one tells us something <about that>; and it is not
possible <for them to say something>, unless one speaks as we <have said>,
namely that which sets in motion produces <that unity>.
These considerations link with the preceding ones about the ideas. In 10.31 already,
Aristotle had referred to the numbers, in 10.40 he takes up the question again. It is,
however, a different topic when one asks after the reason why numbers, soul and
body and the nature of a thing and the thing, in general, are one.
Certainly, the tenth chapter is the last of the whole book, but it has not the usual
form with a summary of results. It does show that the speculation carried out in this
book can provide answers to the leading question in both directions: in the natural as
well as in the speculative sense. To understand the chapter it will be pivotal to take
a perspective on it compatible with that which precedes it. This is possible when
we see why the theory of Met. Λ has no problems with the good as mentioned in
10.13–10.23, or with becoming (10.24–10.27), knowledge (10.28–10.29), the non-
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sensual (10.30–10.38) or with unity (10.39–10.41). Next, I shall attempt to show
that this is the case.
Ad 10.13–10.23: There are no problems with the good because to be in the sense of
{ousia← noesis→energeia / Doxa} has proven to be the good in the sense of the
for-the-sake of becoming, as such it is that which sets in motion unmoved itself; this
applies on the level of the singular beings as well as on the level of the whole.
The theoria has shown that being (Sein) is the good and the arche without contrary
and the unmoved moving cause. The remark in 10.21, that “medicine is somehow
health” can be understood by means of the difference between the theoretical and
the natural objectives of knowledge. Medicine as totality and system of a certain
knowledge corresponds to the speculative view of noesis1, theoretically, medicine
is already health. Under the natural aspect, medicine leads to health. Becoming
healthy is a process the telos of which is health. Insofar as health is a physical state,
health is something other than medicine.
The mention of Anaxagoras’ nous in 10.20 is also instructive. The nous sets other
things in motion such as Plato’s demiurge, the Judeo-Christian creator or the men-
tioned physician do. That is the perspective in the natural mode, not in the theoret-
ical. By the theoretical approach we cannot speak of such setting in motion. The
particular noesis3 as an activity of knowledge or thought has no priority (even if it is
the most important act in our everyday life), but in the theoretical sense the noesis1
is prior and that allows us to have our particular noeseis. On the other hand noe-
sis1 is not something like an objective whole, in principle the same for all humans
for all times, something like I. Kant thought was pure reason and intellect. On the
contrary, noesis1 has grown up as a world of opinions and can be discerned as a
structure through analyzing a given world of opinions (Meinungswelt).
Ad 10.24–10.27: The questions about the eternity of movement and the causes of
becoming which arise in the context of becoming can be answered if we apply the
set of the four causes, the ether as the hyle of the heavens and the four elements that
account for the difference between perceptible eternal and perceptible finite beings
(that was the tenth aporia in Met. B, 996a2–4). The eternity of becoming becomes
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understandable through noesis1 by the theoretical approach, in the area of natural
beings through the sphere of the fixed stars.
Ad 10.28–10.29: W.D. Ross, ad loc., says that it is “[...] a curious and difficult
passage [...]”; he tries to explain it on the basis of the Platonic opposition between
knowledge and ignorance with respect to being and non-being (he refers to Rep.
477–478). The primary form of knowledge has no opposite, because it is a knowl-
edge of the first principle (i. e. knowledge of god in the view of W.D. Ross), which
evidently has no opposite principle.
But what is the sense of “opposition” here and what does it mean that there is no
opposite to the first? There is no opposite to ousia or to the first (cf. Cat. 5, 3b24–
32). Opposition can mean that nothing stands intermediate between two values,
like there is nothing between even and odd numbers or that there can stand medially
some value, such as between black and white. Aristotle says (1075b21–22) that the
opposition requires hyle, but the first is without hyle. What does this mean, does it
mean that any first thing will have no opposite or that only the first as seen in Met.
Λ will have no opposite? The knowledge without an opposite which is at issue here,
must be seen in the context of the aporias 2 and 3 inMet. B, 995b6–13 and 996b26–
997a33 and of Met. E 1 too. In aporia 2 it is asked whether it is the matter of one
and the same knowledge to deal with the principles of ousia and with the general
principles of proof. In aporia 3 it is asked whether there is a single knowledge of all
ousiai or many different forms of knowledge of the different ousiai. I list in Table
11 the points by which the first cannot be said to have an opposite.
What does it mean that there is something (or nothing) opposite to the first knowl-
edge or to the knowledge of the first? In Met. Λ Aristotle, using theoria as method
(in contrast to dianoia and also to logismos), aims at a knowledge of the first to
which there is no opposite; he leads us through speculation to see this first in that
and how synthesis is possible.
Ad 10.30–10.38: By speculation a non-perceptible being, Sein, has been shown,
which I have tried to grasp in the formula {ousia← noesis →energeia / Doxa}.
This is connected with aporia 4, that is with the question of whether or not there
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– The knowledge we are searching for relates to ousia; there is no op-
posite to ousia;
– ousia is the first about-what: this determination is right and neces-
sary but not sufficient (see Met. Z 3);
– ousia is the result of the interaction of the opposites upon the hyle,
consequently it is not itself an opposite, but ousia incorporates the
opposites (see Categories 5, 4a10–b18);
– ‘being’ as primary in the sense of noesis noeseos noesis has no op-
posite;
– if we presume that the first in the sense of being has an opposite, what
could that be, could it be non-being? The ‘first’ and ‘something else’
would be a contrast that would occur at the hyle, but on the level of
the first there cannot be something else;
– in Cat. 11, 13b36, Aristotle says that “the bad is contrary to the
good, in fact necessarily.” There is, then, a difference between the
good as the first without an opposite and the good with the bad as its
opposite;
– oppositesmust be in the same genus (seeCat. 11, 14a19): but neither
to on nor ousia are a genus.
Table 11.1.: The first has no opposite
is an ousia besides the perceptible ousiai. Being, Sein, is not perceptible but it has
perceptible consequences in beings. This to be is the ground of the change from
steresis to eidos, whereby beings come to be. Further, it predefines an order in the
sense of a cosmological result, so it is the ground of ta ourania. On the fact that
numbers and ideas are not able to initiate motion, enough has already been said in
the text (10.31).
Ad 10.39–10.41: Owing to what are numbers, soul and body and in general the eidos
and the thing one? Aristotle’s answer is that this happens in the process of becoming
through the cause which sets in motion (to kinoun). D. Sedley (2000, 346–8), and
W.D. Ross ad loc. try to explain the point relying onMet. H 6 (which is a later text
than Λ). Form does give unity but things come to existence only through a causa
efficiens (see 1045a30–33 and b21–23).
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It is, however, also possible to derive the explanation from Met. Λ itself. That
which first sets in motion is the {being–actuality} (6.8), complemented in 7.17 with
noesis. Being, Sein, in this sense, is not a second thing beside the cause which sets
in motion, but is itself the first unmoved moving, not in the sense of causa efficiens
but as the for-the-sake of becoming. In this way it is the ground of the unity of
numbers, of soul and body and in general of eidos and thing.
In De Anima B 1, 412b4–8 we find a similar consideration. The soul is the first
entelecheia of the body. We must, therefore, not ask whether soul and body are one
nor ask in general whether hyle and that of which it is the hyle are one, because to
be one and to be are said in many ways but of both the first is entelecheia, actuality.
Here, in Met. Λ it is the actuality in the noesis, in the world. Unity is thanks to
noesis noeseos noesis. Aristotle means the same when he says hen to on.
The eidos and the being become one on their route to the cause, which first sets
them in motion and on route to the for-the-sake-of, to the noesis. This, again, is
a speculative sentence, it must not be taken in a realistic manner. There are not
separate particular eide and things which later become a unity, but to be is the unity
(hen to on), insofar as any particular perception realizes a point in a comprehensive
structure, that is in a world. In a factual state of perceiving something and being
perceived at once (= noesis3) that which is prior to this event as a system of opinions
that is as noesis1 comes to be in a phenomenal world.
Ad 10.41: At the end Aristotle quotes a passage from Homer’s Iliad from the open-
ing of the Peira: “It is not useful when many are ruling, one single sovereign should
rule” (Iliad, B 204). Agamemnon wants to test the morale of his army after dream-
ing a dream sent by Zeus. He says that he will give up the war against Troy and
contrary to his expectation the men assent and run to the ships to sail away for home.
Athene appears to Ulysses and orders him to stop the flight. He says to the fleeing
warriors that they should fear the wrath of the sovereign, who has received his au-
thority from Zeus. He blames them, they are of little worth in either councel or
in war. They should be wary of making decisions because “It is not useful when
many are ruling, one single sovereign should rule,” he who, in fact, has his scepter
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from Zeus. So the koiranos in B 204 is not the absolute first sovereign, he has his
power from Zeus. He is not a good model for the first principle in the sense of the
divine-design reading, as for example, C. Horn among many others take it.4
It is, at any rate, a poetic figuration. The one sovereign may stand for to be in the
sense of {ousia← noesis →energeia / Doxa}, the unmoved moving noesis, the
actuality for which beings are striving.
4 C. Horn, 2016, 269.
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Part IV.
Noesis inMet. Λ and Theoria in Plotinus,
Enn. III 8
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12. Theoria in Plotinus’ Enn. III 8 and Noesis in
Met. Λ
Plotinus’ Enn. III 8 can and should be compared toMet. Λ. For this there are, in the
main, three reasons. First, Plotinus himself refers to Aristotle’s Met. Λ (among the
works of other authors, especially Plato and Parmenides) by quotation and allusion.
Secondly, both, Aristotle and Plotinus, ask the question about being. Thirdly, their
method of answering the question is that of speculation and they offer a comparable
speculative answer. The keyword of Aristotle’s answer is noesis, Plotinus’ is theo-
ria.1 Plotinus’ thesis “Everything is striving for vision” is comparable in sense with
the one that can be drawn from Met. Λ, namely, that ultimately to be only realizes
itself in the noesis.
Next, I shall elaborate on these reasons, then present Enn. III 8. From this outline
the proximity of the two texts will become clear.
First, some remarks on the allusions. For the details of the references I refer to
the table in the appendix. At the beginning of Enn. III 8, where Plotinus wants to
show that the ‘products’ of nature are products of her vision, he speaks, as Aristotle
had, of the first motionless moving (2.16-17) and uses Aristotle’s very expressions
kinoun protos and akineton. He points to this using ekeino (2.17), as did Aristotle
to the origin after which we are seeking.
Several times the Parmenidean theme of the identity of being and thinking or of
nous and noeton comes to the fore. Regarding νοῦς and νοεῖν, Plotinus says: τὸ
γινῶσκον…εἰς ἓν γνωσθέτνι ἔρχεται, “the recognizing …comes to unity with the
1 Andreas Kirchner, „Alles strebt nach Theorie“ Bemerkungen zu Plotins Konzept der Theoria, in:
Thomas Jürgasch, Tobias Keiling (eds.) Anthropologie der Theorie, Mohr Siebeck, 2017; Kirchner
tries to show that Plotinus’ theoria is the further development of Aristotle’s theoria.
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recognized” (Enn. III 8, 6. 15–17); ταὐτὸν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, “to be and to
perceive are the same” (8.8 ); ἓν ἄμφω, and 8.10 ἓν οὕτως ἄμφω, “in this way they
are a unity” (8.5-6). Plotinus also poses the question of whether the nous thinks
something or nothing, rejecting the possibility of thinking nothing with the same
argument employed by Aristotle: what then would be the semnon, the venerable, in
the nous (9.16)? Plotinus calls the nous the “most beautiful of all” (11.27), Aristotle
the “most divine of all.” Like Aristotle, Plotinus also points out that the primary for
which we are searching cannot be something that has come about out of potentiality
to reality (11.2). As an image of the reality of nous, that is of noesis, both use the
figure of life (9.33), following the Sophist 248e-249a. Both also say that the First
is the for-the-sake of everything else (Plotinus 7.15-18).
That Plotinus refers in this way to Met. Λ suggests common interest and shares
subject matter which consists in the question of being. Our description in Part II of
the background to Met. Λ and the commentary on it in Part III have shown that the
book poses the question of being and offers a speculative answer. Aristotle poses the
question of being starting from the central question in Plato’s Sophist, 242c-243e.2
Met. Λ represents an early speculative blueprint to an answer to that question,Met.
Z a later, more concrete elaboration.
Secondly, Plotinus also makes it clear at various places that his book is about being
and that he wants to show that being consists in vision, theoria. In 3.17-18 he writes:
“To be means for it <: for nature> to produce” and nature’s production is vision
(3.20-21, ἡ ποίησις ἄρα θεωρία, “so then producing is theoria”); later, referring
to this again Plotinus writes 5.1-2: “Becoming is the vision of nature.” Chapters 5
to 7 generally show that the being of the soul is vision which Plotinus summarizes
at 7.1-2: “All true beings come from vision or are vision.” That being consists in
vision also applies to what is first, 7.16: τῶν πρώτων ἐν θεωρίᾳ ὄντων, “…if the
first has its being in vision, …” .
Finally, both follow the speculative method and give a speculative answer to the
question of being. Aristotle’s speculative answer can be summed up in the famous
2 See my commentary on Met. Ζ, 2012, where this is explained in detail.
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formula noesis3 noeseos1 noesis2, which means: something can only be if it fits into
the noetic structure that constitutes a world. This noetic structure consists of basic
distinctions, concepts and values. It is something like a ‘world before the world’
comparable to what Plato is talking about in the first part of the Timaeus. The world
determines what can be, where ‘world’ here does not mean the totality of things, for
that would only repeat the common sense or scientific approach. World in this case
means the noetic order of things, it corresponds to noesis1 in Aristotle’s formulation.
A comparable speculation can be found in Plotinus’ Enn. III 8. The thesis of that
text “Everything strives for vision,” in fact, means nothing other than “everything
strives to be,” whether that be as the action of vision or as the result of vision.
Plotinus says playfully and ironically that everything is vision or is thanks to vision.
He distinguishes between vision and the seen (theoria – theorema), the vision and
its result (which is a thing or object not pre-existing). Natural beings are the result
of the vision of nature, nature itself is the result of the vision of the soul, which
itself is the result of the vision of nous. The nous is not, however, the first origin
and the ultimate first, but itself still depends upon ‘something.’ That ‘something’
is not one of the beings but stands above all beings (see end of III 8.9). It is the
δύναμις πάντων, the potentiality for everything, like the noesis1.
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13. The Long Treatise [Grossschrift] and theStructure of Enn. III 8
Enn. III 8 bears the title Περὶ φύσεως καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, On Nature,
Contemplation and the One (occasionally only cited as Peri theorias, as already by
Porphyry). Plotinus here develops the thesis …πάντα θεωρίας ἐφίεσθαι “All is
striving for vision.”1 This text is the first part of the so-called Long Treatise, the
following parts are Enn. V 8, V 5 and II 9. The text was divided by Porphyry
into these four parts, its overall subject seems to be the question about hen, unity.
Plotinus develops the question from different starting points. In III 8 he shows that
the being of nature, of the soul and of nous is vision. In V 8 he proceeds from the
difference between being and knowledge; in V 5 he argues against the idea that the
noeta are outside of the nous; and in II 9 he finally turns against Gnostic arguments.
Because Enn. III 8 is the very beginning of the whole text, we may dispense with the
presentation of the later parts, acquaintance with which is not presumed as necessary
to the understanding of the earlier section. Chapter 7 contains a summary of the
preceding chapters, fromwhich the structure of the whole text is easily inferred. The
first chapter exposes the paradoxical idea “All is striving for vision.” This thought
is, then, examined up to the fourth chapter concerning nature, in the chapters five
1 Περὶ φύσεως καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, Enn. III 8. For the Grossschrift see: R. Harder, 1937,
1–10, is the first to set together the whole text; V. Cilento, 1971, and D. Roloff, 1971, give extensive
commentaries. – For Enn. III 8 see: E. R. Dodds, 1956, 108–113; J. N. Deck, 1967; V. Cilento, 1973,
M. I. Santa Cruz De Prunes, 1979; D. O’Meara, 1993, 72–78; M. L. Gatti, 1996. – It is noticeable
that, for example, J. N. Deck, M. I. Santa Cruz De Prunes and M. L. Gatti unlike Plotinus begin with
the ‘One.’ I think that is due to the prejudice that Plotinus’ thinking is oriented entirely vertically. –
This is, of course, not the only text where Plotinus uses the concept of theoria, vision; see also Enn.
III 2, 6; V 1, 7; V 3, 10; V 4, 44 and others.
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to seven concerning the soul and in chapters 8 to 11 concerning the nous.
These clearly delineated sections of the text are based on the implicitly underlying
questions “What do being, becoming, producingmean?” Plotinus asks the questions
about producing, becoming and being in the different domain of unity (commonly
known as ‘hypostases’) and answers each of these questions with “being, viz. be-
coming, producing mean vision.”2
2 Enn. III 8, 3, 19: being is vision for nature; 3, 20–21: acting is vision; 5, 1: becoming is vision.
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In what follows I shall attempt to clarify what Plotinus understands by theoria in
the thesis “All things are striving for theoria, vision” and how being, becoming,
producing, acting mean nothing other than vision. It will be sufficient to take a
closer look at Plotinus’ approach in the case of nature. The structural principles in
the case of the soul and the nous are the same as in the case of nature where he says
that becoming in nature is the result of the vision of nature. In the approach, where
being is vision, (theoria versus theama or theorema), viewing and the viewed are
distinguished from each other.1 Since that which is seen can in turn see another
thing, this mutual relation, developed in the case of nature, can be iterated. Nature
is the vision of the soul, the soul is the vision of the nous. In this way, Plotinus is
ultimately searching for the arche: to hen and to agathon.
We shall see that Enn. III 8 is an extremely speculative text. It is far from any kind
of realistic or the like view of creation, with which it is occasionally associated.
Like any other speculative text, it is challenging. It’s sense cannot be grasped by
the usual means. Plotinus is well aware of the fact that his speculation turns our
everyday opinion and experience upside down. Thus, he says right at the beginning
of the treatise, that it is only about a “play” (1, 1) and that everybody will find his
proposal “paradoxical” (1, 8).
1 The translation with ‘object of contemplation,’ ed. Gerson, would bemisleading because it insinuates
that this object is already; but Plotinus wants to say that what will be an ‘object’ afterwards comes
to be by vision.
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14.1. The Paradoxical Character of this Sentence
The tractate Enn. III 8 begins as follows:
If we say first just playing, before we take serious, that everything strives for
vision and looks at this goal, not only the rational living beings, but also the un-
reasonable ones, and also the nature in the plants, and also the earth producing
this, and that everything reaches <the vision also>, as far as it is ever possible
for it in its nature, that thereby, however, in one case the vision and the suc-
cess is so, in another case different; one gets the truth, but another one only an
imitation and a picture of it – who could bear the paradox of this speech?2
Plotinus later expands the range application of the sentence beyond the being of
nature to action.3 This means that the principle is valid not only in the domain of
objects but also in that of our actions. Why does Plotinus emphasize his thesis so
much as “play” and “paradoxical”? The question is all the more urgent, since later
at the more earnest moments (: III 8, 6, 16) the thesis is by no means abandoned,
but all the stronger.
The question that runs through the treatise, never explicitly but always implicitly, is
“What is the meaning of the term ‘being’?” This question is not placed by Plotinus
at the beginning, as Aristotle had done in Met. Λ, but it appears clearly enough in
the answers offered, at the end of the third chapter, for example, where Plotinus
says that for nature ‘to be’ means ‘to produce’ and nature produces through vision
(“nature’s ‘producing’ (poiesis) has proved to be vision,” 8, 3, 17–23). At 8, 4,
5 Plotinus introduces nature speaking: “…what has come to be is my vision <:
2 Transl. Gerson with minor modifications: “If, before attempting to be serious, we were actually to
begin by playing and say that all things aim at vision and look to this goal, not only rational but
also non-rational animals and nature in plants and the earth which produces them, and that all things
achieve it as far as they can in their natural state, but contemplate and achieve it, some this this way
and others another way; some in a genuine manner, others by acquiring an imitation and image of it,
would anyone put up with the oddity of the statement?”
3 See III 8, 1, 15; moreover III 8, 6, 1–2 and III 9, 6, 9–10 and 37. The sentence has been associated
by R. Harder, R. Beutler, W. Theiler, 1964, 366, and M. I. Santa Cruz De Prunes, 1979, 13, with
that of Eudoxus, “Everything is striving for lust,” referring to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. K 1,
1172b10. As regards the content this reference is rather unlikely; in contrast to the sentence in the
Nicomachean Ethics Plotinus’ sentence has speculative objectives even if applicable in the context
of our actions; the vision produces what it sees, desire is directed to what is present.
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theama> …”; at 8, 5, 1, Plotinus resumes what he had been saying about nature
with “that becoming <in nature> is vision,” and, at 8, 7, 1, looking back: “That all
genuine beings are from vision or vision …is somehow clear.”
What is true in the case of nature is true all the more in the case of the soul and the
nous. At the different levels of unity (nature, soul, nous) we always find the same:
being is vision on all levels of unity.
Plotinus writing at the very beginning of the book “All things are striving for vision”
(McKenna), is offering a speculative answer to the question of being. He says that
this sentence actually means “‘to be’ means vision”, since everything strives to be,
and everything can only be by perceiving or being perceived. But saying this Plot-
inus must expect manifold other answers to the same question. After all, we ever
know what ‘to be’ means. In our everyday life we have naive and realistic opinions
about to be. As philosophers, we know many traditions and different philosophical
opinions on the subject, among which we will prefer one or the other. We might
think, for example, that to bemeans to exist or to occur as a thing in space and time
or we might conceive it, as Plotinus specifically mentions, to be composed of matter
and form (an Aristotelian concept). We might think with Plato the idea is the being,
or something else. And it is with respect to just such opinions concerning being that
Plotinus now expects us to undergo a complete reversal.
In our everyday thinking one might primarily focus on the individual as the pattern
of being and model the workings of nature on the artisan. On the one hand we see
the manufacturing craftsman, on the other the object manufactured and of the man-
ufactured object what it is made of and the shape it takes under manufacture. This
pattern of thought is based on a dualistic conception of being. Through his action,
the artisan impresses form upon the apparently formless matter. But, since matter
does itself always actually have a form this construal cannot be true. Matter and
form do not seem to be the absolutely separate domains that they were presumed to
be. If hyle and eidos were absolutely separable it would be difficult to understand
how they could become unified in the phenomenal object of fact. Through his spec-
ulation, Plotinus is attempting to overcome the fallacy of this dualism and to get at
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the unity of proper being, which is vision; a vision in which not only hyle and eidos,
but also producer and product are united.
This sentence – “All things are striving for vision” – must not be understood as if
it would say “All x are striving for being F or doing F.” That would only repeat
the customary, dualistic view of things according to which there is one thing that is
striving for something and another which is object of desire while both the desiring
and the desired are strictly distinct from each other. It is just this dualism, which
Plotinus wishes to supersede through speculative thought. ‘To strive for vision’
actually means to strive for being and, correlatively, the same means also ‘to be
the result of the vision of another being, by being the vision of that being,’ i. e. to
‘realize the vision of another as being seen,’ to be itself and to be for that other. The
vision is only secondarily the vision of another thing. Primarily, it is the realization
of the envisioning being itself. It would not match Plotinus’ intention if it were said
that nature directs itself toward the world of the body by vision. In this case, this
world of the body would be pre-existent, but Plotinus wishes to convey that natural
beings come to be through nature’s vision.
Vision is not the vision of a particular subject, it is impersonal and “everywhere.”
In III 8, 9, 26–28 Plotinus uses the beautiful image of a voice in space, which is au-
dible at every point in that space. This stands for the omnipresence of the regarding
nous:4
As when a voice echoes through loneliness or in this loneliness encounters
people < somewhere in loneliness>, if one then opens one’s ear, then this <: the
voice> at the same time communicates completely, but also not completely.5
Plotinus tries to illustrate his understanding of ‘vision’ with the image of the geo-
metrician drawing (8, 4, 8). The actual activity of the geometrician is to see his
construction in its geometric purity. He drafts on paper or in sand, to be sure, but
4 In analogy with this image he uses that of all-illuminating light, leaving aside the corporeal source
of light Enneades VI 4, 7.
5 Just as when a voice fills an empty space or human beings, too, as well as the space, in whatever
part of the empty space you place your ear you will receive the voice as a whole and yet not all of it.
(Transl. Gerson)
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the drawn result is not the actual goal because it never will be geometrically correct,
the objective sought is the thought which the draft should represent. In this way is
the vision of nature to be understood. Only, nature does not even draft, but only
regards. As nature has a vision of things, things come to be.
14.2. Nature Does not Work Mechanistically
In three steps, Plotinus tries to free us from the naive assumption that nature pro-
duces in the manner of the artisan (chapter 2). First he refers to the comparison with
the craftsman; second he analyzes the distinction between the parts remaining and
moved in an object which becomes; finally he reflects on the being of physis.
The naive idea of production is not the whole truth, even in the case of the arti-
san, writes Plotinus. For even in handicraft production, there are other things re-
quired than the craftsman and the material to produce his works. Artisans could
not actually produce colors, they would have to take them from somewhere else.
Complementary to that, we may add, even if they make colors, there would always
be something they would need to draw from elsewhere. They need something that
remains compared to what they produce. What remains is of a different kind than
what the producer otherwise needs.
The mechanistic conception has even less explanatory power in its transposition to
the process of becoming that unfolds in nature. “Nature does not lever” Plotinus
says right at the start, “it does not need hands or feet and has no need of tools to pro-
duce something.” One might well replay that that was intended only metaphorically
but even if we remove the anthropomorphizing component of the comparison, the
mechanistic contents of the simile remains and this is the real reason why natural
becoming cannot be explained by the action of the artisan. Unlike the artisan, nature
is not a subject that acts (as is also maintained by Aristotle). Nature is not visible
as actor in the various processes of becoming, which run “calmly” and “remain in
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themselves.”6
The coming into being of natural beings is also not comparable with the process by
which timber becomes a table through the work of a carpenter. Such is immedi-
ately obvious in many natural processes, like the development and growth of living
beings. Both the work of the artisan and becoming in nature require something in
themselves that is enduring and in that permanence, not in the working hands, the
productive power (dynamis) does inhere (8, 2, 14). Plotinus adds (8, 2, 15) that this
power does not require some movable element (which would be the hyle) in addi-
tion to the permanent one, because in that case the power would not be “that which
primarily sets in motion” and the “immovable in the whole” (8, 2, 17–18). That pat-
terning of an active and passive element in the process of becoming would repeat
the dualistic separation in the naive conception of an artisanal workmanship. Like
Aristotle, Plotinus does not ask what the particular things are and how they come to
be in a scientific sense.7 He is asking in what their unity does consist. Ultimately,
then, it is a matter of understanding what constitutes the unity of the particular be-
ing. When we would say – with Aristotle – that the synholon consisting of eidos and
hyle is the unity for which we are looking, that is only an assertion, no explanation,
an assertion for which we could still ask for justification.
Even such things as tables or shoes do not take their unity from the external manip-
ulations of the artisan, but from the idea, from the form, its purpose and the like,
in other words from everything that guides and determines the action of the artisan.
The closer the artisan approaches the result the closer the object nears its end and the
more it is. This is the becoming with which Plotinus is concerned. We can easily
understand that it is correct to say that an artisan ‘sees’ or has a vision of how his
work is coming nearer and nearer its objective.
In the end, the work produced converges with the craftsman’s guiding idea. At the
same time, it becomes the looked at, the seen. In his producing the craftsman is that
6 Enn. III 8, 4, 5; 5, 25 with reference to the soul.
7 Quite differently e. g. J. N. Deck, 1967, 3: “Contemplation is thus productive – productive of con-
crete, substantial realities”, or 111: “Both of them <sc. nous and Nature> are genuine efficient
causes of the real sensible world.”
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which is having the vision, while his table, his shoe or given product is that which is
looked at. In this process both are. In working he realizes his vision: his table, his
shoe is the result of the vision. The table’s becoming is a ‘coming into the artisans
vision.’ The result of the vision and the having the vision both become what they
respectively are through that very vision.
The logos is what remains (8, 2, 19) and nature, Plotinus continues, is nothing other
than this. Nature must be eidos too (8, 2, 22), but not itself comprised “of hyle and
eidos.” Plotinus explains this with an example (8, 2, 25-27). How does hyle, for
example, become fire? It could scarcely happen that way that fire would be added
to hyle. That would presuppose the existence of fire in the natural sense. But that is
exactly that what is asked after. Hyle becomes fire in such a way that the logos of
fire is “added” to the underlying indefinite hyle.
What Plotinus says here, relying on the example of an element, can and must be
applied to any thing. In this way, nature is the logos which conveys itself to the
hypokeimenon, but itself remains what it is (29-30). The logoi are what actually
“produce” (28), i. e. they turn the ‘something becoming’ into ‘something being.’
The logos is and operates in different ways. In one sense, it is in the manner of
permanent priority, but also in the changing outer visible form (31). In this form,
however, it is “dead” and cannot produce anything else. As being-in-advance, how-
ever, the logos does have the power to produce.
14.3. The Iteration of the Relation “Viewing – Viewed”
The becoming of natural beings is founded in nature’s vision, but nature’s vision is
not the absolute beginning, so what does precede it (Enn. III 8, 3)? Plotinus dis-
tinguishes between a logos which is strong enough to remain in itself and another
logos which turns outwards. If nature, as logos, could remain entire unto itself and
could thus be nothing other than vision alone, then nature would be the total vi-
sion of every natural being, it would be its (immaterial) embodiment, so to speak.
Without hyle, it would be that which remains. Real nature is too weak to do so,
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it turns outwards and strives to be actual also in hyle which seems to be more but,
in fact, is less. The thesis that nature is “too weak” would mean that nature could
not sufficiently maintain its unity. It produces external beings because nature is too
powerless to keep its vision to itself and anthropomorphically speaking, we might
say nature were not satisfied with the mere vision.
What nature beholds, then, becomes natural beings, “falling out” from the pure vi-
sion (8, 4, 10). Natural becoming is, in principle, nature’s vision but insofar as
nature produces anything else it is only a secondary vision. This secondary or im-
perfect mode of vision is emanation. Emerging is essential for being (Sein), but that
emergence can take place in different ways.
Nature is already a thought (: logos, 8, 2, 29; 8, 3, 11), thus to be means for nature
“to have a vision,” a vision that “goes outward.” Nature is indeed vision but not the
absolute beginning of vision. It is itself already a result, namely the result of the
vision of the soul. Nature is, at the same time, a seeing and a seen (3, 17; Schau
und Geschautes). As vision, nature produces, in being viewed, it is a product of
the soul. What is seen by nature in its vision are the natural beings. In this context
Plotinus employs the already mentioned image of the geometer, who also looks at
his drawing, but in his thoughts does not mean the drawing at all, but the geometrical
facts.
Because physis is both, viewing as well as viewed we may ask whose vision it is
the result of. There is an iteration, then, of the distinction between what is seeing
and what is being seen. In what follows Plotinus considers the soul and the nous in
the light of this distinction. In the vision of the soul, the seeing and the seen attain
a higher unity than is possible in the vision of nature.
On the occasion of the discussion of the vision of the soul, Plotinus explains the
being of the soul as menein, proienai and epistrephein (: to remain in itself, to
emerge, to return to itself). It is entirely in these three moments that the vision of
the soul consists: More still, that is the very notion of being or to be. The being
of the soul as theoria is the subject of chapters 5 to 7. As moments of theoria,
Plotinus mentions menein and proienai in 8, 5, 11-17 and epistrephein in 8, 5, 35.
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These three moments of being must not be understood as three things or as periods,
epochs or levels of a being. They do not evolve one after the other, but they are
untemporary and wholly together, as the figures in a picture are present together.
Being takes place at once (untemporary) by remaining, proceeding and reverting
to itself. These three factors cannot be captured with the image of the life-cycle
of a butterfly, as the larva, caterpillar, imago, butterfly. For, in each moment of
being, the being (Sein) of any being (Seiendes) is determined by the three factors at
once. In each individual moment of its temporal unfolding this trinity constitutes
the unity of the being. Whatever something may be, it resides within the frame of its
concept or essence. Becoming and stepping out of essence into existence, however,
it realizes this essence and comes into itself precisely through this realization.8
Such considerations apply to an even greater extent to the nous, which as a system,
is the unity beyond time. We have, then, to ask again whether the nous is the first
vision or is itself viewed by something “prior” to it (8, 9, 1–6). Plotinus answers
that the “potentiality of all beings and the power to view all beings” (δύναμις τῶν
πάντων) is prior to the nous (8, 10, 1).9
The expression is reminiscent of Aristotle’s formulation in De Anima, Γ 8, 431b20,
Νῦν δέ, περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαντες, εἴπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ
ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα.
Now, to sum up what has been said about the soul, let us once again say that
the soul, in some way, is all beings.
The soul is, in a certain way, all beings, because it can take all eide in itself and,
through this, it can recognize and see all things.
If we reverse the logic of the realists, according to which the soul is only capable of
seeing what is factual retrospectively and we ask on what basis the soul be capable
8 See e.g. E. Sonderegger, 2004, in the commentary on Proclus’ Stoicheiosis theologike, on paragraphs
25-39.
9 δύναμις is used deliberately in its double sense of ability or possibility to be all and the power to
produce all by view; we find the same formulation only in Damascius Περὶ ἀρχῶν.
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of this, we will be compelled to reply that the soul is able to do this on the basis of
an aptitude or a disposition. That aptitude of the soul to recognize anything in our
world derives from its already having seen in advance and its possession of a basic
grid of the world, an order, which enables it to grasp and classify any given object
in its respective world. That is not far away from the vision which Plotinus calls
theoria. Aristotle continues in De Anima:
ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δ’ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ
δ’ αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά· πῶς δὲ τοῦτο, δεῖ ζητεῖν.
For, the beings are either perceptible or conceivable, but knowledge is in a
certain sense the known, the perception the perceptible; how that <is possible>
that is what we have to ask.
Aristotle points to the reciprocal influence of basic patterns and particular experi-
ence.10
Of course the realistic view of the statement that perception is somehow the per-
ceptible is correct too, only it is incomplete. For it gives only the ex post and does
10 Due to its major importance I cite too the sentences that follow, Aristotle, De Anima, Γ 8, 431b21–
432a3:
τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἡ μὲν δυνάμει
εἰς τὰ δυνάμει, ἡ δ’ ἐντελεχείᾳ εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ
αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταὐτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ‹τὸ›
ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ ‹τὸ› αἰσθητόν. ἀνάγκη δ’ ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἴδη εἶναι. αὐτὰ
μὲν δὴ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος· ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ
ἡ χείρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος
εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν.
Knowledge and perception are divided as the things they have to do with,
the potential <knowledge or perception> in the potential <state of affairs>,
the actual in the actual; the soul’s ability to perceive and to understand is
potentially the same, one that is to be understood the other that is to be
perceived. They must be either the things themselves or their eide. Clearly
not the things themselves; for it is not the stone which is in the soul, but its
eidos; therefore the soul is like the hand; for the hand too is a tool for tools,
and the nous is the eidos eidon <: form for forms> and the perception is
the form for the perceptible.
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not take into account that which is prior to it. If that were the complete and correct
answer to the question about our possibilities for knowing and perceiving, then we
would have nothing more to ask, but this is exactly what Aristotle invites us to do.
What we have to ask about is the way – hard to see – in which we would be able to
‘learn’ a world (we learn how to behave and to act in a world), when we can only
do so because having one and already inhabiting one.
With δύναμις τῶν πάντων, which stands above the nous, Plotinus points to the to
hen, to unity (10, 1). He uses the similes of the source without origin, the roots of a
plant, to give an idea of what he means and brings us here to a second speculative
point in inverting the priority of actuality and potentiality. The “potentiality of all
beings and the power to view all beings” (δύναμις τῶν πάντων) beyond the nous is
the potential for a vision without subject, the vision prior to anything at all, before
even a viewer.
14.4. Being is Vision – but, what is Vision?
We conclude these reflections with some considerations about the question of what
is meant by ‘vision’. – The word might primarily evoke the everyday action of
seeing in general, but Plotinus transforms it into specific term. Everyday seeing
always refers to seeing some object which is independent of the person seeing it.
Seeing always proceeds from a subject, even if seeing should reflexively refer to
the subject itself. Plotinus’ vision is not of this kind. His vision does not refer to
vision of anything else, for such does not yet exist, as long as everything receives
its being only from vision. This form of vision is not intentional it does not depend
upon a particular seeing subject. It cannot be translated with ‘somebody is seeing
something.’
Plotinus’ intuition “being is vision” contrasts with other conceptions of being which
he demonstrates to be secondary of insufficiently thoroughgoing, in that they all
presuppose a world in which they can be asserted. Anyone who wishes to consider
them thoroughly must consider their world, the fundamental distinctions through
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which the assertions become sense and can be true or false. This world is not a thing,
not a being, but an order and nothing else, an order of fundamental distinctions,
concepts and values. This order is easily, but only metaphorically, demonstrable as
a vision.
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In addition to Plotinus’ command to understand being as vision, I would propose
another suggestion. Some interpreters think that in Enn. III 8 Plotinus is debating
with Plato’s Timaeus. The reason for thinking so is that Plotinus refuses to use the
work of the craftsman as a model for explaining natural becoming.1 Seeing that
relationship is certainly justified. Here, however, I am trying to activate another
reference. For it seems to me that Enn. III 8 contains an interpretation of Met. Λ
and we may say, inflecting what Plotinus has said:
If someone, just playing, said that the statement that being is vision (: theoria)
was nothing other than an interpretation of Aristotle’s sentence kai esti noesis
noeseos noesis in Met. Λ, then would it be possible for anyone to accept this
paradoxical proposal?
Let us playfully scrutinize this proposal from idfferent sides. Its claim is that the
main point in Aristotle’s Met. Λ is not only the question about ousia (and this def-
initely not in the sense of substance), but that noesis too is at the core of the spec-
ulative answer to that question. As in the case of ousia, however, it has become
more and more difficult to understand what Aristotle has meant by noesis, if that is
translated with ‘thinking’ and even for the same reasons, namely because both ideas
have been pulled into the maelstrom of theology.
Following the line of interpretation of the present book and taking into account
the three mentions of noesis in the phrase kai esti noesis 3 noeseos1 noesis2 and,
finally, also assuming that noesis3 and noesis2 are not identical, then noesis3 is the
explicandum, i. e. our individual awareness, be that as perception or as thinking.2
1 See e. g. D. O’Meara, 1993, 72, and id., 1975, p. 70; L. Brisson, 1994; M. Baltes, 1976; with
reference to the ‘modeller’ Timaeus, 76c6.
2 For the traditional views of noesis noeseos noesis I refer to what is said in Part II, 2.5, as well
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Noesis1 is the world order as a whole, noesis2 our ability to realize that order in
a particular case. The sense of the phrase kai esti noesis3 noeseos1 noesis2 can
therefore be expressed in this way: In each individual becoming aware of something
we realize a node in the nexus, which is the world as an order of everything. In any
given act of vision, the being that ‘is looked at’ (metaphorically only) enters into
that order which is defined by basic terms, distinctions, values. As that ‘not-yet-
being’ enters into this world at a certain point it becomes a being, it is something as
something (es ist etwas als etwas).
In realizing that world, the viewing is and the viewed object too, being united in
vision. This is the same as to say “being is vision” and therefore all things are
striving for vision.
Both Aristotle and Plotinus discuss being, both search for the arche as the first, as
the origin of being, both give us a speculative answer. Aristotle finds the structural
fundament of the beings in noesis1, Plotinus in the ‘producing’ origin, but an origin
which ‘produces’ only by theoria. Theoria enables the becoming of things of lower
levels of unity, but only through vision, not artisanal working. The vision of a higher
unity gives rise to things of a subordinate unity.
In this realization of a ‘world view,’ the respective being has its factual reality and
its being and this, in fact, is the same as to say: “Being is vision.” Everything,
therefore, strives for vision.
as to the commentary on KP 23 in Part III. For the traditional view of the term see also the new
commentaries by F. Baghdarassarian and L. Judson, 2019.
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17. Appendix
Plotinus,
III 8
Text Met. Λ Text
Henry-Schwyzer in ed. minor
9.15-
16
νοοῦν μὲν ὁ νοῦς ἀνόητον
δὲ ἀγνοήσει καὶ ἑαυτό;
ὥστε τί σεμνόν;
1074b17-
18
εἴτε μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ
σεμνόν;
Harder-Beutler-Theiler, in the commentary
2.17 ἐκεῖνο (“unbewegter Be-
weger”!)
1072a25 ἔστι τι ὃ οὒ κινούμενον
κινεῖ
8.14–
21
νόησις – ζωή 1072b18 νόησις
1072b26
f.
καὶ ζωὴ δὲ ὑπάρχει
9.16 ὥστε τί σεμνόν 1074b17 εἴτε μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ
σεμνόν;
other things I noticed
2.17 ἐκεῖνο (: what sets in motion
primarily)
1072b15 ἐκεῖνο: what is searched in
7.15 as ἀρχή
2.17–
18
ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἔσται τὸ
κινοῦν πρώτως
1072a23–
26
τὸ κινοῦν πρώτως, τὸ
ἀκίνητον
1070b34 ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα ὡς τὸ
πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν
πάντα
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1050b3 ἕως τῆς τοῦ ἀεὶ κινοῦντος
πρώτως
Phys.,
258b4-
5
φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων
ὅτι ἔστιν τὸ πρώτως κινοῦν
ἀκίνητον
6.15-
17
τὸ γινῶσκον …εἰς ἓν τῷ
γνωσθέντι ἔρχεται
1072b21 ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ
νοητόν
7.15-
18
…καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα
ἐφίεσθαι τούτου …
1072α26 κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτόν
1072b27 ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια
8.5-6 νοῦς – ἐγνωσμένα …εἰς ἓν
ἄμφω
1072b21
8.8 ταὐτὸν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ
νοεῖν
1075a1 ἢ ἐπ’ ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ
πρᾶγμα
8.10 ἓν οὕτως ἄμφω 1072b21
9.33 νοῦς: ἐνέργεια οὖσα ἐν
διεξόδῳ
1073b26–
27
καὶ ζωὴ δὲ ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ
νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνο
δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια
10.1 ἀρχὴ διεξόδου: δύναμις
τῶν πάντων
1074b34 καὶ ἔστιν νόησις3
νόησεως1 νόησις2
11.2 Wirklichkeit – Möglichkeit 1071b12–
20
Priorität der ἐνέργεια; ἀρή:
ἧς οὐσία ἐνέργεια
11.27 νοῦς …πάντων κάλλιστον 1074b15–
16
δοκεῖ <ὁ νοῦς> μὲν γὰρ
εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων
θειότατον
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Register
is perceived, 415
perception
mutual, 418
physics
knowledge
not first, 134, 136
theoretical knowledge, 134, 135
physis, 186, 352
and ouranos
not the first unmovedmoving,
376
as for-the-sake-of, 186, 189
as principle, 185
as result of becoming, 188
Plato
Doxa, 317
no theory of ideas, 306
Politeia, 317
Sophist, 317
five highest genera, 89, 130,
135, 235, 286, 317, 333
Sophist, Parmenides, Timaeus
in Aristotle, 305
Timaeus
change of status quaestionis,
320
date, 305
its impact, 273
no creatio ex nihilo, 274
no proof of existence of god,
149
questions left, 283
story displays hierarchy, 282
text type, 281
theme: transition, 149
Timaeus - Met. Λ
text type, 281
Timaeus - Sophist
chronology, 335
content-related relationship, 335
UnwrittenDoctrine, 221, 311, 312,
322, 455
potentiality
colloquial sense, 365
modal sense, 364
pros hen, 131, 457
proton kinoun, 141, 151, 159, 161,
199, 230, 269, 284, 349, 383
question
about becoming, 225
as question of transition, 334
Theophrastus, Old Academy,
Aristotle, 226
about being, 336, 455
answer: noesis, 487
as basis of becoming, 225
change of its sense, 369
different answers, 235
empirical / theoretical, 160
first to ask, 239, 240
in Plotinus, 470, 476, 477
method, 327, 334
questions the questioner, 206
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Sophist, Met. Λ, 330
theory as method, 333
about origin
natural, analytical, 271
Plato, Sophist, 331
about origin and end, 271
about the first, 373
moving, 161
about the first as a goal, 402
about the good, 455
about transition, 334
change of direction
early dialogues, Politeia, Timaeus,
328
difference of
astronomical, theoretical, 256
in Met. Λ, 156
questions
about principles, 297
common
Aristotle and Theophrastus, 293
Timaeus, Theophrastus, Met.
Λ, 322
quotations, 380
setting in motion
first
as a goal, 396
characteristics of, 393
unmoved, 249
examples in everyday life, 394,
395
in Plotinus, 469
not in nature, 394
sophists, 133
speculation
as turn from beings to being, 382
difficulties of expression, 402
first high point in 6.8, 374
in Plotinus, 470
text as allegory, 401
standard interpretation, 21, 112
guided by presuppositions of the
Middle Ages, 205
its roots, 20
motives to keep it, 203
reasons
to reflect its premises, 208
theological
its problems, 140, 141
subsistence
not in Corp. Arist., 125
substance, 124
as individual form, 80, 85
Baumgarten, 82
connected with subject, 142
connecting points in Corp. Aris-
tot., 83
contradictory concept, 84, 86, 87
Descartes, 81
false translation of ousia, 106
for theological use, 99
history of the concept, 102
Kant, 83
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Leibniz, 82
modern concepts, 97
origin of this concept, 78, 80
Suarez, 81
subsistence, 83
threemain characteristics inmod-
ern scholarship, 83
ultimum subiectum
God, 124
sun
as first moving cause, 366
as unmoved being, 156
insufficient as first cause, 369
synthesis, 463
systoichia, 397
teleology
and nature, by Kant, 170
and subject, 175
as functionality, 272
background today
idea of a creator; idea of pur-
posiveness, 168
by Kant, 169
connection with God, 168
descriptive, 177
emergentism, 178, 179
historical development, 181
in Met. Λ, 191
in Christian context, 173
in Theophrastus, 188, 189
Kant on purposiveness as an idea,
175
modern interest, 167
prepared in the Timaeus?, 188
standard interpretation
god as telos of the world, 192
vitalism, 171
telos
function in Met. Λ, 193
with Theophrastus, with Aristo-
tle, 301
theology
a form of knowledge, 125
A’s use of the term, 125, 126
antique
modern studies in, 203
Aristotelian
impact, 203, 204
based on cosmology
De Mundo, 165
characteristics of, 143
content of Λ, 121
doubts, 21, 23
in Λ, 112
as result of reception, 114
doubts, 113, 118, 205
history, 115–118
noesis noeseos, actus purus, first
substance, 112
not content of Λ, 113, 121, 122
not mentioned in Λ, 137
not the theme of Λ, 138
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Register
object of this knowledge, 126
result of reception, 121
status in A’s philosophy, 119
term not used in Λ, 119
use of philosophy in, 139
variants of, 114, 119
Theophrastus
Metaphysics
false premises about, 214
old presuppositions, 182
theoria
as vision
is being, Sein, 475
divine and human, 404
in Lambda, 209
in Plotinus, 470, 475
in Theophrastus, 209
results, insights, 419
speculation, 30
thinking
non-assertive, 26, 29, 333
without claims, 286
without contention, 234
time
natural becoming
with beginning, 326
notion of
no beginning, 326
to be
asmenein, proienai, epistrephein,
482
means vision, 477
topical attitude, 31, 176, 225, 227–
229, 286, 327, 330, 333, 372
transition, 319, 383
from noeta to aistheta, 245, 284,
320, 321
from possibility to actuality, 190
from steresis to eidos, 382, 400
in Timaeus and Λ, 431
speculative and cosmological
view, 283
question of
Theophrastus andAristotle, 299
theme of astronomy, 429
Timaeus, 318
unity
ground of, 465
Unmoved Mover
not anAristotelian expression, 141
vision
unites hyle and eidos, 478
unites producer and product, 478
without subject, impersonal, 478
vocabulary
Parmenidean, 425
world
as noesis1, 415
before the world, 471
eternity of, 274
Philoponus, versus Simplicius,
325
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Register
noetic, natural, 277
worlds, 409, 415, 419, 422
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